Rutilius, A. D. 418, ridicules monkery, and laments the progrefs of the chriftian religion. 6 Zofimus, who wrote his history about 425, cafts many fevere reflections upon Constantine and Theodofius; and loudly complains of the progrefs of the christian religion. At the fame time he is himself so fuperftitious, and fo credulous in receiving, and recording filly fables and fictions, as to expose, rather than recommend the ancient religion, to which he adhered. Befides these our author has alleged the teftimonies of Himerius, Olympiodorus, Hierocles of Alexandria, Proclus, Marinus, Damafcius, and Simplicius, but they are of little importance. Among all the testimonies to chriftianity, which we have met with in the first ages, none, fays he, are more valuable and important, than the testimonies of those learned philofophers, who wrote against us. All know whom I mean: Celfus in the fecond century; Porphyrie, and Hierocles, and the anonymous philofopher of Lactantius, in the third, and Julian in the fourth centurie. These may be feemingly against us, but are really for us. They are not come down to us entire. But we have large and numerous fragments of fome of them which bear a fuller, and more valuable testimonie to the books of the New Teftament, and to the facts of the Evangelical history, and to the affairs of chriftians, than all our other witneffes befides. They purposed to overthrow the arguments for christianity. They aimed to bring back to gentilism those who had forfaken it, and to put a stop to the progrefs of christianity by the farther addition of new converts. But in those designs they had very little fuccefs, in their own times, and their works, compofed and published in the early days of chriftianity, are now a teftimonie in our favour, and will be of use in the defence of chriftianity to the latest ages. • One thing more which may be taken notice of is this: that the remains of our ancient adverfaries confirm the prefent prevailing fentiments of christians concerning those books of the New Teftament, which we call canonical, and are in the greatest authority with us. For their writings fhew, that, thofe very books, and not any others, now generally called Apocryphal, are the books which always were in the highest repute with chriftians, and were then the rule of their faith, as they now are of ours.' Here our author, having brought down-his examination of heathen teftimonies to the year 550, concludes his enquiry. He then proceeds to confider the state of gentilifm under christian emperors; upon which he makes the following obfervations: 1. Conftantin, and divers other chriftian emperors acted contrary to the edict, which was published by him and Licinius. in the year 313. 2. There was as yet no laws of chriftian emperors, rea Itraining the freedom of fpeech in gentil people, or the freedom of writing and conference in things of religion. 3. There were then no laws or edicts of chriftian princes, requiring men to frequent the religious affemblies of chilftians, or to embrace and profefs the chriftian religion, upori the pain of any inconvenience, or fuffering either in their perfons, or their properties. I 4. I think, it must be fuppofed, and allowed that the laws 4gainst gentilifin, above recited by me, were not rigorouíly executed. 5. Our Bleffed Saviour gave not any directions to his diftiples to propagate his religion by external force and violence. 6. All wife and underftanding men of every feet and religion, recommend moderation, and condemn force and compulfion in things of religion. 7. We cannot juftify the laws and edicts of chriftian emperors, which prohibited the practice of the religious rites of genfilifim upon heavy pains and penalties, fuch as confifcation of goods, banishment, or death, or exclufion from civil and militarie offices. 8. The chriftian religion is able to uphold, and recomimend itself without worldly encouragements, and without the aid of external force and compulfion. Laftly, having now feen in ancient Jewish and heathen writers fo many teftimonies to the accomplishment of our Sáviour's predictions concerning the deftruction of Jerufalem, and to the books of the New Testament, and to the facts of the Evangelical hiftorie, and therein to the truth of the chriftian religion, muft we not be hereby induced not only cordially to embrace it, but likewife to recommend it to others, according. to the best of our ability ?” We are now come to the conclufion of this long and labo rious work, which the author fays, has been in hand almost half a century. It is, however, a complete performance in its kind. Every heathen writer, who lived between the commencement of chriftianity and the year 550, and has left any memorial of chriftian affairs, is faithfully cited. His own words are generally produced. There is, perhaps, hardly a fentence, relative to the fubject, to be collected from the wrecks of time, which our indefatigable author has omitted. But, which is the chief recommendation, this work is executed with great accuracy and judgment. The paffages which bear the marks of forgery and interpolation are critically examined; and the legendary tales in favour of chriftianity, which have been recorded by weak and credulous authors, are treated in the manner they deferve. III. An Appeal to Common Senfe in Behalf of Religion. 8vo. Pr. 5. Cadell. T is generally fuppofed, that mankind have run into various abfurdities for want of employing their reasoning faculties on the capital truths of religion. Reafoning therefore has been deemed the only fecurity against error and delufion, Upon this perfuafion the art of difputation is encouraged at our universities; and our theological writers are accustomed to fupport the cause of chriftianity by argumentation. But the ingenious author of this treatise endeavours to evince, that an inteinperate love of reafoning is the foible of the human mind; and that in many cafes, it is frivolous, impertinent, and fitter to perplex and abuse the understanding, than to affift it in the difcovery of truth. To what purpose, fays he, fhould we fet about the proof of the being of matter and motion, of gravitation or any other primary truth? Can we by the rules of reafoning add any thing to the conviction we have of these realities? Or can we at all reafon on the subject? Where fhall we find a medium, or how form the fyllogifm? We may affume the truth in queftion, as is often done, for a principle of reasoning, and fo form a fophifm; or we may have recourfe by analogy to other truths not more evident, and fo produce a trifling demonftration. But we fhall never offer any thing that deferves the name of argument in proof of primary truths; for as they do