We cannot, of course, give a definition of matter which will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted upon by, or can exert, force. Treatise on Natural Philosophy - Pàgina 145per William Thomson Baron Kelvin, Peter Guthrie Tait - 1867 - 727 pàginesVisualització completa - Sobre aquest llibre
| William Thomson Baron Kelvin, Peter Guthrie Tait - 1872 - 316 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician; but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted...Force, which, in point of fact, is a direct object of sense ; probably of all our senses, and certainly of the ' muscular sense.' To our chapter on Properties... | |
| William Stanley Jevons - 1874 - 978 pàgines
...implied. Thus Thomson and Tait say0, ' The naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted upon by or can exert force.' I take this to mean — Matter = what can be perceived by the senses ; Matter — . what can be acted... | |
| George Henry Lewes - 1875 - 500 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted...of these definitions, involves the idea of Force." J 35. In its widest sense, Matter is the symbol of all the known Properties, statical and dynamical,... | |
| William Thomson Baron Kelvin, Peter Guthrie Tait - 1879 - 572 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted...indeed the former also, of these definitions involves Force. the idea of Force, which, iii point of fact, is a direct object of sense; probably of all our... | |
| William Thomson Kelvin (1st baron), Peter Guthrie Tait - 1879 - 564 pàgines
...naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, Force. Mass. Deusity. latter, and indeed the former also, of these definitions...Force, which, in point of fact, is a direct object of sense; probably of all our senses, and certainly of the " muscular sense." To our chapter on Properties... | |
| Sir Norman Lockyer - 1879 - 956 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that 'which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted upon by, or can exert, force." The authors proceed to throw out a hint about Force being a direct object of sense, and after telling us... | |
| George Thom (principal of Dollar inst.) - 1881 - 152 pàgines
...INDEX 124 128 PHYSIOGRAPHY. CHAPTEE I. MATTER AND MOTION. 1. Matter may be defined as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted upon by, or can exert, force. It exists in three states. There is first the solid state, in which a body has a definite form or shape,... | |
| Raymond St. James Perrin - 1885 - 602 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which can be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted...of these definitions involves the idea of Force." ' In the treatise of Lewes on the Nature of Matter, in Problem IV., we have an illustration of the... | |
| Raymond St. James Perrin - 1885 - 604 pàgines
...will satisfy the metaphysician, but the naturalist may be content to know matter as that which ean be perceived by the senses, or as that which can be acted...of these definitions involves the idea of Force." ' In the treatise of Lewes on the Nature of Matter, in Problem IV., we have an illustration of the... | |
| William Thomson Baron Kelvin, Peter Guthrie Tait - 1888 - 569 pàgines
...be perceived by the senses, latter, and indeed the former also, of these definitions involves Force. the idea of Force, which, in point of fact, is a direct object of sense; probably of all our senses, and certainly of the " muscular sense/' To our chapter on Properties... | |
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