Fort Royal." The correction, however, is of little importance to this discussion. The contest was in no way one between ships and batteries. The defences of the island were taken by an overwhelming land force. Rochambeau, although his army was much inferior in numbers, made a defence which was far from being satisfactory to the republican government. Being regarded as a traitor to his country, he never ventured to return to France.

Political animosities run so high that the French generals would not act in concert; and, on the retreat, the forces of General Bellegarde were refused admittance into the fort. Dr. Campbell expressly states, that the conquest was attempted "in consequence of the disputes which existed between the royalists and republicans."

"Havana, attacked and taken in 1763 by Admiral Pocock;" the "castle on the beach was first silenced by Captain Harvey, in the Dragon," &c. The taking of Havana, mentioned above, was effected almost entirely by land forces, under Lord Albemarle, the ships acting as transports. The following details of this attack are taken from the British reports and histories of the affair: The attacking force consisted of 22 or 23 ships-of-the-line, carrying near 1,600 guns; 20 frigates, carrying about 600 guns; a large number of sloops-of-war, bomb vessels, artillery ships, and transports-203 sail in all-with a land force of 12,000 efficient men, and a considerable body of negroes. The Havana was defended by 4,610 regulars, and some militia, mulattoes, and negroes-number not known. The naval defences consisted of 12 ships-of-the-line, carrying 784 guns, and 5 smaller vessels, making in all 908 guns. But little or no use was made of this home squadron in the defence, and it was surrendered to the enemy on the capitulation. "So little confidence," says the British account, “had they (the Spaniards) in their shipping, for resisting the efforts of the English armament, that the only use they made of it was to sink three of their largest vessels behind a boom, which they had thrown across the mouth of the harbor." The defences against a water attack consisted of the Governor's battery of 22 guns, the Apostles and Shepherds' batteries of 14 guns, the Moro of 40 guns, and the Punta, a small work opposite. The works of Havana against a land attack were large, but not strong. The principal defence both by land and water was the Moro, which was a small work, armed with only 40 guns of all descriptions, and garrisoned by 280 regulars, 300 marines, and 94 negroes.

The British troops were landed several miles from the Moro, to which they laid formal siege, and, forty-four days after the opening of the trenches, forced it to capitulate. The town of Havana also capitulated after a siege of “two months and eight days." The "castle on the beach," said to have been "silenced by Captain Harvey, in the Dragon," was a small unimportant work, some six miles from the Havana, and used merely to harass the English while crossing the Coximar. Little or no defence was made, and the English themselves have never thought of claiming the slightest credit for its capture. No loss is mentioned as having been sustained on either side; but "Captain Harvey, in the Dragon," and two other shpis-of-the-line, carrying in all 222 guns, did, during the land siege of the Moro, make an attack upon its water front. "They began," says the official report of Admiral Pocock, "to cannonade about 8 o'clock; and after keeping up a constant fire till 2 p. m., the Cambridge was so much damaged in her hull, masts, yards, sails, and rigging, with the loss of so many men killed and wounded, that it was thought proper to order her off; and soon after, the Dragon, which had likewise suffered a loss of men, and damage in her hull; and it being found that the Marlborough could be of no longer service, she was ordered off likewise. The numbers in killed and wounded are as follows: Dragon-16 killed, 37 wounded; Cambridge-24 killed, 95 wounded; Marlborough-2 killed, 8 wounded." The castle, on the contrary, received no injury worth mentioning from this water attack, which

was the last and only important trial of strength between the ships and forts made during the siege.

"The Cape of Good Hope-taken by the British fleet, and the commerce of the States ruined in those seas."-The conquest here alluded to was probably that of 1795; but this was effected wholly by troops landed at a distance from any defensive works; and the ships, after effecting this landing, were anchored in Simon's bay, six miles from the encampment of Muysenburg, and at a considerable distance from Cape Town. The British fleet carried about 600 guns, and the only forts that could have been engaged with it were two small batteries one armed with two guns, and the other with one gun and a mortar.

That the naval forces assisted indirectly in this conquest cannot be denied, for they transported the troops which effected it, and also met at sea and defeated a Dutch squadron of eight men-of-war, 342 guns, which had been sent out to join in the defence; but it is well known that these forces were never immediately engaged in the attack. This has been so decided by judicial authority; for, when the admiralty put in a claim for a share in the profits of the capture, it was rejected by Sir William Scott, because no ships of a military character had assisted the army in this valuable capture.

