ABANDONMENT OF SHIP, NOTICE OF: See IN-APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEES OF COLO-
2. By the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111, s. 1, the Consignee or Indorsee of goods named in a Bill of lading, and the Indorsee of a Bill of lading, to whom the property in the goods mentioned shall have passed by such indorsement, has transferred to and vested in him all rights of suit, and he is subject to the same liabilities in respect of such goods as if the contract in the Bill of lading had been made with himself -The right of suing upon a contract, under a bill of lading, follows the property in the goods therein specified, that is, the legal title to the goods as against the Indorsee. THE FREEDOM " 594 (Petitory) to recover possession of land in Lower Canada: See COLONIAL LAW. 9. ADJUDICATION IN BANKRUPTCY: See BANK-
NIAL CHURCH: See COLONIAL CHURCH. ARTICLES AND FORMULARIES OF THE CHURCH, rules of judicial exposition with refer- ence to. VoYSEY v. NOBLE ARTICLES OF CHARGE AGAINST BENEFICED CLERGYMAN FOR HERESY: See Ec- CLESIASTICAL LAW. 3. ARTICLES OF RELIGION: See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. 3, 4. ASSAULT: See PLEADING. 1.
ASSIGNEE OF PATENTEE: See PATENT. 1.
AVERMENT IN PLEADING AS A MATTER OF
AGGRAVATION. See PLEADING. 1. AVERMENTS IN PETITION: See PRACTICE. 1, 4. BAILMENT.] A bailment on trust implies that there is reserved to the Bailor the right to claim a re-delivery of the property deposited in bail- ment.-Wherever there is a delivery of property on a contract for an equivalent in money, or some other valuable commodity, and not for the return of the identical subject matter in its original or an altered form, this is a transfer of property for value-it is a sale and not a bailment.-Where, therefore, Corn was deposited by Farmers with a Miller, to be stored and used as part of the cur- rent consumable stock or capital of the Miller's trade, and was by him mixed with other corn de- ADMIRALTY REGULATIONS with respect to posited for the like purpose, subject to the right of steering and sailing rules. THE "VELOCITY" 44 the Farmers to claim at any time an equal quan- regarding Lights, effect of Disobedi-tity of corn of the like quality, without reference to any specific bulk from which it was to be taken, ence when justifiable. THE "FENHAM or in lieu thereof the market price of an equal ADVANCES MADE ON GOODS SUBJECT TO quantity, on the day on which he made his de- LIEN: See LIEN.
ALB: See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. 6.
mand, with a small charge for general purposes: -Held, that such a transaction amounted to a sale by the Farmer to the Miller, and was not a
ALIEN PRISONER: See PEREMPTORY CHAL- bailment of the corn, and entitled the Miller to
BANKING COMPANY, construction of Charter. BILL OF EXCHANGE continued. See COLONIAL LAW. 12.
BANKRUPTCY.] A member of a Firm carrying on business in London and Hong Kong, sent from London a power of attorney to his Partners in Hong Kong, enabling them to petition the Court at Hong Kong for an adjudication of Bankruptcy, or to make an assignment of all their estate in trust for Creditors. Under this authority they peti- tioned the Court, which was, by the law of Bankruptcy in force there, in itself an act of Bankruptcy; and they also assigned the property of the firm to a Trustee, which was also an act of Bankruptcy by that law. About the same time a Partner of the Firm resident in London was ad- judicated Bankrupt there, and a joint adjudica- tion passed in Hong Kong against all the Part- ners, the latter being subsequent in date to the former-Held, that it was not competent to the Partner in London to dispute the validity of the joint adjudication.-Semble, a separate adjudica- tion in England against the English resident partner of a Hong Kong firm, is no ground for re- fusing in Hong Kong a joint adjudication against all the Partners, though one is not resident in the Colony. LYALL v. JARDINE - 318 BARRISTER: See COLONIAL BAR.
