Revisiting the Yom Kippur WarP.R. Kumaraswamy Routledge, 11 de gen. 2013 - 256 pàgines Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history. |
Des de l'interior del llibre
Resultats 1 - 5 de 88.
Pàgina 8
... decision ' had become ' noises ' for domestic and inter- Arab consumption . As Gabriella Heichal suggests , as the only centre for the evaluation of military intelligence , AMAN enjoyed the complete monopoly over the flow of information ...
... decision ' had become ' noises ' for domestic and inter- Arab consumption . As Gabriella Heichal suggests , as the only centre for the evaluation of military intelligence , AMAN enjoyed the complete monopoly over the flow of information ...
Pàgina 9
... decision ' was seen as a pressure tactic , if not blackmail , to expedite the US airlift.17 Implementation of the ' decision ' of the kitchen cabinet would not only have nuclearized the conflict but also undermined the non ...
... decision ' was seen as a pressure tactic , if not blackmail , to expedite the US airlift.17 Implementation of the ' decision ' of the kitchen cabinet would not only have nuclearized the conflict but also undermined the non ...
Pàgina 12
... decision and approved it on 5 April 1973.7 Given its vulnerability to Israel Air Force ( IAF ) deep penetration ... decisions to go to war . It nevertheless gained some information on the basis of which it could be concluded that already ...
... decision and approved it on 5 April 1973.7 Given its vulnerability to Israel Air Force ( IAF ) deep penetration ... decisions to go to war . It nevertheless gained some information on the basis of which it could be concluded that already ...
Pàgina 13
... decision - makers . The information provided by him , years before the war started , served as the basis for AMAN's estimation that Egypt and Syria would not be ready for war before 1975 . According to this source Sadat believed that ...
... decision - makers . The information provided by him , years before the war started , served as the basis for AMAN's estimation that Egypt and Syria would not be ready for war before 1975 . According to this source Sadat believed that ...
Pàgina 14
... decision after Soviet advisers promised him that if Egypt and Syria attacked Israel simultaneously , the Syrian army would completely occupy the Golan Heights in 36 hours . 18 As far as is known , the warning did not turn any red light ...
... decision after Soviet advisers promised him that if Egypt and Syria attacked Israel simultaneously , the Syrian army would completely occupy the Golan Heights in 36 hours . 18 As far as is known , the warning did not turn any red light ...
Continguts
1 | |
11 | |
Aims Coherence and GainDistribution | 36 |
The Lessons of the 1973 War | 70 |
Diplomacy of War and Peace | 104 |
The Soviet Union and the Yom Kippur War | 127 |
The Israeli Political Elites and the 1973 War | 153 |
The Domestic Fallout of the Yom Kippur Wa | 177 |
Perception Image Formation and Coping in the PreCrisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War | 195 |
New Lessons | 221 |
Abstracts | 238 |
Index | 243 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Frases i termes més freqüents
according Agranat Commission air force aircraft airlift alert AMAN AMAN's American Arab Arab-Israeli Asad attack Aviv Bar-Lev Bartov battle bloc Brezhnev Cairo cease-fire Chief of Staff coalition Command conception conflict Dado decision decision-makers détente diplomacy economic Egypt Egypt and Syria Egyptian Elazar Eli Zeira elite emergency enemy failure front Golan Heights Golda Meir ground forces Harb October Hebrew Heikal Ibid IDF's initial intelligence inter-Arab Israel Israeli Air Force Israeli society Israelyan Jerusalem Jordan Kissinger leaders leadership Meir's Middle East military Minister of Defence missiles Moscow Moshe Dayan Mossad Nasser Nixon nuclear offensive operational Palestinian parties peace plans political possible President Prime Minister Rabin reservists Resolution role Sadat September Shazly Sinai situation Six Day War Soviet Union strategic Suez Canal surprise Syrian Tel Aviv territories Third Army threat troops United warning Washington Yitzhak Yitzhak Rabin Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira