In November 1882, plaintiff finds him in Quebec on the point of leaving for Liverpool and arrested him. Was he justified in so doing? After leaving Bury it would appear that the defendant married again and had his domicile in England, he certainly divested himself of all his property in this country, perhaps paying some of his creditors to the detriment of others; this was a legal fraud, and plaintiff might then have arrested him. Having failed to do so, is plaintiff now, when he finds him, after long absence in foreign countries, within the jurisdiction of this Court, debarred from so doing? The case of McKenzie & Shaw, was when a merchant was going and had been in the habit of going to Europe and returning to his domicile here. In Hurtubise v. Bourret it was not alleged where the debt was contracted (23 L. C. J. 130). In the cases of Henderson v. Duggan, and Paulet v. Autaya, the circumstances disproved any fraudulent intent. Defendant certainly did in law secrete his property, for he sold all he had without applying any of the proceeds to pay plaintiff. He left the country for many years, residing in foreign parts, and making no attempt to pay his debts, he never communicated with his creditors, though he was in constant employment as a professional man, presumably getting adequate remuneration. What is intent to defraud? In this case he had for years kept out of the jurisdiction of our courts, and was again leaving when arrested. When he left Bury he did so under extremely suspicious circumstances; it is shown that he meditated how to get away without paying his debts, prevaricating, and in the end insulting his creditor. I think he was, even under the strict interpretation which some of our Judges place upon the law of capias, liable to arrest. H. B. Brown for plaintiff. J. W. Merry for defendant. COURT OF APPEAL REGISTER. MONTREAL, Nov. 15. Bury & Samuel.-Motion to proceed ex parte.-C. A. V. Molson & Starnes, & The Hon. E. J. Flynn, respondent par reprise d'instance.-Motion of appellant, to force the Hon. E. J. Flynn to take up the instance in the place of the Hon. Mr. Starnes.-Granted. Dorion & Crowley.-Motion to dismiss appeal.-Granted as to costs by consent. Malbouf & Laurendeau.-Motion to dismiss appeal.-Granted as to costs. Nov. 17. Montreal, Portland & Boston Railway Co. & Hatton.-Heard on motion of respondent to set aside appeal bond. Dorion & Dorion (No. 120).—Part heard. Reilly & Hannan.-Heard; C. A. V. Bury & Samuel.-Motion to proceed ex parte rejected with costs. Merriman & Burroughs.-Motion for leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment, rejected with costs. Montreal, Portland & Boston Railway Co. & Hatton.-Motion to reject security bond granted; bail bond set aside; eight days to enter new security. Sipling & Sparham Fireproof Roofing Co.Judgment confirmed. Reed & Sparham Fireproof Roofing Co.Judgment confirmed. Hogan & City of Montreal.-Judgment reversed. Quimet & Normandin.-Judgment confirmed. Lighthall & Craig.-Judgment confirmed. Foley & Cressy.-Judgment confirmed. Gaudin & Ethier.-Judgment confirmed. Virtue & Vaillancourt.-Argument concluded; C. A. V. Les Curé & Marguilliers de l'Euvre & Fabrique de Varennes & Choquet.-Motion for substitution granted. Heard on the merits; C. A. V. Black & Shorey.-Heard; C. A. V. Ross & Langlois.-Heard; C. A. V. Lambe & The Ontario Bank.—C. A. V. Lambe & The Molsons Bank.-C. A. V. North British & Mercantile Insurance Co. & Lambe.-C. A. V. Williams Manufacturing Co. & Lambe.—C. A. V. Lambe & The Bank of Toronto.—C. A. V. Ogdensburg Coal & Towing Co. & Lambe.— C. A. V. Export Lumber Co. & Lambe.-C. A. V. Biron & Trahan.-Heard on merits; C. A. V. Deschenaux & Lizotte.-Part heard. Nov. 26. Bell & Court, & McIntosh.-Motion to dismiss appeal rejected without costs. La Corporation du Bout de l'Isle & Reburn.Judgment confirmed, Ramsay, J., dissenting. Dunn & Wiggins.-Judgment confirmed. Simpson & The Corporation of Ormstown.Judgment confirmed. Dorion & Dorion (No. 585).-Judgment reversed. Poitras & Lalonde.-Judgment confirmed. Deschenaux & Lizotte.-Hearing resumed and continued until adjournment. REGLE Lorsque les causes de la campagne sont fixées à un jour, et que ce jour ne suffit pas pour en disposer, alors le jour suivant leur est réservé, et de même de jour en jour jusqu'à épuisement du rôle des causes de la campagne à l'exclusion des causes de la ville. Nov. 27. Beauchamp & Letourneux.-Judgment confirmed. APPEL DES CAUSES PERIMES. Joseph & Saunders.-Appeal dismissed. Maclaren & La Société de Construction Métro politaine.-Appeal dismissed. Federal Bank & Brown.—Appeal dismissed. Parker & Stewart.-Appeal dismissed. Pangman & Lamarche.-Appeal dismissed. Pangman & Buchanan.—Appeal dismissed. Deschenaux & Lizotte.-Hearing resumed and concluded. Pillow et al. & Cour du Recorder.-Heard on merits; C. A. V. The Court adjourned until December 9 for judgments. RECENT DECISIONS AT QUEBEC. Resolution of County Council. Jugé, 1o. Qu'il y a ouverture à la voie de cassation devant la Cour de Circuit, d'une décision ou résolution d'un conseil de comté, même siégeant en appel d'un règlement du conseil local, si le conseil de comté commet une illégalité. 2. Que c'est le cas d'appliquer les articles 100 et 698 qui ont rapport à tous les conseils municipaux, locaux ou de comté.-La Corporation de St. Maurice v. Dufresne, (Queen's Bench), 10 Q. L. R. 227. Exclusion of Community. — Jugé, 1. Que dans le cas d'exclusion de communauté, le mari n'a que l'usufruit des biens meubles de sa femme à qui reste la propriété de tous ceux qui ne sont pas fongibles; qu'en conséquence le mari ne peut les aliéner, ni les créanciers du mari les saisir. 