policy effected by the curé upon the church and sacristy; the curé and one of the marguilliers-en- charge, by a notarial instrument, transferred to the Appellants (" the Quebec Fire Assurance Company," who had granted the policy), in consideration of the payment by them of part of the amount of the damage sustained by such fire, the right to sue and claim from the Respondents the amount so paid. Held, that this constituted a valid subrogation of the debt due to the insurers in right of the fabrique according to the French law pre- vailing in Lower Canada. Held, also, in an action brought upon
the notarial Acte, that though the declaration was not strictly in form, yet it was substantially good; for the Plaintiffs (the Appellants) could not be held to sue as assurers (in which character they had no title); but as being subrogated to the debt due to the fabrique of the church by the Defendants (the Respon- dents), by reason of the payment made on their behalf in respect of the damage occasioned by them. Semble. By the old French law, the
curé and marguilliers together could not convey by way of assignment without the consent of the Bureau, though they might subrogate a debt due to them in their official cha- racter. [The Quebec Fire Assur- ance Company v. St. Louis]
SUSPENSION.
See "PUBLIC OFFICER."
1. Upon the reversal of the Judg- ment of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, finding for the Plaintiff, this Court, in the circumstances of the constitution of the Supreme Court, directed a verdict to be entered for the Defendants, instead of awarding a venire de novo. [Bank of Bengal v. Macleod] 35 2. At a trial, certain documents con-
tained in the schedule to the an- swer of the Defendants to a Bill of Discovery, filed in Equity, were read as evidence for the Plaintiff, but the Court refused to allow the Defendants to read the answer to
which the schedule was annexed. Held, that as the Supreme Court at Calcutta, being Jurymen as well as Judges, had refused to allow the answer to be read, on the ground that such answer contained nothing material to the issue, which could influence their verdict, a new trial on the ground of such refusal would not be granted. [The East India Company v. Oditchurn Paul] 85 3. Plaintiff sued in trespass in the Supreme Court of the Island of Jamaica, laying his damages at £3000, a sum above the limit of the jurisdiction of the Local Courts, in the Island, constituted by the Jamaica Act, 5 Vict., c. 26, and recovered a verdict for 40s. Held, First, that the sum recovered by the verdict and sanctioned by the judg ment, and not the sum laid in the declaration, was the test to be ap- plied, to ascertain the right to sue in the Supreme Court, and to en- title the Plaintiff to Supreme Court
next Government sale at Calcutta, each party knowing that the other might use means to enhance or depress such price. Held, that the bidding at the sale by one of the Plaintiffs, though done colourably, and, as it appeared, only to enhance the price, was no fraud on the De- fendants, or upon the public, as he had a right in common with all the world to bid at such sale, and was not precluded from recovering the amount of such wager contracts, by the fact, that such bidding tended to bring about the event by which the wager was to be won. Held also, that employing agents at such sale (all of whom were cogni- zant that the object was to enhance the price of opium sold) to bid, there being no crimen falsi com- mitted, did not constitute an illegal conspiracy, or such frand as would vitiate the wager contracts. By the 6th Article of the Convention between Great Britain and France, the French Government had a right to demand, out of the quanti- ties sold at the Government sale, 300 chests of opium, at the average rate of sale. Held, that no fraud on the vendors was committed by inducing the French Consul to exercise that option in favour of the Plaintiffs. [Doolubdass Pet- tamberdass v. Ramloll Thackoorsey- dass]
By the Statute of Wills (1 Vict., c. 26, s. 21), obliterations, interline- ations, or other alterations in a Will, after execution, are void, if not affirmed in the margin, or otherwise, by the signature of the Testator, and the attestation of witnesses.
The mere circumstance of the amount, or the name of a legatee, being inserted in different ink, and in a different handwriting, does not alone constitute an oblite ration, interlineation, or other alteration, within the meaning of the Statute, nor does any pre- sumption arise against a Will being duly executed as it appears. The case is different where there
is an erasure apparent on the face of the Will, and that erasure has been superinduced by other writing. In such circumstances, the onus probandi lies upon the party who alleges such alteration to have been done prior to execu- tion, to prove by extrinsic evidence, that the words were inserted be- fore execution, and that they had the sanction of the Testator. In the absence of proof, that certain words in a Will, written with different pen and in a different ink, and in a different handwriting, partly upon an erasure, were in- serted prior to execution, so much of such Will, consisting of the inserted words, which constituted a reversionary disposition, pro- nounced against.
London Printed by Woodfall and Kinder, Angel Court, Skinner Street.
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