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by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia handed over to her conqueror the leased territory of Liaotung and the South Manchurian railway. China not only consented to this arrangement, but by certain secret clauses of an agreement voluntarily concluded between her Government and Japan in December, 1905, she deprived herself of valuable rights, specifically reserved for her by the Treaty of Portsmouth, in regard to the economic and industrial development of Manchuria. By pledging herself not to build any railways which might compete with the South Manchurian line, she made it possible for Japan to veto (as she subsequently did, in partnership with Russia) all British and American enterprises in that region. To-day, Japan's privileged position and paramount influence on the mainland to the north and west of Korea is regarded by the nation, not only as one of vital necessity, but of indisputable right — a right established at the cost of two victorious wars, and subsequently developed by means of concessions freely granted by China's rulers in return for money loans. To suggest (as was done by Lord Curzon and Mr. Lansing in the Consortium dispatches of 1919) that Manchuria and Mongolia are actually integral 'provinces' of China, to be regarded and dealt with internationally in the same way as the eighteen provinces of China proper, is to ignore the basic realities of the situation, not to mention elementary geography and history.

Mongolia, as a dependency, stands toward China in precisely the same relation as Tibet. It is not easy to understand upon what grounds Great Britain, after having required China to abandon her claims to effective sovereignty over autonomous Tibet, can profess to regard Mongolia (which has asserted its independence of Peking) as a 'province' of China. Nor can any

valid process of reasoning justify England or America in supporting China's contention that Japan should now surrender, or greatly modify, her claims to 'special interests' in Manchuria. The arguments and attitude of Japan's representatives at Versailles clearly demonstrated their determination to insist upon recognition of those interests, as an equitable quid pro quo for our Asiatic Exclusion acts and all that they imply. The same determination was unmistakably manifested in the negotiation and conclusion of the LansingIshii agreement in 1917.

To sum up. If England, America, and Japan now concur in recognizing the critical condition of affairs in China, and unite, in a common purpose of good-will, to restore her stability of government and to protect her sovereignty, the resources of diplomacy should be capable of devising a practical and equitable solution of the Far Eastern problem. Frank discussion of the existing situation should entail, pari passu with reasonable recognition of Japan's established position in Manchuria and Mongolia, the simultaneous restoration to China, by all the powers concerned, of 'leased' territories in China proper, the withdrawal of all foreign garrisons and post-offices from the eighteen provinces, and the abandonment therein of all claims to spheres of influence and concessions, which conflict with the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity.

Given such an agreement, concerted measures for the restoration of the Central Government's authority and fiscal machinery, for the effective disbandment of the tuchuns' irregular forces, and for financial reorganization, might be profitably discussed with China's representatives. But, pending the application of such remedial measures, it is foolish and futile to talk of restoring the unfettered authority of

the Chinese Government in Manchuria and Mongolia, for the simple reason that there is no effective government in China. Under existing conditions, the rapid economic development of these dependencies, which has resulted from Japan's railway and mining enterprises, has proved of immediate bene fit, not only to China's revenues, but to large numbers of Chinese workers and settlers, who have poured into the country from Shantung and Chihli, attracted by good wages and the pros pect of immunity from the lawlessness that preys upon all forms of productive industry, as the result of chronic misrule under the Chinese Republic.

A word, in conclusion, with the political idealists who would have us believe in the impending federation of the world by virtue of Christianity and faith in the blessings of Democracy. It were well for the peace of mankind if they could be led to realize the simple

truth that the impact and influence of the West have tended to destroy the cohesive and self-sufficient qualities of China's patriarchal system of government, without supplying anything of practical value in its place. A venerable civilization, probably the wisest, and certainly the oldest, that humanity has produced, is now in danger of perishing, as so many others have perished, by contact with our machine-driven, armor-plated culture, in combination with soulless international finance. Time will show whether the process of disintegration wrought by these disruptive influences can possibly be arrested by a new policy of harmonious coöperation, for China's good, between the friendly powers, so as to preserve her independence as a nation and to restore peace and prosperity to her people. Reduced to simple terms, this is the real Far Eastern question, which awaits the deliberations of the Washington Conference.

