dom; and (2), in lieu of the present Papal regime, to introduce a popular Assembly, with provincial and municipal councils, a new code of laws, a new revenue system, &c. Not unnaturally, the Cabinet of Vienna declined to join in demanding of the Papal Government so entire a revolution, and so high-handed a subversion of the immemorial status of the Supreme Pontiff. But it was ready to join France in urging upon the Papal Government some specified changes of a less sweeping kind. Napoleon III. would not consent to modify his demands: indeed, he was probably well pleased to get an opportunity for ranging himself on this point in direct opposition to Austria. The game progressed. Last July, when the Emperor was at Plombières, Count Cavour (of course by previous arrangement) came to visit him, and doubtless gave satisfactory assurances as to the policy which Sardinia would follow in the event of an Italian war, and after it. The nature of the understanding then come to between the Sardinian Prime-Minister and the French Emperor may be seen in the warlike and provocative attitude hereafter assumed by Sardinia; as well as by the extraordinary armaments at present going on in the French arsenals, and the great concentration of troops at Lyons, close to the passes of the Alps. In this manner have Napoleon's designs upon Italy been gradually progressing for the last three years; and now the curtain is apparently about to rise on the last act.

It is needless to say that the Sardinian Government is ardently on the side of the French Emperor in this matter. Victor Emmanuel and his prime-minister are both devoured by the desire to emancipate Italy from the rule of the Austrians, and to form all Northern Italy into a united monarchy, of which Victor Emmanuel shall be king. With a view to this she has for several years burdened herself with a greater military establishment than her revenue is able to support, and her journals have never ceased to excite hatred to Austria. "Count Cavour wishes for war," said the Marquis de Beauregard in the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies during the debate on the loan,

"and he will do his utmost to provoke it. In the perilous situation in which his policy has placed us, war presents itself to his mind as the only possible chance of honourable liberation from the alarming debt that crushes us, and of fulfilling the engagements he has undertaken." "To speak candidly," said the Count della Margherita on the same occasion (Feb. 9), “if, since 1849, we had quietly attended to the development of our institutions, if we had made it our chief care to promote science, art, and commerce within our own limits; if we had not extraordinarily increased the taxes, if we had not held out allurements to the factions in all parts of Italy, and evoked hopes which for eight centuries have been nourished in vain; if we had thought more of improving our own lot than of censuring and causing anxiety to other Governments, we should not have the name of agitators, nor should we see the plains of Lombardy inundated with Austrian bands; rumours of war would not arise on the shores of the Ticino." As Count Cavour, in his circular to the European Governments, pretends to regard Austria as the aggressor, and alleges that the military preparations of Sardinia have been forced upon her, and are purely of a defensive kind, we may quote one more passage from this interesting debate. Count Revel, who voted for the loan on the ground that "Austria has assumed an attitude which I will not call hostile, but which is very suspicious," nevertheless felt constrained to add that "this was the consequence, if not of the public acts of the Government, at least of the generality of the press, of the generality of the menaces, of the generality of unconcealed proposals, with which it was wished that Austria might be attacked by us." Count Cavour is a man of the highest ability, of indefatigable energy, and of most fearless determination. In answer to the recriminations of the Opposition, he proclaimed to the Chambers that the speech of the Emperor of the French" gave to the policy of Piedmont a solemn and complete approbation." And beyond doubt in his mind the die is already cast. The Court of Turin has made every sacrifice in order to induce a

war and to be ready for it. The king has given his daughter, a girl of fifteen, in marriage to a French Prince whom she had never seen, and of whom she could have heard nothing so very favourable as to compensate for the want of personal acquaintance. And now it is reported that the King intends to sacrifice himself also in a similar way. Having made a family alliance with Napoleon III., he meditates a similar alliance with the Czar. At first it was said that the object of his choice was the Grand-duchess Maria of Russia, eldest daughter of the late Czar, and widow of Prince Leuchtenberg, who is now in Italy, and who is a few months older than the King; but as this princess has formed a morganatic marriage with a Count Strogonoff, such a union was impossible. But the Grand-duchess has a daughter, likewise named Maria, now in her eighteenth year; and it is to her that the royal widower of Turin has made his matrimonial proposals, through the Marquis of Alfieri. It is confidently stated that these proposals have been accepted, and that the apartments of the late Queen are already undergoing repair and embellishment preparatory to the marriage. It is clear that whatever can be done will be done by Count Cavour and his royal master in order to advance the aggressive enterprise upon which they have set their mind. Sardinia, they know, even if supported by the Italians, is not strong enough to wrest Lombardy from the Austrians; and hence they seize every means to obtain the aid of powerful allies.

