Imatges de pàgina
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on the shelf of the scholar, as the author says in his preface. The division by chapters is as follows:

I. Parties, their rights and remedies; II. Jurisdiction; III. Necessary and proper parties; IV. Aliens, non-residents, Indians, Trustees, Assignees, etc; V. States, counties, cities and towns; VI. Public officers; VII. Bankrupts and insolvents; VIII. Infants, Insane Persons, Idiots; IX. Husband and wife; X. Executors and administrators; XI. Landlord and tenant, Joint tenants, and tenants in common; XII. Master and servant, Principal and agent, Principal and surety, Bailor and bailee; XIII. Partnerships, Corporations, unincorporated associations, etc. XIV. Of the Joinder of Parties. XV. Of the misjoinder and non-joinder of parties, amendment and new parties. XVI. Abatement, revivor, etc.; XVII. Intervention; XVIII. Interpleader.

There is an excellent Index, covering 200

pages.

As I now hold them in my name.
I give her power to convey the fee
As fully as though 'twere done by me,
And here declare that from all charges,
My wife's "receipts are good discharges."
May God Almighty bless his word
To all

my presents from the Lord,"
May he his blessings on them shed
When down in sleep they lay their head.
And now, my wife, my hopes I fix
On thee, my sole executrix-
My truest, best, and to the end,
My faithful partner, crown, and friend.
In witness thereof, I hereunto
My hand and seal have set,

In presence of those whose names below,
Subscribe and witness it.

26th January, 1835.

J. C. G. [L.S.]

This will was published, sealed and signed,
By the testator, in his right mind,
In presence of us, who, at his request,
Have written our names these facts to attest."

THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON
LAW: A paper prepared at the request
of the Committee of the Bar Association
of the city of New York, appointed to
oppose the measure. By James C. Car-
ter, a member of the Committee.
York, 1884.

New

LYRICS OF THE LAW.-A recital of songs and verses pertinent to the law and the legal profession, selected from various sources, by J. Greenbag Croke. Publishers: Sumner Whitney & Co., San Francisco, 1884. This collection of lyrics of the law embraces a great many scraps of interest. Some of them may seem without value to those actively engaged in the practice of the profession, but they would be useful and amusing in proper hands at a bar dinner. We have only room at present for the follow-bers of the Legislature and the Bar of the ing:

A LAWYER'S WILL.

This is my last will and testament:
Read it according to my intent.
My gracious God to me hath given
Store of good things, that, under heaven,
Are given to those that love the Lord,
And hear and do His sacred word:
I therefore give to my dear wife
All my estates, to keep for life,
Real and personal, profits and rents,
Messuages, lands, and tenements;
After her death I give the whole
Unto my children, one and all,
To take as 'Tenants in Common' do
Not as Joint Tenants', per mic, per tout.
I give all my Trust Estates in fee
To Charlotte, my wife and devisec,

To hold to her, on trust, the same

This is a very learned and interesting essay on the subject of the proposed codification of the common law of the State of New York. Mr. Carter is an earnest opponent of the scheme, and the Bar Association apparently agree with him, as they have directed that three thousand copies of Mr. Carter's paper be printed and circulated among the mem

city and State. We regret that we have not been able to give this pamphlet such a careful examination as it deserves. With us codification is an established fact, and although complaint may be made of obscurity in some parts and omissions in others, yet no one suggests that the Code should be swept away. As Sir James Stephen says, referring to the proposed Criminal Code in England:-"When a sufficient number of judicial decisions have clearly defined a principle, or laid down a rule, an authoritative statutory enactment of that principle or rule superseding the cases on which it depends is a great convenience on many wellknown grounds, and especially because it

abbreviates the law and renders it distinct to an incredible extent." A carefully prepared code is a great boon, and we predict that the advocates of codification in the State of New York will sooner or later prevail.

A SHORT RESPONSE TO A LONG DISCOURSE: An answer by Mr. David Dudley Field to Mr. James C. Carter's pamphlet on the proposed Codification of our Common Law. New York, 1884.

In this paper Mr. Field vindicates his draft Code from the charges of Mr. Carter. He rather sneers at the New York Bar Association as "a highly respectable association of SOO lawyers out of 7,000 in the city-one in nine,” and declares that there is nothing new in Mr. Carter's pamphlet. "It is the same old committee, so far as appears, and it is the same old story, which the Legislature, the Bar, and others interested in the subject have heard time and time again, for the last nine-and-thirty years. The voice is a little disguised, it may be, when heard from behind the curtain, but as the actor advances to the foot-lights, we behold the same visage glaring at us that has glared so often before. To change the figure a little abruptly, 'The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." It may be judged from the foregoing that Mr. Field's style is animated, and his reply is interesting reading.

