futility of this objection, and proves that the company is, in its present form, a thousand times more an imperium in imperio than the proposed commissioners. The worst species of government is that which can run counter to all the ends of its institution with impunity. Such exactly was the East-India company. No man can say, that the directors and proprietors have not, in a thousand instances, merited severe infliction; yet who did ever think of a legal punishment for either body? Now, the great feature of this bill is, to render the commissioners amenable, and to punish them upon delinquency.

The learned gentleman prides himself that his bill did not meddle with the commerce of the company; and another gentleman, after acknowledging the folly of leaving the government in the hands of the company, proposes to separate the commerce entirely from the dominion, and leave the former safe and untouched to the company itself. I beg leave to appeal to every gentleman conversant in the company's affairs, whether this measure is, in the nature of things, practicable at this moment. That the separation of the commerce from the government of the east, may be ultimately brought about, I doubt not; but when gentlemen.reflect upon the immediate state of the company's affairs; when they reflect that their government was carried on for the sake of their commerce, that both have been blended together for such a series of years; when they review the peculiar, perplexed, and involved state of the eastern territories, their dissimilitude to every system in this part of the globe, and consider the deep and laborious deliberation with which every step for the establishment of a salutary plan of government, in the room of the present odious one, must be taken--the utter impossibility of instantly detaching the governing power from interference with the commercial body, will be clear and indubitable..

A gentleman has asked, Why not choose the commis sioners out of the body of directors; and why not leave the choice of the assistant directors in the court of proprietors? That is to say, why not do that which would infallibly undo all you are aiming at? I mean no general disparagement when I say, that the body of the

directors have given memorable proofs, that they are not the sort of people to whom any man can look for the success or salvation of India. Amongst them there are, without doubt, some individuals, respectable both for their knowledge and integrity; but I put it to the candour of gentlemen, whether they are the species of men whose wisdom, energy, and diligence, would give any promise of emancipating the East-India concerns from their present disasters and disgraces. Indeed, both the questions may be answered in two words. Why not choose the directors, who have ruined the company? Why not leave the power of election in the proprie tors, who have thwarted every good attempted by the directors?

The last point adverted to by the learned gentleman relates to influence; and upon his remarks, combined with what fell from some others, upon the same subject, I beg leave to make a few observations. Much of my life has been employed to diminish the inordinate influ. ence of the crown. In common with others, I succeeded; and I glory in it. To support that kind of influence which I formerly subverted, is a deed of which I shall never deserve to be accused. The affirmation with which I first introduced this plan, I now repeat; I re-assert that this bill as little augments the influence of the crown, as any measure which can be devised for the government of India, that presents the slightest promise of solid success; and that it tends to increase it in a far less degree than the bill proposed by the learned gentleThe very genius of influence consists in hope or fear; fear of losing what we have, or hope of gaining more. Make these commissioners removable at will, and you set all the little passions of human nature afloat. If benefit can be derived from the bill, you had better burn it than make the duration short of the time necessary to accomplish the plans it is destined for. That consideration pointed out the expediency of a fixed period; and, in that respect, it accords with the principle of the learned gentleman's bill; with this superior advantage, that instead of leaving the commissioners liable to all the influence which springs from the, appointment of a governor-general, removeable at pleasure, this bill invests them with the power for the time specified, upon

man.

the same tenure that British judges hold their station, removeable upon delinquency, punishable upon guilt, but fearless of power, if they discharge their trust; liable to no seducement, and with full time and authority toexecute their functions for the common good of the country, and for their own glory. I beg of the house to attend to this difference, and then judge upon the point of increasing the influence of the crown, contrasted with the learned gentleman's bill.

LV. Mr. Fox, in defence of his East-India bill.

PART III.

THE state of accusations against me on this subject of influence is truly curious. The learned gentleman (Mr. Dundas), in strains of emphasis, declares that this bill. diminishes the influence of the crown beyond all former attempts; and calls upon those who formerly voted with him in support of that influence, against our efforts to reduce it, and who now sit near me, to join him in opposing my attempts to diminish that darling influence. He tells them that I OUT-Herod Herod; that I am outdoing all my former out-doings; and proclaims me as the merciless and insatiate enemy of the influence of the

crown.