Russia hardly requires the silken ties of a family alliance to make her regard with complacency the projects of Sardinia. She has ends of her own which will be served by this attack upon Austria. At the close of the late war, the Russian Government vowed in its wrath that it would annihilate the empire of the Hapsburgs on the first opportunity, in order that such an obstacle might no longer stand in the way of Russia's ambitious designs upon Turkey. The late Czar had reckoned that he could entirely rely upon the cooperation of Austria in his attack upon the "sick man "-that co

operation being expected on the understanding that Austria would be aggrandised by the annexation of the north-western provinces of Turkey, as Russia would be by appropriating the north-eastern region, including Constantinople. Austria, however, when it came to the push, listened to the counsels of England, and thought it wiser to forego her own share of the spoil rather than allow her colossal neighbour to get in his paw. For this "desertion at so critical a time, the Russians vowed direst vengeance. But notwithstanding these vows of profound irritation, we question whether Russia, even if an opportunity present itself, will seek to carry out her threat of destruction to Austria. Were the Austrian Empire dissolved into its heterogeneous component parts, a state of matters would arise which might prove very embarrassing to Russia, and which at present she is quite unprepared to face. Russia's true policy, it seems to us, is not to seek the destruction of Austria, but to weaken her just so far as to render her a pliant tool in the hands of the czars, to strip her of territory to such an extent as to make her unable any longer to match herself against Russia, and willing to recover her strength by joining in the spoliation of Turkey. Thus to weaken Austria will be enough for Russia; and this is just what France and Sardinia propose to do by wresting from her Lombardy. Russia accordingly seems disposed to countenance this project. Indeed the Peace of Paris was hardly signed before Russia showed signs of wishing to annoy Austria on the side of Italy. Sardinia, for the sake of associating herself with the great allied Powers, in grandiose contrast to the neutrality of Austria, had fought against Russia without any very obvious interest in the contest herself; yet so entirely passionless are great diplomatists, attending simply to self-interest, that, finding a common bond of union in hatred of Austria, the Court of St Petersburg quite overlooked the recent hostility of Sardinia, and made it one of the objects of Russian policy to come to a good understanding with the Court of Turin. Accordingly, one after another, members of the imperial

family of Russia betook themselves to the Sardinian territories "on account of their health;" and by the interviews and courtesies interchanged between them and the Court of Turin, an entente cordiale was established, which speedily showed itself by Sardinia taking the part of Russia in the Bolgrad difficulty of the boundary question, and more recently in assigning to her use the important Sardinian harbour of Villafranca. What sentiments of policy were interchanged at Paris between the Grand-duke Constantine and the Emperor Napoleon, in the visit paid by the former on his return from Sardinia, cannot be known. But from all the indications that Russia has yet given of her leanings, it may be inferred that she is not disposed to take the opposite side from France in this formidable Italian question.

As regards France, it is unquestionable that the commercial classes are entirely opposed to any rupture of the existing tranquillity; yet it is equally certain that the army would hail with joy the advent of hostilities. And considering that the French Government, though founded by universal suffrage, is actually a military despotism, the wishes of the army, at least in the present question, may be regarded as quite as influential with the Emperor as that of the trading community. More than once the public feeling has been against contemplated acts of the Emperor,--but the acts took place. He is now too firmly seated on the throne to be unseated by a passing breath of unpopularity; and, confident in the wisdom of his policy, he can afford to wait till the public is convinced by the good result. Hitherto the good result has always come, and he has risen steadily, more and more, in the opinion of the nation. He is resolved to take the same course now, and, relying on his calculations, to let the public be converted to his side by the irresistible logic of events. Of all possible wars, one like the present is best calculated to enlist the suffrages of Frenchmen. To extend French influence over Italy has always been part of the "traditional policy" of France; and to wage a war for the "liberation" of Italy is