BENGAL LETTERS PATENT.] A cause having been heard before a single Judge of the High Court, and a decree made by him dismissing the suit, an appeal was made to the same Court in its appellate jurisdiction before two Judges. The Court was divided in opinion; the Chief Justice holding that the judgment should be reversed, and the Puisne Judge that it ought to be affirmed; and, under the 36th section of the Letters Patent creating the High Court, a decree of reversal was ordered. On appeal, the Judicial Committee, without expressing any opinion, whether the 36th section was applicable, having regard to the 26th rule of the High Court, directed the appeal to be heard on the merits. MILLER V. BARLOW - 733 BILL OF EXCHANGE.] The Bank of Van Die- men's Land were Indorsers of a Bill drawn by G. on G. & Co. at Melbourne at fifteen days after sight. The Bill was transmitted by the Bank of Van Diemen's Land to the Bank of Victoria, their Agents at Melbourne, for presentment. The Bank of Victoria received the Bill at one o'clock on Fri- day, and at two o'clock on the same day the Bill was presented by their Clerk to the Drawees, G. & Co., for acceptance, and left with them for that purpose. On Saturday, the following day, an acceptance was written by one of the Firm of G. & Co. across the face of the Bill, and the Bill so accepted was handed to a Clerk to be delivered in the usual course of business, and at half-past 11 o'clock on that day a Clerk of the Bank of Victoria called upon the Drawees and asked for the Bill. He was told by the Clerk of the Drawees that the Bill had been mislaid, and re- quested to call again on Monday, which he agreed to do, as according to the custom in Melbourne business closed at 12 o'clock on Saturdays. On Monday the Clerk of the Bank of Victoria called again upon the Drawees, and was told that the Bill was ready to be delivered, but that in the absence of the Clerk who had charge of it, it
could not then be got at, and he was requested to call on Tuesday. The Clerk called on that day and obtained the Bill, but the acceptance of the Drawees was cancelled on the face of the Bill, the Drawees having obtained information in the in- terval that the remittance was not likely to be for- warded by G. to meet the Bill. G. became insol- vent, and the Bank of Van Diemen's Land having received nothing in respect of the Bill, brought an action against the Bank of Victoria, as their Agents, for negligence. The evidence did not show any uniform usage at Melbourne to present Bills the same day for acceptance. The custom to close at 12 o'clock on Saturdays was proved. The Judge put it to the jury, whether they thought that the Bank of Victoria was guilty of negligence or a breach of duty, in not demanding that the Bill should be delivered up on Saturday accepted or unaccepted, and the jury answered that, strictly speaking, there was a neglect, but considering the respectability of the Drawees, and Saturday being a short day, the Bank of Victoria was excusable in leaving the Bill. The jury found for the Plain- tiffs with nominal damages, and an application by the Plaintiffs to increase the damages to £3,000, the amount of the Bill, was refused by the Su- preme Court:-Held, by the Judicial Committee (affirming that judgment), that in the circum- stances, and considering the position of the Drawees, there was no such negligence by the Defendants as Agents as to entitle the Plaintiffs to substantial damages.-Held, further, that al- though the Judge was wrong in directing the jury on what was a matter of law and not fact, yet that the substance of the answer of the jury was, that it being the ordinary course to leave a Bill for acceptance for twenty-four hours, and that the twenty-four hours run out on Saturday, but not be- fore 12 o'clock, it was an excusable neglect to post- pone the demand for an answer until the opening of the Drawee's Counting House on Monday. The duty of an Agent is to be measured by considera- tions arising in particular cases; his duty is to ob- tain acceptance of the Bill, and it may be prudent, in circumstances, from the respectability of the Drawee, not to press for acceptance in such a way as to lead to a refusal, providing that proper steps are taken within the limit of time which will pre- serve the rights of his Principal against the Drawee. THE BANK OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND V. THE BANK OF VICTORIA
BILL OF LADING: See COLONIAL LAW. 10. DAMAGE OF CARGO.
BIRETTA: See ECCLESIASTICAL LAW. 6. BISHOPRIC, COLONIAL: See COLONIAL CHURCH. BOTTOMRY BOND.] Before resorting to Bottomry for raising necessary supplies, it is absolutely necessary (where practical) that notice should be given by the Master to the Owner of the Vessel, and an allegation that such Owner was Insolvent, is no excuse for not communicating to him, unless he has been judicially declared Insolvent, and the ownership of the Vessel vested in his Assignees, to whom such notice must then be given.-Semble: -Notice to the Mortgagee of the Vessel in such circumstances, would not suffice. THE "PANAMA
