the question of Ottoman Administrators. If in the débris of the breaking-up ship of state there be a few planks of sound material, experience only can tell with certainty; but in any case the preservation even of the smallest part of the administration, local or general, in a position of responsibility towards the Sublime Porte will be but the patching a new coat with old cloth; the covering up of embers for future conflagration; and the most of all to be apprehended is the appointment of the Christian governors bred by the Porte, adroit in all the arts of the courtier, but tried in none of the virtues of good government, whose career has been made by sycophancy and betrayal of their co-religionists, by being more Turk than the Turk himself, and by prostituting a greater talent and higher political capacities to the support of a misgovernment which would have perished long ago but for them. Wherever we may look for the fidelity and uprightness needed in the heads of administration, we shall assuredly not find it in the time-serving Christian Pasha who has won his grade only by a devotion to the profitable barbarism which "out-herods Herod," and leaves but one doubt whether he was ever capable of fidelity even to his Mohammedan master. These men can only serve Europe well when there is no interest but that of Europe to enlist their devotion; and as long as any trace of responsibility to the old condition of things remains, no material can be so untrustworthy to reconstruct with as this; and what is, perhaps, of more immediate consequence, there is no one in whom the Rayah has so little confidence, or for whom he has so profound a hatred. There is not a province in the Turkish empire, probably, which if left to choose would not prefer a Turk as governor to any Christians in the Turkish service.

The latter are recommended neither by the

popular nor the European interest, and the only motive for retaining them would be to compromise with an interest whose utter exclusion from the administration is the sine quâ non of a final settlement. England cannot safely leave her interests in the hands of a class whose whole success has been of that kind which a healthy and energetic national existence would speedily eliminate-a fungoid parasitic growth which may be ornamental, but is more likely to be fatal. Whatever the interests of England may be, let Englishmen look after them; but I would sooner trust them to the Russian than the Levantine, should the contingency arise which demands a choice between the two. England can afford to be generous, she cannot risk a chance of betrayal at a point where she has nothing to fear from open force, but everything from intrigue.

APPENDIX A.

THE ANDRASSY NOTE.

Buda-Pest, December 30, 1875.

INCE the commencement of the troubles in the Herzegovina, the European Cabinets interested in the general peace have been compelled to fix their attention on the occurrences which threatened to

endanger it. The three Courts of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany, after exchanging their views on this subject, have united for the purpose of employing in common their efforts for pacification.

This object appeared too much in conformity with the general wish for them to doubt that the other Cabinets, when invited to associate themselves in the movement through their Representatives at Constantinople, would hasten to join their efforts to

ours.

The Powers have come to an agreement to make use of all the influence at their disposal in order to localize the conflict, and diminish its dangers and calamities by preventing Servia and Montenegro from participating in the movement.

Their language has been the more effectual from being identic, and has, consequently, testified the firm determination of Europe not to permit the general peace to be imperilled by rash impulses.

The Cabinets, moreover, have offered to the Turkish Government the good offices of their Consular Agents to assist in putting an end to the insurrection. In the pursuit of this object, they have been equally careful to avoid all meddling, and to guard the dignity, rights, and authority of the Sovereign.

The Delegates were not authorized to constitute themselves a

Commission of Inquiry, or to make themselves the advocates of the wishes of the insurgent populations. Their mission was to undeceive them as to any assistance to be expected from without, and to exhort them to disperse after setting forth their wishes and grievances. The Powers merely reserved the power of urging on the Turkish Government such of the demands of the insurgents as should appear to be legitimate. This conciliatory action of the Cabinets sufficiently testified to the friendly intention which had inspired their good offices. It showed that in their eyes there existed a complete identity in the interests of Europe, of the Porte, and of the insurgent populations, to put an end to a ruinous and sanguinary conflict, and to prevent its recurrence by serious reforms and effective improvements of a nature to reconcile the real necessities of the country with the legitimate requirements of authority.

Such is briefly the history of the proceedings of the Powers. since the outbreak of the insurrection.

The Cabinets have till now been especially guided by the desire to avoid everything that could be construed as an unseasonable interference on the part of Europe.

Accordingly all the Cabinets have confined themselves to recommending the Sultan not to trust solely to military measures, but to apply himself to combating the evil by moral means, with a view to avert future disturbances.

In acting thus, the Cabinets intended to furnish the Sublime Porte with the moral support of which it stood in need; and,. further, to give it time to pacify feelings in the revolted provinces, hoping that all danger of ulterior complications might thus be averted.

Unfortunately their hopes have been disappointed. On the one hand, the reforms published by the Porte do not appear to have had in view the pacification of the populations of the insurgent provinces, or to be sufficient for the attainment of this essential object. On the other hand, the Turkish arms have not been successful in putting an end to the insurrection.

Under these circumstances, we think that the moment has arrived for the Powers to agree on a course to be pursued in common, to prevent the peace of Europe being ultimately compromised by a continuation of the movement.

In common with the other Powers, we have applauded the benevolent intentions which have inspired the recent manifes

toes of the Sultan. The Iradé of October 2, and Firman of December 12, contain a series of principles intended to introduce reforms into the organization of the Ottoman Empire. There is reason to believe that these principles, if embodied in wisely-conceived legislative measures, and if, above all, their execution fully corresponds with the enlightened views which have dictated them, will introduce real ameliorations into the administration of Turkey.

We cannot, however, disguise from ourselves that the projected reforms cannot, by themselves, arrest, even momentarily, the shedding of blood in the Herzegovina and Bosnia, still less establish on a secure basis the future tranquillity of these portions of the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, on examination of the contents of the Iradé of October 2 and the Firman of December 12, one must acknowledge that the Sublime Porte appears to be engrossed rather with general principles which, when they have been formulated, will serve as bases for the administration of the Empire, than with the pacification of the provinces at present in revolt.

Now it is for the interest of the Ottoman Government that peace should, above all, be assured; for, so long as it is unsecured, it will be impossible to carry out even the principles which the Porte has proclaimed.

On the other hand, the state of anarchy which prevails in the provinces to the north-west of Turkey not only involves difficulties for the Sublime Porte, but also conceals grave danger to the general tranquillity; and the different European States cannot see with indifference the continuation and aggravation of a state of affairs which already weighs heavily on commerce and industry, and which, by daily shaking more and more the public confidence in the preservation of peace, tends to compromise the interests of all parties.

We, therefore, believe that we are fulfilling an imperative duty in calling the serious attention of the Guaranteeing Powers to the necessity of counselling the Sublime Porte to complete its undertaking by such measures as appear indispensable for the re-establishment of order and tranquillity in the provinces now ravaged by the scourge of civil war.

After a confidential exchange of ideas, which has taken place between ourselves and the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Berlin, it has been recognized that such measures must be

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