the people and the government have in the security of this portion, is related to other facts which hardly leave an alternative as to the mode of attaining that security.

From the relative geographical position of this part of the coast, and the country interested in its safety; from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that portion, within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy will, from peculiar circumstances, be competent of itself to sustain the assaults of an exterior foe. Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every alarm post of the frontier with a more and more dense population; and the ocean and the interior parallel communication transmit rapid aid to the right and left, while the coast of the Gulf, weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance.

Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, a permanent, and a timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this communication) will apply to this part of it with a peculiar force so long as any portion of its system of defence is incomplete.

It has already been observed that the board of engineers have made no examination between Cumberland sound, in Georgia, and Pensacola. There are, however, along that shore and in the Florida reef several very important harbors which must be accurately surveyed.

Pensacola bay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellowwater or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river; and while the tributaries of the last, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem to mark the courses whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, the face of the whole region is remarkably adapted to the application of railroads.

Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay. and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of New Orleans.

Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is accessible to the largest class of sloops-of-war and to small frigates, and under favorable circumstances will admit even large frigates; and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened.

The bar is near the coast, and the channel through it is straight and easily hit. The harbor is perfectly land-locked, and the roadstead very capacious. There are excellent positions within it for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water is abundant. It is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government to fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs.

An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form the scheme of defence, while no other objects were sought than the security of the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country and showing the several avenues by land and water are found to be necessary.

The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly completed, $210,000 being asked to finish them. A further water defence at the position of the Barrancas, and the works that are indispensable to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the western bays-the latter requiring the further surveys

above mentioned-are not yet planned. The Barrancas work may be taken at $100,000, and the others at $300,000, making a total for Pensacola of $610,000. Perdido bay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and to Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully surveyed, with a view to these objects. It must be forfeited, and the cost may

be $200,000.

Mobile bay-The plan of defence for this bay comprised a fort at Mobile Point, which has been finished; another on Dauphin island, and a tower at the Pass au Heron. The estimates for the two last named amount to $905,000.

New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.-The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is by the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake, or might continue onward through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the Mississippi at the head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road. To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenu, a navigable channel, (the one pursued by the English army in the last war,) not running into the Mississippi, but possessing shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little to the south of this is Bayou Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. The avenues just named are defended by a fort at the Rigolets; another at Chef Menteur; another at Bayou Bienvenu, and a tower at Bayou Dupre.

The defences of the river are placed at the Plaquemine turn, the lowest position which can be occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right shore, and Fort St. Philip a little lower down, on the left: this last work must be repaired or renewed. The expense is estimated at $117,000.

The only permanent work required at present, west of the Mississippi, is a fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the Mississippi, near New Orleans. The estimate for this work is $400,000.

Before leaving this part of the subject, it is necessary to advert to the important uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications. The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States may be very numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would, in certain cases, be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. In the case we have just been considering, for example, fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans, even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing to the great width of the passages, we cannot, by fortifications alone, deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very excellent one west of Chandeleur island, nor entirely cover the interior water communications between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to all the annoyance and injury which an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by the timely preparation of a floating force, adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the favorable shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy. As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications, in every sense; as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation of our naval force to that of other powers-a relation continually varying as the shapes which these auxiliaries are to assume-the materials of which they are to be formed, the weapons they are to use, the agent which is to give them

power, are points on which every ten years of this age of rapid improvement in the arts may effect complete revolutions, it is considered premature to go into details, and premature to go into expense.

From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the seaboard of the United States, it appears that all the fortifications proposed are not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance. Some are required immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In proceeding to class them, it must be observed that the works of the first class are those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the country, those which will defend the great naval arsenals, and those which will cover the chief cities and towns.

In the second class will be placed the works which are to defend those naval stations and those cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and may, therefore, wait until the more important points are secured against a first attack; and in the third class will we arrayed the works which complete the defensive system in all its parts, but of which the construction may, without great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive degrees of strength resulting from a gradual erection of the forts of the first and second classes. A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be necessary only conditionally.

Table A, joined to this report, contains the first class, and shows that the works of this class will cost $11,609,444; will require 2,585 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 30,966 in case of siege.

Table B contains the works of the second class, showing that they will cost $5,873,000; will require 975 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 10,680 in case of siege.

Table C contains works belonging to the third class, showing that their cost will be $14,078,824; that their garrisons in time of peace will amount to 2,350 men, and in time of siege to 21,745 men; showing, also, that the total future expense of fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $31,561,268; the troops necessary to guard these fortifications in time of peace to 5,940 men, and 63,391 men in time of war, supposing them all (which cannot happen) besieged

at once.