Down sits the learned gentleman, and up starts an honourable gentleman with a charge against me, upon the same subject, of a nature the direct reverse. I have fought under your banners, cries the honourable gentleman (Mr. Martin), against that fell giant, the influence of the crown; I have bled in that battle which you commanded, and have a claim upon the rights of soldiership. You have conquered through us; and now that victory is in your arms, you turn traitor to our cause, and carry over your powers to the enemy. The fiercest

of

your former combatants in the cause of influence falls far short of you at this moment; your attempts in reerecting this monster exceed all the exertions of your former foes. This night you will make the influence of the crown a colossus, that will bestride the land, and crush every impediment. I impeach you for treachery

to your ancient principles-Come, come, and divide with us!

This honourable gentleman, after a thrust or two at the coalition, sits down and whilst the house is perplexing itself to reconcile these wide differences, the right honourable gentleman (Mr. W. Pitt) over the way confounds all past contradictions, by combining, in his own person, these extravagant extremes. He acknowledges that he has digested a paradox; and a paradox well he might call it; for never did a grosser one puzzle the intellects of a public assembly. By a miraculous kind of discernment he has found out, that the bill both increases and diminishes the influence of the crown.

The bill diminishes the influence of the crown, says one: you are wrong, says a second, it increases it: you are both right, says a third, for it both increases and diminishes the influence of the crown. Now, as most members have one or other of these opinions on the subject, the honourable gentleman can safely join with all parties upon this point; but few, I trust, will be found to join him.

Thus, sir, is this bill combated; and thus am I accused. The nature and substance of these objections, I construe as the strongest comment upon the excellence of the bill. If a more rational opposition could be made to it, no doubt it would. The truth is, it increases the influence of the crown, and the influence of party as little as possible; and if the reform of India, or any other matter, is to be postponed until a scheme be devised, against which ingenuity, or ignorance, or caprice, shall not raise objections, the affairs of human life must stand still.

LVI. Mr. Burke, on India affairs.

PART I.

THE rights of man, that is to say the natural rights of mankind, are indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure, even if no charter at all could be set up against it. If these natu

tal rights are farther affirmed and declared, by express covenants; if they are clearly defined, and secured against chicane, against power, and authority, by written instruments, and positive engagements, they are in a still better condition: they partake, not only of the sanctity of the object so secured, but of that solemn public faith itself, which secures an object of such importance. Indeed, this formal recognition, by the sovereign power, of an original right in the subject, can never be subverted, but by rooting up tire holding, radical principles of government, and even of society itself. The charters which we call, by distinction, great, are public instruments of this nature; I mean the charters of king John and king Henry the third. The things secured by these instruments may, without any deceitful ambiguity, be very fitly called the chartered rights of men.

These charters have made the very name of a charter dear to the heart of every Englishman. But, sir, there may be, and there are, charters, not only different in nature, but formed on principles the very reverse of those of the great charter. Of this kind is the charter of the East-India company. Magna Charta is a charter to restrain power, and to destroy monopoly: the EastIndia charter is a charter to establish monopoly, and to create power. Political power and commercial monopoly are not the rights of men and the rights to them derived from charters, it is fallacious and sophistical to call “ the chartered rights of men." These chartered rights (to speak of such charters, and of their effects, in terms of the greatest possible moderation) do at least suspend the natural rights of mankind at large, and, in their very frame and constitution, are liable to fall into a direct violation of them.

It is a charter of this latter description (that is to say, a charter of power and monopoly) which is affected by the bill before you. This bill, sir, without question, does affect it; it does affect it essentially and substantially. But, having stated to you, of what description the chartered rights are which this bill touches, I feel no difficulty at all in acknowledging those chartered rights in their fullest extent. They belong to the company in the surest, manner; and they are secured to that body, by every sort of public sanction. They are stamped by