ARE WE GIVING JAPAN A SQUARE DEAL? II

BY E. ALEXANDER POWELL

THE key to Japanese militarism and imperialism is to be found in the dual government that exists in Japan. There is the constitutional government the Cabinet, the Diet, consisting of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, and the administrative bureaucracy with which the world is familiar. But there is also an invisible government, an unseen empire, com

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posed of a clique of military men and men with military affiliations, headed by the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, with the General Staff of the Army as its instrument. Of the two governments, the latter is by far the more powerful. Japanese policy, particularly in foreign affairs, is invariably shaped by this unseen government, its wishes generally being translated by the constitu

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At the head of the Japanese State stands the Emperor, generally spoken of by foreigners as the Mikado ('Honorable Gate,' a title comparable with Sublime Porte), and by his own subjects as Tennō, or Heavenly King. The present Emperor, Yoshihito, is the one hundred and twenty-second of his line, according to Japanese history, which reckons from 660 B.C. when Jimmu ascended the throne. But as written records do not carry us back further than A.D. 712, the reigns and periods of the very early monarchs are more or less apocryphal. Still, the fact remains that Japan has been ruled by an unbroken dynasty ever since the dawn of her history, in which respect she is unique among all the nations of the world. By the Constitution of 1889 the Emperor combines in himself the rights of sovereignty and exercises the whole of the executive powers, with the advice and assistance of the nine Cabinet ministers. He alone can make war, declare peace, and conclude treaties. But between the Cabinet and the Crown stands a small body of men, the survivors of those by whose genius modern Japan was raised to her present high position among the nations. They are known as the Genrō, or Elder Statesmen. At the present time only three remain - Field-Marshal Prince Yamagata, Marquis Okuma, and Marquis Matsukata. These three old men are the real rulers of Japan.

VOL. 128- NO. 5

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Now let me make it clear that the Elder Statesmen are neither appointed nor elected. Indeed, there is no such office as that of Elder Statesman per se. You will find no mention of them in the Japan Year-Book or other works of reference. They are not officials, though they hold the reins of power, though by virtue of their rank they have seats in the House of Peers. They are private citizens who, because of their experience and sagacity, are the trusted advisers of the Emperor, as they were of his father before him. They are so firmly intrenched in the confidence of the Emperor and great nobles; they are the embodiment of traditions so indissolubly linked with the history of the Empire; the social, political, financial, and military interests which they represent are so powerful; that all attempts to dislodge them or seriously to weaken their influence have met with failure.

The invisible government of which the Elder Statesmen are the head and brains is not a modern development; it goes back into Japanese history for centuries. For nearly a thousand years Japan has had a nominal government and another unacknowledged government, the latter more or less cloaked and independent of check or control, existing side by side. This unseen empire dates from the period of the Shogunate, during which the Emperor was the titular ruler and the Shogun the actual ruler of Japan. When the Shogunate was abolished in 1868, and the unification of the country under the Emperor Mutsuhito begun, the task of reconstruction was undertaken by the daimyo, or feudal nobles. They became the officials of the new government and directed the transformation of Japan into a modern state. Their descendants fill those offices to-day.

When it is remembered that the present officeholders are almost all members of the ancient military clans,

it is not difficult to understand the ascendancy of the militarists in Japanese politics. For example, nearly all the members of the military clique belong to the Chosun clan, while the navy clique is recruited from the Satsuma clan. The acknowledged leader of them all, the uncrowned ruler of Japan, is Prince Yamagata, himself a soldier and a field-marshal. The Emperor, feeble in health and mind, in spite of the profound veneration in which he is still held by the great mass of his subjects, is a ruler only in name.

Of the nine members of the Cabinet, two the Minister of War and the Minister of Marine are not answerable for their actions to the Premier, but are responsible only to the Emperor which, translated, means the Elder Statesmen. As a result of this anomalous situation, these two ministers can, and frequently do, defy the Premier and block legislation. In fact, a former Prime Minister resigned because he was unable to find men for these portfolios who would consent to carry out his policies. As the members of the Cabinet are appointed by the Emperor, instead of, as is the custom in most European countries, by the Premier, it is self-evident that no one could obtain the portfolio of war or of marine unless he was persona gratissima to the militarist party. This closest of close corporations is still further bound together by family ties, the present Minister of War, MajorGeneral Giichi Tanaka, being a son-inlaw of Prince Yamagata.

