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The Legal News.

VOL VII. NOVEMBER 1, 1884. No. 44.

THE LAW REPORTS.

We are receiving from all sides the most gratifying expressions of approval of the new system of Reports. Those who have considered the subject are unanimously of opinion that the step now taken is one that must be advantageous to the profession. The remark has been made to us, however, whether the Legal News may not lose some of its interest by the withdrawal of full reports of the Superior Court and Appeal decisions. Our arrangements for the Legal News under the new system are not yet complete, but we think, taking the last two as average numbers, that the apprehension of a falling off in interest is shown to be unfounded. We have reports of a number of judgments in the Circuit Court, a judgment in Appeal at Quebec, &c., none of which fall within our regular system, and will not be repeated in the "Montreal Law Reports." Some of the advantages accruing to the Legal News will be, (1) More speedy publication of short notes of current decisions. (2) Increase in the number of notes embraced in each issue. (3) Increased space for articles and correspondence on current topics, and on subjects of interest to the bar. (4) Increased space for decisions in rural districts. (5) Increased space for notes of important contemporary decisions in England, France and the United States upon branches of the law similar to our own. It is proposed, moreover, that the Legal News from 1st January next shall be delivered at half price ($2 per annum) to all subscribers to the "Montreal Law Reports."

JUDICIAL WORKSHOPS.

The buildings provided for judges and lawyers to do their work in, are seldom all that could be desired. In England Mr. Justice Stephen loses his way in the intricate and confused maze of the new law Courts. (7 L. N. 256.) The St. Louis Court House has become an unsavory refuge for tramps (7 L.N. 89). Chicago also boasts a new Court

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House, but it is so unsatisfactory that the Chicago Legal News recently mentioned the following fact in reference to it:

"A few days ago, one of the best judges on the bench said, "My court room is dark, and I have to burn gas most of the time. The air heated by the burning gas is extremely injurious to my health. I feel that I am breaking down from this cause, and at the expiration of my term next year, I shall resume my practice at the bar."

Thereupon Mr. J. A. Crain, a lawyer of Freeport, sends the following suggestion to to the editor:

For twenty years I have had over each gas-burner in my office, a pipe leading into a chimney, which pipe carries off all heat and noxious effects of the gas when burning. Tell the judge mentioned in Legal News of 18th, and oblige."

LORDS BRAMWELL AND COLERIDGE ON THE SALVATION ARMY. A correspondent who asked a question of Lord Bramwell, as to the law in regard to the Salvation Army, received the following reply:

"There is no statute law on the subject you mention. By the common law, if any one or more, either by stinks, noises, or otherwise, make the neighbourhood unwholesome or distressing to its inhabitants, a public indictable nuisance is committed, and the offender may be fined and imprisoned. But it must be a sensible grievance, and not one to fastidious people only; and it must be one not affecting one or two persons only, but the neighbourhood generally. You will find all this mentioned in Russell on Crimes,' vol. i. book ii. c. 30, s. 1, fourth edition. But I recommend you to lay a case before counsel, stating what facts can be proved. He will be able to advise you on the facts and law of your particular case, an opinion on which is worth much more than one on law only."

While upon this subject we shall quote a passage from the judgment of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge in Beatty v. Glenister. We had not seen this judgment when we referred to the case of the Salvationists in Montreal (ante, p. 257). It will be observed that

his Lordship goes much further than we❘ Although the liabilities of traders who have ventured to do in our remarks, for there is a manifest difference between merely singing a hymn on a public square and parading the streets with beat of drum and other instruments. His Lordship says (the italics are ours):

