INSOL.] Re BRIGGS the Elder.-, bankruptcy, and had in fact been included in the the plaintiffs (a married lady and her son) in a suit of balance-sheet, the petition merged in the bank-Penny v. Hale, wherein a decree was made in February ruptcy. The certificate, he subinitted, was a discharge last. About two years since he had gone to Glasgow as to these debts, and therefore the petition should be to reside for a period of forty days, and had a Scottish treated as if it did not exist. sequestration awarded against him under the 19 & 20 Mr. Commissioner MURPHY referred to sect. 200 of Vict. c. 79 (29th July 1856) and 20 & 21 Viet. c. 19, the Bankruptcy Consolidation Act 1849, and expressed which was still pending, never having made an offer of his opinion favourably to this application. On which composition to his creditors on having obtained his disit was stated by counsel, who was in the Chief Com-charge under the Act. The creditors under the semissioner's Court when Mr. Hare made the original appli-questration were all inserted in the schedule filed under cation, that the Chief Commissioner had given a decided the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. opinion against receiving the second protection petition. Mr. Commissioner MURPHY then refused the application. [Note.-The learned Commissioner's opinion upon this point may be gathered upon reference to the cases reported at p. 238 of Macrae's Protection Practice.] (Before Mr. Commissioner MURPHY.) The court may direct the conveyance of interests in lands and tenements vested in the provisional assignee when of no value to creditors, where no creditors assignee has been appointed; but it has no power to direct a creditors' assignee to make, or join in making, any such conveyance. Denny, on the part of two mortgagees, and on an affidavit of a creditor of the insolvent, moved for a rule upon the creditors' assignee, to enable him to concur in an assignment of the equity of redemption of some leasehold premises at Croydon, alleged to be of no value to creditors. The 68th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, enabled the court to direct a conveyance when an interest of no value to the creditors was vested in the provisional assignee; and he submitted that it was fairly within the spirit of the section to give a similar direction to a creditors' assignee, who required it for his own indemnity and protection. Mr. Commissioner MURPHY doubted whether the court could interfere, but suggested whether the 47th section, which enabled an assignee to obtain the consent of creditors, would help him. Denny said that section had reference to real estate, in which it was supposed the insolvent had some beneficial interest; but in the present instance the insolvent's creditors had no interest, and the property in question was personal-it being leasehold estate-and therefore it could not be brought within that section. Mr. Commissioner MURPHY intimated that he would mention the point to the Chief Commissioner; and, having done so, he declined to interfere. Application refused. J. Philips contended that the court could not proceed in this case as to the debts which were in existence at the time of the sequestration awarded in Scotland, and that they were improperly inserted in the schedule. The insolvent had in the present schedule totally ignored the proceedings in the Scotch court, and included all his debts without distinction, and this court might thus be led to deal with property that belonged to others, and to distribute dividends to creditors who had no right to receive them. The mixing up of insolvencies was not to be permitted. That court would not entertain matters which were still pending in another court of competent jurisdiction. The proceedings in the Scotch court were not, in fact, terminated, nor was there any final refusal to discharge the insolvent. He referred to the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 79, s. 146, to show that, after two years from the award of sequestration, the bankrupt might obtain his discharge without the consent of creditors; and that it appeared in evidence that that period had elapsed or nearly so, and that the only reason the bankrupt was not discharged was the nonpayment by himself of the necessary fees. Sargood, in support of the petition, replied that the proceedings in the Scotch courts were substantially terminated by the inability of the insolvent to comply with the condition made essential to his discharge by that court, and that therefore this court must of necessity interfere, as otherwise the insolvent might be condemned, without remedy, to perpetual imprisonment. The application of the insolvent to that court was not properly his act, but rather that of the creditor who had arrested him in this country for a debt accruing subsequent to his Scotch sequestration, and who had thus compelled him to resort to the only tribunal competent to entertain the question of his relief