best promoted by regulating our own customs' duties as may be most suitable to the financial and commercial interest of this country, without reference to the amount of duties which foreign Powers may think it expedient for their own interests to levy on British goods.' The two main points Mr. Ricardo sought to establish were, first, that the chief advantage the nation would gain from the extension of its commerce would arise from the increase of its imports, and that this might be secured at once by simply reducing the duties levied upon them; and, secondly, granting that we had also an interest, though a minor one, in procuring admission for our productions into foreign countries on easier terms, that this advantage was not likely to be obtained by negotiation, nor by insisting on what is called 'reciprocity.' I do not think I ever heard speeches more remarkable for their clearness, and for the conclusive force of their reasoning, than those in which Mr. Ricardo maintained these propositions; they appeared to me to be unanswerable, and certainly they were not answered with success by the very ingenious speeches of Mr. Gladstone, who, on both occasions, as President of the Board of Trade, took the leading part in resisting the motions on behalf of the government of Sir R. Peel. In 1843 Mr. Ricardo was defeated by a majority of more than two to one, and in 1844 the House was counted out before a division could be taken. But though Mr. Ricardo thus failed in obtaining a vote of the House of Commons in favour of the policy he recommended, he was completely successful in bringing about its practical adoption. A great impression was made by these two debates on public opinion, and, as we must infer from the result, on the opinion of Sir R. Peel, which was of more immediate importance.' His government had recently failed in negotiations for the conclusion of commercial treaties with Spain and Portugal, but after the date of Mr. Ricardo's last motion these negotiations were not renewed, and, as I believe, no similar ones were again attempted with other powers during the remainder of the time that Sir R. Peel continued in office. He certainly proceeded in his course of commercial reforms without the slightest reference to the terms on which British goods were admitted by other countries to their markets. The succeeding administration avowedly acted upon the principle that the regulation of our customs duties was not a fit subject for discussion or negotiation with foreign nations; that we ought to settle these duties entirely with a view to our own interests, and leave them to do the same without interference from us.

From 1844 to 1860 this policy was steadily adhered to by different 1 When the debate in 1844 was brought to a close by the counting out of the House, I left it with Mr. Ricardo; and I remarked to him at the time that I was convinced from Sir R. Peel's manner that he felt that an unanswerable case had been made out in favour of the policy Mr. Ricardo recommended, and that, notwithstanding the failure of the motion for the moment, it would prove to have been very useful,

administrations, and its success was even more complete than its original advocates had anticipated. When no longer embarrassed by the consideration of what concessions to our trade might be won from other countries in return for reductions of our duties on imports, the work of improving our tariff went on easily and quickly. The protective duties which had imposed a heavy burden on the people without any corresponding gain to the exchequer were got rid of, and the increasing productiveness of the revenue made it safe gradually to repeal or reduce other duties of customs and excise which, though not of a protective character, had checked the progress of trade and manufactures. As I have already observed, this change in our policy was followed by a rapid advance of the nation in wealth and prosperity, and the practical proof thus afforded of the advantages of free trade had in a few years made a strong impression on opinion in foreign countries. I am not aware that any important steps towards following our example had actually been taken by these countries in 1860, but there were obvious signs in most of them that they were beginning to perceive that our policy was giving us a great advantage over them, and that, if they did not mean to be left hopelessly behind in the race of commercial advancement, they must, like us, relieve industry from the trammels of what is called protection.

Had this feeling been left to work freely, I cannot doubt that in a few years it would have liberated the commerce of the world from the greater part of the difficulties it has long laboured under from unwise restrictions. But unfortunately this was not allowed to happen. The British Government, by concluding with France the commercial treaty of 1860, abandoned the policy which Mr. Ricardo had recommended, and which had been followed with signal success, in order to revert to that which had been previously pursued and had even more signally failed. This is the mistake in our policy to which I referred in a former page as having had even greater influence in reviving the opinion in favour of protection in foreign countries than the license given to our colonies to act on this policy. The conclusion of the treaty of 1860 at once arrested the current of opinion in favour of free trade which was beginning to set in abroad. It was considered that England had, by large concessions, purchased from France more favourable terms for the admission into that country of some articles of her produce, and this was almost universally regarded as a practical recantation by the British Government of the doctrine upon which it had for some years insisted, that the reduction of import duties is not a fit matter for negotiation among nations, and that excessive duties of this kind inflict more injury on the nations that impose them than on the countries on whose commodities they are charged. It also created a belief, in those nations of which the tariffs were adverse to our trade, that, as we had purchased a somewhat freer entrance for British goods into the French market by large reductions of our duties on French commodities,

they would do well to follow the example of France, and only consent to admit our produce on better terms if we would agree to give them something in return. The bad effect upon opinion produced by this treaty was not diminished by the fact that this country really gained nothing by it. The only part of the arrangement from which it derived any material benefit was the reduction of the duties previously levied in this country on wine and on silks. There was some reason for doubting whether, in the then state of affairs, this reduction was altogether financially prudent at that particular time; but setting aside this consideration, there could be no doubt of the important advantages that must result from it both as a boon to the consumers of the articles relieved from taxation, and as being calculated to give a stimulus to our trade. But these advantages (which proved to be far greater than was generally expected) we could have secured just as well without any treaty by simply reducing the duties in question. What we were supposed to have gained by the treaty-the reduction of the French duties on certain English goods-was in reality of little moment to us. Even if the remissions of duty on English goods had been large enough to give any considerable stimulus to our exports to France (which in fact they were not), all that we should have gained would have been the power of paying for a larger portion of what we received from her directly, instead of indirectly by increased exports to countries from which she draws articles that she wants. Our increased imports from France must necessarily be paid for in the one or the other of these ways, and it signified little to ourselves in which of them the payment was effected, though it would have been a gain to France to receive it by opening her ports more freely to English goods useful to her people. For an insignificant advantage, therefore, we were abandoning an important principle, and doing what was sure to have a powerful effect in giving new life to the belief that was beginning to fall into general discredit, that the repeal of excessive duties on imports, and more especially of protective duties, is more advantageous to the nations on whose produce they are levied than to those by which they are imposed. This belief is what, more than anything else, makes foreign nations now cling to their restrictive tariffs; our interests therefore must suffer if it should receive fresh encouragement, and the apparent sanction of England, from the passing of the Canadian tariff.

