Besides the bomb-cannon, guns, and carronades for these armaments, there would be required shot, shells, small arms, pistols, and cutlasses, and a supply of powder sufficient for equipping a strong force in case of a sudden emergency. The cost of these objects may be estimated as follows: Armaments for 14 ships-of-the-line, at $45,000 each.. Armaments for 13 smaller vessels, at $1,500 each.... For guns, bomb-cannon, and carronades, 100 shot to each gun, and 200 shells to each bomb-cannon, and shells for guns. 8,000 muskets... 3.500 pairs of pistols 8,000 cutlasses 9,000 barrels of powder.. $630,000 214, 500 54, 000 75,000 19,500 993, 000 427,000 100,000 43, 750 34,000 202, 500 1, 800, 250 No. 4. [HO. REPS., Ex. Doc. No. 206, 26TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION.] LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A SYSTEM OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FOUNDERIES. WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1840. SIR: In reply to so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th ultimo, requesting the Department of War "to lay before this House, as soon as practicable, a report of a full and connected system of national defence, embracing steam and other vessels-of-war, and floating batteries' for coast and harbor defence, and national founderies, and the internal means, auxiliary to these, for transportation and other warlike uses, by land, and that he be requested to furnish this House with the reports submitted to his department at any time by Major General Edmund P. Gaines, or other person or persons of professional experience, of their 'plans of defence,' if any such have been submitted, with the views of the Secretary of War thereon; and that the Secretary furnish an estimate of the expenses of his own and other plans he may report, distinguishing such parts of plans as ought to be immediately adopted and prosecuted, with the probable cost and time of their prosecution and completion:" I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of a board of officers, assembled to examine the subject, and to present a connected plan of defence for the maritime and inland frontiers of the United States. On submitting these reports, I should have considered my duty discharged, had not the resolution required me to give an opinion with regard to the several plans of national defence presented to the department, and to furnish a comparative statement of the cost of each. The plan presented to Congress by Major General Gaines, which will be found in the accompanying printed document, and that now submitted from the board of officers, are the only ones that have been brought to the notice of the department. On the subject of the former, I beg leave to state that, with every respect for the experience of the gallant author, I am constrained to differ from him when he proposes to abandon the system of permanent defences as obsolete, and to rely entirely upon the expe dients of vast floating batteries and extensive lines of railroads. The accompanying reports of the board of navy commissioners and the chief topographical engineer exhibit the probable cost of carrying out the general's plans, which far exceeds that of constructing permanent works of defence, without being in any manner so well calculated to protect the country. After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject involving in so high a degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions expressed by the board of the superiority of permanent works of defence over all other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their absolute necessity if we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace-a necessity rather increased than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and the use of hollow shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them, and to rely upon our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valor of the people to protect the country against the attacks of an enemy possessing great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand miles in extent, and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities and important naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very superior to the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, which will occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear; and this large naval armament, instead of performing its proper function as the sword of the state in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be chained to the coast or kept within the harbors. It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works deemed necessary for the defence of the coast. One hundred thousand men divided into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vulnerable points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. An amount of force against an expedition of 20,000 men, which, if composed of regulars would cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum, and if militia, about $40,000,000; and, supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend the coast with the aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the difference of expense for six months would enable the government to erect all the most necessary works. This calculation is independent of the loss to the nation by abstracting so large an umount of labor from the productive industry of the country, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous, and harassing system of defence. It must be recollected, too, that we are not called upon to try a new system, but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature deliberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more axtensive scale than is deemed necessary here; so much more so, that there exist there single fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in mind, also, that the destruction of some of the important points on that frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole line would amount to, while the temporary occupation of others would drive us into expenses far surpassing those of the projected works of defence. The organization of permanent defences proposed by the board for cur frontiers is not upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to protect the internal navigation of the country. The fortifications proposed, at the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and defend the principal commercial avenues and naval establishments, cover the whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute in so essential a manner to the defence of the country by furnishing prompt and economical means of transportation; so that, while the main arteries which conduct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior navigation, parallel to the coast, is protected, and a free communication kept up between every part of the Union. Although this department is fully aware of the importance of affording permanent and as perfect protection as may be possible to the whole coast, it regards that section embraced by the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the most exposed and the most important. It is true that the coast to the eastward of Cape Hatteras possesses points that may attract the attention of an enemy, and that, in the present state of things, the chances of success would justify a hostile enterprise, and are much greater than a wise provision would allow to exist. It is equally so, that, however difficult of access the coast may be from Cape Hatteras to Florida, the nature of a part of its population, and the facility afforded to an enemy by its present neglected condition to blockade and annoy the prin cipal outlets of the valuable exports of that important portion of our country, require our early attention; still, the means of defence from Maine to Florida may be united together, and the parts may afford mutual succor to each other. But the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, on the contrary, is insulated