COLLISION: See COMPULSORY PILOTAGE. COLONIAL BAR.] Whether an appeal lies to the Queen in Council against a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Lower Canada, quashing a writ of Error against an Order of the Court of Queen's Bench on the Crown side, fining and ordering an attachment against a Counsel for an alleged contempt of Court-quære.-Semble, where a fine is imposed, the remedy is to petition the Crown for a reference to the Judicial Committee, under the Statute, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 4.-A Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench in Lower Canada, whilst sitting alone in the exercise of the Criminal jurisdiction, has, under the authority conferred on him by sect. 72 of ch. 77 of the Con- solidated Statutes of Canada, no power to pro- nounce a Counsel in contempt for publishing two Letters reflecting upon the conduct of such Judge, or to impose a fine In re RAMSAY. - 427 COLONIAL CHURCH.] In 1847, the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, with its dependencies, was erected into a Bishop's See and Diocese, to be called the "Bishopric of Cape Town," and the Appellant was appointed and consecrated Bishop thereof. By the Letters Patent the Bishop was constituted a body corporate, with power to hold and enjoy land and hereditaments of what nature or kind soever; and he was further empowered to resign the office of Bishop of Cape Town, with- out prejudice to any responsibility to which he might be liable, in law or equity, in respect of his conduct in his office. In 1850, a grant was made, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty, of a piece of land in the Town of Pietermaritzburg and
COLONIAL CHURCH-continued. district of Natal, in the Colony, to the Appellant and his successors, in trust for the English Church. In October, 1853, the Appellant, in pursuance of the power given him in his Letters Patent, resigned the office and dignity of Bishop of Cape Town. In November, 1853, Letters Pa- tent were issued for erecting the district of Natal into a separate See or Diocese, subject and sub- ordinate, with the See of Graham's Town, thereby also created a separate See, to the Metropolitan See of Cape Town; and the Respondent was ap- pointed Bishop of Natal. The Respondent was, as in the original Letters Patent creating the Appellant Bishop of Cape Town, constituted a Corporation sole, with the like power to hold and enjoy lands, and the Church then building on the ground granted in 1850, was declared to be thenceforth the Cathedral Church and See of the Respondent as such Bishop of Natal. In De- cember, 1853, the Appellant was appointed by Letters Patent, Bishop of the See of Cape Town, and Metropolitan of the Cape of Good Hope, with the same corporate character and capacity as had been before conferred on him by the Letters Pa- tent of 1847. Soon after the Respondent's conse cration, the Appellant appointed him by power of Attorney to act as Trustee of certain lands and Churches in the Colony and See of Natal, including the land and Cathedral Church thereon in the City of Pietermaritzburg, granted in 1850, and which had then been entered on the Colonial the Appellant revoked this power of Attorney. In register in the name of the Appellant. In 1864, consequence of this and other proceedings taken at the instance of the Appellant to prevent the Respondent from having the free use of the Ca- thedral Church at Pietermaritzburg, the Respon- dent brought an action of ejectment against the Appellant for possession of the land and Church, claiming nominal damages, and for the substi- tution of his own for the Appellant's name as Trustee thereof. The Supreme Court gave judg- ment in favour of the Respondent, and decreed the land and the buildings thereon to stand vested in the Respondent and his successors, as Bishops of Natal.-On appeal, Held, by the Ju- dicial Committee, first, that though the suit was not properly framed so as to allow the substitution of the Respondent as Trustee in the place of the Appellant, yet, that, having regard to the terms of the grant, and the successive Letters Patent appointing the Appellant and Respondent respec- tively Bishops of Cape Town and Natal, and that the Respondent's Patent was subsequent to the Appellant's resignation, but prior to his second Patent as Metropolitan; the Appellant had ceased on such resignation to be a Trustee of the land and Cathedral Church, or to have any estate or right to interfere with the Respondent's free access to and use of such Church; and-Second, that it was competent to the Crown at the date of the Letters Patent to the Respondent, to "Ordain and declare that the Church in the City of Pieter- maritzburg should thenceforth be the Cathedral Church and See of the Respondent and his suc- cessors, Bishops of Natal; and the decree of the Court below varied by its being declared, that the Respondent, as Bishop of Natal, shonld have free
COLONIAL CHURCH-continued.