In the preceding pages I have endeavoured to show that the surrender of the authority formerly exercised over the colonial legis latures by the Imperial Government has been injurious to the colonies themselves as well as to this country, and is likely to endanger the stability of their connection with the Empire by causing that connection to be regarded not as an advantage but as a burden. by the British people. I will now add a few remarks on what ought VOL. V.-No. 28. 3 R

to be our policy for the future. I see no reason to doubt that the authority, which up to a very recent period was universally acknowledged to belong of right to the Crown, might have continued to be used with advantage in order to prevent the adoption of measures hurtful to the common interests of the Empire by the colonial legislatures, if it had never ceased to be exercised with judgment and in a conciliatory spirit. But to bring again into active exercise an authority which has been allowed practically to fall into disuse, would be a very different matter from maintaining it while it was still habitually exerted, and certainly ought not to be attempted without at least endeavouring to come to some previous understanding with the colonies. Still the necessity of taking some means to make sure that the policy of the Imperial Government shall be supported instead of being thwarted by the action of the dependencies of the Empire is a pressing one, and the question arises how this object can be provided for. I observe that when the delegates of the Australian colonies met to consider the question as to the propriety of maintaining the restrictions on their power of altering their tariffs, they asserted that Great Britain must logically do one of two things, either leave the colonies unfettered discretion, or, if she is to regulate tariffs or reciprocal tariff arrangements, or to make treaties affecting the colonies, give to the colonies representation in matters affecting the Empire.' If this is meant to refer to a project which has not unfrequently been suggested of giving to the colonies the right of returning members to the House of Commons, it is open to insurmountable objections. In the first place it is only an exceedingly small proportion of the whole business of the House of Commons which relates to matters in which the colonies are so directly interested as to give them any grounds for claiming that members returned by them should take part in it. It would plainly be unreasonable that a Canadian or Australian member of the House of Commons should be entitled to speak and vote on questions relating to the imposition of taxes in this country which his constituents would not have to pay, or, indeed, upon any of those questions relating to the internal affairs of the United Kingdom which occupy by far the largest share of the time of Parliament. But besides this, there would be an obvious inconvenience in having colonial members sitting in Parliament, as this would necessarily lead to their being enrolled in the ranks of one or other of our parliamentary parties. If they adhered to the Opposition, it would be impossible for them to hold confidential intercourse with the Government; and if they supported the ministers of the day, the defeat of the administration would render their relations with a new one still more difficult. Hence it is clearly undesirable that representatives of the colonies should sit in the House of Commons; yet, on the other hand, in the position to which the colonies have now attained, it could not be

regarded as unreasonable if they were to ask that if they are to be made subject to a real control on the part of the Imperial Government, in order to make sure that their measures shall not clash with the policy of the Empire, some effectual means should be afforded to them of making their wishes and opinions heard by that government before it comes to decisions in which they are concerned.

To provide for this in a satisfactory manner would be no easy matter, and serious objections would no doubt be found to any plan for doing so that could be devised, but I will venture to suggest that it might at least be worth considering whether some such arrangement as the following might not be adopted with advantage. A committee of the Privy Council to be formed for the purpose of considering and reporting its opinion to Her Majesty on such questions affecting the colonies as Her Majesty on the advice of her ministers might think fit to refer to it. Her Majesty to signify her readiness, on the recommendation of the colonial governments which have agents in this country with suitable salaries, to appoint them to be members of her Privy Council and also of the Committee on Colonial Affairs so long as they held their posts as agents. Already the appointment of agent in this country is occasionally conferred by some of the more important colonies on one of their leading men, and it is probable that this would be done more frequently if the appointment by the arrangement just suggested were invested with an importance calculated to make it an object of ambition, and to give them greater authority in their communication with Her Majesty's Government. The advice and assistance of eminent colonists might be expected to be of great value in the proposed committee, and also to the Secretary of State in a less formal manner. In referring any question to the committee, Her Majesty to direct such members of her Privy Council as she might think fit to be summoned to assist the colonial members of the committee in considering it. On important subjects the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and perhaps some of his colleagues, would probably take part in the deliberations of the committee, and it is to be hoped that, in some cases at least, party feeling would not prevent the aid of former ministers from being also obtained, and from proving of great utility. No colonial Acts to be disallowed by Her Majesty without having been first considered and reported upon by this committee, which would in fact be merely reverting to an ancient practice of the Government which is still kept up in form, though not in substance. In the early days of the British colonies the authority of the Crown over them was mainly exercised through the Committee of Council for Trade and Plantations, now called the Board of Trade; and though its functions with regard to the colonies have long been transferred to the Secretary of State, the form of referring colonial Acts to it is still adhered to, and the assent to them of the Crown or their disallowance is signified by the approval by