the former he says: “Il embarrasse tout le monde, ne se contraint pour personne, ne plaint personne, ne connoît de maux que les siens"; of the latter: "C'est un personnage illustre dans son genre, et qui a porté le talent de se bien nourrir jusqu'où il pouvoit aller. . . . Quelque part où il soit il mange, et s'il revient au monde, c'est pour manger."1 Of his more complex characters we may take his description of a hero, supposed to be in part a portrait of the great Condé. He "was born what other great men only become by force of rules, of meditation and practice . . . great in prosperity, greater still when fortune was contrary: the raising of a siege, or a retreat, has more ennobled him than his triumphs; . . . he has been heard to say: I took to flight, with the same grace with which he said: We beat them." And we have the summing up, in which the principal sentiments of the great man, and one or another of his characteristic emotions, are touched on in conjunction with others of his qualities: "a man devoted to the State, to his family, to the head of his family; sincere before God and before men; so great an admirer of merit that we should have supposed it to have been less a property of himself and less familiar to him; a man true, simple, magnanimous, not lacking in the least virtues." 2

We may compare this noble portrait in which we seem to grasp the essence of the man, with one by another great delineator of character. Clarendon's portrait of the Duke of Buckingham is more complex, enters more into the details of his action, but represents a similar combination of qualities. of conduct, sentiments, and emotions to form a single conception. The qualities of this statesman are first mentioned: "This great man was a Person of a Noble nature, and generous disposition." "He was of a most flowing Courtesy and Affability to all men who made any address to him. . . . He was of a Courage not to be daunted, which was manifested in all of his actions. . . ." Of his sentiments of love and hate, says: "His Kindness and Affection to his friends was so vehement, that they were as so many marriages for better and 1 Op. cit., 'De l'Homme.'

he

2 Op. cit., ' Du Mérite Personnel.'

worse. : And it cannot be denied that he was an Enemy in the same excess ; and was not easily induced to reconciliation." After a history of some incidents of his life, other qualities are enumerated: "He was in his Nature just and candid, liberal, generous, and bountiful." And these qualities are referred to his lack of Avarice: "nor was it ever known, that the temptation of Money sway'd him to do an unjust, or unkind thing." In conclusion, his ruling sentiment is noticed and excused: "If he had an immoderate Ambition with which he was charged, and is a Weed (if it be a weed) apt to grow in the best Soils; it doth not appear . . that he brought it with him to the Court, but rather found it there, and was a Garment necessary for that Air." 1

We have now given sufficient examples to show something of the variety of constituents that may enter into the conception of character, and that these constituents, notwithstanding the profound differences that subsist between them, are thrown together without method, or one is abstracted from the rest : any course being justifiable that produces a clear conception of the character we have to describe. Thus the qualities of a man's conduct are no sooner clearly identified than they are transferred to character, and placed alongside of other constituents that are not conduct, nor qualities of conduct.

We have now to consider how these same qualities of conduct are related to the impulses, emotions, and sentiments, and to the varieties of will and intelligence organised with them.

2. The Conception of Conduct

We combine, distinguish, and oppose the conceptions of character and conduct. We think of the one as within, and of the other as without us. We think of conduct as the expression of character, and of character as the source of conduct. We think we can observe other men's conduct, but not their character; and that they cannot observe ours; but that we can to some extent observe our own by introspection. The distinction is not however so clear as it seems. Conduct is the expression of character ;

1 'Hist. of the Rebellion,' book i.

but not every action of the body is conduct. Reflex actions are not conduct; instinctive actions are. For conduct does not always imply a preceding thought of it, still less an intention to fulfil it. Our strong emotions seize us of a sudden; their impulses hurry us into action; their behaviour is sometimes instinctive, and their ends unforeseen. Sometimes we do not foresee a behaviour of our emotions which is acquired, when the habit of it has been long established. In anger, words often escape from a man, which he afterwards denies that he ever meant, or even said. And yet such actions are a test of character, because they are a test of temper. There are some natures so noble that even in anger they cannot degrade themselves. Thus not only the actions that we foresee and intend, but those also which we do not foresee, so far as they spring from our acquired habits or our innate temper belong to our conduct; and they are also the expression of our character, because they are the expression of some one of its instincts, emotions, or sentiments.