LETTERS UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, known as the B. N. A. Act, 1867, by the Hon. T. J. J. Loranger. Quebec, 1884. First Letter. This is a republication of letters which appeared in the daily newspapers, treating of federal and provincial relations. In the first Letter the Mercer case is discussed. Mr. Loranger, it is well known, holds extreme views on the subject of provincial rights, and in these Letters his pretensions are supported in a voluminous argument.

CATALOGUE BY SUBJECTS, OF THE BOOKS PRE-
SENTED TO MCGILL COLLEGE BY MR. JUS-
TICE MACKAY.

Mr. Justice Mackay, on retiring from the
Bench of the Superior Court, generously pre-

sented his very valuable law library to
McGill University. We have now before us
a catalogue by subjects of the works com-
prised in the gift, showing that for a private
collection it is unusually complete, and forms
an important adjunct to the University
library.

SPEECH OF MR. MACMASTER, M. P., ON THE
LIQUOR LICENSE ACT, 1883.

Mr. Macmaster, Q. C., delivered an able address in Parliament, in the course of the debate on the McCarthy Act, on the 18th of March last. We have received a pamphlet copy of the Hansard report, which makes a valuable addition to the literature of the Constitutional Act. Mr. Macmaster quotes a remark made to him by Mr. J. P. Benjamin in England, referring to the difficulties which occur in the interpretation of a written constitution: "You appear to have great difficulty in interpreting your Constitution, which has only been in existence for fifteen years; but I can tell you, after a practice of thirty odd years in the United States, and subsequently in England, where I often had to do with cases relating to the Constitution of the Colonies in the House of Commons and the House of Lords, that these cases are increasing year by year and day by day, and although we thought in the United States

that the difficulties of our Constitution would be settled in the first fifteen or twenty years of its existence, the present day has develOped difficulties that we never contemplated, and that are ten times as great as any that existed in the first half century of its existence."

NOTES OF CASES.

SUPERIOR COURT.

MONTREAL, Jan. 15, 1884. Before MATHIEU, J.

Hon. Sir A. CAMPBELL, es qual. v. JUDAH. Rights of the Crown-Compensation—C. C. 9, 1187, 1188.

Art. 9 of the Civil Code refers only to such rights and prerogatives of the Crown as are attributions of the sovereignty, and not to such rights as may be possessed equally by subjects. Hence Articles 1187 and 1188 of the Code apply to ordinary claims of the Crown,

and compensation may be pleaded between a claim of the Crown for the price of land sold and a debt due by the Crown for salary.

The judgment, which fully explains the point decided, is as follows:

“La cour, après avoir entendu les parties par leurs avocats sur la réponse en droit par le demandeur au second plaidoyer du défendeur en cette cause, examiné la procédure et délibéré:

"Attendu que le demandeur ès qualité de ministre de la justice et de procureur-général | pour la Puissance du Canada, et comme tel agissant pour et au nom de Sa Majesté, réclame du dit défendeur comme légataire universel de feu Henry Judah, décédé le 10 février 1883, en vertu du testament de ce dernier en date du 1er mai 1876, qui fut prouvé dans la cour supérieure à Montréal le 14 février 1883, et enregistré au bureau de la division d'enregistrement de Montréal Ouest le 1er juillet 1883, la somme de $18,941.92, pour intérêt sur la balance du prix de la vente de l'ancien bureau de Poste à Montréal, No. 146 | du Quartier Ouest de la cité de Montréal, consentie à Maurice Cuvillier par l'Honorable Sir Hector Langevin, K.C.M.G., ministre des Travaux Publics de la Puissance du Canada, au nom de Sa Majesté la Reine, le 4 novembre 1873, conformément à certaines conventions entre le dit Maurice Cuvillier et l'Hon. Alex. Campbell, maître-général des Postes de la dite Puissance, en date du 3 avril 1871, qui furent confirmées par un ordre du Gouverneur-Général en Conseil du 8 mai 1871, quel acte de vente sous seing privé du 4 novembre 1873 fut déposé dans les minutes de W. A. Phillips, notaire, le 25 octobre 1875, et enregistré le 7 décembre 1875, lequel terrain fut ensuite vendu par le dit Maurice Cuvillier à Henry Hogan, par acte devant le dit Mtre. Phillips, notaire, le 25 octobre 1875, puis vendu par le dit Henry Hogan au dit Henry Judah, par acte devant le même dit notaire, le 14 décembre 1876, enregistré le 21 décembre 1876;

comme commissaire sous le statut pour l'abolition des droits seigneuriaux dans le Bas Canada depuis le 31 mars 1879 jusqu'à la date de sa mort;

