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The two cases of France and England exemplifying that either a fleet or fortifications have heretofore sufficed.

The great question that arises, in adapting the one or the other exclusively, will be the cost, the efficiency at the eventful moment, and the consequences, in a political point of view, of directing such immense resources as dependence upon a fleet would require to a system that has its advantage in throwing the evils of war from our shores at the same time that its success brings a spirit of conquest and aggrandizement, limited only by the extent to which the nation may be led by the glory its arms shall achieve.

My opinion is, that sound policy calls upon us to adopt the mixed system of permanent batteries in conjunction with ships-of-the-line and war steamers.

If we adopt a floating system, we must make ourselves superior afloat to our enemy. Every seaport and dock yard must be provided with its own floating batteries, available for its waters and adjacent shoals. The great estuaries leading into the heart of the country must each be watched and protected. The floating defences that will protect Boston cannot secure the Hudson, Delaware, Chesapeake, southern coast, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific, at one and the same time. Nor can we place reliance upon our superior fleet blockading our enemy in his ports. The fallacy of this reliance is exemplified by the sailing of the Yavlan fleet and transports no less than three times without being perceived, and being afloat in the narrow sea of the Mediterranean fifty-two days, notwithstanding all the watchfulness of the English fleet; a single detachment of the enemy's fleet escaping the blockade, sails for any of our harbors, where it must be met either by floating or land batteries. Hence, we have no alternative but a decided superiority, if we place reliance upon floating batteries.

These floating defences are of the most perishable character, and enormously expensive in first cost and repairs, compared with land batteries. To have some idea of the cost of fleets, let us look to the history of Europe.

The French estimate that a ship will last but twelve years; and to have forty ships-of-the-line and fifty frigates in commission, it is necessary to have fiftythree ships-of-the-line and sixty frigates, so great and constant are the necessary repairs. The fact was stated to the French Chamber by C. Dupin, as deduced from their own experience.

The cost of maintaining the French fleet annually, from 1689 to 1789, was averaged...

From 1776 to 1783 was averaged

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$7,808,000

19,400,000

12,600.000

16,700,000

28,000,000

22,000,000

10,200,000

9,600,000

8,640,000

10,800,000

18,053,908

...

1818..do ...

In 1837 the Chambers voted

In 1847.......do ..........

The cost of maintaining the navy of the United States for forty-one years, from 1792 to 1832, inclusive, was $112,097,122, giving an annual average of...

From 1812 to 1815, inclusive, it amounted to

The annual average being (four years).

From 1831 to 1837,..

The annual average being (six years)....

$2,734,076

26,376,215

6,594.053

31,393,151

5,232.191

The cost of maintaining the navy of Great Britain, from 1799 to 1851. (not including 1841 to 1844,) a period of forty-one years, amounts to the sum of.

$2,283,645,277

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These enormous sums enable us to form some judgment of the gradual increase in the annual expenses of maintaining a navy, and the expenses in periods of peace, compared with war. Now let us examine into the magnitude of the fleets of Europe, at different points, to form some idea of the number of ships we must have to secure that superiority that will justify our reliance upon floating defences.

The French fleet, by no means the strongest we are likely to contend with, consists of the following number of large ships at the period stated: In 1789..... .81 ships-of-the-line, and 69 frigates.

March, 1791.

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.67...do.

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..86.

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.78...do.

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1828..
1829..

.59.

..do..

51...do.

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.41...do. only.

July,

At this date she was building eighty ships to restore her navy and replace the rotten and decayed ships.

In 1837 she had one hundred and fifty-three ships afloat, and in 1847 she had two hundred and sixteen ships afloat, sixty-six of which were steamers. The study of the above shows the losses that the vanquished have to sustain from time to time-an item to be more particularly stated hereafter.

The following table gives a more enlarged view of the strength of the different naval powers:

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Fleets of the different nations in 1783, 1793, 1829, and 1840.

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Having now some data upon which to judge of the number of ships we must have as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the defence of our coast, let us now examine the losses that must be sustained by a reliance upon floating defences, as conqueror and conquered.

Loss of the English fleet during the war from 1793 to 1801. Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt:

Ships-of-the-line

Under the line

Total...

20

145

165

Loss of the French, Dutch, Spanish and Danish ships during the same war. Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt:

Ships-of-the-line . . .

Under the line, of which 150 were frigates

Total...

84

234

318

Loss of the English fleet during the war from May, 1803, to July, 1815. Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt:

Ships-of-the-line.

Under the line

Total

13

304

317

U. States.

Loss of the enemy's fleet during the same wars, namely, French, Dutch, Spanish, Danish, Russian, Turkish, and American. Same causes as above:

Ships-of-the-line
Under the line...

Total.....

71

108

179

In our statements of the cost of maintaining fleets, the total expenditure has been given, including wages of seamen, ordnance, &c. To make some comparison between the cost of building fortifications and building ships, the following facts may be useful:

The wear and tear of ships of the English fleet, 1799 to 1819,

inclusive, was

The cost of building and repairing ships during the same period,

was

Total cost of wear and tear and building in 21 years.
Or, an average per annum of.....