and apart, and must depend altogether upon its own resources. It constitutes the maritime frontier not only of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and of West Florida, but of Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois, and the Territories of Wisconsin and Iowa, embracing nearly three-fourths of the territory of the United States; and it must be borne in mind that the evils which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Mississippi, or from a successful blockade of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, would not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the interests of the whole Union; and no reasonable expense, therefore, ought to be spared to guard against such a casualty. Although it would appear on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose, yet the statements contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entirely. The coast of the United States throughout its vast extent has but few points which require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war; against which inferior works and the combination of the same means and a well-organized local militia will afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities and naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equivalent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, when compared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, is inconsiderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineer and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war. It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unprotected, and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It is no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to state what the experience of two wars has demonstrated that they cannot stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disorded by their manœuvres in the open field; whereas, their fire is more deadly from behind ramparts. The principles of defence recommended by the board for the maritime frontier of the United States are applicable to the northern or lake frontier and to that of the west. Some few sites are recommended to be occupied by fortifications, both to afford protection to places fast growing up into important cities, and to furnish a refuge and rallying point for our naval and land forces. Very respectfully, your most obedient servant. Hon. R. M. T. HUNTER, Speaker of the House of Representatives. J. R. POINSETT. WASHINGTON, May 10, 1840. SIR: The board of officers to whom the subject of the military defences of the country was committed have the honor to submit the following report, viz: 1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine. This is divided into two distinct portions, viz: the coast from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida, and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay. 2d. Report on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay. 3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake Superior. Connected with these reports are tabular statements, showing the " permanent defence commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" with conjectural estimates of "the probable expense of constructing or completing such works as may not yet have been completed or commenced," 4th. Reports "on the armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either constructed or deemed necessary; with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or commenced, but which may be deemed necessary." Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine. So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several occasions, within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and military officers, by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individual officers who have at various times been called on to treat the same subject, that in quoting their opinions we should, for the greater part, express our own. But though these reports are, some of them, comprehensive and elaborate, we suppose that an explicit statement of our views, at least as to the great principles on which the system of defence should be erected, is expected from us, especially as the system now in progress has been the subject of a criticism which, considering the high official source whence it emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed the confidence of the public therein. The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamental principles, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous, will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove tedious. This, however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the subject for excuse, if not for justification. The principal errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to are― 1. That for the defence of the coast the chief reliance should be on the navy. 2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced wherever they can be used. 3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions; and, consequently, 4. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are unnecessarily large for the purposes they have to fulfil. On these topics, together with other errors of the same nature, we shall feel constrained to enlarge. The first question that presents itself is this: What, in general terms, shall be the means of defence? We have a sea-coast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, along which lie scattered all the great cities, all the depots of commerce, all the establishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair, and towns, villages, and establishments of private enterprise without number. From this line of sea-coast navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of which are similarly occupied, penetrate deep into the heart of the country. How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the prosperity of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from the ocean, is, as regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness? Shall the defence be by a navy exclusively? The opinion that the navy is the true defence of the country is so acceptable and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a careful examination. Before going into this examination we will premise that by the term "navy" is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle-ships, frigates, smaller sailing vessels, and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, such as floating batteries. For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, we will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that this is to be defended by a fleet alone. By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meeting the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there would be no reason to look for a successful defence; and as there could be no escape for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue, would only render it the more calamitous. Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, and it probably would be so. Still, hazard—some of the many mishaps liable to attend contests of this nature-might decide against us; and, in that event, the consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding supposition. In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole feet, but he could lose nothing more; while we, in a similar attempt, would lose not only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed to protect. If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects be complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such case, employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean; and nothing could be done to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to be successfully assailed. In either of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of the harbor, instead of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from such an *See Senate document No. 293, vol. 4, p. 1, 24th Congress, 1st session. |