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Attendu que le dit demandeur ès qualité demande le renvoi de cette partie du dit second plaidoyer du dit défendeur parceque le défendeur ne peut plaider compensation contre la couronne, et que la dette par lui réclamée et offerte en compensation n'est pas également claire et liquide ;

"Considérant que par les dispositions de l'article 1188 du code civil, la compensation s'opère de plein droit entre deux dettes également liquides et exigibles et ayant pour objet une somme de deniers;

"Considérant que la créance offerte par le défendeur en compensation pour autant de la créance du demandeur ès qualité, est une créance liquide et qui parait exigible d'après les allégations du plaidoyer du défendeur;

"Considérant qu'il est bien vrai que la couronne n'est pas mentionnée dans les articles 1187 et 1188 du code civil; mais que les dispositions de l'article 9 du code civil, qui décrètent que nul acte de la législature n'affecte les droits ou prérogatives de la couronne, à moins qu'ils n'y soient compris par une disposition expresse, ne s'appliquent qu'au cas où ces droits ou prérogatives appartiennent à la couronne comme attribution de la souveraineté, et que ces dispositions ne s'appliquent pas au cas où les droits de la couronne sont des droits qui lui sont communs, et qui peuvent appartenir également aux sujets;

"Considérant que dans l'espèce la réclamation du demandeur ès qualité est pour le prix d'une vente d'immeuble, et que la qualité de créancier du demandeur ès qualité est une créance ordinaire qui ne fait pas partie du domaine de la couronne et des droits de la souveraineté, et que les dispositions des articles 1187 et 1188 du code civil lui sont applicables;

"Considérant que par le serment du couronnement tel que decrêté par le statut impérial de 1688, chapître 6, de la première session du règne de Guillaume et Marie, le Roi ou la Reine jure de gouverner le peuple du royaume conformément aux statuts passés en parlement et aux lois et coutumes de ce

"Attendu que le dit défendeur, dans son second plaidoyer, offre en compensation de la réclamation du demandeur ès qualité et pour autant la somme de $568.34 pour loyer et dépenses de bureau et la somme de $7,060, pour balance du salaire du dit Henry Judah' royaume;

"Considérant que ce ne serait pas conforme aux dispositions de ce serment si Sa Majesté pouvait acheter et vendre des propriétés et exercer les droits des sujets sans être soumise aux lois qui les concernent et qui ont été sanctionnés par Sa Majesté en parlement; "Considérant que la dite réponse en droit est mal fondée: A renvoyé et renvoie la dite réponse en droit."

Answer-in-law dismissed. Church, Chapleau, Hall & Atwater, for the plaintiff.

A. Branchaud, for the defendant.

SUPERIOR COURT.

MONTREAL, April 29, 1884.
Before JOHNSON, J.

Other evidence shows that it is probable, and there is nothing to suggest a loose life in this woman, nor that any one else might have been the father of her child.

We have nothing to do here now with any right that might be claimed by this woman for herself. She asks nothing for herself—it is not an action of damages :-there is nothing before the Court but the right of the child to have its paternity declared, and to be maintained, and the woman's evidence for the child is quite admissible. Fournel in his well known and well written treatise, says at page 118, speaking of the "exception tirée de l'inconduite de la fille enceinte: Cette exception est devenue le moyen banal employé par ceux qui sont poursuivis en déclaration de paternité. Ils ne manquent jamais d'opposer que la com"plaisance qu'ils ont éprouvée n'était point une faveur particulière, mais que plusieurs "autres ont participé au même destin; et par "cette imputation d'inconduite et de désordre, "ils cherchent à éluder les dommages et inté"rêts, et la charge de l'enfant.

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DENAULT es qual. v. BANVILLE. Action en déclaration de paternité-Evidence. In an action en déclaration de paternité, where the defendant admitted the connection with the mother, but assigned a date which would disprove his paternity of the child, and there was no evidence of improper" conduct of the mother otherwise: that the Court would give weight to her declaration on oath that the defendant was the father. Absolute certainty in such cases is not required: it is sufficient to establish a strong probability that the defendant is the father. JOHNSON, J. This is an action en déclaration de paternité brought by the mother of a child to whom she has been appointed tutrix, and of which the defendant is alleged to be the father. The defence-a most cruel one if unfounded -is that the mother was a woman of loose habits, and that the child, which was of full term, could not be the defendant's, as he only had connection with her in December, 1882, and the child was born in July, 1883. The defendant therefore acknowledges his connection with this woman, but suggests, (and we

have only his word for it) that it took place in December. As to alleged intimacy with other men, it is not proved. There were some technical objections made as to the registration of the tutelle; but they have no weight.