a more captivating way of doing the thing than any other that could be devised. Such an enterprise would persuade France that she is still the champion of freedom, although she takes so little of it to herself. And if this war with Austria be successful, what glory to revive the memories of Marengo and Castiglione, and see the white uniforms of Austria once more refluent before the eagles of a Napoleon! Indeed, we should not be surprised to see the Emperor himself take the field in such a war. Of all men in Europe, not soldiers, there is no one who has so assiduously studied the art of war as the French Emperor: indeed, we question whether any of his marshals ever pondered the history and science of their profession with more profound thought. Any one in his position would gladly have his brows encircled by martial laurels ; but, in addition to this, his whole nature is such as to make him burn to distinguish himself in that arena where genius and power are developed in their grandest and most terrible form-in the strategy of the campaign, and the disciplined rush of the battlefield. It has been remarked that, in unison with the altered tone of the Imperial speeches, there has occurred a change in the Imperial costume. Napoleon III. now imitates, as far as modern fashion permits, the dress of his uncle; and, contemporaneously with the dropping of "L'empire c'est la paix," he has begun to ride about daily in the streets of Paris attired in the grey redingote, the war-dress of his uncle. Does the Emperor indeed contemplate trying in person the fortunes of war, and on the same fields which witnessed the first victories of Napoleon the Great?

But, let it be observed, it is not from personal inclination, nor even from the ordinary motives which impel monarchs to warlike aggression, that Napoleon III. is now bent upon carrying this Italian question to a violent solution. A necessity drives him on. He foresees a great danger ahead, and he is resolved to evade by anticipating it. Italy cannot remain long in its present condition without a revolutionary outbreak taking place; and it would be the ruin of Napoleon III. if such

a revolution were to surprise him in his present position. It was French troops which annihilated the Roman Republic; it is French troops which have kept down " Italian liberty" in Rome ever since. And if a revolutionary movement like that of 1848 were again to extend over the peninsula, Napoleon III. and his troops at Rome would have no alternative but to act against it. If the revolution were for a moment successful, it would almost to a certainty excite similar movements in other countries-probably in France itself; and Napoleon III., the elect of the people," would be ruined by being forced to play the despot pur et simple. Even if the revolutionary movement were confined to Italy, and were to find the Napoleonic legions supporting the Papal despotism in Rome, the issue would be most disastrous to the prestige, and most obstructive to the future projects of the French Emperor. Hence his resolute desire to free himself from this embarrassing position. Hence his anxiety now to get his troops withdrawn from Rome, or at least to assume an attitude which may free him from the charge of being the supporter of despotism and a foe to the liberties of Italy. His dread is, to be surprised by another 1848: and observe how his present policy is designed to extricate him from the difficulty. After having for ten years played the despot at Rome, he now comes forward to champion the cause of Italian freedom. He declares that he is most anxious to withdraw his troops from the Italian soil; he demands that Austria shall equally evacuate the Papal territories; and also demands that Austria shall agree to force upon the Papal Government the adoption of "reforms" of so sweeping a nature as of themselves to amount to a revolution. This is the ground upon which he founds his quarrel with Austria. But, as regards these proposals of reforms, the French Emperor has not only made them such as Austria can hardly accept, but in his pamphlet he has studiously endeavoured to make it impossible for her to accept them. He desires a war, in which he would appear as the liberator of Italy. For, such a war, if successful, would

not only greatly gratify the pride and extend the influence of France, but it would entirely obviate the outburst of that new revolution which the Emperor dreads, and of which the elements already exist in other quarters besides Italy. The whole Italian nation would regard Napoleon III. as their champion; the party of Mazzini would disappear, or, if they dared to raise their head, would instantly be struck down by the mailed hand of France and Sardinia. In short, the French Emperor is going to war in order to avert revolution. As he "discounted" the intended Socialist revolt in France in 1852 by the coup-d'état of December 1851, so he proposes to discount the Italian revolution by an immediate Italian war. Adopting the principle of Dr Jenner, he proposes to avert a peril by bringing on the disease which he dreads at his own time and in a (to him) less dangerous form.