from such imprisonment. It was necessary to insert in the schedule the debts which existed at the time of the award of sequestration in Scotland; because, not hav ing obtained his discharge from them under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 79, they were still existing debts, and the insolvent was bound by oath to give a true account of all his debts in his schedule. The Scotch court was in the nature of a foreign jurisdiction, and there were no means of controlling it so as either to procure the bankrupt's discharge or a final refusal of it. Application under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, for discharge Mr. Commissioner MURPHY stated that, in his judgfrom English debts during the pendency of a Scotchment, the proper course was, to strike the debts that sequestration. A bankrupt who had not obtained a discharge from his creditors under the Scottish Bankrupt Act, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 79, was imprisoned for a debt contracted in England, and petitioned for his discharge under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110: Held, that, as the Scottish sequestration vested all title to the bankrupt's property under that Act, and the creditors under the sequestration were entitled to come in under it, they must not be mixed up with new creditors upon a subsequent insolvency under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. This insolvent applied for his discharge under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and was opposed by Philips, for a creditor who had arrested him in July, under an attachment from the Court of Ch. for the nonpayment of 28. 158. 2d., being the amount of costs ordered to be paid by him. The insolvent had become next friend of came under the Scottish sequestration out of the present schedule, but that he would confer with the Chief Commissioner Law on the subject before giving his decision. Nov. 6.-Mr. Commissioner MURPHY intimated that the Chief Commissioner concurred with him in thinking that, before that court could deal with this case, all the debts which were due under the Scotch sequestration must be erased from the schedule. There was a title to property attached to one set of debts which ought not to be mixed up with the title acquired by the subsequent creditors under the present proceeding. The debts therefore connected with and due at the date of the sequestration in Scotland must be struck out of the schedule, and when that was done an adjudication would be pronounced in respect of the subsequent debts. These debts were accordingly struck out of the list of creditors, and the insolvent was discharged. M. R.] Re STORY, ex parte MARWICK. [M. R. representatives of Rymer have since carried in their Reported by GEORGE WHITELEY, Esq., of the Middle Temple, account under this order. ROLLS COURT. Barrister-at-Law. Friday, Nov. 4. Re STORY, ex parte MARWICK. Where a suit was pending for taking the accounts of This was a petition for the taxation of a bill of costs of a solicitor under the 39th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73. On the 15th Sept. 1858 a common order of the M. R. was obtained by the trustees to tax the costs of Messrs. Philpot, Greenhill and Hand, and their bill of costs was carried into the office of the taxing master. Mr. Mills, the taxing master, requested that part of the bill which related to common law business should be taxed by one of the masters of the Q.B., and an appointment was made to attend before Mr. Turner for that purpose. The solicitor of the petitioner attended before Mr. Mills and Mr. Turner, and objected to the taxation, on the ground that the bill which was delivered in the name of Hand ought to have been made out partly in the name of Story and partly in the name of Messrs. Philpot, Greenhill and Hand, by whom respectively the business had been done. Mr. Mills held that, under these circumstances, he could not tax the bill of Mr. Story, and recommended that new bills should be sent in properly headed. Hand withdrew the bill and delivered to the trustees bills of costs in the name of Story, and in the names of Philpot, Greenhill and Hand, and the solicitor of the trustees immediately prepared a petition for a common order to tax the bill of costs, but in the mean time this petition was presented, praying an order for the taxation of the bill of costs of the said J. S. Story, and that the taxing master should inquire into the retainer of the said Story by the trustees, and for payment of the petitioner's costs, unless by reason of one-sixth being taxed off the said bill the same should become payable by the said Story. J. H. Palmer, Q.C. and Field, for the petitioner, In the month of April 1855 James Verity was contended that they had a perfect right to present this adjudged bankrupt, and H. H. Cannan and Alfred petition, which was special in its character; that they Rymer were appointed official assignee and creditors' could not