The time required to construct the whole system must depend upon the annual appropriation which the nation may grant to this branch of the public service. All that need be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. An undertaking of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work years. But it may be too much hurried as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner and at the minimum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality and more costly if delayed.

of

France was, at least, fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences. Some remarks will now be offered on the subject of the expense of erecting a system of defensive works, and garrisoning them for war, comparing it with the expense of defending the coast without fortifications. To simplify the proposition, the defence of Portsmouth, Boston, Narraganset roads, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannahi, and New Orleans, only, will be taken.

Supposing an enemy had concentrated 20,000 men at Halifax or Bermuda; the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist it at all the points mentioned above. As it will be impossible to foresee on which the first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each; and to meet the attack with a force not less numerically than that of the assail

ant, the troops kept constantly under arms must, at least, equal one-half of the hostile expedition, while as many more, ready for instant service, must be within call. These points are so immediately accessible in some cases, and so remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by the appearance of the enemy before it, there will be no time for reinforcements to come from the interior.

By manoeuvring in front of any of these places the enemy would induce us to concentrate forces there; when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise, at least, equal to his own. No reinforcement can, in this case, arrive from the interior in time, for all the troops under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he has just quitted.

Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a single expedition; and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an enemy might ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities and other great establishments are not garrisoned, they will become a prey at once; and if they are garrisoned, the treasury will be gradually emptied; the credit of the government exhausted; the weary and starving militia will desert to their homes; nor will it be easy to avert the consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration.

The table E, joined to this report, shows that, to be in readiness on each of these vulnerable points, it will be requisite to maintain 107,000 men encamped and under arms at the ten places mentioned, and 93,000 men ready to march and within call.

This number is, in fact, below that which would be required; for these points being, according to our hypothesis, exposed to an attack from 20,000 regular and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them, unless aided by entrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which might not be allowed, and involving expenses which are not included in the estimate. Besides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be necessary, considering the epidemics that always assail such troops, to carry the formation of these corps to at least 25,000 men.

The State of Louisiana, being remote from succor, requires a larger force under arms than the other points; this force is fixed at 17,000, supposing that the State may supply 3,000 within call.

All expenses being reckoned, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost $300,000 per annum, or $150 per man, for a campaign of six months. 1,000 militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, or $200 per man, for a six months' campaign. But, taking into consideration the diseases which invariably attack men unaccustomed to military life, and the consequent expense of hospital establishments; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp to their homes, and from the interior to the camp; and the cost of camping furniture, utensils, accoutrements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign as for a year; regarding all these things, the cost of militiamen cannot be reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.

The 107,000 militiamen necessary to guard the above-mentioned points, the maritime frontier being without defence, will therefore cost, in a campaign of six months, $26,750,000. In strict justice, there should be added to this expense, which is believed to be much understated, amongst other things, the loss of time and the diminution of valuable products resulting from drawing off so considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable pursuits. This, besides being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the nation.

It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation from the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps of men suddenly exposed to the fatigues and privations of a military life.

The total expense of constructing the fortifications at the ten places before mentioned will amount to $21,767,656.-(See table E.)

The garrisons of these fortifications may consist of the same number of regu lar troops in time of war as in time of peace, the remainder being furnished by the militia held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 3,010 regulars and 32,076 militia, either within the works or in small corps on advantageous positions, making in all 35,086 men, would suffice, 64,914 men being kept in readiness to march when called upon.

We should, therefore, have only 35,086 to pay and support instead of 107,000, and the expense would be $8,430,500 instead of $26,750,000. The difference, namely, $18,319,500, being only $3,448,156 less than the whole cost of these defences. It follows that the expense of their erection would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single campaign of six months.

It is proper to add that, although the expense of these works will be great, that expense is never to be renewed; while with troops, on the contrary, the expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly and to an extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. Armies are most wanted, and must be paid, in periods of the greatest emergency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up, and when the treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most burdensome and disagreeable to the people.

The defence of the maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and the disbursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive economy. The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of waiting an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few which, being well understood by us, will, of course, have received timely preparation. There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more reluctant to risk his expeditions, and, therefore, that we shall not only be better able to resist, but also less frequently called on to do so.

Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying a maritime border; the practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and numerous infantry may, in some cases, dispense with fortifications; but though disciplined troops may cover a frontier without the aid of fortifications, undisciplined troops cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncertainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the very moment of attack require that every important post be prepared to repel his attempt, or retard it until reinforcements can arrive and adequate means of resistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy; but the ocean is a vast plain, without obstacle, where his movements are made out of our sight, where no trace is left of his path, and where we know nothing of his approach until he is within reach of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable points of a seaboard are covered by fortifications their only chance of safety must depend upon the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when the best disciplined, most experienced, and best appointed troops have made all possible preparation for the combat.

As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small portion, about equal in number to the peace garrisons, should be of regular troops, the remainder of militia, practiced in the manoeuvres and drill of great guns, ic