An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: In Four Books, Volum 2H. Woodfall, 1768 |
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: In Four Books, Volum 2 John Locke Visualització completa - 1760 |
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: In Four Books, Volum 2 John Locke Visualització completa - 1775 |
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abftract Ideas Affent Agreement or Difagreement alfo anfwer annexed Aqua Regia becauſe Body Cafe Certainty Changeling Colour complex Idea Confequence confider Confideration confifts Conftitution Demonftration Difcourfe Difputes diftinct Ideas diftinguiſhed diſcover doubt effential elſe eſtabliſhed evident exift Exiſtence Faculties faid fame farther fenfible ferve feveral fhall fhew fhould fignify fimple Ideas fince firft firſt fome fomething fometimes fpecifick ftances ftand fuch fuppofed Gold greateſt hath himſelf immaterial impoffible Inftance intuitive Knowledge itſelf Knowledge ledge lefs Lordship Matter Meaſures Miftake Mind mixed Modes moft moſt Motion muft muſt Names Nature neceffary neral nominal Effence Number Obfcurity obferve Occafion ourſelves particular perceive Perception pleaſes precife prefent Propofitions Qualities Queſtion real Effence Reaſon Secondly Senfe ſeveral ſhall Signification Soul ſpeak Species ſtand Subftances Syllogifm thefe themſelves theſe Things thofe thoſe Ideas Thoughts tion true Truth Underſtanding univerfal uſe wherein whereof whofe Words
Passatges populars
Pàgina 10 - ... for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
Pàgina 131 - This part of knowledge is irresistible, and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge...
Pàgina 186 - Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right ones ? It is true also of a triangle, wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to the idea of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition...
Pàgina 4 - Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas ; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men ; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.
Pàgina 165 - ... we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.
Pàgina 121 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
Pàgina 72 - They are all marks of some action, or intimation of the mind; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied.
Pàgina 185 - From whence it follows that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires; for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us...
Pàgina 271 - First. Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly. Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so ; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.
Pàgina 185 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.