"As well might it be said that Wesley had 'created a disturbance' when he went to preach in Oxford, at Lincoln College, and the undergraduates mobbed him and pelted him with mud. In one sense, no doubt, he had created it, for he went there, and they did not like him; and it might be said in a sense that he had 'headed' the crowd that followed him, but he could not help that, and it was not his fault. So here, the defendants had only 'caused a disturbance' or 'headed a crowd' in that sense and no other, and they ought not to have been convicted. Singing hymns or shouting Hallelujah!' was not 'brawling' and creating a disturbance within the meaning of the law, nor was playing an instrument out of tune an offence against the peace. He sometimes wished it was. The proceedings of the Salvation Army might not always be such as he might like or approve, but they had their legal rights as other people had, and these rights were not to be interfered with unwarrantably. It was not because the magistrates or some of the inhabitants did not like these proceedings of the Salvation Army that, therefore, they had a right to interfere with them if not against the law. And this was an attempt to strain the law so as to make it operate against practices which were not liked or approved of, but which were not offences against the law. The conviction, therefore, was wrong, and must be set aside."

failed during the past quarter are larger than in the corresponding period of any preceding year since 1879, the number of insolvents is more than 25 per cent. less than last year. This increase of liabilities has been due to the failure of two or three large firms, as for example that of Fawcett & Co., private bankers, whose liabilities exceeded a million dollars, but compensation in some measure is found in the fact that the assets have more than correspondingly increased. Taking the full period of nine months, the failures in the past six years rank thus:

1884....
1883.

1882.

1881.
1880.
1879.

Number.
979

Liabilities. $14,855,492

1,001

11,688,951

537

5,832,552

479

4,690,747

779

6,888,611

1,484

24,424,570

SUPREME COURT REPORTS.

To the Editor of the LEGAL NEWS:

SIR,-As the plan announced in the last number of the LEGAL NEWS does not embrace a full report of the Supreme Court decisions, I would suggest that some publication which is not entering into the extension of the LEGAL NEWS should make it a specialty to publish reports of the Supreme Court cases. The reports now published by autho rity are most unsatisfactory, especially for the Province of Quebec. There is not a proportion equal to 10 per cent. of the decisions reported. We have had most important cases, upon the decision of which other ac tions pending before the provincial courts depend; Harrington v. Corse in particular, and after over two years no report has so far seen the light, although repeatedly asked for. The length of the reports published is discouraging for any one. To find out the enunciation of a useful principle of law ap plicable to another case, is almost impossible in those prolix deliverances. When we read Liabilities. a book, there is a summary of matters and an $4,112,892 index somewhere to shorten the labour. In 3,439,891 these endless reports you have to go through 1,715,982 787,889 a mass of useless matters before you find out 1,219,763 what you want. And when one judge has 6,998,617 explained the facts, why should we be

BUSINESS FAILURES IN CANADA.

The number of failures in the Dominion during the three months ending with September, as reported to Messrs. Dun, Wiman & Co., was as follows:

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afflicted by quintuple repetitions? It is high time that private enterprise should take hold of this standing necessity. And if it is done, I for one will not disturb anybody by obtaining a copy of the authentic reports.

D.

[We have not verified the percentage mentioned by our correspondent, who is a senior Queen's Counsel, with a large practice before the Supreme Court; but we are under the impression that the Province of Quebec cases before the Supreme Court are especially in arrear as far as reports are concerned.-ED. LEGAL NEWS.]

THE COURT OF REVIEW. To the Editor of THE LEGAL NEWS:

SIR,-It has been evident for some time past, that the system adopted by the Court of Review, with regard to hearing country cases, is working an injustice to the advocates practising in the city, and to the litigants before the Courts here: and as the result of this term's work has brought this out more glar- | ingly than ever before, it may be useful to call the attention of the Bar and the Judges to the matter more forcibly by publishing the actual figures.

