power of a state under the Webb-Kenyon Act to forbid shipment into its territory of intoxicating liquors from other states includes the lesser power to prescribe by law the conditions under which such shipments may be allowed.28 The purpose of congress in enacting this statute was not to prohibit all interstate shipments or transportation of intoxicating liquors into so-called dry territory, but to render the prohibitory provisions of the statute operative whenever, and only when, the liquors are to be dealt with in violation of the law of the state into which it is shipped.29 The test of interstate commerce is importation into one state from another.30 The transportation of one's goods from state to state is interstate commerce, and, as such, subject to the regulatory power of congress.31 The transportation of prohibited articles upon the person of one being carried in interstate commerce is within the well-established meaning of the words "interstate commerce."32

§ 758. Case of United States v. Hill, decided Jan. 13, 1919. -In this case the indictment charged that the defendant, Dan Hill, on Nov. 20, 1917, being in the state of Kentucky, there intended to go and be carried by means of a common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, from the state of Kentucky into the state of West Virginia, and intended to carry upon his person, as a beverage for his personal use, a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to-wit: one quart thereof, into the state of West Virginia, and did in the state of Kentucky purchase and procure a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to-wit: one quart thereof, contained in bottles, and

28 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. State of North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298, 38 Sup. Ct. 96.

29 Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 238 U. S. 190, 35 Sup. Ct. 824.

80 International Textbook Co. v.

Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107, 30 Sup. Ct. 481; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 325, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. ed. 492.

31 Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560, 34 Sup. Ct. 956.

32 United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532, 33 Sup. Ct. 595.

did then and there board a certain trolley car, being operated by a common carrier corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and by means thereof, did cause himself and the said intoxicating liquor, then upon his person, to be carried and transported in interstate commerce into the state of West Virginia. It also charged that said Hill violated the Act of congress approved March 3d, 1917, commonly known as the Reed Amendment, by thus carrying in interstate commerce from Kentucky into West Virginia a quantity of intoxicating liquor as a beverage for his personal use, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes being then prohibited by the laws of the state of West Virginia. And further, that the intoxicating liquor was not ordered, purchased, or caused to be transported for scientific, sacramental, medicinal or mechanical purposes.

The indictment was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, and the court sustained a demurrer and motion to quash the indictment on the ground that the phrase "transported in interstate commerce," as used in the act, was intended to mean and apply only to liquor transported for commercial purposes. This conclusion was reached from a construction of the act when read in the light of other legislation, especially the Wilson Act of 1890 and the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913.

Under the Criminal Appeals Act, by writ of error the case was brought before the United States Supreme Court to be reviewed, and this court decided that the United States District Court gave to the Reed Amendment too narrow a construction, and reversed the judgment of the latter In the opinion in this case the United States Su

33 United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143. See also Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 Sup. Ct. 729; St. Louis, San Francisco & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651;

St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 33 Sup. Ct. 703; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635.

preme Court says: "In view of the authority of congress over the subject-matter, and the enactment of previous legislation embodied in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Laws, we have no question that congress enacted this statute (the Reed Amendment) because of its belief that in states prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes the facilities of interstate commerce should be denied to the introduction of intoxicants by means of interstate commerce, except for the limited purposes permitted in the statute which have nothing to do with liquor when used as a beverage. That the state saw fit to permit the introduction of liquor for personal use in limited quantity in no wise interferes with the authority of congress, acting under its plenary power over interstate commerce, to make the prohibition against interstate shipment contained in this act. It may exert its authority, as in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, having in view the laws of the state, but it has a power of its own, which in this instance it has exerted in accordance with its view of public policy."

"When congress exerts its authority in a matter within its control, state laws must give way in view of the regulation of the subject-matter by the superior power conferred by the Constitution."

§ 759. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.-In December, 1917, congress passed a resolution submitting the text of the proposed Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution to the state legislatures for their approval; and on January 16th, 1919, the necessary threefourths of the states had ratified the Amendment. It reads. as follows: "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof, for beverage purposes, is hereby prohibited.

"The congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. "This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several states as provided in the Constitution within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the states by the congress."34

§ 760. The "Bone-Dry" Law of the State of Kansas.The most drastic prohibitory intoxicating liquor law in force in the United States at present (May 1, 1919), is what is known as the "Bone-Dry" Law of the State of Kansas. This statute, which became effective February 14, 1917, provides, among other things, as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or have in his possession for personal use or otherwise, any intoxicating liquors, or permit another to have or keep or use intoxicating liquors on any premises owned or controlled by him, or to give away or furnish intoxicating liquors to another, except druggists or registered pharmacists as hereinafter provided.

It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, firm or corporation or any other person for hire or without hire to bring or carry into this state, or carry from one place to another within this state, intoxicating liquors for another or for itself or himself, even when intended for personal use; and it shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its agent or employee to deliver any intoxicating liquors that may be in its possession to any person for any purpose whatIt shall be unlawful for any person in this

soever.

34 The movement which had its culmination in the prohibition amendment to the federal constitution and the drastic war legislation may be said to have had its inception in a resolution of the continental congress, adopted in 1777, which reads: "Resolved, that

it be recommended to the several legislatures of the United States immediately to pass laws the most effectual for putting an immediate stop to the pernicious practice of distilling grain, by which the most extensive evils are likely to be derived."

state to receive, directly or indirectly intoxicating liquor from a common carrier or other carrier or person, and it shall also be unlawful for any person in this state to possess intoxicating liquors received directly or indirectly from a common carrier, other carrier or person. This section will apply to such liquors intended for personal use as well otherwise and to interstate as well as intrastate carriage." Penalties are expressly provided for violations of any of the aforesaid provisions. The act also expressly excepts from its operation certain transactions by certain persons under certain circumstances. Thus the act does not prevent any regularly ordained minister or regular priest of any church from receiving or possessing wine for communion purposes; nor prohibit and common carrier from receiving such wine for shipment and delivery to such regularly ordained minister or priest for such communion purposes. Nor does the act, under certain circumstances, apply to druggists, or regularly established hospitals, or manufacturers whose products require a certain amount of alcohol for medicinal, mechanical or scientific purposes.

The act also provides that it shall be considered as supplemental to laws in force relating to intoxicating liquors, and furthermore, if for any reason any part of the act shall be held void such holding shall not invalidate any other portion of the act.35

35 Laws of Kansas 1917, c. 215 (House bill No. 432).