The expedition of 1806 consisted of nine ships-of-war, carrying above 270 guns, and 5,000 troops. But here, again, the conquest was effected entirely by land forces. A detachment of sailors and marines served with the troops on shore, under the designation of marine battalion; but the fleet itself acted merely in the capacity of protecting transports, and no trial of strength was made between them and land batteries.

"Malta was taken by the French fleet, which sailed into the harbor, and carried the city during the panic."-This statement of the conquest of Malta in 1798 certainly furnishes no argument for the position in support of which it has been adduced; for, if the island was lost through panic, it could not have been taken merely by the superiority of guns afloat over those on shore. But, in reality, panic was not the cause of no defence being made by the Maltese. It has been generally understood that, preferring the French to the English, the grand master and knight had previously agreed with Napoleon for its surrender. This is positively asserted by the English historians, and not contradicted by the other parties. The grand master retired from the island on its capture, for the sum of 1,000,000 livres, and the promise of an annual pension for life, of 3,000 more from the French treasury. Napoleon himself confesses that, although he then commanded forty vessels-of-war, and4 0,000 troops, he would have found it very difficult to reduce the fortifications of Malta, if the moral strength had been any ways equal to the capability of physical resistance.

Malta was attacked by the Turks in 1565 with 200 sail and above 40,000 troops, mostly Janissaries and Sophis, who were the bravest troops in the Ottoman Empire. The island was defended by 700 knights and 8,500 soldiers. The siege was continued for four months, and scarcely a day elapsed without some attempt to batter down or storm the fortifications; but the Turks were at last compelled to raise the siege and retire with the loss of a considerable portion of their shipping and more than a quarter of their men—or, in other words, the number of their losses was more than equal to the garrison of the island!

"Curaçoa was stormed and taken by Sir Charles Brisbane with four small ships, boarding the castle at the entrance from his boats."-The following is the account of this capture, as given by the English historians: Captain Brisbane was directed "to watch the island of Curaçoa, and interrupt the trade of the enemy. While employed on this service, he learnt that the Dutch had a custom of drinking out the old year and drinking in the new one; he therefore conceived the possibility of taking it by a coup-de-main." Accordingly, about the dawn of day on the 1st of January, 1807, with a squadron of four frigates, carrying 176 guns and 1,200 men, he entered the harbor of Amsterdam, and

anchored; the governor and his garrison were at this time in bed, made by the revels of the night utterly unconscious of all danger. The harbor was well secured by fortifications; but the only resistance made by these was the firing of five shot from Fort Republique. All of these shot took effect, killing and wounding fifteen men, which was the only loss the British sustained. Captain Brenton, in his Naval History, says that this fort alone might have sunk every one of the enemy's frigates in half an hour, without any comparative injury. But, instead of defending his fortifications, the drunken governor, under pretence of fearing a negro insurrection, but in reality not yet being awoke from his revels, forbid any resistance to be made to the English, because, he said, they had come merely as friends! The forts were therefore given up, and the squadron of Dutch ships then lying in the harbor, with a number of guns almost equal to the British fleet, also surrendered without opposition, the principal portion of the crews being yet asleep. The English themselves say that scarcely the slightest resistance was made by the drunken crews and garrisons. The argument attempted to be drawn by the Apalachicola report from this attack would be equally conclusive of the general superiority of guns afloat over each other; for the Dutch forts and ship were overcome in the same way—a conquest due to Bacchus rather than Mars. No case could possibly be adduced more inconclusive and inapplicable to the argument.

"Chagres taken in [1740?] 1741, by Admiral Vernon."-The British fleet, at the taking of Chagres, consisted of three sixty-gun ships, three fifty-gun ships, three bomb-ketches, two fire ships, and two tenders, carrying in all, 374 guns and 2,500 men; while the works of defence were armed with only eleven brass cannon and eleven pateroes, or small stone mortars-an inequality of fifteen or twenty to one. Of the eleven guns in the fort, only six or eight could be brought to bear on the shipping; but, notwithstanding the small armament of the castle of St. Lorenzo, "it sustained a furious bombardment (from the bomb-ketches) and a continued cannonade from three of the largest ships in the fleet" for thirty-six hours. Is there anything in this capture to authorize an inference of naval superiority, gun for gun?

