in safety in our harbors, and harass or even destroy the commerce and property in those harbors.

2d. Because they become dangerous barriers, which an enemy is seldom disposed to leave behind him, the custom of war being to attack fortifications when offensive operations are intended to be carried on by an enemy beyond their localities; and finally, a fortification is the usual depot for all munitions of war, both in implements and provisions. The heavy ordnance, so essential to our present system of defence, could hardly be stored in safety elsewhere, unless at such distances from the seaboard as to render their transportation tardy and perhaps hazardous to the several points where they might be immediately needed. I will close these preliminary remarks by adding, that fortifications give confidence at home and mistrust to an enemy, and compel him to make additional and costly preparations, both in money and time, when he expects to come in contact with them.

I will now proceed to give my views and opinions on the several points enumerated in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, and will discuss these in the order in which they are presented.

1st. I look upon the invention and extension of railroads as of important advantage during a state of war, so far as the rapid transit of both troops and munitions are concerned, but that advantage might be too much depended upon.

Railroads are so easily impaired or destroyed that it would be dangerous to depend entirely upon their use. An enemy would naturally weigh the value or importance of such conveyances, and would offer such high rewards for their destruction as would be likely to meet with success. It is well known that our railroads are generally constructed through the most uninhabited portions of our country, and are in consequence liable to be approached and destroyed by mercenaries, who would run many risks to obtain rewards commensurate with the importance of the undertaking.

I have already remarked that without fortifications our harbors and seaports would be exposed to an enemy's fleet, and I now give it as my opinion that all the facilities afforded by the railroads that centre, for instance, in and about the city of New York would not prevent an enemy's fleet from destroying that city, were it not protected by suitable fortifications. The same result would undoubtedly attend any other of our important commercial cities on the seaboard; this opinion is based upon the supposition that an active and competent naval force would be employed by the enemy to attain these important results by a sudden attack, and that, too, combined with an adequate number of troops in case it would be found necessary to make a simultaneous one.

We have had during the late war with Great Britain many instances to warrant this opinion. I will cite a few of them to show the necessity of fortifications in our harbors.

The defence of Fort McHenry saved the city of Baltimore. The defence of Craney island saved Norfolk and the navy yard at Gosport. The temporary defences at Sandy Hook, New York, prevented the blockading squadron from entering within the waters of the bay, and compelled the ships every evening to make an offing, thereby giving an opportunity to our merchant vessels to slip out of the harbor. These latter defences were insignificant in themselves, but they acted in conjunction with some fifteen or twenty gunboats, each mounting one gun, which were generally anchored in the cove, and ready at any time to co-operate with the fort and block-house erected on the Hook; and had Fort Washington been defended instead of being destroyed, it is my opinion that the Capitol of the Union would have remained unmolested during that war.

2d. The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of steam to vessels-of-war, would seem, in my opinion, to increase the necessity of fortifying our sea-coast. The great advantage of steam power lies more in the certainty of accomplishing an object in a given time than in increasing the strength and

power of an enemy. In other words, an expedition planned for a particular point on our sea-coast by a transatlantic power can be calculated to a day when steam vessels are being employed for the purpose; but those steam vessels, in the presence of or passing our fortifications, are more exposed to be injured by our forts than ships-of-war would be. The machinery of the one cannot be well protected, consequently is easily impaired, and when impaired, the steamer's motive power is either retarded or entirely suspended, whilst the other is so constructed as to be at times crippled in her hull and even her spars by shots without losing much, if any, of her way in passing a battery.

I have just said that the certainty of arriving at a particular point at an appointed time is the advantage obtained by the use of steam in vessels-of-war ; that advantage is a great one, and the only means to counteract it is to have permanent defences where it is likely an enemy would endeavor to surprise any one or more of our seaports.

I believe it to be demonstrable that, with our present system of fortifications, provided, as they are intended to be, with the heaviest mortars, howitzers, and columbiads, the advantage on our side would be increased had we to contend against war steamers instead of ships-of-the-line.

The difference of speed between the two kinds of vessels when within shot distance from our forts is more than counterbalanced by the greater surface offered in the length and breadth of the deck of a steamer, and the constant exposure of her machinery to curved fires.

The machinery of these war steamers is supposed to occupy about one-fifth of the length of the vessel; one single shell or shot passing through that portion of her hull would in all probability injure some part of that machinery, and delay or stay her progress. With our heavy guns we may calculate to reach with certainty and effect an enemy's vessel at the distance of two miles. If that vessel is compelled to pass under our guns, she will, sailing at the rate of twelve miles per hour, be within reach of our pieces, say twenty minutes; in those twenty minutes each gun will, upon an average, discharge twelve shots, consequently a battery of say forty guns will discharge four hundred and eighty shots and shells, which, when directed with skill, will, in most instances, have their effect against passing vessels.

