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the defiles of Harlem heights-obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg's Neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it for a great distance above and below. No other position, even in the channel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval means of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place the floating defences themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of consideration the question of relative power, position alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are other considerations no less important than that of position. Schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. On the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen; they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion of the fort. This result can be obtained with little difficulty in narrow channels, and an approximation to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries.

We will suppose that there are no such points of land in the inlets to our harbor, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast in the absence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being made here where our fleet is assembled. Now, if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an attacking force would probably be of picked men, and of the best material. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal; the enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor would, in all respects, be complete, provided this force never left the harbor. "But, then, all the commerce of the country, upon the ocean, must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor."

These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but a single harbor, whereas we have many of them, and all must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults. If he come to one in our absence, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable defeat and ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises? "As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length-a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept as well as the Atlantic, or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of two things either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question."

"On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it-or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's

operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean-it may be well to consult experience."

The naval power of Spain under Philip II was almost unlimited. With the treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of 150 or 200 sail to invade another country was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for this purpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz with a combined fleet of 170 ships, which entered the bay of Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed along a great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting the slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.

In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of 22,000 men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting with any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sent out, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing of the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the coast of France to seek shelter.

In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon afterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reached Quebec in safety.

In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British force under Commodore Bags, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent upon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships-of the-line were then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several of these were actually in pursuit.

In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into Ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to intercept the French fleet in its passage. The channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridgeport, was stationed at Spithead; Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward; Vice-Admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple floating bulwark, as it was called-one fleet on the enemy's coast, a second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores-the French fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of 25,000 men, reached Bantry bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been for the disasters by storms; for only one of their whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that express object. "The result of this expedition," says Alison, in his history of Europe, "was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the best concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion; that, in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her sailors, nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions.

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"While these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that the only base on which certain reliance can be placed, even by an insular power, is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects."

Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. In the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops passed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the port of Ilpacombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast of Wales. Again: in 1798, the immense British naval force failed to prevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala; and, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of nine vessels and 3,000 men escaped Sir J. B. Warren's squadron, and safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration,

we quote from the report of the board on national defence, in 1839.

The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and numerous transports, making, in all, 300 sail and 40,000 troops, slipped out of port and sailed to Malta. "It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage; so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them there, returned by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness of this sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.

"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; their evasion of him amongst the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several re-enforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battlethese are instances, of many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. For more than a year, Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.

"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt of misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot

and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness.

"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or resource beyond. "The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious sphere that of the offensive. In our last war, instead of lying in harbor and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid—they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal-they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors.

"Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement.

"In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."

As there is but little probability that our naval power, no matter how great that power may be, will meet the enemy at sea in sufficient force to destroy any large and well-concerted expedition, we must prepare to meet him on the shore, and repel his attacks. To determine the best means of accomplishing this, let us consult past experience. We shall quote exclusively from English history, during the wars of the French revolution, inasmuch as the British navy was then the most powerful in the world, and their maritime descents are almost the only ones which have ever been attended with the least shadow of success.

In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an expense of $8,000,000. This part of the coast had then a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about 1,600 guns. Lord Bridgeport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about 1,500 guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to seek shelter under the guns of l'Orient. The naval defence being destroyed, the British entered Quiberon without opposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History, to be "the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for landing an army."

Besides the natural advantages of naval supplies, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. The Chouans and Vendéans offered their co-operation, and a large body of royalists in the south of France were favorable to the enterprise. A body of 10,000 troops were landed, and arms and clothing furnished to as many more Chouan troops; but they failed in their attack upon St. Barbe; and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with 7,000 men, held in check a body of 18,000, penned up without defences in the narrow peninsula. Re-enforced by a new debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon defeated and nearly destroyed.

In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland, with a fleet

of fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about 1,100 guns, and a great number of transports, with an army of 36,000 men. The first division was detained some two weeks off the coast by tempestuous weather, and the whole force landed in detachments at some days' interval. A considerable party of Orangemen favored the landing, and the Prince of Orange himself made a demonstration on the frontiers of Frise. The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships-of-the-line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight, and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about 1,200 guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and soon hoisted the hostile flag. The defensive army was at first only 12,000 men, but the Republicans afterwards increased it to 22,000, and finally to 28,000 men. Several undecisive battles were fought, but the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place, and, after a loss of 6,000 men, were compelled to capitulate. Such," says Alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during the war."

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In 1801, Nelson, with three ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and thirty-five smaller vessels and bombs, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of Boulonge, but was repulsed with severe loss.

Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the Scheldt, or, as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expediency of maritime descents, and the ease with which naval forces can sail past fortifications, or reduce them to silence. The following is a brief narrative of the expedition:

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Napoleon had planned, for the protection of a maritime force in the Scheldt, the construction of vast fortifications, dock yards, and naval arsenals at Flushing and Antwerp-the former at the mouth of the Scheldt, and the latter sixty or seventy miles further up the river. The plan was scarcely commenced, when the English attempted to seize upon the defences and capture or destroy the naval force. Flushing was but ill secured, and Antwerp was at this time entirely defenceless. The rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its garrison consisted of only about 200 invalids and recruits. Napoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula. The attacking force consisted of 37 ships-of-the-line, 23 frigates, 33 sloops of war, 28 gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 87 gunboats, and innumerable transports, with over 40,000 troops, and an immense artillery train; making in all, says Alison, an hundred thousand combatants." The land force alone was nearly equal to the army of Wellington at Waterloo. A landing was made upon the island of Walcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which surrendered eighteen days after the landing, and two days after the opening of the siege batteries. These batteries were armed with fifty-two heavy guns; the attack upon the water front was made by seven or eight ships-of-the-line and a large flotilla of bomb vessels. The channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be defended by Flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt. Twenty-eight days after the first disembarkation the headquarters had advanced about half way to Antwerp; but this place was now repaired; the French and Dutch fleets (which, on the arrival of the English, were off the mouth of the river as a home squadron) had been removed above the city for safety, and a land army assembled in large numbers. The English gradually retired, and finally evacuated their entire conquest. The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It was certainly very poorly managed; but we cannot help here noticing the superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents. They did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised; the works of Flushing were never intended to close up the channel of the Scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of shipping. But they were not reduced

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