cased with iron; and so convinced do naval men seem to be in France of the irresistible qualities of these ships, that they are of opinion that no more ships of the line will be laid down, and that in ten years that class of vessels will have become obsolete." Our own authorities, however, seem to consider the experiment as of doubtful issue, and apprehend that very serious difficulties will attend its practical adoption. It is also as yet a question as to the sufficiency of defence which iron-plates would afford against the extraordinary development of projectiles. No plating will render a ship proof against solid wrought-iron shot; and, though the late trials did not satisfactorily establish the effectiveness of the Armstrong bolt against iron, yet it remains to be seen what may be the issue of the experiments with larger and heavier shells. It is our own belief that projectile power will attain such a terrible expansion as to defy defence, and that the idea of protection or impregnability from shot or shell will very shortly be an illusion; and we cannot, therefore, think that it is wise to sacrifice the great qualities of speed and manageableness for an uncertain resistance against attack. It would seem that, as with the old armour, the invulnerability of the shielded mass would be more than counterbalanced by its want of mobility. Nor can we accept these batteries as the fittest medium for the application of rifled cannon to the purposes of attack. These wonderful engines, to give effect to their long-ranges, will require to be placed in ships which are under perfect command-which are mobile, and possess great speed. These qualities cannot, we think, be given to the iron-plated ships; they will ever be difficult to steer, will not probably move well under steam, and will not be handled with the ease and certainty necessary to insure correctness of aim and great effect for their long-range projectiles. This, however, is a problem for practical men, and which experience only cau solve. Meantime France has four of this class building, two of

which are nearly complete, and intends to construct two more. We shall doubtless follow in the wake of the experiment if the Armstrong gun do not settle at once the question of defence.

It is contemplated by the French Commission,* "that, in 1860, she will have a steam fleet consisting of 40 steam line-of-battle ships, 6 ironplated frigates, 30 screw frigates, 19 paddle-wheel frigates, and 26 steam transports;" and that this fleet would be capable of" carrying an army of 60,000 men, with all its horses, provisions, and materiel for one month." Nor is this the limit of the expansion. It is projected that the augmentation should progress until the steam navy number "150 vessels of war of all classes, in addition to 72 transports," and until the arsenals, the great military ports, be complete in respect of docks, factories, and buildings, "to meet the requirements of the fleet." A sum of nearly nine millions has been deemed adequate for this purpose, and it is purposed that "the expense shall be spread over the period from 1859 to 1871." Here, then, we arrive at a definition of the extent which the navy of France is destined to attain; and it is not such as to daunt or terrify us. It is one that, in the like time, we can easily exceed. The component parts are, however, significant. There will be 45 or 50 liners and 72 steam transports, and these forces would point at something more than the assertion by France of her rightful rank among naval powers. It would suggest that the army of France is to become a power on the seas. Our own prospective increase would carry us much in advance of our rival. At the same period of 1860, it is expected that England may possess 56 steam liners by the farther conversion of 6 sailing vessels, and 34 frigates, with the possibility of converting 27 more, and razeeing 13 sailing line-of-battle ships. This, however, can only be achieved (and the whole result can scarcely be) by an extraordinary effort. According to the ordinary means and expenditure, the consummation could not be

arrived at for many years to come. England has been roused to sudden energy and activity certainly, but the proportion betwixt the established strength and the purposed extension of the French navy, shows also that she, in her start, was compelled to resort to an unusual effort, and employ means and appliances which she did not intend to maintain permanently. When the plans here detailed shall be completed, both nations will have used up their old material; and, as the building of a ship costs about four times as much as its conversion, the future extension of each will be as much a question of finance and resources as of constructive capacity.

The building space and building means at the disposal of France are certainly very great. She has her five great ports, containing an aggregate of 73 building - slips, with three in progress, and 17 docks, with a proposed addition of seven; and these great establishments occupy altogether an area of 865 acres.

Altogether, in achievement and intent, in resource and expansion, we have here a most formidable product, but we see also its limit, its end; and notwithstanding a temporary loss of place, we must feel assured that it is within the scope of the energies and resources of our country far to surpass it, and that we have not lost, nor shall we lose, our supremacy in the art-power of production.

The German writer claims also for the French a superiority in the naval armament, on what warranty we cannot tell, as even his own comparisons contradict his conclusions. At present we believe that our ships are nearly equal in this respect. The total of guns carried by frigates and line-of-battle ships shows a slight preponderance on our side; and, from personal observation, we are assured that our guns are generally better cast, are much superior in their fittings and gear, and altogether more serviceable. The assumption, that in the theory and training of artillery practice the French have an excellence and superiority of system, we must discuss hereafter.

We have done now with the material, the art-power of the navies, and

we come to the second element, the man-power, the personnel, the living body, which is to give vitality, motion, and direction to these great masses of wood and guns.

