The Federalist PapersPenguin UK, 30 d’abr. 1987 - 528 pàgines Written at a time when furious arguments were raging about the best way to govern America, The Federalist Papers had the immediate pratical aim of persuading New Yorkers to accept the newly drafted Constitution in 1787. In this they were supremely successful, but their influence also transcended contemporary debate to win them a lasting place in discussions of American political theory. Acclaimed by Thomas Jefferson as 'the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was written', The Federalist Papers make a powerful case for power-sharing between State and Federal authorities and for a Constitution that has endured largely unchanged for two hundred years. |
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... executive, legislative and judicial functions of government to reside in separate hands. It was Montesquieu who was cited by the authors of the Federalist, by Hamilton in No. 78 and by Madison in No. 47, where he referred to him as “the ...
... executive, legislative and judicial functions of government to reside in separate hands. It was Montesquieu who was cited by the authors of the Federalist, by Hamilton in No. 78 and by Madison in No. 47, where he referred to him as “the ...
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... executive, and judiciary offices shall be kept forever separate.” 49 His own formulation could be found in Federalist No. 47: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be ...
... executive, and judiciary offices shall be kept forever separate.” 49 His own formulation could be found in Federalist No. 47: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands... may justly be ...
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... executive and judicial power, as they clearly had done in the recent American past. Madison contended in Federalist No. 48 that a new chapter in the history of the doctrine of the separation of powers had arrived. Previously threats to ...
... executive and judicial power, as they clearly had done in the recent American past. Madison contended in Federalist No. 48 that a new chapter in the history of the doctrine of the separation of powers had arrived. Previously threats to ...
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... Executive is to control the legislature.” 52 The Constitution sought most carefully to carve out a separate and independent social base for the President and thus for executive power. He was to be chosen by electors, who themselves were ...
... Executive is to control the legislature.” 52 The Constitution sought most carefully to carve out a separate and independent social base for the President and thus for executive power. He was to be chosen by electors, who themselves were ...
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... executive. Elbridge Gerry also opposed the Council of Revision because “it was the combining and mixing together of the legislative and the other departments. It was making statesmen of the judges.” James Madison, on the other hand ...
... executive. Elbridge Gerry also opposed the Council of Revision because “it was the combining and mixing together of the legislative and the other departments. It was making statesmen of the judges.” James Madison, on the other hand ...
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The Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay,Lawrence Goldman Previsualització limitada - 2008 |
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