2. Que sous le régime d'exclusion de communauté, la preuve testimoniale est admi-e relativement aux meubles acquis par la femme depuis le mariage. · Hôpital Général v. Gingras, et Lacroix, oppt. (Superior Court, Casault, J.), 10 Q. L. R. 230. Marine Insurance.-Held, that in an action for total loss on a policy of marine insurance, the plaintiff may recover for a partial loss.The Merchants Marine Insurance Co & Ross (Queen's Bench), 10 Q. L. R. 237. Freight - Goods damaged in unloading.— Held, that the master of a vessel is entitled to recover freight on the cargo delivered at the port of destination, though the goods have been damaged in unloading. 2. The recourse of the consignee may be in damages, by plea or incidental demand, to recover the loss sustained.-Halcrow v. Lemesurier, (Queen's Bench), 10 Q. L. R. 239. Petitory Action - Demurrer.- In a petitory action, to which the defendant demurred on the ground that the plaintiff had not alleged his title nor that of his auteurs, nor that the same were enregistered, held, over-ruling the demurrer, that such allegations were not necessary, and that the averment that the plaintiff's auteurs were, at the time of the sale to him, proprietors in open, public and peaceable possession of the land so sold, in virtue of good titles, was sufficient to render the declaration non- demurrable on the grounds urged by the defendant. · Ross v. Lefebvre (Court of Review), 10 Q. L. R. 244. Controverted Elections Act, Canada-Corrupt le fait de promettre de payer, ou de payer Influence-Freedom of the press.-Jugé, 1. Que des comptes dus pour une élection antérieure, constitue une manœuvre frauduleuse. 2. Que l'engagement de charretiers pour tion constitue aussi une manœuvre fraudumener voter les électeurs le jour de la vota leuse. 3. Que la presse a droit de discuter la légalité d'un arrêt du tribunal, mais que si, en faisant sa critique, elle s'écarte de la vérité, elle devient justiciable du tribunal, pour mépris de Cour.-Dussault et al. v. Belleau (Superior Court, Caron, J.), 10 Q. L. R. 247. THE COLERIDGE LIBEL CASE. The action of Adams v. Coleridge, tried last week, reads more like a passage from one of those novels in which the late Mr. Anthony Trollope delighted to confide to his readers the domestic perplexities of persons in high places than a chapter out of real life. No advantage is to be derived from discussing the moral and social aspects of the case. Chief Justices have had trouble with their daughters before. Lord Coke, when he wished his daughter to marry according to his own choice, put on breastplate and sword and stormed the house in which she had taken refuge, pledging his knowledge of law that those who resisted him might be guilty of murder, while those on his side would be justified. Lord Coleridge is entitled to disapprove of a son-in-law nonę the less because he happens to be Lord Chief Justice, and to enforce this disapproval by the only means in the power of a father towards an adult daughter-namely, by omitting her name from his will. Public opinion, no doubt, expects that a Chief Justice in such circumstances will not act out of caprice, but according to equity. It must be assumed that this natural expectation has not been disappointed, in the absence of any material to form an independent judgment. That material is not in existence; and without knowing all the circumstances, it is unfair to suggest that anything but justice has been done. The action of libel brought against Lord Coleridge's son by the intended husband in respect of a letter written to Miss Coleridge raises, however, in itself sufficiently important questions both in legal administration and the law of libel to merit full discussion. ture Acts, in such circumstances, was to let the case go to the jury, and to reserve leave to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, but this practice was rescinded in December, 1876. After the jury had given their verdict the judge might have declined to give judg ment, and left the parties to move (Order XXXVI., rule 39). This practice was not uncommon in the early days of the Judicature Acts, but it is now unusual. Since the passing of the Judicature Act, 1876, which by section 17 requires that the action shall be disposed of by the judge at the trial, it is considered that the parties are entitled to the opinion of the judge who tried the case. The only other course open was simply to nonsuit the plaintiff. This is a course not, infrequently followed by judges during their first years on the bench, but experienced judges hardly ever resort to it, knowing that it too often exposes the parties to a second trial. The criticisms, therefore, which have been made on Mr. Justice Manisty for 'overruling' the verdict of the jury proceed from want of knowledge of the procedure of the Courts, just as any suggestion of motive proceeds from a total ignorance of the character of the judge, and is at once repudiated by every lawyer who hears it. The mention of costs was due to a slip on the part of the Attorney-General. The costs followed the event-that is, the judgment—and the defendant could only lose them on the application of the plaintiff. Whether Mr. Justice Manisty was right in his two rulings fully deserves consideration. The first ruling, that the occasion was privileged, is supported by a decision of Baron Alderson in 1835, in the case of Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C. & P. 8S. The action was brought against the