not require, fo they cannot admit of any proof.... It is impoffible, he thinks, for a man of sense to take an attentive furvey of the harmony of the universe, and doubt of the being and perfections of God; and equally impoffible for one of his character to confider with attention certain undoubted facts appearing from the face of the chriftian revelation, and doubt of its truth; and therefore he concludes, that to make a due impreffion on sceptics, or to produce in them that belief which is due to primary truths, nothing more is neceffary than to put them on viewing those truths in their native evidence, and comparing them with their oppofite abfurdities, by a fimple appeal to common sense. The author has divided this work into seven books. In the firft he fhews, that mankind in all ages have paid too little regard to the authotity of common fenfe; that the learned and unlearned have a strong propenfity to purfue far-fetched difcoveries, to the neglect of truths more obvious and useful; that the fages of antiquity neglected obvious truths of the greatest moment to the interests of virtue, through an abfurd inclination to employ their reasoning powers on improper fubjects'; and that that chriftian divines, in contradiction to common fenfe, and to the detriment of religion, have fubjected the most facred and obvious truths to the refinements of reasoning. Many of the best written books, he fays, are full of trains of reafoning, of laborious reafoning, with but here and there a discovery of confequence. We meet with opinions, and fyftems of opinions, various, oppofite, and contradictory, with a great variety of arguments, objections, and confutations, and but few of thofe indubitable maxims, on which a wife man would choose to found his conduct. Setting afide the doctrines of natural philofophy, which are founded upon repeated experiment and obfervation, or upon a fpecies of reafoning equally to be depended on, the useful and undoubted truths to be gathered from all the other fciences, bear no propórtion to the dubious pofitions, and conjectural reasonings in fupport of thefe pofitions, with which the writings of the learned abound. So true is this obfervation, that a man may go through the circle of fcience, without being able to pick up as much information as would be fufficient for his conducting himself with propriety in any station of life.... The folly of overlooking obvious and certain truths, and running eagerly in pursuit of those more remote and uncertain, is not peculiar to the learned. It is the foible of human na→ ture, and discovers itself in all the arts, the most neceffary, the moft common, and in the lowest occupations, as well as in the fciences. Do husbandmen, artificers, and those who are em-’ ployed in the feveral branches of trade, give due attention to the various methods of improving and enlarging the branches of business in which they are engaged, thofe methods, I mean, which lie within their sphere, and offer themselves to obfervation! They do it just so far, and no farther than they are urged by neceflity, or folicited by the near prospect of great gain. Beyond that they feldom go; but hold on, with little variation, the track into which they were firft put, till their curiofity is awakened by fome far-fetched discovery of fome bold adventurer, who often engages all the men of enterprise in rash and dangerous exploits. ... Juft as the vulgar pafs over what is plain and useful, to puzzle themselves with dark paffages of scripture in which they have little concern; and as our young gentry, overlooking the police, the manners, and even the geography of their own country, run abroad to make ćurfory remarks on the fingu larities of foreign nations; and as all idle people enter more keenly into the politics of Europe, than into the government of their families, or the management of their own affairs, fo do the generality of mankind, men of bufinefs, and men of letters, H 3 letters, make light of interefting, obvious, and undoubted truths, which are objects of fimple perception and judgment, through an ungoverned ambition of employing their reafoning powers in difcoveries of no real ufe, and unfupported by any folid evidence. The folly is ingrained and inveterate, breaks out on all occafions, in every clafs of men, and in all ages and nations. 6 We admire the wife men of Greece and Rome: and with Feafon; for on many accounts they are worthy of high efteem. They were men of great induftry and ability, animated with a laudable zeal for knowledge; and, bating the folly fo common to mankind, of relying more upon reafoning, than fimple perception of primary truths, were intitled to the character of wife, but fo far gone in that folly, as difqualified them for being guides to others in what may be called the firft philofophy. That the Epicurean fcheme was no other than Atheifin difguif.d; that the hypothefis of the Stoics was little different from the Polytheifm of the vulgar; and that the faith of the Academics was either none at all, or faint and, fluctuating at beft, will not be difputed by those who have any knowledge of antiquity. If you will judge of their fentiments by occafional fayings with which modern philofophers were wont to embellish their works, you may believe, as many have done, that ancient philofophers were poffeffed of the whole fyftem of natural religion. But look into their writings, and you will be undeceived. Or if you will take the teftimony of one of the most confiderable among them, who had made their doctrines his fudy, you will be told, that the being and providence of God was, of all other fubjects, a matter of the greateft doubt and difputation among philofophers. Now, how came men of fuch capacity and judgment to hefitate about fo evident a truth? The anfwer is plainly this. They would not pronounce upon it as men of fenfe, but as philofophers. They would not reft in the teftimony which the phænomena of nature bear to this great truth, but, by a procefs of reafoning, would needs make out a ftrift proof of what is too evident to admit of any; and failing in the attempt, they fell into great perplexity, cónfùfion, and doubt. Let Cicero's dialogues concerning the nature' of the gods, stript of rhetorical embellishments, and reduced to fimple propofitions, be put into the hands of fome peafant of common understanding, and tolerably acquainted with the Christian revelation, and he will be much aftonished at the opinions of the ancients, the grofs ftupidity of the Epicureans, the frivolous fuperftition of the Stoics, and the prefumptuous rafhness of the Academics, and heartily thank his God for beftowing on him the gift of common fenfe, and of the holy fcriptures.' |