Majesty was further pleased to add, that if he had been in my place he would have done the same. Upon the receipt of the Emperor's letter, I felt considerable embarrassment with respect to the part it became me to take. I was unwilling to abuse the indulgence of a direct intercourse with a Sovereign, and not less so to acquiesce in imputations and principles, against both of which I deemed it my duty to protest. Upon the best reflection, I determined to separate the memorandum as much as possible from both the letter and the person of the Emperor, and to direct my reasoning wholly to that, as a Ministerial document, which had reached me through His Imperial Majesty's intervention, but to which he was in no other sense a party. I yesterday accordingly sent the reply which I now inclose, accompanied by an explanatory letter to the Emperor, by my brother, as the most respectful and least formal channel of conveyance. I should have wished that this species of discussion had fallen into more able hands, and especially that it could have been conducted by the Minister of one of the Powers more immediately interested in the Polish question; but, when I saw the service suffering from inaction, I found it difficult to be passive, and your Lordship may be assured that England is still the only Power that either can or dares raise her voice against the powerful and the oppressor. I wish I could lead your Lordship to expect a favourable issue to these Polish discussions. I shall furnish you with the details of their intermediate progress since my last in a separate despatch. My object has been that, at least, the Prince Regent should stand justified in the eyes of Europe, whatever may be the event, and that if the Powers most immediately interested should find themselves obliged to submit to an unjust and illiberal act of power, His Royal Highness's Ministers may have been found true to those principles which have distinguished the British Government throughout the war, and which have conciliated to her councils the respect and confidence of the Continent. The Earl of Liverpool. CASTLEREAGH. (Inclosure 1.)-The Emperor of Russia to Viscount Castlereagh. Vienna, October 18, 1814. [See Vol. XXII. Page 1006.] (Inclosure 2.)-Russian Memorandum. [See Vol. XXII. Page 1008.] (Inclosure 3.)-Viscount Castlereagh to the Emperor of Russia. Vienna, November 4, 1814. (Inclosure 4.)-British Memorandum. - Vienna, November 4, 1814. [See Vol. XXII. Page 1015.] (Inclosure 5.)-Tableau des Possessions de la Russie en Pologne. [See Vol. XXII. Page 1021.] (Inclosure 6.)-Tableau Officiel des Pertes de l'Autriche en Pologne. [See Vol. XXII. Page 1022.] No. 6-Visc. Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool. - (Rec. Nov. 24.) (Extract.) Vienna, November 11, 1814. I REPORTED to your Lordship in my despatch of the 24th ultimo, the result of the confidential interview that took place at my house between the Austrian and Prussian Secretaries of State. On the following day, and before the Emperor of Russia's departure for Buda, Prince Metternich had an interview with him, which led to a discussion of much warmth, especially on the part of His Imperial Majesty. Upon the return of the Emperor of Austria to Vienna, Prince Metternich received His Imperial Majesty's directions to transmit the note of which the inclosed is a copy, to Prince Hardenberg, as the basis of the intended negotiation with the Emperor of Russia. Your Lordship will observe that, in the third alternative, the Austrian Minister proposes to release Russia from all restraint as to the erection of her Polish dominions into a Monarchy (which would then contain nearly 10,000,000 of people) under the Russian sceptre, provided the 2 other powers received the Vistula as their frontier. The prospect of reconciling their differences on German affairs was no sooner opened, than both Austria and Prussia resumed their former earnestness on this point, which was much augmented by a variety of collateral indications of the intriguing spirit which actuated the Russian Councils in other quarters. I deemed it of great importance to contribute as far as depended upon me to this concert, considering the establishment of Russia in the heart of Germany not only as constituting a great danger in itself, but as calculated to establish a most pernicious influence both in the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets; and I also foresaw that if these 2 Powers, from distrust of each other, gave up the Polish point as desperate, the contest in negotiation would then turn upon Saxony, Mayence, and other German points, and through these contentions of Austria and Prussia the supremacy of Russia would be established in all directions, and upon every question; whereas an understanding previously established on German affairs gave some chance of ameliorating the Polish arrangement, and, in case of its failure, afforded the best, if not the only means of counteracting the Russian influence in the other European arrangements, to the tendency of which it was impossible not to look with alarm, whilst she kept an army of 60,000 men under Bennigsen upon the Elbe, still treating Holstein, without a pretence for doing so, almost as an enemy's country. I was of opinion that every consideration of policy combined to make it our particular interest, as well as duty, to promote the concert in question; and, for the reasons I have stated, I trust your Lordship will see that to have been indifferent to the Polish question would have augmented, instead of diminished, our own immediate difficulties. On the contrary, it appeared to me that it was better for Great Britain, in order to secure her own objects, to contend for an European question of great magnitude in the true spirit of the policy that has marked her conduct throughout the war, than to seem indifferent to that policy, and to reserve herself for an object, viz., the low countries, which is regarded on the Continent as particularly connected with her own power, and which, as I have observed above, might have been exposed to a very unpleasant question, under a disunion between the great German Powers. I have certainly been led, from circumstances, to take a more active share in the discussion on this question than I should have permitted myself to do, if it had been any part of my policy to push the Polish point to a hostile issue. In preparing for so serious an alternative, I should have felt the propriety, as a British Minister, of preserving a greater degree of reserve; it being the province of Great Britain to support, rather than lead, in such occasions. But in