son-in-law of a lady who, having become a widow, proposed to marry the plaintiff. The learned The first question deserving inquiry is how Mr. Justice Manisty discharged the very delicate task of trying a case in which the interests of the chief of the bench on which he sits were directly involved. It is unlucky that the course adopted by the learned judge was such as not to satisfy the public. His action in declining to nonsuit the plaintiff in the first instance, and, immediately after the verdict of the jury for £3,000 damages, entering judgment, with costs, for the defendant, was easily open to misconstruction. It looked like a contemptuous treatment of the verdict of a jury in the interests of a brother judge. That nothing of the kind was intended is obvious to every lawyer, but difficult for laymen to understand. The only fault, if such it was, of the learned judge was in not regulating his conduct in a case of such sensational interest so as not to be misunderstood by the world at large. The course taken was, in fact, the most favourable that could be taken for the plain-judge ruled that a son-in-law had sufficient tiff. The learned judge was clearly of opinion that the occasion was privileged, and that there was no evidence of malice. Still the Court above him might be of a different opinion, and in order to avoid putting the plaintiff to the expense and annoyance of a new trial, if the other judges should differ from him, the learned judge allowed the question to go to the jury and the damages to be assessed. The practice before the Judica interest in his mother-in-law to create a privilege for a letter written to her remonstrating upon the proposed marriage. The question of express malice was left to the jury, and a verdict found for the defendant. The decision, if it be sound law, covers the present case; but it was only a Nisi Prius decision, and although it bound Mr. Justice Manisty, will not bind the Courts above. The law of privileged occasions is somewhat vague, but, plaintiff under Order XL., rules 4 and 5, must apply to the Court of Appeal if he desire to have judgment entered for him. If, however, the Attorney-General desire a new trial, either on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the damages are excessive, the Divisional Court will have jurisdiction over both motions. Under the old Rules there would have been two applications—one to the Court of Appeal and the other to the Divisional Court; but by the new Rules, if there is a motion for a new trial as well as a motion to reverse the entry of judgment, the Divisional Court hears both. The verdict of the jury was of course largely due to the fact that the defendant was not according to Baron Alderson, an intimate friend of a person about to marry is entitled to give warning against the proposed marriage. It is clear that the line cannot be drawn at relatives, and it is difficult to draw the line at all so as to give a practicable definition, unless it is drawn at parents and guardians. Baron Alderson, in the case referred to, charged the jury to be rather liberal to the writer of such a letter in putting a construction on his motives, but the jury in Adams v. Coleridge passed a very stern judgment on the defendant. Possibly they misunderstood the frequent objections of the Attorney-General and the rulings of Mr. Justice Manisty against the plaintiff. These interruptions had in reality the effect of keep-called as a witness. It was suggested on his ing the plaintiff straight in the conduct of his case. Whenever he was on the verge of committing an indiscretion which might have ruined his case, he was pulled up either by the judge or the opposing counsel. This may have looked like an attempt at repression, whereas it was in fact guidance, and may partly have accounted for the absurd verdict of £3,000 damages. This amount seems to have been suggested by a desire to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of dower with his intended wife-a consideration totally out of the question. If the jury were right in deciding that there was an excess of privilege, a complimentary sum as damages would have amply sufficed. The verdict having been arrived at, it is not easy to say that it is unsupported by evidence. If a younger brother is privileged to write to his sister defamatory statements of her intended husband, the law must carefully guard against any excess of such privilege. The jury were probably impressed by the tone of Mr. Coleridge's effusion, especially his 'not caring a fig,' his reference to the plaintiff's 'bluster,' and his imputation of sordid matrimonial views, and, above all, by the fact that the defendant, on being informed of the untruth of the statements which he had made, declined to enter into any further communication about them. It may be assumed that the case will go either to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal. If the Attorney-General simply rests on the decision of Mr. Justice Manisty, the behalf that the information on which he NEW PUBLICATIONS. THE LAW OF MEDICAL MEN, by R. Vashon Rogers, Jr., of Osgoode Hall, Barristerat-law: Publishers, Carswell & Co., To ronto. The subject of his latest work, as may be supposed, affords the author ample opportunity for the display of a great deal of curious lore and the citation of a number of peculiar cases. Mr. Rogers begins with the Druids, as the first medical practitioners in England of whom there is any record. Chirurgery was pretty much restricted to the monks and clergy until the twelfth century, when the Council of Tours |