In answering the third point in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, I would say that vessels-of-war would at all times afford important services in the defence of our seaports; and could they be so multiplied as to be found at each port in sufficient numbers to cope, with the assistance of auxiliary means obtained on the spur of the moment, with a powerful naval force, then they would in a measure remove the necessity of creating another species of defence; but this state of things cannot well take place. Our navy can never attain such pre-eminence, and consequently must, while subdivided along the coast, as it will be in time of war, be found in the minority by an invading force, and thereby be compelled to seek for protection under our fortifications. Their co-operating with the defences in our harbors, they will become extremely important and of great assistance.

Steam batteries have often been spoken of, and might, perhaps, be of service where the channel-way is narrow, and can afford them protection from the shores; but in open roadsteads I would not rely much upon them; they necessarily must be slow and unwieldly, and in consequence liable to be turned and even avoided by an active naval force. All other temporary expedients, such as arming merchant ships, steamers, &c., might, perhaps, be made useful for a short time, and upon a particular emergency, but no reliance could be placed upon them. The immense expense attending the transformation of these vessels together with the cost of their imperfect armament, would hardly warrant the introduction of such a doubtful system of casual defence in our large seaports. The havoc which would naturally result to these light vessels, when

engaged with heavy ships-of-the-line and war steamers, would, I am inclined to believe, be extremely disastrous. The expense, moreover, for such temporary means would, I believe, exceed the cost of the permanent fortifications constructed for the same object.

Permit me for a moment to digress, by stating that there is one consideration attending our expenditures for fortifications which, in my opinion, is far from being unimportant to the general welfare of the country, aside from the importance I attach to fortifications as national defences, and which but few, perhaps, have considered; it is, that every article used for our defences is found in a crude state in our country, and generally in the neighborhood of our important works. The manipulation of these materials gives employment to a large and useful class of our citizens, and creates, as it were, a sort of revenue which benefits both the laborer and the government, first by rewarding industry, and that industry, by the natural course of things, bringing back to the aid of the general government portions of the revenue which that industry enables the laborer to obtain from abroad through our custom-houses. For instance, a quarry, when worked, requires many hands; these hands, devoting all their time to their arduous labor, find it necessary to exchange the price of that labor for the necessaries of life, hence imported goods of many kinds must find a market with them. The manufacturers of bricks, cement, lime, lumber, iron, and other materials used in the construction of our fortifications come under the same rule, and, independent of the mechanics and laborers employed in our public works, form a large and useful class of our citizens, all returning to the general fund a portion of revenue created, in fact, only by their industry.

I name this fact to show that, although many look upon our system of defence as costly, yet the advantages of it, independent of the security it affords to the country in a military point of view, are substantial and important to the community at large, inasmuch as they create a revenue by bringing out the latent resources of the country.

The fourth point relates to our northern frontier and its defences. I can but look upon that frontier as an exposed one, and consequently requiring the watchful eye and fostering care of the government. Our neighbors have been diligently employed since the war of 1814 in strengthening her borders, and many vast improvements have been made by them to keep pace with our increasing strength in population on the lakes. Their population, too, is increasing, and the Welland canal has removed obstacles which gives them now the advantage of an inland navigation from the St. Lawrence through to all the lakes. If there ever was a time when a system of defences planned and executed for the protection of our extensive northern frontier, it is the present one, when we can weigh the advantages that could be derived from the great improvements already in evidence on the opposite side of the lakes. If Great Britain should ever hereafter be found at war with us, a portion of the naval force would be found on the lakes, and interfering with our frontier towns and cities and our inland commerce. The redundancy of her population at home would naturally place at her disposal the means of increasing her forces in those inland seas, and by a system of locomotive warfare disturb and annoy a population numerically much stronger than the forces she would oppose to them.

To meet this state of things it would seem indispensable to fortify permanently certain points in our northern frontier, not only for the protection of those positions, and as depots for provisions and munitions of war, but as great rallying points for the militia and other troops.

The remarks I have already made upon the subject of national defences for the seaboard, in connexion with auxiliary means, will apply to the lake defences so far as the mercantile marine is concerned; they might become of use if supported or protected by permanent fortifications, but left to themselves they could hardly be expected to cope with vessels-of-war.

In the war of 1812 and 1814 the ascendency on the lakes between the British navy and ours fluctuated according to the number of vessels constructed and the time they took their element; one single vessel added to the one or the other would give, for the time being, the preponderance to that side; but the time is past when we ought to think of adopting the same system, since, by the vigilance of Great Britain, she has opened the way for any number of armed vessels she may be able to spare from her own coast. These circumstances would, of themselves, seem to indicate the necessity of fortifying the vulnerable as well as the important points on the lakes.