In this man-power lies at present the strength and advantage of France. The Emperor, prescient as ever, when he contemplated and provided for the creation of the new steam-power, saw that the new force required new adaptations, and that a new organisation of the personnel was necessary; and thus originated the "Decret sur l'Organisation du Personnel des Equipages de la Flotte," which is now the law of France.

The sources from which and by which this man-power is supplied are by the maritime inscription, by voluntary enlistment, and by the advancement of the "Mousses" or boys. The inscription is the enrolment of the seafaring and coast population of France. Over these the State asserts its right to demand and command their services according to the exigencies or wants of the occasion. Levies are made periodically, and all men on the muster-roll are liable to sea service from the age of 18 to 50, though two-thirds of the whole numher only are supposed to be available. The "Conversations Lexicon" gives the amount of the seafaring population as 300,000, but states also that the inscription-list of 1855 included only 162,000 men liable to sea service. The report of the English committee estimates the number of men employed in the mercantile marine, according to the tons of shipping registered, at 90,217 men. This includes those attached to the fisheries and the home trade, but may not take in the coasters, boatmen, and the crews of the small vessels. the lowest figure, this inscription furnishes a ready resource for immediate and ordinary service-a grand reserve for exigency or emergency. The men obtained under the "recrutement par l'inscription maritime" are bound to serve seven years, and may then claim a discharge, or be readmitted under certain conditions. During their service they are, of course, admitted to advancement in the different grades of the hierarchy. The voluntary engagement applies to

At

all men who are anxious to embark under the drapeau, and who are under twenty-one years and a half, and possess the requisite physical attributes. The "Mousses are recruited from the sons of petty officers, sailors, and officials, preference being given to those children whose fathers have died or suffered injury in the service. They are divided into two classes those who are to be admitted to the school at Brest, and the "mousses auxiliaires." The former are furnished in certain proportions from the five great naval arrondissements, and are received at the age of from 13 to 15. The "Mousses auxiliaires" are chosen by the commissions of the "inscription maritime," and sent to the different divisions. The "Mousses" of both classes can, after a certain period, enter voluntarily for the seven years as novices or apprentices. This source of supply has been so valuable a one, that the minister of marine himself declares that he considers "l'école des mousses comme principale pépinière de nos officiers-mariniers" (warrant and petty officers).

The force obtained from these different sources has been organised according to a new decree under the denomination of the "personnel des equipages de la flotte." The former arrangement of the "equipages de ligne" has been suppressed, and the permanent companies replaced by compagnies de dépôt," composed of sailors belonging "à une même spécialité professionelle." By this change, and by grouping the men par spécialité," it is supposed that there will be a greater facility in arming the ships by selecting from the "compagnies de dépôt" all the elements necessary for navigation and combat. This personnel is divided into five divisions-two of the first classes stationed at Brest and Toulon, and three of the second at Cherbourg, L'Orient, and Rochefort, each being designated by the name of the port at which it is established. The first-class divisions are composed of "compagnies de dépôt,"divided thus -one of the "matelots timonniers," steersman, one of seamen gunners, one of seamen musketeers, one of engineers, stokers, &c., two of the

seamen of the inscription, and one of the volunteers. The second-class divisions have their état-major and two companies, one composed of the specialities, and the other of the inscribed and volunteer seamen. At L'Orient there is, besides, a battalion of instruction of apprenticed fusileers, under the superintendence of officers who have qualified at Vincennes; and at Brest, the Ecole des Mousses. From these divisions crews are embarked according to the demand, with a proportion of the specialités of maîtres and of seamen. These men having been trained to work and exercise together, readily unite in the organisation of the equipage. The system, too, of the "service interieur" has been adapted to the new order; and the rules for unity in detail made most stringent. The internal economy of the service has been determined by the Government, so that there may be uniformity of rule, of detail, and of discipline throughout, so that whatever ship a man might be draughted into he would find the same system prevailing, and fall at once into his proper place either for exercise or action. "Il est indispensable pour l'éxécution d'un service aussi special, et en même temps aussi varié, de tracer à chacun des devoirs de chaque jour, de chaque heure, de chaque instant." The rolls for stations, quarters, or inspection, are always the same, so that men and officers should always find a uniform mode prevailing, in which they had been instructed and trained. This uniformity, leaving nothing to the discretion or fancies of different commanders, insures in all the exercises and evolutions a simplicity and order which cannot fail to promote efficiency.

In the discipline there is the same uniformity. The crimes are all classed, the different punishments prescribed, and a due and legal investigation provided for in all cases. The code is not severe in its penalties, nor vexatious in its operation; for the graver offences there are the cells, the prison, and "la barre de justice;" for petty delinquencies the usual penalties, the "esconade de punition," the peloton d'exercice," stoppage of leave, of the allowance

of wine, &c. But the term of these punishments is short - none exceeding ten days, and always exacted under responsible supervision. The policy which this fleet designates is, however, the question of the present time.