properly attend the taxation of the bill costs assignee of the estate and effects of the bankrupt; but if prosecuted by the trustees, or see that the bill was subsequently an order of the Court of Bankruptcy was properly taxed; and that upon the order obtained for obtained annulling the bankruptcy, and by an inden- the taxation of the bill of costs of Philpot and Co., ture dated the 30th Sept. 1855, and an indenture of Mr. Story would not be liable to pay the costs of the even date, the estate and effects of the bankrupt were taxation although one-sixth should be taxed off. They assigned and vested in the said Alfred Rymer and also objected that there was no proof of the retainer Samuel Wylde, upon trust for the creditors of the of Story by the trustees. The M. R., however, said this said bankrupt. The petitioner is one of such credi-objection could not be supported by the petitioner, the tors. John Samuel Story was the solicitor employed in the preparation of the deed of assignment, and also in carrying into effect the trusts thereof, and in getting in the debts due to the bankrupt, and collecting the estate and effects vested in the trustees, and a large bill of costs was incurred by the trustees in respect of such business done by him. The trustees paid him a sum of 1007. on account. Subsequently Story assigned his business and professional debts due to him to Mr. Lewis Hand, who afterwards joined Messrs. Philpot and Greenhill, who acted for some time as the solicitors of the trustees. The trustees afterwards discontinued to employ the firm as their solicitors, and employed a Mr. G. Brown, who is also their solicitor in the suit. The partnership of Philpot and Co. has since been dissolved, and an arrangement was then made that Mr. Hand should be entitled to receive all costs due from the trustees, either to Story or to the firm. The trustees have paid him 507. on account. Rymer is dead some time since. A suit is now pending in this court (V. C. Kindersley), in which Verity is plaintiff, and Samuel Wylde and the representatives of Rymer, the petitioner, and another of the creditors of the bankrupt, are defendants, for the purpose of having the trusts of the said indenture of the 30th Sept. 1855 carried into effect by this court, and of taking the account of the receipts and payments of the trustees under the trusts of the said indenture; and an order was made in the suit, dated 12th May 1859, to that effect, and directing an account to be taken of the receipts and payments of Rymer and Wylde. The defendant Wylde and the trustees not denying the retainer. Sehryn, Q.C., for Story, and R. Palmer, Q.C. and Sheffield, for the trustees, objected that this special order was unnecessary, on the ground that the chief clerk in the suit (in which the trustees seek to prove so much of the bills of costs as shall be allowed on taxation) has power, under the 12th order, Oct. 1842, to request the taxing master to tax such costs, and the petitioner would be at liberty to attend. The MASTER of the ROLLS.-This petition is founded on a misconception. The proper course which ought to have been taken to obtain a taxation of the bill of costs was in the cause. The distinction is plain between a proceeding under the Act, and in a cause where trustees seek the taxation of a bill of costs which they intend to charge against their cestuis que trust. There the course is in the cause to get the bill taxed, and that substantially is the case here. But it is said that under a taxation in the cause, although more than a sixth was taken off the bill, Mr. Story would not have to pay the costs of the taxation; but I think the parties might get that arranged in the cause. With respect to Story, he is perfectly passive in the matter. There is nothing more than that a bill of costs due to him has been delivered in the name of Philpot and Co., the solicitors who succeeded to the business; but it is objected that it is Story's bill, which ought to have been taxed; it is, however, in fact the same bill, and no other claim can be made in respect of such business done, and if the money is paid to Philpot and Co. or Hands, Story will have no claim for the amount. I am of opinion that the petitioner has no right to have the original bill taxed, M. R.] PASCOE v. SWAN.