The few defences temporarily erected during that war on the northern frontier bore testimony of their great usefulness in checking the enemy's ingress. At Plattsburg, for instance, when our navy, protected under the guns of the forts, gained a brilliant victory over the enemy; Sir George Prevost, with an army of fourteen thousand men, found there an opposition which compelled him to retreat precipitately, leaving his sick and wounded at the mercy of the American general commanding. Thus a garrison of fourteen hundred men, which was the force of General Macomb, within well planned defences, protected our navy on Lake Champlain, and taking the offensive as well as the defensive, compelled an army of fourteen thousand men to abandon the project of invading the country, which was understood to be the avowed intention of the British commander.

Many other instances of the kind occurred during that war which could be mentioned to show the importance of works of defence on our inland borders. In conclusion, permit me to say that to protect the lives of its citizens is a high consideration with every government, but with none can it be so important as with ours, when it is considered that our population is yet too thin and sparse to furnish large masses for war services. We must, in consequence, use all means at our disposal to reduce the number of troops required for active service in time of war, and these should, so far as practicable, be protected by these means; I know of none more effectual for this important object than permanent fortifications. By multiplying them you relieve a portion of your useful citizens from the perils and hardships incident to the fields of battle, and leave them at home to pursue their useful avocations.

In presenting this feeble view of the subject, could I persuade myself that any portion of it would be acceptable or useful to the honorable the Secretary of War, it would be most gratifying to me; as imperfect as it is, I submit it with all respect.

Brigadier General Jos. G. TOTTEN,

R. E. DE RUSSY, Lieutenant Colonel Engineers.

Chief Engineer of the United States, Washington.

No. 9.

Report of Major W. H. Chase.

CHASEFIELD, NEAR PENSACOLA, April 17, 1861.

The undersigned, in compliance with the orders of the Secretary of War, communicated through the chief engineer, has the honor to submit to the War Department the following views and opinions of the subject embraced in the first resolution of the series adopted by the House of Representatives of the United States during its session on the 3d of March, 1851.

In viewing "the general system adopted after the war with Great Britair, and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then deemed necessary for the national defence," it will be relevant to the subject to allude to the condition of that defence when the United States declared themselves independent of Great Britain, and prepared to sustain that declaration by force of arms during the period of peace from 1783 to 1812, and during the war of 1812–215. In the first period the defences on the seaboard of the colonies, extending from Nova Scotia to Florida, were confined to a few points. England having driven the French from their North American colonies, had little fear of any future attempt on the part of France either to regain her lost possessions or to attack the other possessions of England in America.

In the course of the war of independence the English were driven in succession from Boston, New York, Yorktown, and other places, and finally from the whole country, by which the power of the United States, even in its incipiency to resist aggression from the most powerful of nations, was favorably exhibited. Few or no additional sea-coast defences were constructed during the war, yet the public and private armed ships, issuing from the ports of the United States, did immense injury to British commerce, and even kept the whole western coasts of England and Scotland in constant alarm. Some hastily raised redoubts on Dorchester heights, compelled the English to retreat from Boston with their fleet and army; and the castle defending the entrance to the harbor, falling into the hands of the Americans, together with some temporary erections of earth on the surrounding heights and islands, secured Boston from again being occupied by the enemy. Charleston was successfully defended by the Palmetto fort against a squadron of ships; and the success generally of the Amercan arms up to the surrender of Yorktown, demonstrated, if not the impossibility of reducing the colonies to subjection, at least the enormous expenditure of life and money attendant on the attempt.

This truth led, with other things, to a change of policy in England in regard to the United States. The new administration made peace with the colonies; and the wise statemen of England saw that an intimate commercial intercourse with the United States as an independent power would probably be more advantageous to the interests of their country than the possession of colonies that would require much blood and treasure to regain and hold; whilst the trade with the same would be interrupted and precarious. The foundation of this policy was the preservation for the future of uninterrupted friendly relations between England and America; and it was the determination of the party in power to secure at all hazards and at all times peace with the United States.

But unfortunately for a strict adherence to these views, the great wars growing out of the French revolution placed England in position to struggle for her very existence as an independent power; and in the course of the contest principles in relation to neutrality were adopted, and so rigidly adhered to, that the interests and honor of neutral nations, and of the United States in particular, were compromised. In persisting to assert her arrogant pretensions, the government of England was deceived by its diplomatic agents and friends as to the effect produced in America. These, judging of the strength of the party in opposition to Mr. Madison's administration, and of the talent and influence of the principal men of that party, constantly represented to the English government that the President would not recommend to Congress a declaration of war against England in the face of the powerful party opposed to such a measure. A secretary of legation in Washington was the only correspondent of the English ministry who understood the exact state of things in the United States. He repeatedly advised the minister of foreign affairs that the latter was not correctly informed of the feeling in America; and that, unless the orders in council were revoked and other obnoxious measures and acts abated, war would certainly be declared against England by the United States.