In this month of October the Court has sat four days, nominally devoting two days to country cases and two to those of this district. This, to begin with, gave an undue proportion of the time to the country cases, as there were only 22 on the roll out of a total of 65; one being an election case. But as we come to examine the working of the system, the disproportion appears more and more abnormal. On the first day of the Court, the election case, and one privileged case, were heard. The second and third days were devoted to hearing cases from the rural districts. On the fourth, two Montreal cases were heard, and then the insatiable country litigants claimed the privilege again, as having been represented by city advocates, who had the day before yielded their place to their rural confrères. The result of the term's work stands as follows: 1 election petition; 1 privileged case; 1 motion; 3 Montreal cases, and 11 country cases heard. In other words, half of the country cases on the roll were disposed of, and only one-thirteenth of the city cases. It

is well for us to be courteous to our country brethren, and for the Court to be complaisant in its arrangements for their convenience; but we must not altogether forget the interests of our clients and ourselves, nor fail to remember that complaisance may degenerate into stultification.

If we turn to the September list we do not find much comfort, but only indications of the October fiasco. Out of 80 cases on the roll, 27 were from the rural districts, and there was one election case. The Court sat longer than usual in the attempt to diminish this heavy list; five or six days, if I remember rightly, devoting three days to country cases. Five motions were heard, one election case, and one motion in a jury case; 10 city cases were heard on the merits, and 14 country cases!

I have not sufficient spirit left to proceed further with this investigation; enough has been said to show that some radical change is needed in the system upon which this Court is managed.

I would humbly suggest that the Court should adopt some system, as to country cases, like that which works so well in the Court of Appeal:- taking them in their turn upon the roll as far down as the Court might expect to reach ; or devoting only one day out of the four, and that the last, to these cases. Taking them last would relieve the Bar here from much uncertainty as to their cases being called;—and would cause no inconvenience to our confrères; but, on the contrary, would make their day fixed, instead of uncertain as at present.

It would relieve the roll very much if the election cases could be heard on a day set apart, and not in the regular term. They are invariably lengthy, and generally take up at least one of the days set apart for city cases.

The roll is not made up on a logical system. Cases called and not argued should go to the bottom of the list, and lose their turn on the roll for the next term. To give an instance of how the present system works, I may mention a case which was reached in September, on the last day at 3.30 p.m. The Court adjourned without hearing the parties, who were ready. This term it was the 9th on the roll instead of the first! and it has not yet

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it was constituted in favor of a seigniory, and it disappeared by the concession of the real estate in favor of which it was created.

4. That the deed of sale of 1850 did not create a real servitude, but only a personal obligation, inasmuch as no héritage dominant was mentioned therein.

5. That the existence of a héritage dominant not mentioned in the deed cannot be proved by verbal evidence.

RAMSAY, J., delivered the judgment in appeal, by which the judgment of SICOTTE, J., Superior Court, St. Hyacinthe, was confirmed.

Mercier, Beausoleil & Martineau for the Appellants.

Lacoste, Globensky & Bisaillon for the Respondent.

SUPERIOR COURT.

Roy (deft. below), Respondent.*

Servitude-Seigniorial Act of 1854—Evidence.

MONTREAL, Sept. 30, 1884.

Before LORANGER, J.

COMPANY.*

Company-Forfeiture of shares-Sale of confiscated stock.

By deed of partition, in 1811, between the GILMAN V. THE ROYAL CANADIAN INSURANCE proprietors of a seigniory, it was agreed that the co-partitioners should not erect for their own profit any grist or saw-mill on their respective portions, within a league of the mills then existing on the seigniory. By deed of sale in 1850, a piece of land forming part of the same seigniory was sold by the representatives of one of the co-partitioners, with a stipulation that the purchasers and their representatives should never build nor permit to be built any flour mill or grist mill, whether such mill were operated by water, steam or any other motive power.

In an action brought to compel the respondent to demolish a grist mill:

Held, 1st. That the deed of 1811 created a reciprocal servitude in favor of each portion of the seigniory divided by the deed of partition.

2. That if this servitude was in its nature a seigniorial servitude, it was abolished by the Seigniorial Act of 1854, whether the servitude be considered as a principal right or as an accessory of the right of banalité.