-GOULDER . CAMM. 6. [M. R. testatrix devised property to trustees for the benefit and use of her daughter, the rents to be received by herself from the tenants, whether married or single." There were subsequent trusts for issue, and in default of issue, and the testatrix directed that no sale or mortgage of either the property or the rents thereof should take place during the life of the daughter: Held, that the devise to the daughter was not to her separate use, and that the clause in restraint of alienation was therefore void. his sole object being to attack the costs of taxation; | A Friday, Nov. 4. PASCOE . SWAN. Partition — Account - Occupation by one tenant in common-Infancy of the other tenant — Entry. Where there were two tenants in common, one of whom (the plaintiff) was an infant when his title accrued, and the other (the defendant) had been in actual occupation of the property at the death of the infant's mother, the former tenant in common, and had continued in such occupation during the infancy of the plaintiff: Held, that the occupation of the defendant was an entry on the estate of the infant, and therefore that he was liable to account for rents and profits under the Statute of Anne, although he had not received any rent, and that he must pay an occupation rent. This was a suit for a partition, and for an account of mesne rents and profits received by the defendant, who was in the occupation of the property, under the statute. The defendant and Mrs. Pascoe, the mother of the plaintiff (now deceased), were possessed of the property as tenants in common, the defendant being entitled to two-thirds of the property, Mrs. Pascoe to the other one-third. Mrs. Pascoe died in 1851, leaving the plaintiff, her eldest son, then an infant, on whom her share of the property descended. He attained twenty-one in 1857. The defendant had been in the actual occupation of the property before and at the date of the death of Mrs. Pascoe, and has continued in such occupation up to the present time. Follett and Southgate, for the plaintiff, asked for an account of mesne rents and profits against the defendant, under the stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, contending that the defendant had entered on the estate of the infant, and was liable to pay an occupation rent, although he had received no rents: (Goodtitle v. Tombs, 3 Wils. 118.) Renshaw (with Selwyn, Q.C.) contended that the defendant having been in actual possession of the property during the whole period from before the death of the plaintiff's mother to the present time, there was no entry by the defendant on the estate of the plaintiff. A fine levied of the whole estate would not be an ouster: (Peaceable Hornblower v. Read, 1 East, 568.) Therefore, having received no rent from the property, he was not liable to account, the statute only applying in the case of rents received: (Eason v. Henderson, 17 Q.B. 701.) The MASTER of the ROLLS.-I am of opinion that the defendant entered upon the estate of the infant, and therefore he is liable to account, and as he occupied the property himself, he must pay an occupation rent. In taking the account, allowance must be inade for improvements made by the defendant, but he must pay the costs of the suit, so far as they were increased by his resisting the claim for an account. Saturday, Nov. 5. GOULDER v. Camm. Will-Bequest-Married woman— -Separate useRestraint on alienation. VOL. XXXV.-No. 863, O. S.-No. 2, N. 8. This was a claim by an equitable mortgagee of freehold estate for payment of his mortgage-debt, or a sale of the hereditaments. Rebecca Gilbert, by her will, dated in 1840, devised the whole of her real estate situate at Hucknall Tockard upon trust unto John Morley and Robert Widdowson, their heirs and assigns, for the benefit and use of "my natural daughter Elizabeth Towers, the rents and profits of which estate she shall receive from the tenants herself while she lives, whether married or single. If my aforesaid daughter should marry and have children, then I desire that such children may be the joint heirs of the above estate; but if she have no children, then I desire that she may will it to whom she thinks proper; but if she die without a will, then I desire that it may become the property of my next heir then living. But I hereby direct that no sale or mortgage of either the abovenamed freehold, or the rents arising from it, shall take place during the life of my aforesaid natural daughter. I also hereby further direct that my said daughter, or executors, shall, from the rents and profits of the aforesaid freehold, pay to my mother, Elizabeth Towers, the sum of 3s. per week while she lives, and at her death that they pay 31. towards the expense of her funeral." The testatrix died in 1841. In 1843 her daughter Elizabeth Towers married the defendant Camm, and has issue. Mr. and Mrs. Camm executed an equitable mortgage, dated the 6th May 1857, of the interest of Mrs. Camm in the property devised by the before-mentioned will to the plaintiff. Mr. Camin has since become bankrupt. This claim was instituted to enforce the above security. R. Palmer, Q.C. and Hemming, for the plaintiff, contended that under the devise the wife took an ordinary life-estate on the property, and that the clause restraining alienation was void, and therefore that a valid equitable mortgage had been created by the husband and wife of the life-interest of the wife for the life of the husband. They cited Tidd v. Lister, 3 De G. M. & G. 857; Stanton v. Hall, 2 Russ. & M. 175; Tyler v. Lake, 2 Russ. & M. 183; Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Hare. 40. Lloyd, Q.C. for the wife, contra, cited the observations of Lord Brougham in Stanton v. Hall, that no particular form of words was necessary to create a separate use in a married woman; the intention, though not expressed in terms, might be inferred from the nature of the conditions annexed to the gift. See also Lee v. Prideaux, 3 Bro. C. C. 381; Dixon v. Olmius, 2 Cox, 414; Massey v. Parker, 2 Myl. & K. 174; Tullett v. Armstrong. He also contended that the restraint against alienation attached to her interest in the property after she married. The MASTER of the ROLLS.