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Law, was only to have their Causes heard over again; and when you afterwards consented to the Creation of the Tribunes, neither you, nor even the People themselves, intended any thing more in the Establishment of those new Magiftrates, than that this Law might have Protectors, and the Poor be provided with Advocates. who might prevent their being oppreffed by the Great. What Relation is there, between fuch a Law, and the Cafe of a Senator, a Man of an Order fuperior to the People, and who is accountable for his Conduct to none but the Senate? To fhew that the Lex Valeria relates only to Plebeians; for about feventeen Years that it has been made, let Decius give me one fingle Inftance of a Patrician called in Judgment before the People by that Law, and our Difpute will be at an End. And indeed what Juftice would there be in delivering up a Senator to the Fury of the Tribunes, and to fuffer the People to be Judges in their own Caufe; as if their tumultuous Affemblies, directed by fuch feditious Magiftrates, could be without Prejudice, without Hatred, without Paffion? Thus, O Fathers, it is my Advice, that before you come to any Determination, you maturely confider, that in this Affair your Interefts are infeparable from thofe of Coriolanus. As to the reft, I am not for your revoking the Favours you have granted the People, by whatever means they obtained them; but I cannot forbear exhorting you to refufe boldly for the future whatever they fhall endeavour to obtain of you contrary to your own Authority, and the Form of our Government.

LESSON VI.

It appears from thefe two Speeches of Decius and Appius, that the Bufinefs of Coriolanus was only used as a Colour to Affairs of greater Importance. The true Caufe of the Dispute and Animofity of the two Parties was this, That the Nobles and Patricians pretended a Right of Succeffion to the Regal Authority, upon the Expulfion of Tarquin, and that the Government ought to be purely Ariftocratic; whereas the Tribunes, by new La s, endeavoured to turn it into a Democracy, and to bring the whole Authority into the Hands of the People. M, Valerius, an old experienced Senator, and a true Republican, difpleafed to fee thofe of his own Order conftantly affecting

fecting a Distinction and Power, ever odious in a free State, Spoke as follow.

WE

E are made to fear, that the public Liberty will be in Danger, if we grant fo much Power to the People, and allow them to try thofe of our Order who fhall be accufed by the Tribunes. I am perfuaded on the contrary, that nothing is more likely to preferve it. The Republic confifts of two Orders, Patricians and Plebeians; the Question is, Which of those two Orders may more fafely be trufted with the Guardianship of that facred Depofitum, our Liberty? I maintain, that it will be more fecure in the Hands of the People, who defire only not to be oppreffed, than in thofe of the Nobles, who all have a violent Thirft of Dominion. The Nobles, invefted with the prime Magiftracies, diftinguished by their Birth, their Wealth, and their Honours, will always be powerful enough to hold the People to their Duty; and the People, when they have the Authority of the Laws, being naturally Haters and jealous of all exalted Power, will watch over the Actions of the Great, and, by the Dread of a popuJar Enquiry and Judgment, keep a Check upon the Ambition. of fuch Patricians as might be tempted to afpire to the Tyranny. You abolished the Royalty, Confcript Fathers, because the Authority of a fingle Man grew exorbitant. Not fatisfied with dividing the fovereign Power between two annual Magiftrates, you gave them a Counsel of three hundred Senators, to be Infpectors over their Conduct, and Moderators of their Authority. But this Senate, fo formidable to the Kings and to the Confuls, has nothing in the Republic to balance its Power. I know very well, that hitherto there is all the Reason in the World to applaud its Moderation: But who can fay whether we are not obliged for this to our fear of Enemies abroad, and to those continual Wars which we have been forced to maintain? Who will be answerable that our Succeffors, growing more haughty and more potent by a long Peace, fhall not make Attempts upon the Liberty of our Country, and that in the Senate there fhall not arife fome ftrong Faction, whofe Leader will find means to become the Tyrant of his Country, if there be not at the fame time fome other Power, out of the Senate, to withstand fuch ambitious Enterprizes, by impeaching the Authors and Abettors of them before the People?

Perhaps the Queftion will be afked me, Whether the fame Inconvenience is not to be apprehended from the People, and whether it is poffible to make fufficient Provifion, that there

fhall

47 fhall not at fome time arife among the Plebeians, a Head of a Party, who will abuse his Influence over the Minds of the Multitude, and under the old Pretence of defending the People's Interefts, in the end invade both their Liberty and that of the Senate? But you well know, that upon the least Danger which the Republic may feem to be in on that Side, our Confuls have Power to name a Dictator, whom they will never chufe but from among your own Body; that this fupreme Magiftrate, abfolute Mafter of the Lives of his Fellow-Citizens, is able by his fole Authority to diffipate a popular Faction; and the Wisdom of our Laws has allowed him that formidable Power but for fix Months, for fear he should abuse it, and employ in the Establishment of his own Tyranny, an Authority entrusted with him only to destroy that of any other ambitious Men.

Thus with a mutual Infpection the Senate will be watchful over the Behaviour of the Confuls, the People over that of the Senate; and the Dictator, when the State of Affairs requires the Intervention of fuch a Magiftrate, will curb the Ambition of all. The more Eyes there are upon the Conduct of every Branch of our Legiflature, the more fecure will be our Liberty, and the more perfect our Conftitution.