3. That if the servitude was not seigniorial,

*To appear in the Montreal Law Reports, 1 Queen's Bench.

the right to confiscate and sell shares on
Held, that the company, defendant, had
which the calls were not paid within the
time fixed by notices regularly given. It
detail in the advertisement of sale, nor to
was not necessary to mention the shares in
set forth the amount paid on each share.
The intention of the directors to sell the for-
feited shares as if all past due calls were paid
calls, was regular and legal.
up, and subject to the payment of all future

The action to set aside the forfeiture of shares, and to prevent the sale of the shares at public auction, was dismissed.

A. W. Atwater for the plaintiff.
N. W. Trenholme, counsel.

Bethune & Bethune for the Royal Canadian
Insurance Co.

Geoffrion, Rinfret & Dorion for Thibaudeau et al., directors.

L. N. Benjamin for Robertson et al., directors.

To appear in the Montreal Law Reports, 1 8. C.

SUPERIOR COURT.

MONTREAL, Oct. 6, 1884.

Before MOUSSEAU, J.

GILMAN V. ROBERTSON et al., and THE ROYAL CANADIAN INSURANCE Co., mis en cause.* Company--Sale of shares-Election of Directors.

Held, the sale of the Kay stock mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration was regular and legal, and, moreover, the plaintiff having acquiesced therein, had no right to complain. 2. The defendants Archer, Ostell, Hodgson and Moss had no need of re-election as directors on the 7th of February, 1884, and such re-election did not legally affect their then status of directors until the annual meeting of the company in 1885.

3. The remaining directors were all duly and legally elected at the meeting of the company held on the 7th of February, 1884. 4. All the said directors were duly qualified under the charter of the company.

Action dismissed.

Trenholme, Taylor & Dickson for plaintiff. Maclaren, Leet & Smith for defendants, Robertson et al.

Kerr, Carter & Goldstein for the plaintiffs Beique, McGoun & Emard for the defendant La Banque d'Hochelaga.

Abbott, Tait & Abbotts for the defendant the Molsons Bank.

COUR DE CIRCUIT.

MONTRÉAL, 4 septembre 1884. Coram LORANGER, J.

LACHAPELLE V. LAROSE.

Collecteur exigeant honoraire pour coût d'une lettre.

JUGÉ: 1. Qu'un agent ou collecteur, n'a pas droit d'exiger $1.50, ni aucune autre somme, pour le coût d'une lettre écrite à un débiteur lui réclamant sa dette.

2.

Que dans le cas actuel, le défendeur sera condamné à rembourser au demandeur $1.50, coût d'une prétendue lettre d'avocat par lui écrite au demandeur de la part du nommé Edouard Richelieu et qu'il s'était fait payer en qualité d'agent.

Voici la teneur de la déclaration du demandeur:

Qu'en la cité de Montréal, il aurait payé au défendeur la somme de $1.50 aux dates

Bethune & Bethune for defendant Ostell and suivantes, savoir: $1.00, le 10 décembre 1880 the mis en cause.

Kerr & Carter for defendants Archer et al.

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et $0.50, le 7 janvier 1884, ainsi qu'il appert aux reçus du défendeur produits au soutien des présentes, et ce, pour le coût d'une prétendue lettre d'avocat que lui aurait envoyée le défendeur de la part d'Edouard Richelieu

Que la dite lettre n'était pas une lettre d'avocat, mais avait été écrite par le défendeur et signée de son nom, en qualité d'agent, et qu'il n'avait aucun droit à la dite somme de $1.50.

Que le défendeur n'est pas avocat, mais que pour mieux surprendre la bonne foi et profiter de l'ignorance du demandeur qui est entièrement illettré, comme pour mieux le représenté comme avocat, en qualifiant sa tromper et le frustrer, il se serait faussement dite lettre de "lettre d'avocat ": appert par l'exhibit No 2 du demandeur.

Que le demandeur a payé au défendeur la dite somme sans la lui devoir, par erreur, ignorance de cause et sous la fausse impression qu'il s'agissait d'une lettre d'avocat.

Qu'en obtenant ainsi la dite somme, le défendeur s'est rendu coupable d'extorsion,

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