The language of the ancient as well as the modern books is, that a corporation cannot be seised to an use. (z) Hence the objection, in practice, that a corporation cannot convey by a lease for a year, operating as a bargain and sale, and a release. This objection equally applies to sole corporations; and to corporations aggregate of many.(a) But in regard to sole corporations, as a bishop, there is this diversity: a conveyance to a sole corporation to uses, will be good, for the benefit of the corporation; and the estate will not be subject to the use which is declared: while a bargain and sale by a sole corporation will be good, during the office of the person by whom the bargain and sale is made.(b) Thus the law admits the individual to be bound, as far as he has individually an ownership. 66 66 The language of Bacon is, (c) " If a bishop bargain or sell land whereof he is seised, in right of his see, this is good during his life, it should be during his incumbency, “otherwise it is where a bishop is enfeoffed "to him and his successors, to the use of “ J. D. and his heirs, this is not good; no, (2) Bac. on Uses, 57. "not for the bishop's life: but the use is merely void." From this distinction, if allowed to prevail, it will follow that a lease and release by a sole corporation, is an efficient conveyance, (for a time) while a like conveyance by a corporation aggregate, is open to the objection, that the lease, or bargain and sale for a year, is inoperative, and cannot be a foundation for a release. The alledged reason for which a corporation cannot stand seised to an use, is, "be cause their capacity is to an use certain; "(d) again, "because they cannot execute an "estate without doing wrong to their corpo"ration or founder;"(e) and finally, because the Court of Chancery could issue no process against the individuals for the execution of the use. (f) So that there could not be any privity of person, or personal confidence. Hence the practice, for corporations aggregate to convey by feoffment, or by ease at the common law, perfected by entry prior to the release, and then by a release in enlargement of the estate granted by the lease.(g) In one case it was admitted, that a corporation might give an use, although it could (d) Bac. on Uses, 57. (e) Bac. on Uses, 57. (f) Cruise on Uses, 22. Gilb. on Uses, 5 Plow. 102, (g) Holland v. Bonis, 2 Leo. 121. 3 Leo. 175. not stand seised to an use and it was supposed that a bargain and sale in fee, by a corporation, was sustainable as a valid assurance. In the distinction, that a corporation may give an use, and that it cannot stand seised to an use, there is a refinement not fit to be followed in judicial decisions. There is a difference in terms only, and not in substance, or in sense. If a corporation can give an use, it must be on the ground, that it can stand seised to an use and if a corporation can give the use of the fee, it can, with equal reason, give the use for a term of years and, the use being given, the statute will execute it into estate, and the estate thus created, may be enlarged. The case which admits the bargain and sale in fee to be efficient, has not been followed in practice: nor can it be supported in principle, consistently with the doctrine, that a corporation cannot stand seised to an use. Either the rule that a corporation may give an use, or the more ancient and more approved rule, that a corporation cannot stand seised to an use, must be abandoned, whenever the question shall be brought forward, for judicial decision; unless the rule stare decisis shall be allowed to prevail, and establish one of those anomalies which disgrace the law as a science: although it must be admitted that every decision, right or wrong, ought to be followed, if it has once become an acknow→ ledged rule of property. The more ancient rule, that a corporation cannot stand seised to an use, seems too well established to give place to the more modern decision, that a corporation may give an use: and that decision has never been followed in practice, so as to become an acknowledged rule of property. Perhaps it may be safe to say, that there are not three titles in the kingdom depending on the question whether a corporation can give an use ; in other terms make a bargain and sale in fee, under the statute of uses; as a departure from the rule that they cannot stand seised to an use, so as to convey by a bargain and sale for a year, and a release grounded on the estate of the bargainee. From the rule that a corporation cannot stand seised to an use, it would be a fair and reasonable inference that a corporation could not be a trustee, and that a specific performance of a contract could not be decreed against them. This inference, however just in its analogy, is not warranted by the acknowledged doctrine of modern times. Corporations frequently are trustees forcharitable and other purposes: and no one is at liberty to doubt that these trusts are binding on the corporation; and contracts for sale are binding on corporations as well as on individuals. In these particulars, also, there is an inconsistency, which destroys the uniformity of the law, and renders its study so abstruse. Granting it to be true, that a corporation cannot give an use, or cannot be seised to an use; it ought to follow as a deduction from the same principles, that it cannot be a trustee or make any contract which a court of equity can enforce. If a corporation could not have been a trustee before the statute of uses, no alteration in the law on this head, has been made since the statute; and to be consistent it ought to have been decided that a corporation cannot be a trustee in modern times. But if it be admitted that corporations might before the statute, have been charged with trusts; then the statute of uses might reconcile the distinction, by allowing the conclusion, that the statute for transferring uses into possession, applies to the seisin of" persons," and not to the seisin of corpora tions: thus leaving the uses or trusts, declared of the seisin of corporations, in the same state in which they were found. The learned Bacon in his examination of the statute of uses, and the decisions grounded on the same ;(h) and in comparing the law since the statute of uses, with the rules of equity and of law, founded on several statutes prior |