The Iffue of this Debate was, that Coriolanus was given up to be tried by the Tribunes of the People; by whom he was condemned to perpetual Banishment.

LESSON VII.

In all the Struggles between the Patricians and the People, the latter generally carried their Points; infomuch, that in Procefs of Time the greatest Part of the Power of the Commonwealth of Rome came into the Hands of the Tribunes. They called Affemblies of the People when they pleafed, and in those Affemblies frequently annulled the Decrees of the Senate. Nothing could be concluded without their Confent, which they expreffed by fubfcribing the Letter T at the Bottom of the Decree. They had it in their Power to prevent the Execu tion of any Decree, without giving any Reafon for it, and merely by fubfcribing VETO. They fometimes called before the People even the Confuls and Dictators to account for their Conduct. About forty Years after the Affair of Coriolanus,

during

during the Confulship of Quinctius Capitolinus and Agrippa Furius, the fame Diffentions are again reviv'd, infomuch that tho' the qui and Volfci, taking Advantage of thefe Disorders, ravage the Country to the very Gates of Rome, the Tribunes forbad the neceffary Levies of Troops to oppofe them. Quinctius however, a Senator of great Reputation, well belov'd, and now in his fourth Confulate, gets the better of this Oppofition, by the following Speech.

HOUGH I am not confcious, O Romans, of any

T Crime by me committed, it is yet with the utmost

Shame and Confufion that I appear in your Affembly. You have feen it-Pofterity will know it-In the fourth Confulship of Titas Quinctius, the Aqui and Volfci (scarce a Match for the Hernici alone) came in Arms to the very Gates of Rome, and went away again unchaftifed! The Course of our Manners indeed, and the State of our Affairs, have long been fuch, that I had no reafon to prefage much Good; but could I have imagined, that fo great an Ignominy would have befallen me this Year, I would by Death or Banishment (if all other Means had failed) have avoided the Station I am now in. What! might Rome then have been taken, if those Men who were at our Gates had not wanted Courage for the Attempt?- Rome taken, while I was Conful!- Öf Honours I had fufficient-of Life enough-more than enough-I should have died in my third Confulate. But who are they that our daftardly Enemies thus defpife? the Confuls? or you, Romans? If we are in fault, depofe us, punish us yet more feverely. If you are to blame-may neither Gods nor Men punish your Faults! only may you repent. No, Romans, the Confidence of our Enemies is not owing to their Courage, or to their Belief of your Cowardice: They have been too often vanquished not to know both themselves and you. Difcord, Difcord, is the Ruin of this City. The eternal Difputes between the Senate and the People, are the fole Caufe of our Misfortunes. While we will fet no Bounds to our Domination, nor you to your Liberty; while you impatiently endure Patrician Magiftrates, and we Plebeian, our Enemies take Heart, grow elated and prefumptuous. In the Name of the immortal Gods, what is it, Romans, you would have? You defired Tribunes; for the Sake of Peace we granted them. You were eager to have Decemvirs; we confented to their Creation. You grew weary of these Decemvirs; we obliged them to abdicate. Your Hatred purfued them when reduced to be private Men; and we suffered

you

you to put to Death or banish Patricians of the firft Rank in the Republic. You infifted upon the Reftoration of the Tribunefhip, we yielded: we quietly faw Confuls of your own Faction elected. You have the Protection of your Tribunes, and the Privilege of Appeal; the Patricians are fubjected to the Decrees of the Commons. Under Pretence of equal and impartial Laws, you have invaded our Rights, and we have fuffered it, and we ftill fuffer it. When shall we fee an End of Difcord? When fhall we have one Interest, and one common Country? Victorious and triumphant, you fhew lefs Temper than we under our Defeat. When you are to contend with us, you can feize the Aventine Hill, you can poffefs yourselves of the Mons Sacer. The Enemy is at our Gates, the Æfquiline is near being taken, and no body ftirs to hinder it. But againft us you are valiant, against us you can arm with all Diligence. Come on then, befiege the Senate-Houfe, make a Camp of the Frum, fill the Jails with our chief Nobles, and when you have atchieved these glorious Exploits, then at least fally out at the Efquiline Gate with the fame fierce Spirits againft the Enemy. Does your Refolution fail you for this? Go then, and behold from our Walls your Lands ravaged, your Houfes plunder'd and in Flames, the whole Country laid waste with Fire and Sword. Have you any thing here to repair thefe Damages? will the Tribunes make up your Loffes to you? They'll give you Words as many as you pleafe; bring Impeachments in abundance against the prime Men in the State; heap Laws upon Laws; Affemblies you fhall have without End: But will any of you return the Richer from those Affemblies? Extinguish, O'Romans, thefe fatal Divifions; generously break this curfed Inchantment, which keeps you buried in a fcandalous Inaction. Open your Eyes, and confider the Management of thofe ambitious Men, who to make themselves powerful in their Party, ftudy nothing but how they may foment Divifions in the Commonwealth. If you can but fummon up your former Courage, if you will now march out of Rome with your Confuls, there is no Punishment you can inflict which I will not fubmit to, if I do not in a few Days drive thofe Pillagers out of our Territory. This Terror of War (with which you feem fo grievoufly ftruck) fhall quickly be removed from Rome to their own Cities.

LESSON

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