-I am of opinion that the words of the will are not sufficient to give to Mrs. Camm a life-estate for her separate use. The observations of the V. C. in Blacklow v. Laws, with reference to the principle on which these cases of gifts to the uses of married women are to be construed are strictly applicable -and an established rule must be overturned by a higher authority than mine. Uniformity of decision is of the greatest importance; and, though I think the rule is not shaken which is stated in that case-that this court does not require greater proof of intention in one case than another; that in all cases the intention must M. R.] Re HOLBROOK'S WILL-HAINES e. BURNETT, [M. R. stipulation that the lease should contain a covenant that the lessee should not assign unless to a person approved by the lessor, and also all usual covenants. The draft lense contrined a condition that the lease should be determined by the lessee becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or in the event of an execution being levied under a judgment against the lessee: Held, that this condition for determining the lease on the bankruptcy, &c. of the lessee was warranted by the stipulations contained in the memorandum, which prohibited an assignment without licence. This was a suit by a proposed lessor against the proposed lessee for a specific performance of agreement for a lease to be granted to the defendant. clearly appear, but that the court does not require | A memorandum of agreement for a lease contained a clearer proof of intention in the case of a gift to the separate use of a woman than in any other, and that it is most dangerous to say that intention is to be estimated differently in different cases-there is this important consideration in all these cases, that, if decisions have laid down that particular words are not sufficient to create a separate use to the wife, the court, in subsequent cases, is bound by this rule; and though I should have doubted originally that, where a testator directs the dividends of stock to be paid to a married woman into her own hands, for her own use and beneat, he could mean anything but to give her a separate interest in the bequest, yet, if I find that the cases lay down the contrary, it is impossible for me to adopt a different construction. Tyler v. Lake was a much stronger case than this in favour of the argument that there was no gift to the separate use of the married woman; for there the testator used exactly the same words in a gift to his son, showing that, in his mind, they were not applicable to this purpose; and in that case Lord Brougham laid down, that a direction "to pay their shares into their own proper hands,' either taken singly or in conjunction with the rest of the clause, to and for their own respective use and benefit," does not create a separate use in the wife. Here the words are not so strong. "She is to receive the rents herself from the tenants herself while she lives, whether married or single." In Blacklow v. Laws, the words were rather stronger; but the V.C. said that, in accordance with the cases, he could not hold that a separate use was created. Taking this view of the bequest, I must hold that the clause restraining alienation was void, and therefore that husband and wife might make a valid mortgage. Wednesd y, Nov. 9. By a memorandum of agreement made between the plaintiff and defendant, dated March 1856, for a lease to be granted by the plaintiff to the defendant of the Royal Kentish Hotel at Tunbridge-wells, for the term of twenty years and a-half (less seven days) from Midsummer then next, determinable at seven or fourteen years, the lessor agreed to do certain repairs to the premises, and in consideration thereof the lessee was thereafter to keep the premises in repair, paint, paper, &c. during the terin; to keep the beer, spirit and other licences renewed from time to to time, "not to assign excepting only to a responsible person previously approved by the lessor, or assign by way of mortgage, or deposit as a security for any sum or suins of money lent and advanced thereon to the lessee." The lease to contain generally all such other covenants, clauses and stipulations as are usually inserted both on behalf of lessor and lessee in leases of property of a similar description." The draft lease contained a proviso for determining the lease in the event of the lessee becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or