It is a masterly conception. Supposing even that there be no war, and even that Austria successfully resists the adoption of the reforms which he has proposed-still, Napoleon III. will at least have freed himself from the odium of the Italians, and will have paved the way for siding with, and thereby controlling, any revolutionary movement that may take place. Again, if the pressure of the other European Powers make Austria accede to reforms, the triumph will be entirely his,

for he has taken pains to proclaim to the world the demands which he has made. Or if, as is more likely, the issue be war, the chances are again very much in his favour, and the consequences of success to him would be incalculable. In addition to the popular movement throughout Italy by which his enterprise would be seconded, there is available to him a strategetical operation which was never in the power of his uncle. During the wars of the first Revolution, the seas were wholly in possession of the British fleets, and Napoleon I. had to confine his strategy entirely to the land; whereas now (England standing neutral) Napoleon III. may transport his legions to any part of the Italian coast. And if the immense fleet and flotilla of

war which he is preparing be able to effect the landing of an army at the head of the Adriatic, such a manouvre would take in rear all the formidable fortresses and river-lines of Lombardy, and, if successful, would cause the Austrian forces to evacuate the entire valley of the Po and retire to the Passes of the Alps. Napoleon III, will not seek to push Austria to extremities (his policy is never to push any Power to extremities); and Hardinia and the Italians may rely upon it that he will stop short in the enterprise whenever it suits himself, and compel them also to do the same. Just as he refused to go along with England and Turkey in the war with Russia, after the French arms had been "covered with glory" by the capture of Sebastopol, so assuredly will the Italians find him resolved to stop short in the "liberation of Italy," as soon as he thinks best for himself. Triumphs by short wars and diplomacy are the means upon which he Aelios to aggrandise himself.

If Napoleon III. plunge into this war, ho will aim at making it a short one; and it will also be one of the first requisitos in his eyes that it be not allowed to overpass the limits of Italy and assume a European charao for giving rise to unforeseeable conjunctures He must wish it to be an Tralian war contined to Italy; and he Will seek to insure this by a previous understanding with Russia, the inthuence of which great Power, if exerted in unison with the objects of France, will wholly neutralise the influence of Great Britain and Prussia on the other side. If he have come to an understanding with Russia, to the effect that Russia will have no objection to the French army assisting Sardinia, provided the war be not allowed to assume a revolutionary character, and if Russia be not disinclined to see her hated neighbour weakened by the loss of Lombardy, then Napoleon has a clear field before him, and may reckon upon being able to follow it up without any material opposition from the other Powers. Great Britain and Prussia will send protocols, but no troops; and the French Emperor, coolly assuring them that he is fighting merely to "consolidate the ace of Europe," by removing one

of the disturbing conditions, will prosecute his game to its close. At present the available strength of our fleet is no more than equal to that of France, and far below that of the fleets of France and Russia united. The British fleet could most seriously obstruct the military plans of the French Emperor with it against him, indeed, we do not believe that he could ever force his way through the bristling fortresses and riverlines of Lombardy to the Carinthian Alps. And probably it is on the threat of a naval alliance between France and Russia against us, if we venture to interfere, that he reckons most confidently to secure our nonintervention. This war with Austria he regards as a neat little enterprise that can be carried on while the rest of Europe is at peace; and now is the time when it might be executed most successfully. Once the disintegration of the Turkish empire fairly begins-and it cannot be delayed above a few years the alliances of the European Powers will probably undergo another change, and in any case France will then have important work on her hands of another kind. Now, when Russia is willing to see Austria weakened, and when none of the other Powers can well interfere, is the time for the French Emperor to win brilliant renown for himself as the "Liberator of Italy," and also to gain a powerful position in the Italian peninsula, such as may be turned to good account in the farther and grander strife that is likely to ensue when the Ottoman empire falls to pieces, and the Powers of Christendom quarrel as to the distribution of the spoil.

In the threatening aspect of the hour, the British Government has a difficult and momentous part to play. Great Britain has long befriended Italy. For the last half-centuryever since the Battle of Maida shook the tyrannous domination of Napoleon I. in Southern Italy, and first taught his army the terrors of a charge of British bayonets, it is to England that the Italians have looked for sympathy and support in their yearn ings after internal reforms. England has literally been the only the world that has cam and moved on their