the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his measures. in parliament by intimidation. A sense of perfonal danger kept the members of the houfe of commons in fubjection. A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at laft the parliament and nation from flavery. That overbearing fyftem, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his fon. After the restoration there fucceeded in its place, and fince the revolution has been methodically pursued, the more fuccefsful expedient of influence. Now we remember what paffed between the lofs of terror, and the establishment of influence. The tranfactions of that interval, whatever we may think of their occafion or effect, no friend of regal government would wish to fee revived.But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the fame doctrine. In the British colonies of North America, the late affemblies poffeffed much of the power and conftitution of our house of commons. The king and government of Great Britain held no patronage in the country, which could create attachment and influence fufficient to counteract that restless, arrogating spirit, which in popular affemblies, when left to itself, will never brook

own.

an authority, that checks and interferes with its To this caufe, excited perhaps by fome unfeasonable provocations, we may attribute, as to their true and proper original, we will not fay the misfortunes, but the changes that have taken place in the British empire. The admonition, which fuch examples fuggeft, will have its weight with thofe, who are content with the general frame of the English constitution; and who confider ftability amongst the first perfections of any government.

We proteft however against any construction, by which what is here faid fhall be attempted to be applied to the juftification of bribery, or of any clandeftine reward or folicitation whatever. The very fecrecy of fuch negociations confeffes or begets a confcioufnefs of guilt; which when the mind is once taught to endure without uneafinefs, the character is prepared for every compliance and there is the greater danger in these corrupt practices, as the extent of their operation is unlimited and unknown. apology relates folely to that influence, which refults from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments. Nor does the influence, which we defend, require any facrifice of perfonal probity. In political, above all other fub

Our

jects,

jects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures, on each fide of the question, are often fo equally poifed, that the wifeft judgments may be held in fufpenfe: thefe I call fubjects of indifference. But again, when the fubject is not indifferent in itself, it will appear fuch to a great part of those to whom it is propofed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either fide is fupported. Thefe are fubjects of apparent indifference. This indifference occurs ftill more frequently in perfonal contefts; in which we do not often discover any reason of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to another. These cafes compofe the province of influence; that is, the decifion in these cases will inevitably be determined by influence of fome fort or other. The only doubt is, what influence shall be admitted. If you remove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for influence from a different quarter. If motives of expectation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fucceed in their place, acting probably in an oppofite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the queftion. There exift, as we have feen, paffions in the human heart, which will always make

23

make a strong party against the executive power of a mixed government. According as the difpofition of parliament is friendly or adverse to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the bufinefs of empire will be tranfacted with ease and convenience, or embarraffed with endlefs contention and difficulty. Nor is it a conclufion founded in justice, or warranted by experience, that, because men are induced by views of intereft to yield their confent to measures, concerning which their judgment decides nothing, they may be brought by the fame influence to act in deliberate oppofition to knowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country fince the revolution, will find few even of the moft queftionable measures of administration, about which the best inftructed judgment might not have doubted at the time; but of which he may affirm with certainty, that they were indifferent to the greatest part of those who concurred in them. From the fuccefs, or the facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage of the crown carried measures like thefe, ought weto conclude, that a fimilar application of honours and emoluments

would

would procure the confent of parliament to councils evidently detrimental to the common welfare? Is there not, on the contrary, more reafon to fear, that the prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be long able to fupport itfelf? For when we reflect upon the power of the house of commons to extort a compliance with its refolutions from the other parts of the legiflature; or to put to death the conftitution by a refusal of the annual grants of money to the fupport of the neceffary functions of government-when we reflect alfo what motives there are which, in the viciffitudes of political interefts and paffions, may one day arm and point this power against the executive magistratewhen we attend to thefe confiderations, we fhall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth in that important, but much decried apophthegm, " that an independent parliament is incompatible with "the existence of the monarchy."