and uninterrupted access to the land and premises in the grant of 1850 for the purpose of enjoying and exercising all rights, privileges, and immu- nities, which had hitherto been enjoyed and ex- ercised, or ought to be enjoyed and exercised, by the Bishop of Natal as such Bishop or otherwise, in reference to or within the Cathedral thereon, and its appurtenances; and that the Appellant, the Bishop of Cape Town, and his Agents, be restrained from in any manner interfering with such access, enjoyment, or exercise; saving, how- ever, to any, except the Appellant, any rights in reference to the Cathedral Church as they also enjoyed. THE BISHOP OF CAPE TOWN v. THE 1
COLONIAL LAW.] 1. The Canadian Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 51, consolidating and regulating the general clauses relating to Railways, enacts by sect. 19, cl. 1, that each shareholder shall be individually liable to the Creditors of the Com- pany, to an amount equal to the amount unpaid on the Stock held by him, for the debts and lia- bilities thereof, and until the whole amount of his Stock shall have been paid up; but shall not be liable to an action therefor before an execution against the Company shall have been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, and the amount due on such execution shall be the amount re- coverable with costs against such Shareholders."- Article 1,187 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, tit. "Obligations," sect. V., provides that, "when two persons are mutually Debtor and Creditor of each other, both debts are extinguished by com- pensation which takes place between them," and Article 1,188 declares, that "compensation takes place by the sole operation of law between debts which are equally liquidated and demandable, and have each for object a sum of money or a certain quantity of indeterminate things of the same kind and quality."-A., a holder of Stock in a Railway Company in Lower Canada, of which Company he was President at a specified salary, paid up his shares to a certain amount, and as far as calls were made by the Company. B., a judg- ment Creditor of the Company, sued A., under the Act, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 51, in his character of a Shareholder of the Company, for the amount of his Stock unpaid. A. pleaded in defence, com- pensation under the 1.187th and 1,188th Articles of the above Code, the Company being indebted to him for salary as President to an amount ex- ceeding the sum due on the unpaid Stock, which he insisted operat d as an extinguishment by com- pensation. The Court of Queen's Bench in Lower Canada were of opinion, that compensation had taken place under the above Articles of the Civil Code. Upon appeal :-Held by the Judicial Com- mittee (reversing such judgment), that, as no calls in respect of the unpaid Stock held by A. had been made, as provided by sect. 16, cl. 10, of the above Act, the provisions of Articles 1,187 and 1,188 of the Civil Code did not apply, and that compensation had not taken place between 4. as a Sharehol ler and B., as judgment Creditor of the Company. RYLAND V. DELISLE 17 In proceeding by writ of Foreign attachment, under the Victoria Common Law Procedure Act (28 Vict. No. 274, s. 215), against a
Action by the Owner of a Mill against the owner of lands situate above the Mill in which, or over which, part of the water that supplied the Mill arose and flowed, for diversion and subtrac- tion of such water. The Plaintiff claimed under grants and certain Regulations and Ordinances made by the Governor and Council of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as well as upon a right of servitude by prescription. Judgment was given, with damages, for the Plaintiff. On appeal such judgment affirmed, the Judicial Committee being of opinion that, whether the power to legis- late respecting the water-rights of the lands in which the water arose, or over which it flowed, had or had not been sufficiently reserved in the original grants by the Governor and Council to the then Owners, yet that it was abundantly shewn, that the Legislature of the Colony had exercised authority, by Regulations and Ordi- nances, over the water in question, by which the derivative rights of the Plaintiff in the Court below had been regulated and declared.-Semble, that by the Roman-Dutch Law, as by the Law of England, the rights of the lower Proprietors would not attach upon water which flowed beyond the Defendants' land in a known and definite channel, even if it had its source within that land. VAN BREDA v. SILBERBAUER
4. By the law of Jersey, a Testator who dies leaving a Widow and lawful child or children cannot dispose by Will of more than one third part of his personal estate. If the Will professes to dispose of more than one-third part of the move- ables, it is liable to be reduced ad legitimum modum.-By the same law and custom, the Exe- cutors of a Testator are entitled to the possession of the whole of the moveables of a Testator for a year and a day after his decease, and their posses- sion continues until they have received the amount of the moveable estate bequeathed by the Will, and have also fulfilled the duties of administra- tion. But at the beginning of their office they are bound to make an inventory of the whole of the moveables, and to cite the heir for the purpose of seeing this done, unless the heir elect to pay or secure to the Executors the full amount of the bequests, debts, and expenses, in which case the heir becomes entitled to the possession.-Under the maxim "le mort saisit le vif," the children or heirs of a Testator are, from the moment of his death, the true Owners of that part of the move- able estate which by law belongs to them, but the law of Jersey makes the Executors les pro- cureurs légaur of the heir. which procuration is irrevocable jusqu'à l'accomplissement du Testament, and in this character gives the Executors full right and title, deux mêmes, to take possession of, recover, and receive, the whole of the moveables for the purposes of administration, subject to the right of the heir to interpose and demand posses-