making an assignment for the benefi of creditors, or in the event of an execution being levied upon any judgment against the lessee. The defendant objected to the proviso as not being within the meaning of the stipulations contained in the agreement, as not being a covenant usually inserted in The court will make an order under the 4th section of cause. By an order made on a petition presented in this mitter, under the Trustees Act, on 28th July last, the trustees of the testator's will were ordered to transfer a sum of stock, standing in their names, into the names of new trustees appointed by the same order. Thomas Holbrook, one of the trustees, after service of the order on him, has, up to the present time, neglected to transfer the stock. Osborne Morgan now moved, under the 4th section of the Trustees Extension Act 1852 (15 & 16 Viet. c. 55), the trustees having neglected to transfer for twenty-eight days after service of the order, for an order to vest the right to transfer the stock standing in the names of the old trustees, in the new trustees appointed by the court. He referred to sects. 35 and 4% of the Trustees Act 1850; and to Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, Seton on Decrees, 2nd edit., page 413, in which case a similar order had been made on motion in a cause in which an order to transfer had been made. The MASTER of the ROLLS said he thought that the fact of the motion being made in a matter, instead of in a cause, made no substantial difference, and made the order asked for. The plaintiff insisted on retaining this proviso in the lease, and the defendant refusing to complete the lease as proposed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed this bill to compel specific performance. Selwyn, Q.C. and C. Hall, for the plaintiff, contended that this was a usual and proper covenant to be contained in a lease, and that it was a necessary provision for the purpose of carrying into effect that intention and object of the stipulation in the agreement that the lessee should not assign without licence except to a person whom they might approve (Church v. Brown, 15 Ves. 258.) : R. Palmer, Q.C. and Osborne, for the defendant, contra, contended that, according to the practice of conveyancers, this was a proviso which did not come within the spirit of the covenant against assigning, or which could be inserted under the stipulation for adding "usual covenants." The MASTER of the ROLLS said, that, looking at the whole matter, and considering that the inemorandum was an executory agreement, and that it appeared to be drawn in rather a loose way, and that there were obviously various elipses in the stipulation that the lessee should not assign; considering also the nature of the property to be leased, he was of opinion that the lease ought to contain a proviso, making the lease determinable in the event of the lessee becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or making an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or in the event of an attempt being made to sell or assign the premises under an execution being issued upon any judgment against the lessee. CHAN.] [CHAN. Re THE ROYAL BRITISH BANK, MIXER'S CASE. Friday, Nov. 11. had jurisdiction in respect of such company if the PEDDER . PEDDER. registered office of the company had been established Practice-Abatement — Administration suit-Death of in Scotland or Ireland, and in the same manner in all sole defendant-Sole plaintiff executor-Revivor. respects as if such order had been made by the courts Where in an administration suit there was a sole that are hereby required to enforce the same, and in plaintiff and defendant, and the sole defendant died, like manner orders, interlocutors and decrees, made having appointed the plaintiff executor, the court by the court in Scotland for or in the course of the allowed the suit to be revived against the parties in-winding-up of a company, shall be enforced in England terested, who had appeared before the chief clerk in the prosecution of the suit in chambers. This was a motion for revivor. The suit was an administration suit, in which there was a sole plaintiff and a sole defendant. The usual administration decree had been made, and the suit was being proceeded with before the chief clerk in chambers, and some of the parties interested had been summoned and had appeared in such proceedings. In this state of things the sole defendant died, having by his will appointed the plaintiff his sole executor, and he proved the will. The suit having thus abated, C. Hall moved that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff might be allowed to revive the suit against the parties who had appeared before the chief clerk in chambers. The MASTER of the ROLLS thought this would be a proper course, and made an order accordingly. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Wednesday, Nov. 2. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Campbell). Re MACKEAN'S PETITION. Practice Opposition to a patent-Negligence in filing affidavits. A., opposing a patent, did not file affidavits until the morning of hearing: Held, that, as the affidavits were only filed that morning, they could not be read, and the great seal was affixed. This was a petition to have the great seal affixed to a patent, notwithstanding the respondent had filed some affidavits in opposition that morning. It was alleged that the reason of the delay in filing the affidavits was occasioned by the difficulty of procuring them during the long vacation, from persons residing in different parts of Scotland. Hindmarch and Druce appeared for the petitioner. and Ireland, and orders made by the court in Ireland for or in the course of winding-up a company shall be enforced in England and Scotland by the courts which would respectively have had jurisdiction in the matter of such company if the registered office of the company were established in the division of the United Kingdom where the order is required to be enforced, and in the same manner in all respects as if such order had been inade by the court required to enforce the same in the case of a company within its own jurisdiction." The 13th section enacts, that "where any order, interlocutor or decree made by one court is required to be enforced by another court, as hereinbefore provided, an office copy of the order, interlocutor or decree so made, shall be produced to the proper officer of the court required to enforce the same; and the production of such office copy shall be sufficient evidence of such order, interlocutor or decree having been made; and thereupon such last-mentioned court shall cause such order, interlocutor or decree to be registered, or shall take such other steps in the matter as may be requisite for enforcing such order, interlocutor or decree, in the same inanner as if it were the order, interlocutor or decree of the court enforcing the same." During the vacation the M. R. ordered the order in question to be enrolled. C. T. Swanston appeared for the application. The Royal British Bank allotted shares in their bank issued under its supplemental charter to M. under the same circumstances of fraud as in Brockwell's case. M. having executed the deed and received dividends, was held to be a contributory. This case came on upon ап order made by The LORD CHANCELLOR.-I think, under the cir- Kindersley, V.C. upon two summonses at chambers. cumstances, I ought to make an order for the great The V.C. considering the question to be in substance seal to be affixed to this patent. It having been re-identical with that in Brockwell's case, 4 Drew, 205, ferred to the Solicitor-General, and no opposition having been made; but now, on the first day of term, the respondent comes into court and files his affidavits, but these cannot now be read. The respondent can, however, hereafter impeach the petitioner's patent, by an action for infringement or by scire facias. I shall therefore order the great seal to be affixed. desired that the case might be heard before the full court. There being hardly any difference between the circumstances of Brockwell's case and this, it was agreed that, mutatis mutandis, the facts in Brockwell's case should be taken as evidence. One summons was, upon an application of the official manager of the bank, to make an addition or variation in the list of contributories by including therein Robert Mixer as a Re THE WESTERN BANK OF SCOTLAND. member of the company in respect of twelve shares. Practice Order of Scotch Court-Enrolment in Eng-The other was upon an application by Mr. Mixer land-Winding-up-21 & 22 Vict. c. 60, ss. 12, 13. Application was made to have an order of a Scotch court in the winding-up of the Western Bank of Scotland enrolled in this country, under the provisions of the above Act. The L. C. made the order. This was an application to have an order of a Scotch .court in the winding-up of the above bank, enrolled in England under the provisions of the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 60, the 12th section of which enacts, "That any order made by the court in England for or in the course of the winding-up of a company under the Joint-Stock Companies Acts, shall be enforced in Scotland and Ireland, and in the courts that would respectively have claiming to prove against the estate of the bank for 60l. and 600l. and interest, being the amount paid by him on the twelve shares by way of premium and deposit thereon. Giffard, Q.C. and Field appeared for Mr. Mixer.They contended that the issue of shares having been under the supplemental charter of the bank, no final contract of partnership was entered into with Mr. Mixer; that the bank never having procured other subscribers to the extent of the intended additional. capital, could not go on with less without breaking the contract with those who had taken shares upon the faith of the representations they had made. |