But this will not fatisfy fome Men; for their great Quarrel is, That God made fuch a Creature as could Siny and be Miferable; that is, That God created Angels and Men; that he endowed them with Reason and Understanding, and a liberty of Choice; for fuch Creatures as can chufe, may chufe wrong. But this is not an Objection against the Goodness of Providence, but against the Goodness of the Creation; and if it proves any thing, it proves, That God ought not to have made the World; for if Goodness would not allow him to make a Reafonable Creature, who might make himself miferable; Wisdom would not allow him to make a World without any Reasonable Creatures in it. I confefs, I am at a great lofs to know how they would lay their Objection, so as to bear upon the Goodness of God, and what they intend by it, when they have done: For let us confider wherein Creating Goodness confifts.

Does the Goodness of a Maker require any more of him, than to make all Things according to perfect and excellent Ideas, and to make them as perfect as their Ideas are? What is it then they find fault with in God's making Angels and Men? Is not the Idea of a Reasonable Being, and a Free Agent, the Idea of an Excellent and Happy Creature? Are there any greater Perfections than Knowledge, and Wifdom, and Understanding, and Liberty of Choice? Is there any Happiness like the Happiness of a Reasonable Nature? Nay, Is there any Thing that deferves the Name of Happiness befides this? Will you call fenfelefs Matter, nay, will you call Beafts happy? And is the only Idea of a Happy Nature in the World, a reasonable Objection against Creating Goodness ?

T

If

If then there be no fault to be found in the Idea of a Reasonable Creature, was there any defect in the Workmanship? Did not God make Men and Angels as perfect as their Ideas? And give them all the Happiness which belonged to their Natures? If he did not, this would have been a great fault in their Creation; if he did, Creating Goodness has done all that belonged to it to do.

But I would gladly know whence they have this Notion of Creating Goodness, that it must make no Creature which can make it felf Miserable; Juftice is as effential to the Notion of a God, as Goodness; and yet it is impoffible that Juftice fhould belong to the Idea of God, if it were irreconcileable with the Divine Goodness to make fuch Creatures who may deferve well or ill: For Juftice refpects Merit, and confifts in Rewards and Punishments; and if the Goodnefs of God will not fuffer him to make a Creature which fhall deferve either to be rewarded cr punished, Goodness and Juftice cannot both of them belong to the Idea of a God.

But what pretence is there for any Man to fay, That because the Devil and his Ángels fell from their first happy State, therefore God was not good in creating the Angelical Nature? Or because fo many Men Sin, and make themselves miferable, therefore God is not good in creating Man? When there are so many Myriads of bleffed Angels and Saints eternally happy in the Vision and Fruition of God; and those who are not fo, are miferable only by their own fault. Not to have made a happy Nature, had been a juft blemish to the Divine Goodness; to make happy Creatures, though they make themselves miferable, is none; no n ore than it is to make

a Free

a Free Agent, who alone is capable of Happinefs, and who alone can make himself miferable. None but a Reasonable Nature is capable of any great Happiness; and to make a Reafonable Creature without liberty of Choice, and confequently without a poffibility of Sinning, and being miferable, is a contradiction: For what does Reafon ferve for, but to direct our Choice? And indeed all the Pleasures of Vertue, which are the greatest Pleasures of Human Nature, refult from this Liberty, that we chufe well when we might have chofe ill; and if it becomes a good God to make a Happy Nature, it becomes him to make a reasonable and Free Agent, though many fuch Creatures may make themselves miferable.

But fuppose we could not answer this Objection, That God has made fuch Creatures as both could and do make themselves miferable, What is it they intend by it? Would they prove, that God did not make the World, because he made Angels and Men, fome of whom have made themselves Devils? Those who are Saints and Angels ftill fhall Answer this Objection, when any Man has Confidence enough seriously to make it. Or would they prove, That God does not govern the World with Goodness and Justice, because he has made fuch Creatures, as by the good or ill ufe of their Liberty, make themfelves the Subjects of both? There is no other Answer neceffary to that, but only to ask, What place there could be for a Governing Providence, were there no Creatures who could deferve well or ill ?

But this is enough in Answer to an Ojection, which no confidering Man would feriously make: The more confiderable Objection relates

to the many Evils and Miferies that are in the World; and the only Objection which, if it were true, could have any weight in it, is, That the Miferies of this Life are fo many, fo great,and fo univerfal, That they over-balance the Pleafures and Comforts of it; that a wife Man would rather chufe not to be, than to live in this World. And though the generality of Mankind are of another Mind, and therefore need no answer to this, yet they think they have the Scripture on their fide. For the Wife Man, Eccl. 4. 2, 3. tells us, Wherefore I praifed the dead, which are already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive: Tea better is be than both they, who bath not yet been, who hath not feen the evil work that is done under the Sun.

This at firft view looks like a very sharp Satyr upon Human Life; that it is better to die than to live; and that not to live at all, is better than either: And were this univerfally true, it were a vain thing to think of vindicating the Goodness of Providence in the Government of this World, which has nothing good or defirable in it. That this is not the meaning of the Words, we may certainly conclude from those many Promises which are made to good Men in this Life; and God would not promise good Men what is worth nothing.

But the Explication of this Text will contribute very much to the understanding this whole matter; and therefore I fhall,

1. Shew you, That this is not univerfally true, nor intended to be fo understood by the Wife Man, That it is better to die, or not to be, than it is to live.

2. Shew

2. Shew you in what Senfe the Wife Man meant this, viz. with refpect to the many Miferies and Calamities, which fome Ages of the World, and which fome Men in all Ages are expofed to: And how this is alfo to be underftood.

1. That this is not univerfally true, That it is better to die, or not to be born, than it is to live. This, I confefs, was taught by fome of the Ancient Philofophers and Poets in too general terms; That the first beft thing is not to be born: and the next, to die quickly; but no body believed them for moft Men felt it otherwife: That light is sweet, and it is a pleasant thing for the eyes to behold the fun, Eccl. 11. 7. There is a fenfe indeed, wherein this may be true. If we acknowledge, that this Life in its greatest Glory and Perfection is the most imperfect State that a reasonable Soul can live in, as moft certainly it is; then thofe Philofophers who did believe that the Souls of Men lived and acted before they were born into this World, and were thrust into thefe Bodies in Punishment for what they had done amifs in a former State, had reafon to fay, That the beft thing is not to be born; for

upon this Suppofition, it is beft for them to continue in that State of Happiness, and not to come into this World; and if when they die, they return to their Original State of Happiness, the next best thing for them is, to die quickly; and it is most probable that this was their fecret meaning in it. For if we only confider the Advantages and Difadvantages of Life, in ordinary Cafes Life is very defirable; fo defir able that it makes Death the King of Terrors.