The woman swears the connection took place in October, 1882, and that the defendant is the

father of the child.

"Mais il s'en faut bien que cette exception produise cet effet; elle ne peut (lorsqu'elle "est justifiée) s'appliquer qu'aux dommages et "intérêts, sans que l'accusé puisse s'en aider " pour la charge de l'enfant." In the present case, as I have said, nothing whatever is proved against this woman in the way of other misconduct; but if there was, what says Fournel? At the following page (119): "Mais, quand "l'inconduite de la fille est bien établie dans "la cause, ce n'est point une raison pour dispenser l'accusé de se charger de l'enfant, si "d'ailleurs il est suffisamment avéré qu'il y a eu copulation entre les parties." Here the fact is admitted in the plea. Surely the defendant would not have admitted it if untrue, and as surely "he cannot by assigning a particular "date to it, negative the fact itself." The late Mr. Justice Rolland used to say in these cases: "The Court must find a father for this child." "On

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Fournel says the same thing. He says:
ne peut le chercher que parmi ceux qui ont
"fréquenté la mère." Here we have no sug-
gestion of any one in particular who could
have been the father, except the defendant.
Fournel observes in another place (120) that
the word of the mother is very weighty in such
a case, and that "even supposing she might

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The defendants are hotel keepers at Montreal, carrying on business under the firm of "P. Asselin & Cie."

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the firm, caused the effects of Girard, one of the partners, to be seized at his domicile. Girard opposed the seizure on the ground that his individual property could not be seized under a judgment against the firm for a debt of the firm. It was also alleged that the notice of sale was irregular.

The plaintiff contested the opposition, alleging that the firm was dissolved, and had no known place of business nor assets, and that the defendants were jointly and severally liable.

"be wrong," "les magistrats ne craignent pas "de faire une injustice, en chargeant de l'édu"cation de l'enfant celui qui peut au moins en "être le père, et qui n'offre aucun moyen plau"sible pour la négative. De deux possibilités "il faut choisir celle qui étant plus vraisem"blable, est aussi la plus utile à l'enfant : il "lui faut un père" (as Ch. J. Rolland used to say): "Le bon sens veut qu'on le choisisse "parmi ceux qui se sont exposés à le devenir. "Après tout, l'objet des magistrats n'est pas "de rencontrer nécessairement l'auteur de la paternité naturelle. Il suffit qu'il y ait dans "les présomptions de quoi asseoir une pater"nité vraisemblable. Celui sur qui elle tombe "ne doit imputer qu'à son imprudence et à 66 son inconduite de s'être exposé à ce soupçon." And then, Fournel gives some most extraordinary cases which I will forbear from referring to more particularly, but going on the main principles laid down by the recognized authority of Fournel, I say what else is vraisemblable in this case, except the paternity of the defendant? I say more: I say this infamous defence alleging the misconduct of the woman, failing as it does most miserably, what other defence has this man before the Court? The Railway Act-Actions for indemnity— None, absolutely none, but technicalities and sophistries which are too futile to be noticed. I have no doubt that upon the well understood principles governing such a case, the judgment must be for the plaintiff and accordingly the defendant is held to be the father of the child; and to pay for its support.

Judgment for the plaintiff.
E. N. St. Jean for the plaintiff.
Mercier & Co. for the defendant.

CARMEL V.

CIRCUIT COURT.

The COURT dismissed the opposition.
Sarasin for opposant.
D'Amour for contestant.

CIRCUIT COURT, 1881.

SHERBROOKE, July 2, 1881.
Coram DOHERTY, J.

ANDERSON V. THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY
COMPANY OF CANADA.

Limitation of six months.

The six months' prescription under "The Railway Act" applies to actions for the value of

horses or cattle killed on the railway track. This was an action of damages, in which plaintiff claimed, from the defendants, the value of a horse killed on their track, near Richmond, P. Q., on the 17th September, 1880.

The writ was issued on the 22nd April, 1881, more than six months after the alleged

Occurrence.

MONTREAL, January 25, 1884. The plaintiff's declaration alleged that the
Before DOHERTY, J.
fences separating the railway from the plain-
ASSELIN et al., and GIRARD, tiff's pasture were insufficient; that the horse,

opposant. Partnership-Dissolution.

1. The members of a general partnership are jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership, whether it be still existing or not.

2. The creditor of such partnership is not obliged to proceed against the property of the firm before seizing the effects owned by the partners individually.

owing to the bad state of the fences, got on the track, and was killed in consequence of defendants' neglect to maintain the fences in proper condition.

The defendants pleaded the prescription of six months established by "The Railway Act."

W. White for defendants:

The laches of which the plaintiff complains, is the failure of the defendants to fulfil an

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