sion from the Executors, by depositing with them the full amount of the debts and other charges of administration, and of the bequests made by the Will. So held by the Judicial Committee in a case where a Testator domiciled in Jersey, but having moveable estate out of the Island, by his Will bequeathed all his personal property, with the exception of a few trifling legacies, to his Grandson, to the exclusion of his only Son and heir, who claimed to be entitled by the law and custom of the Island absolutely to two thirds, and disputed the right of the Executors to recover or administer more than one third of the Testator's estate. LA CLOCHE v. LA CLOCHE
125 5. No appeal lies in a case of certiorari from the Superior Court to the Court of Queen's Bench in Lower Canada; so held by the Judicial Committee, confirming a judgment of that Court, on an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court quashing a writ of certiorari issued out of the Superior Court, to remove into it certain pro- ceedings of the Seigniorial Revising Commis- sioners, in which they had disallowed a claim for compensation for the loss of seigniorial rights.- Chap. 88, s. 17, of the consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, expressly excepts cases of certiorari granted by the Superior Court from appeal, and is not included in the general terms of s. 23 of c. 77, providing for the allowance of appeals from the Superior Court to the Court of Queen's Bench. BOSTON v. LELIEVRE 157
6. By the Australian Act, the 22 & 23 Vict. 1859, entitled "An Act to regulate and pro- vide the management of the South Australian Branch of the National Bank of Australasia, and for other purposes," that Bank is, by sect. 6, con- stituted a Bank of issue, with all such powers as are usual for establishments carrying on the busi- ness of Banking, and by sect. 7 such Bank is em- powered to take and hold for reimbursement only, not for profit, freehold and leasehold lands, houses, &c., in satisfaction of any debt due to the Bank, or security for any liability previously incurred, but not in anticipation of such, and to sell and dis- pose of the same: provided, that it should not be lawful for the Bank to advance or lend money upon the security of lands, houses, &c.-A., who had an account with the Bank in 1861, obtained leave to overdraw to the extent of £10,000 on the security of the deposit of certain title deeds re- specting lands; having, however, in 1866, over- drawn to an amount exceeding £13,000, the Bank brought an action against him for that amount, and recovered judgment, but agreed not to enforce such judgment, in consideration that the title deeds so deposited were to remain as security for the money then due, for which judgment was, after the approaching harvest, to be signed, and the land sold for the liquidation of such debt. Judgment was accordingly signed; but before the lands were sold A. was declared Insolvent, and the Bank, under the provisions of the Colonial In- solvent Act of 1860, required the Assignees to whom the title deeds were delivered to sell the lands, which they accordingly did, and paid the proceeds of the sale into Court. To a bill filed by the Bank against the Assignees, claiming the benefit of these securities, and for the proceeds of
the sale, the Assignees put in a general demurrer on the ground, that the title deeds were deposited for future advances to be made by the Bank, con- trary to the provisions of the Act, 22 & 23 Vict., 1859. The demurrer was allowed by the Supreme Court in South Australia:-Held, on appeal, by the Judicial Committee, that there being in 1866 a valid subsisting debt between the Bank and A., the agreement then made was within the enabling part of the 7th section of the Act, and the demurrer overruled. THE NATIONAL BANK OF AUSTRALASIA v. CHERRY
A Testator bequeathed all his real and personal estate in the Island of Jamaica, after payment of debts and legacies, to the Re- spondents, his Grandchildren, to be apportioned when they should attain the age of twenty-one years, and appointed D. R. Executor and Guar- dian. The Testator died in 1832, and D. R. entered into possession of the real and personal estate, and carried on the Testator's trade. An account of the Testator's estate was taken by D. R. in 1841, but not finally closed. D. R. died in 1850, and appointed the Appellant his Execu- tor. The Respondents had all attained the age of twenty-one years in 1865, and in that year the Appellant, who was the Executor of D. R., filed a cause petition under the Island Statute, 15 Vict. c. 16, in the Court of Chancery in Jamaica, for an account of the real and personal estate of the original Testator:-Held, that the Appellant was entitled, notwithstanding the delay, as a matter of right, to have an account taken of the personal estate of the Testator, and inasmuch as D. R. had been appointed Guardian of the infants, and had entered into possession of the real estate, accounts should also be taken of the rents and profits of the real estate of the Testator. SMITH T. O'GRADY
Semble a separate adjudication in Eng- land against an English resident Partner of a Hong Kong Firm, is no ground for refusing in Hong Kong a joint adjudication against all the Partners, though one is not resident in the Colony. 318 LYALL v. JARDINE
9. By the French Law prevailing in Lower Canada a Certificate of a Notary Public in the Province of Lower Canada is sufficient evidence in the Courts of that Province of the due execution of the instrument referred to in the Certificate, and identity of the parties thereto; but the Certificate of a Notary Public in Upper Canada, where the English Law prevails, will not be received in the Courts in Lower Canada per se as proof of due execution of an instrument, or of the identity of the parties; such fact must be established by evidence, as required by Eng- lish Law.-In a petitory action brought in the Superior Court in Lower Canada to recover land in that Province, the material evidence of title of the Plaintiff consisted of a deed of sale by a De- visee, whose Husband's christian name, as it was alleged, was wrongly described in the Will of the Testator. The deed of sale was executed under a power of attorney, and the only evidence of the identity of the parties was the Certificate of a Notary Public in Upper Canada that such power was executed before him by the Devisee and her
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