"Senegal taken from the English by a small French squadron."-This capture was made in 1799. The French fleet consisted of two ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and three smaller vessels, with a considerable body of troops, under the Duke de Lauzun. The English garrison was too small to sustain an attack. They therefore determined to make no defence, and the fort was surrendered without resistance. In the same year, the English attempted to retake it with a fleet of six ships-of-the-line and one smaller vessel, carrying in all over 400 guns; but their efforts were of no avail. In the first attack, there was no trial of strength between the ships and fort; in the second, there was such a trial, and the forts were victorious.

Mocha, in Arabia, bombarded and taken by Captain Lumly with one frigate."-We give the English the benefit of their own account of this affair. The defence consisted of a small work, armed with only twelve guns, and garrisoned by about 300 Arabs. The character of the work may be drawn from the following remark of the British officer: "With a few spades and pick-axes we would have levelled the walls and effected a breach." But they had no mining tools, and were obliged to attempt a breach with their guns. The attacking force consisted of a fifty-gun frigate, a brig, two cruisers, and a mortar boat, with a land force of one company of artillery. In the evening, "the ships anchored as close as possible to the fort," and about 10 o'clock the next day, after a long and "brisk cannonade," the English landed and attempted to carry the little work by assault: but, "to their surprise and mortification, found there was no breach; the wall had been a little injured by their shot, but remained as firm and inaccessible as ever;" they were consequently repelled with a loss of thirty men. On the second morning they renewed the assault, but found no

one in the fort—the Arabs had deserted. The ships were not once fired upon by the fort, and we suppose there was no means of doing it, for the cold shot thrown over the walls at the storming party were the same the ships had fired into the work. The fort, when taken, was but slightly injured, and the garrison unharmed as long as they remained inside.

"Sumatra, Java, and the rich city of Manilla."-A battle was fought by the English and Dutch fleets, in the harbor of Java, in 1807, but the land batteries took little or no part in the contest. The English had eight ships-of-war, carrying four hundred guns; and the Dutch only nine small vessels, carrying one hundred and forty guns. The Dutch shipping, including twenty merchant vessels, were destroyed. This place was again attacked in 1811, by an army fitted out at Madras, numbering a little more than twelve thousand men, one-half of whom were Europeans. The naval force consisted of four ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates, and seven sloops, carrying nine hundred and twenty-two guns; besides eight cruisers, fifty-seven transports, and some gunboats-making in all a fleet of one hundred sail. The defence consisted of the combined French and Dutch forces of Generals Jansens and Daendels, numbering in all between eight and ten thousand men; but the latter were too disaffected with the French to be of any service in the defence, and indeed a portion of them soon deserted to the new invaders. The British troops and a party of seamen and marines landed upon an undefended part of the island, twelve miles from Batavia, attacked General Jansens, and, after an obstinate contest of two months, forced him to surrender. The contest was wholly upon land; the ships were not once brought into action against the forts, and in no way whatever could it be regarded as a naval attack. The capture of Manilla, alluded to in the report, was that, we suppose, of 1762; but this capture was effected entirely by land forces, ships not entering into the contest at all. All that was required of the navy, says Dr. Campbell, was a light frigate to transport Colonel Draper and his command. This force amounted to two thousand three hundred effective land troops, and a body of seamen and marines, arranged into companies like soldiers. The defences of Manilla were small, incomplete, and garrisoned by only eight hundred Spaniards, and defended by some thirty pieces of brass cannon; they had also two pieces of field artillery! The Indians, being undiciplined and entirely unacquainted with the use of fire-arms, could be of little value in the defence. The English writers say that the garrison were wholly unprepared for an attack, not even knowing of the declaration of war. The place was besieged in form; its guns being silenced by the land batteries, it was carried by a storming party of three thousand men, issuing from the second parallel.

