islands in the Egean has raised a question which concerns all the European Powers, and especially those that have a great naval position to maintain in the Mediterranean. The attitude of those Powers towards the Italian move will declare itself if Italy decides to convert the occupation into permanent possession. But even should Italy adhere to what is understood to be her present intention-namely, to use the seizure of the islands merely as a strategic measure-another question arises from her action.

The Greek inhabitants of those islands have welcomed the Italians as deliverers from the Turkish yoke, just as their forefathers welcomed the Russians in 1774; and they fear that in the event of their being handed back to Turkey, they may suffer as their forefathers suffered when, after being proclaimed free by the Russian admiral, they were left, on the conclusion of peace, to the vengeance of the Sultan. Actuated by this apprehension, they have petitioned both the Italian Government and the Governments of the other Great Powers that they should not be, in any case, exposed to such a fate, proposing two alternatives-either to be allowed to join Greece, to whom they are united by all national and religious ties, or to be given autonomy. In support of the latter claim they remind us that they did enjoy such autonomy until the last few years, when the Turkish Government began to assail the privileges which successive Sultans of the past had respected.

Neither Italy nor any of the other Great Powers seems as yet to have taken notice of this petition; and the islanders have proceeded to anticipate the future by constituting themselves into an independent Egean Confederation, with Europe's connivance and without any opposition from the Italian military authorities. And so, as a by-product of Italy's Libyan adventure, there has come into being a new Near Eastern problem, and one that may prove even more knotty than the Cretan question.

G. F. ABBOTT.

Art. 13.-THE HOME RULE BILL.

1. Government of Ireland Bill. London: Wyman, 1912. 2. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1912.

3. Report of the Committee on Irish Finance [Cd 6153]. London: Wyman, 1912.

4. Government of Ireland Bill. Outline of Financial Provisions [Cd 6154]. London: Wyman, 1912.

5. A Leap in the Dark. By A. V. Dicey, D.C.L. Second edition. London: Murray, 1911.

6. The End of the Irish Parliament. By J. R. Fisher. London: Arnold, 1911.

7. Against Home Rule; The Case for the Union. With an introduction by Sir E. Carson, M.P. London: Warne, 1912.

8. The Military Danger of Home Rule for Ireland. By Major-General Sir T. Fraser. London: Murray, 1912. 9. The Continuity of the Irish Revolutionary Movement. By H. Brougham Leech, LL.D. London: Simpkin, 1912. 10. Irish Affairs and the Home Rule Question. By Philip Cambray. London: Murray, 1912.

I. POLITICAL.

THE Coalition majority can force the Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons. The Cabinet, so long as it acts in compliance with Mr Redmond's demands, possesses dictatorial powers. The debates on the Bill manifest the unreality of parliamentary discussion under existing conditions. With the exception of Mr Asquith when introducing the Bill, and Mr Herbert Samuel when explaining its finance, no member of the Ministry has condescended to discuss the measure. They have uttered Home Rule generalities, but have left the Home Rule Bill alone. Mr Redmond has given the Bill his benediction, and this represents the ministerial mandate from the electorate. The arguments of the Opposition have, on the other hand, been so penetrating that, were arguments of any practical importance now at Westminster, the Home Rule Bill would never become an Act of Parliament. It will be an outrage on the country and the Empire if the people of the United Kingdom are not permitted to pronounce on this Bill and decide whether the Kingdoms are to be disunited.

The case for the Union and the alternative policy to Home Rule is stated in the remarkable compilation issued by the leaders of the Unionist party under the title of Against Home Rule.' The articles are of the highest authority. They are historical, critical and constructive. It is essential that every student of public questions should make himself familiar with this work. The great constitutional authority of Prof. Dicey lends peculiar importance to the re-issue of his convincing work attacking the fundamental principles of Home Rule. It is an unanswered representation of objections which are as fatal to the present scheme as they were to the schemes of Mr Gladstone, which Prof. Dicey contributed so conspicuously to defeat. Mr Fisher, writing as one intimately acquainted with Ireland to-day, reveals the realities of Irish life, political and social, under Grattan's Parliament. A grasp of the history of that period is of great importance, for the assertion of unrealities about the Ante-Union Parliament forms one of the chief Radical arguments for again disintegrating the United Kingdom. Mr Cambray's book is pre-eminently practical. It contains an admirable and accurate summary of the actual conditions of the much misrepresented and misunderstood system of modern Irish administration. The title of Dr Brougham Leech's valuable contribution sufficiently indicates its scope and object. Originally published in 1887, the essay has now been enlarged by an excellent review of Anglo-Irish relations since that date, and an exhaustive survey of the present situation. The strategic dangers of Home Rule are dealt with by General Fraser, whose book should be read in connexion with the article on 'Home Rule and Naval Defence' by Lord Charles Beresford, and that on 'The Military Disadvantages of Home Rule' by Earl Percy, in ‘Against Home Rule.'

It is impossible in a short article to discuss the innumerable points raised by the Bill to Amend the Provisions for the Government of Ireland.' To treat of the British aspects and Imperial aspects of the question would exhaust a volume. The determination of Ulster never to submit to Home Rule is a fact of such overmastering importance that the British public may be led to believe that, if only the Ulster difficulty was settled, all would be