Mr Reed, in summing up his comments, says: "The steady and enormous increase of the French steam navy in large ships appears to point to something very different from a sudden and unsupported descent on our coasts. Two-deck and threedeck steam-ships are by no means the most fitting vessels for effecting such an operation. They are intended, as their name implies, for the line-ofbattle, and their production in large numbers by the French Emperor is equivalent to a declaration that, if we have to meet his forces at all, it will not be on our coast or in our harbours alone. He is manifestly preparing to meet us, if need be, or, if occasion serve, on the open sea, and to contend there for a mastery of infinitely greater value to him than any mere momentary advantage."

This may be a true deduction from facts. Supremacy on the seas is doubtlessly the ultimate, the grand design of the French navy. Yet, what means the extraordinary expansion of its transport power? The French mercantile marine may af ford in this respect insufficient means for the requirements of a great military nation; but the Imperial design is as much beyond as the national supply would be below the fair proportion of the transport, to the military power and necessities of the State. The 72 steam-ships which are eventually to be an appendage to the navy of France, the 26 which are now in existence, or in instant preparation, what do they portend? Are they necessities? Are they required for the ordinary needs of the nation? If not, what other intent and purpose may they have? There can be only one-that of giving to France a place and a status for her armies on the ocean-of making the seas and channels the sites of floating camps, which should project her military force in any direction, and give to her might the impulse of a concentration capable of attempting

VOL. LXXXV.—NO. DXXIV.

a supremacy by land and sea-capable of annulling the advantages of geographical positions, and giving to a great military population a bridged passage for its ambitions and its aggressions.

History gives little encouragement to any such extended ideas of conquest or supremacy. Yet it may be well to consider what warnings this great line-of-battle and transport fleet. may have for us, especially now that the great fallacy of "l'Empire c'est la paix" has denounced itself, and great political combinations are again looming ominously before us. It has one especial, one direct, warning-preparation.

This has been already partly heed

All

ed. The neglect of former administrations, which had sunk our naval strength far below the standard of national efficiency, or even of national safety, has been redeemed by the energy of the present government. The whole strength and resources of the nation are being applied to the assertion of our supremacy. available means are employed-all possible agencies directed to the establishment of our old status as a naval power. For the first time, too, in our naval annals, the country has been informed of the actual strength and relative condition of its navy. First Lords do not usually condescend to such enlightenment. It knows now how weak it was, how much stronger it is, how strong it may be

come.

We are assured of present equality with France, and are promised that ere the year end, we shall be superior to her in the material of naval war. It has been proposed that during this period nine liners should be converted and six new ships launched. Already four of the converted and two of the new berths are floating on our waters, and will be ready before the end of June as engines of war. This is a goodly instalment, and gives us confidence in our resources and in the men who direct them.

Is it, however, enough to be superior to France? Do not the shadows of coming events, the prospective combinations of the future, warn us to prepare for our old position, our old stand-point-England against the

2 X

world? It was the position which former wars forced on us: it is one which future ones may render equally inevitable it is one for which we should be prepared.

In the art-power, the resources for the creation of naval material, we have been, in spite of temporary lapse, and shall be, ever supreme. As builders of ships, and constructors of machinery, we may and shall challenge the world. Our present difficulty lies in a different source-the man-power.

In her instant supply of manpower, and in her organisation, we see the chief and only advance of France towards supremacy; and in this readiness to man a fleet, and in this system of uniformity, establishing an immediate efficiency, rests an advantage which might give her the power of taking the initiative in a war, and of striking the first blow. It is this superiority we must combat. Here lies our weakness-here their strength. Yet in this manpower, also, we possess the largest resources and the most fitting elements, though we lack the power of controlling or commanding them. The achievement of this would, we believe, insure for us a supremacy superior to the fear of petty alarms

or the shocks of cotemporary policies. How this may be attained we shall discuss hereafter. It is a great national question, to be well and seriously deliberated upon. Our rulers are resolutely and actively meeting the present emergency. How it may be permanently solved must be the result of many contingencies, and, perhaps, of some years. A standing navy is to us a necessity, but cannot be the absolute creation of a moment. A power which shall perpetuate itself and have a permanent existence, must have deep roots and strong sources of vitality. Such a power the navy of England must become.

Meantime, whilst we deliberate and debate upon it, it will be well to keep ever in sight and in memory, ever before us, France's great navy of line-of-battle ships, with its preparation for a floating camp, its great arsenals, its great bodies of enrolled trained seamen; and to remember, at the same time, the design which created it, the policy it represents, that we may gather up our strength and our resources, and be prepared to assert before nations the old supremacy of England on the seas.

The voice of war resounding throughout Europe has an echo for us. That echo speaks preparation for defence.