"Madras, Calcutta, Pondicherry, Ceylon, were all taken by the British fleets."-The bare fact of some town having been reduced by some certain fleet would hardly seem decisive of the general question of comparative strength; yet such is the purpose for which the above is adduced. There is not one single feature in the East India conquests that can be regarded as confirming, in any degree, the positions of the Apalachicola report. These conquests were made from the rude natives of the country, or from Europeans while distracted by political broils. Ceylon, for instance, was summoned to surrender to the crown of England, to be held in trust for the stadtholder. Columbo, the seat of government, obeyed without the least resistance, and ordered the other towns to do the same. The governor of Trincomallé "merely required the formation of a camp and the firing of a few shot as a justification of his conduct in surrendering the fort intrusted to his command. The fort of Osnaburg, standing on a hill, and commanding the entrance to the harbor, surrendered without firing a shot." When Pondicherry was reduced by Colonel Floyd, in 1793, the fleet merely acted as a blockading force, cutting off all supplies and reinforcements from France. The only breaches in the fort were made by the land batteries; these had considerably injured it; "still, however," says the English historian,

"its strength, both by nature and art was such that the conquest might have required a considerable length of time, and been attended with no small difficulty and loss, had not disputes between the royalist and republican parties taken place in the garrison, in consequence of which it was compelled to surrender." This place had been previoualy attacked (in 1748) by 5,000 Europeans and 2,000 native troops, and a fleet of five ships, carrying six hundred and sixty-six guns, under Admiral Boscawen. The water defences of Pondicherry could carry only one hundred guns in all; and yet, although the blockade was continued for several months, the attempt at conquest was entirely unsuccessful. Again, in 1760-'61, when garrisoned by only 1,487 men, including volunteers, it was besieged by an army of near 4,000 men, under Colonel Coote, and blockaded by a fleet of nineteen sail, carrying one thousand and fifty-two guns, under Commodore Stevens. There was no engagement whatever between the ships and forts; but all supplies being cut off by the siege and blockade, the provisions became exhausted, and, after a siege of seven or eight months, the inhabitants were forced to surrender, to avoid starvation. The garrison, however, refused to capitulate, although the town had been given up by the starving inhabitants. The fortifications of Calcutta, when attacked by the fleet of Admiral Watson, were not worth mentioning, and the town surrendered as soon as the British had prepared to open their batteries. Madras was attacked on the 14th of September, 1746, by a British fleet of nine ships, and an army of 1,500 Europeans, and 800 "well-armed, well-trained and disciplined" sepoys and negroes. This place, says the British chronicler of the siege, was defended by only "one weak battalion of four hundred men. Its fortifications were likewise of the most contemptible order, consisting, for the most part, of a common wall, which might at any moment be escaladed should the process of breaching be deemed too expensive; indeed, out of the three divisions into which it was parted, only one (called Fort St George, in which the chief functionaries resided) could boast either of bastion or rampart, far less of cannon or mortars. Against this open and ill-provided place, a heavy fire was opened by both sea and land, and the confusion within the walls soon became fearful. * This siege, if such it deserves to be called, lasted five days, and ended in the surrender of the place."

These several conquests were made by the land troops, and there was no trial, except in the unequal contest just mentioned, of strength between the ships and forts. The navy was of vast service in transporting troops and supplies, blockading the enemy's bastions, and cutting him off from all resources; but nothing occurred to justify the inferences drawn in the report above alluded to.

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Gibraltar," says the Apalachicola_reporter,

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was only once in its history attacked by a fleet, when it was taken by a squadron under Admiral Rooke.”To any one who has ever read of Gibralter, this assertion will be received with unmingled surprise. The following are the principal facts of the conquest by Admiral Rooke, in 1704:

The attacking squadron consisted of forty-one ships-of-the-line and many smaller vessels, carrying 2,935 guns, and near 20,000 men. The fort was garrisoned by only 150 men, and armed with one hundred guns, all included.*

The attack was made simultaneously by land and water; 1,800 men being landed for this purpose. The outworks were soon reduced, and the town forced to capitulate, but not till after the English had sustained a loss of 267 men. We know of but one inference that can be drawn from this conquest. It is: that a fort may be taken by a combined land and naval force more than a hundred times greater than itself! Surely, no one could object to such an inference. Aware of the importance of Gibraltar, the Spaniards immediately attempted

The French accounts state the strength of the garrison even less than this, but we give the English version of the affair.