It is this curious relic of feudal times which is responsible for those failures to keep her agreements which have done so much to lose for Japan the confidence of other nations. Japan's failure to abide by her promise to evacuate Siberia upon the withdrawal of the American and other Allied troops provides a case in point. This commit

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ment was made to the United States and her European allies by the constitutional Government, as represented by Premier Hara. I have good reason to believe that, in making this promise, the Government was entirely sincere and that it fully intended to carry out the evacuation. But the unseen governby which is meant the militarist partyist party-wished Japan to remain in Siberia, for reasons of its own. It wanted territory in that region, - territory rich in mines and forests, — and here was an easy way to get it. I do not know precisely what procedure was followed by the militarists, of course; but I imagine that it was something like this. Prince Yamagata, speaking with the authority of the Emperor, informed his son-in-law, the Minister of War, that the occupation of Siberia was to be continued; whereupon the Minister of War, presumably without the consent of the Premier, and quite possibly without his knowledge, instead of withdrawing the Siberian garrisons, reinforced them. It thus being made impossible for the constitutional Government to keep the agreement it had made, Premier Hara, in order to 'save his face,' as they say in the East, was forced to explain his failure to withdraw the troops by asserting that it had been found necessary to retain them in Siberia temporarily in order to guard Japan from Bolshevist attacks. Result: loss of confidence by the other powers in Japan's promises.

The effect on foreign opinion of such usurpation of power by the invisible government is recognized by the liberal element in Japan; as witness a recent editorial in the Yomi-Yuri Shimbun: —

'It is regrettable that the declarations of the Japanese Government are often not taken seriously. The Powers regard Japan as a country that does not mean what it says. The most important reasons for this will be found in

the actions of the militarists, whose utterances are the cause of the Government's attitude being misunderstood abroad. Unless the militarist evil is stamped out, a hundred declarations disavowing territorial ambitions will not be able to convince the Powers.'

The militarists placed the Government in almost as embarrassing a position in Korea last year as in Siberia. Premier Hara, stirred to action by the excesses of the Japanese troops, issued orders that the military forces in Korea should be subordinated to the civil authorities; but the military, backed by the unseen government, virtually ignored these orders, the newly appointed Governor-General, Baron Saito, being unable to enforce his commands where the military were concerned. Should the Prime Minister resent such attempts to block the policy of the Government, and appeal to the Emperor, he would really be appealing to the Elder Statesmen, who, as I have explained, stand between the Emperor and the Cabinet. Or, should the Diet attempt to put a check on the militarists by refusing to pass the army appropriations, it would have no effect on the situation, for in such a case the budget holds over from the previous year. Having direct access to the Emperor and to the funds of the Imperial Household, which is the richest in the world, the militarists never lack for money. Indeed, when all is said and done, it is they who hold the pursestrings. It will be seen, therefore, that the Progressive Premier, Mr. Hara, is in a trying and none too strong position. The military party and the forces of reaction typified by Prince Yamagata have too much power for him. The Premier, speaking for the Government and through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, makes commitments to other powers. The unseen government ignores these commitments and leaves it

to the Premier to explain as best he can. There you have the real reason why Japan seems so often to violate her treaty obligations. She is not insincere in making them. The men who make them are not the men who break them:

This continued exercise of irresponsible authority by the military party is the most important and the most dangerous factor in the whole Japanese question. Until the invisible and irresponsible powers behind the throne are suppressed in favor of the constitutional Government, there can be no real hope of a satisfactory understanding between Japan and the United States. A democracy like ours cannot do business with a government that is masked; we must know with whom we are dealing. If Japan sincerely desires the friendship of the United States, then she must give valid assurances that the declared policies of her Government will henceforward be binding on her military, as well as her civil agents.

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Although close observers have of late detected a noticeable change in the attitude of the younger generation of Japanese toward the Emperor, who is no longer venerated as he has been by past generations, and although the strength of the anti-militarist party is steadily increasing, to talk glibly, as certain American visitors to Japan have done, of Japanese militarism being on its last legs, is to reveal profound ignorance of the actual conditions. If the system of unseen government were merely transitory, it might readily yield before the growth of education and enlightened opinion. But it is not transitory. Its tentacles reach deep into the traditions of the Empire. It would be strange, indeed, if the militarists were not dominant in Japan, for the whole history of the nation is

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