If we then have to conceive of conduct as the expression of character, we can understand how we come to transfer to it the qualities of conduct. For, as we have already noticed, the systems of character are not wholly contained in the mind; only a small part of them rises into consciousness; and the achievement of their ends is found in conduct. Our primary emotions have an instinctive or innate behaviour, and in this behaviour are the qualities which distinguish them. But this behaviour is part of the system of the emotion, and therefore belongs to our character; and hence the qualities of the one are those of the other also. For instance, under the influence of anger an animal fights; in fighting it manifests that instinctive behaviour for overcoming an enemy which is characteristic of its species; in this instinctive behaviour is found its quality of courage, which is therefore part of its innate character. The quality is in the system as a whole though it is only at first manifested in the conduct or behaviour of the system. Soon in the higher animals, and especially in man, this quality of courage comes to be acquired by the highest part of the system, that which is in the mind.

For man, after his actions, acquires representations

of them; these representations give him foresight, and through this foresight the qualities of his conduct come to be acquired by his will so far as it acts in consequence of these representations. And thus courage, at first a quality of instinctive actions, is acquired by the higher systems of character, in the higher form peculiar to them, and becomes a quality of their conation. And this conation when it acts with foresight is called 'volition' or 'will.' Thus anger when it both foresees dangerous actions and braves them may be said to have a courageous will. All the qualities of conduct, then, innate or acquired may be acquired in this way by the emotions and sentiments to which the conduct belongs. This is the higher sense in which the qualities of conduct come to be acquired by the character.

As our conduct is the effect and expression of our character, so it includes not only positive actions, but also a certain group of negative actions or omissions. Negligence and culpable forgetfulness are modes of conduct, because to do what we have to do imperfectly, or to forget to do it altogether, must be due to some defect of our character, or of one of its systems. For we think that a person should have sufficient regard for others to insure him against such omissions. And therefore these qualities of negligence and forgetfulness attach as much to his character as to his conduct; an omission, in the one is an omission in the other also. If a man is negligent in the conduct of his business, he omits to think of all that he should do for its advancement, or does not think of it with sufficient concentration and effort of will; and his negligence therefore affects one of the systems of his character, even if it does not spread to the whole.

These qualities of negligence and culpable forgetfulness belong to a class which we have now to notice as being first in the character and afterwards in the conduct, and not like the former, first in the conduct and afterwards in the character. We hardly speak of animals as being negligent or forgetful. It is the business of their instincts to be efficient in their several directions. We do not require them to supplement the imperfections of their instincts by trains of thought that forecast particular lines of conduct: we attribute culpable

forgetfulness and negligence to those only who are capable of such trains of thought, and of the self-control to be guided by them. These qualities belong only to the higher side of our character; beginning there, they are attributed also to its effects in conduct.

There are many other qualities that are proper to character itself, or to one or other of its systems. There are the qualities of the emotions, the hardness of some and the tenderness of others, the impulsiveness and lack of self-control of all of them. There are their qualities of sensibility, intensity and duration, varying from one person to another according to innate and acquired tempers. There are the qualities of the sentiments which, as organising their several emotions, require self-control, and in some measure acquire it. Among the highest qualities of their self-control are patience, perseverance, constancy, fortitude, faithfulness; but one or other of their opposites also infect the sentiments, diminishing their efficiency. There are men who cannot learn to be patient, or persevering, or to acquire moral courage. These qualities, and their opposites, which start from the character, spread to and impregnate the conduct. A man's conduct has the patience, or the perseverance, or the fortitude of his character.

There are then two kinds of qualities of character; (1) those which are first in conduct, because they belong to the behaviour of our instincts, and are attributed to our innate character as the cause of it;-as the courage of certain animals and the cowardice of others; (2) those which are first in character, as the qualities of its emotions and sentiments, and thence come to qualify the conduct of these systems. Hence it happens that our conduct seems to be as much filled with qualities of character, as is our character with the original qualities of conduct. And this is at first a source of confusion to the mind. We can, then, by no means maintain that clear-cut distinction between character and conduct from which we started.

Character then is not constituted of the emotions and sentiments alone, with the will and intelligence as their instruments. It has other and very numerous and important