The cost of building the ships afloat, comprising the navy of the
United States in 1842, was
The cost of repairs upon the same vessels from time to time, was

Total...

....

$322,849,296

70,789,070

393,638,366

18,744,784

$9,052,725

5,579,229

14,631,984

Here we have the repairs to first cost in the ratio of five and a half to nine. This cost was for fifty vessels, or for five ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates, including two steamers, and thirty-four smaller vessels, mounting in all 1,440 guns. The average cost per gun, repairs included, is $10,161. The average cost per gun, omitting repairs, is $6,286.

But cost of an exclusive reliance upon floating defences is far greater than appears by this statement. To it should be added the cost and repairs put upon the Constellation, Java, Guerriere, two steamers Fulton, and all the other vessels lost, broken up, foundered, &c., of which I can find no account, and which of themselves (the cost) would go far towards building lasting and permanent defences for some of the harbors on our coast.

I would wish to present the cost of the several fortifications on our coast and the repairs from time to time, but have no data therefor. The only fortifications with which I can make the comparison is Fort Schuyler, the cost of which to this date is.............

To this add for completion, (it is now ready to receive its entire armament, and is as defensible as can be made; the work remaining to be done consists in conveniences for the garrison,) say.

Making the sum of.......

$843, 187

50,000

893, 187

This work is to be armed with one hundred and eighty-four guns, producing an average of $4,855 per gun. This single fort, calculated to endure for ages, is considered an equivalent in defence to an enemy's fleet, and a substitute for a fleet of floating batteries, otherwise necessary.

If we look to permanent land batteries for the defence of our harbors, we have at all times a suitable disciplined force in the uniform militia of our cities and towns for their garrisons, ready at short notice to man the guns. On the contrary, for floating defences we must look to the more limited number of sailors, unaccustomed to guns, and to be disciplined for the purpose. There is no room for doubt, in my mind, that we cannot, with due regard to

the safety of our cities, towns, and dock yards, rely upon vessels-of-war and steam batteries, and that economy demands a dependence to be placed in heavy land batteries built in the most permanent manner. The reliance upon ordinary merchant ships and steamers, as well as any other temporary expedient, I consider as no dependence whatever. Let us imagine a small fleet only of such STEAMSHIPS OF THE LINE as that elsewhere described, mounting thirty-two pounders and eight and ten-inch columbiads, and what chance is there against such broadsides for anything that can be made of merchant ships and mercantile steamers? Such vessels are in no manner suited for heavy armaments, and would, in a measure, have to be rebuilt to fit them for defence. Against a single ship-of-the-line, becalmed or anchored in smooth water, we might hope to interpose a formidable resistance with temporary batteries on merchant ships' decks, towed by mercantile steamers; but against several, mutually acting either on the offensive or defensive, and with auxiliary steam power, (or even without,) capable of flanking each other's position, no defence whatever could be placed in them. There is no part of our coast where beneficial results might be better calculated upon from temporary expedients of this character than Louisiana. The ports being built to keep off the enemy's heavy batteries, he must take to his boats. These, when transporting troops, could readily be run down and destroyed by merchant steamers. A hostile army that might have gained the dry land of the Mississippi would be exceedingly annoyed by floating batteries on the decks of ships towed by steamers; but as a defensive, no reliance could be placed upon them. The facility with which field-guns and howitzers could set fire to and destroy such floating expedients is exemplified by the destruction of vessels used by us in the defence of Louisiana in 1814-'15. Where such expedients are unexpected, and no suitable force at hand to contend with them, they are of great value; but let our enemy know that such is our only defence, and he readily commands the means of destroying them.

4th. How far the increase of population on the northern frontier, and of the mercantile and marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the necessity of continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes?

Upon this point I am not so well prepared to present my views fully, having seen but little of the country and possessing few statistical facts upon which to rely.

On the lakes, as on the ocean, we have no need of fortresses to arrest the movements of invading armies. It is against the operations of floating batteries, as in the former case, that we build forts in this section of our country. Had our neighbors no vessels or means of procuring them we would have no need of forts; but we know they possess both a naval and a mercantile marine of steam and sailing vessels, and have fortified positions superior in strength to our own, within which to protect their mercantile marine, and, when occasion offers, to equip them either as transports or armed vessels.

In the event of a war, a desperate effort would be made to seize upon everything afloat in our ports. The same effort we would doubtless make to secure the floating power of our neighbors. We know, however, that Kingston has for years past been fortified, and strong works, I believe, are still in progress for the land and water defences of that harbor. So long as they hold it, we cannot gain the important point of capturing the only means in their possession to annoy us. An invasion into the heart of our country is not likely to be thought of; and if undertaken, must result in the destruction of the invading force by the vast increase and present density of our population.

It would not be possible for an invading army to leave the lake shores beyond a few days' march. With the command of the lakes, our shores and all the towns and important lines of canals and railroads would be at the mercy of an enemy to lay under contribution, or burn and destroy, as might be their policy. Without heavy batteries to combat their fleet, we can offer no successful opposition by our superiority of numbers to such predatory naval expeditions.

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