proportion as I felt that an effort ought to be made successively by conciliation, by moderation, by persuasion, by pressure of argument, and ultimately, if necessary, by an imposing negotiation, uniting the general sentiments of Europe upon sound and popular grounds, and not by arms, I felt the less precluded from taking a forward part. Some advantages, perhaps, have resulted from my being the person to do so, as the same arguments, had they been urged by the parties most interested, might have rendered accommodation more difficult. Such are the principles upon which my conduct has hitherto been founded. It will be highly gratifying to me should they be honoured with the Prince Regent's gracious approbation, and with the concurrence of my colleagues in the Government. Since I have been on the Continent, in my intercourse with the several Cabinets, I have conceived it my duty to keep in view the following principles, considering them as those on which it was the intention of His Royal Highness' Government that I should act. In the first place, so to conduct the arrangements to be framed for Congress as to make the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe the first object of my attention, and to consider the assertion of minor points of interest as subordinate to this great end. Secondly, to use my best endeavours to support the Powers who had contributed to save Europe by their exertions, in their just pretensions to be liberally re-established upon the scale to which their Treaties entitled them to lay claim, and not to be deterred from doing so by the necessity of adopting, for this end, measures which, although not unjust, are nevertheless painful and unpopular in themselves. And thirdly, to endeavour to combine this latter duty to our friends and allies with as much mildness and indulgence, even to the offending States, as circumstances would permit. I have pursued these views, with a fixed and anxious purpose, if possible, not to suffer the peace of Europe to be disturbed, even upon just grounds, if by any compromise, or even reasonable sacrifice it could be avoided. If, in discharge of this duty, I have felt myself obliged strongly to remonstrate against the principles and temper disclosed by the Russian Councils, I hope I have maintained honest principles, and I am confident that the relations between the 2 Governments would not have been improved by a more pliant tone on my part, opposed to that in which the Emperor has of late been disposed to dictate. Your Lordship may rest assured that no effort on my part shall be omitted to prevent disunion, and still more war; but I am confident I speak the universal sentiment, when I declare my perfect conviction that unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of public conduct, the peace which we have so dearly purchased will be but of short duration. The Earl of Liverpool. CASTLEREAGH. P.S.-In reply to that part of the Emperor of Russia's statement which deprecates Austria as having received more than she was entitled to under Treaty, I inclose a statement received from Prince Metternich, by which it appears that, inclusive of the Pays dé Salzburg, the circle of the Inn and of the Hunsruck, the restitution of which is contingent upon arrangements with Bavaria, Austria is yet somewhat below the standard to which she is entitled to aspire. (Inclosure 1.)-Prince Metternich to Prince Hardenberg. Vienne, le 2 Novembre, 1814. C'EST d'ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique que le Soussigné, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangères, a T'honneur d'adresser à Son Altesse M. le Prince de Hardenberg, Chancelier d'Etat de Sa Majesté Prussienne, le présent office. Le Ministère Prussien n'ignore pas combien les vues de la Cour de Russie à l'égard du Duché de Varsovie, entièrement contraires au sens des Traités qui ont uni les Souverains Alliés contre la France, ont mis d'obstacles, tant à l'arrangement des intérêts des Puissances entre elles, qu'à la marche du Congrès assemblé dans ce moment pour déterminer le nouvel ordre politique de l'Europe, et fixer un état de paix et de tranquillité durable. La Convention signée à Reichenbach, le 27 Juin, 1813, entre les Cours d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, stipule, à l'Article II, "la dissolution du Duché de Varsovie, et le partage des provinces qui le forment, entre les Cours d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, d'après des arrangements à prendre par ces 3 Puissances." Cet engagement a été renouvellé dans les Traités d'Amitié et d'Alliance signé par l'Autriche à Töplitz, le 9 Septembre, 1813, avec les Cours de Berlin et de St. Petersbourg, qui portent à la 4me Section de l'Article I Séparé et Sécret "un arrangement à l'amiable entre les 3 Cours d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie, sur le sort futur du Duché de Varsovie." L'Empereur, invoquant la lettre et le sens le plus clair des engagements réciproques, croit donner une preuve aussi convainquante de son respect pour la foi des Traités, qu'il mettra hors de doute la modération de ses demandes dans les négociations qu'il désire ouvrir à l'égard du partage du Duché de Varsovie; et Sa Majesté Impériale croirait violer des engagements qu'elle ne regarde pas seulement sous le point de vue de son intérêt particulier, mais comme les garants de l'équilibre de l'Europe, elle croirait manquer à ce qu'elle doit au bonheur et au repos de ses peuples, en ne pas insistant, de la manière la plus prononcée, sur l'exécution des Traités, qui doivent lui assurer, non moins qu'à la Prusse, une frontière militaire nécessaire à la sûreté et à la tranquillité des 2 Monarchies. Elle s'adresse à la loyauté et à l'amitié de Sa Majesté Prussienne, comme signataire de ces Traités, pour faire valoir auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies des réclamations et des droits qui leur sont communs. Elle ne désire pas moins que les prétentions légitimes de la Russie soient satisfaites; et elle portera, dans les négociations qui seront entamées à cet effet entre les 3 Cours, avec l'amitié et la confiance conformes tant aux stipulations des Traités qu'aux rapports personnels des augustes Souverains, toute la sincérité et l'esprit de conciliation qui la caractérisent. Le Soussigné, en invitant M. le Prince de Hardenberg à répondre à l'ouverture qu'il a l'honneur de lui adresser, dans le plus court délai possible, désire entrer avec son Altesse dans les explications les plus franches sur l'objet de leur commune sollicitude, et à concerter avec elles les démarches à faire auprès de la Cour de Russie pour |