by accident, we happen into an estate, in which of necessity one evil or another must be suffered, certainly nothing is more naturally reasonable and eligible than to choose the least evil; and when there are two good things propounded to our choice, both which cannot be possessed, nothing is more certainly the object of a prudent choice than the greater good. And therefore, when once we understand the question of suffering, and self-denial, and martyrdom to this sense, as all Christians do, and all wise men do, and all sects of men do in their several persuasions, it is but remembering, that to live happily after this life is more intended to us by God, and is more perfective of human nature, than to live here with all the prosperity, which this state affords; and it will evidently follow, that when violent men will not let us enter into that condition by the ways of nature and prime intendment, that is, of natural religion, justice, and sobriety, it is made, in that case, and upon that supposition, certainly, naturally, and infallibly reasonable, to secure the perfective and principal design of our felicity, though it be by such instruments, which are as unpleasant to our senses, as are the instruments of our restitution to health; since both one and the other, in the present conjunction and state of affairs, are most proportionable to reason, because they are so to the present necessity; not primarily intended to us by God, but superinduced by evil accidents and the violence of men. And we not only find, that Socrates suffered death in attestation of a God, though he flattered and discoursed himself into the belief of an immortal reward, "de industria consultæ æquanimitatis, non de fiducia compertæ veritatis," as Tertullian says of him; but we also find, that all men, that believed the immortality of the soul firmly and unmovably, made no scruple of exchanging their life for the preservation of virtue, with the interest of their great hope, for honour sometimes, and oftentimes for their country. 36. Thus the holy Jesus perfected and restored the natural law, and drew it into a system of propositions, and made them to become of the family of religion. For God is so zealous to have man attain to the end, to which he first designed him, that those things, which he hath put in the natural order to attain that end, he hath bound fast upon us, not only by the order of things, by which it was that he, that prevaricated, did naturally fall short of felicity, but also by bands of religion; he hath now made himself a party and an enemy to those, that will not be happy. Of old, religion was but one of the natural laws, and the instances of religion were distinct from the discourses of philosophy. Now, all the law of nature is adopted into religion, and by our love and duty to God we are tied to do all that is reason; and the parts of our religion are but pursuances of the natural relation between God and us: and beyond all this, our natural condition is, in all senses, improved by the consequents and adherencies of this religion. For although nature and grace are opposite, that is, nature depraved by evil habits, by ignorance, and ungodly customs, is contrary to grace, that is, to nature restored by the Gospel, engaged to regular living by new revelations, and assisted by the Spirit; yet it is observable, that the law of nature and the law of grace are never opposed. "There is a law of our members," saith St. Paul; that is, an evil necessity introduced into our appetites, by perpetual evil customs, examples and traditions of vanity; and there is a law of sin, that answers to this: and they differ only as inclination and habit, vicious desires and vicious practices. But then contrary to these are, first, "a law of my mind "," which is the law of nature and right reason, and then the law of grace, that is, of Jesus Christ, who perfected and restored the first law, and by assistances reduced it into a law of holy living: and these two differ as the other; the one is in order to the other, as imperfection and growing degrees and capacities are to perfection and consummation. The law of the mind had been so rased and obliterate, and we, by some means or other, so disabled from observing it exactly, that until it was turned into the law of grace, (which is a law of pardoning infirmities, and assisting us in our choices and elections,) we were in a state of deficiency from the perfective state of man, to which God intended us. 37. Now, although God always designed man to the same state, which he hath now revealed by Jesus Christ, yet he told him not of it; and his permissions and licenses were then greater, and the law itself lay closer folded up in the compact body of necessary propositions, in order to so much of his end, as was known, or could be supposed. But now, according to the extension of the revelation, the law itself is made wider, that is, more explicit; and natural reason is thrust forward into discourses of charity and benefit, and we tied to do very much good to others, and tied to co-operate to each other's felicity. 38. That the law of charity is a law of nature, needs no other argument but the consideration of the first constitution of man. The first instances of justice or intercourse of man with a second or third person, were to such persons, towards whom he had the greatest endearments of affection in the world, a wife and children; and justice and charity, at first, was the same thing. And it hath obtained in ages far removed from the first, that charity is called righteousness*: "He hath dispersed and given to the poor; his righteousness remaineth for ever." And it is certain, Adam could not in any instance be unjust, but he must in the same also be uncharitable; the band of his first justice being the ties of love, and all having commenced in love. And our blessed Lord, restoring all to the intention of the first perfection, expresses it to the same sense, as I formerly observed; justice to our neighbour, is loving him as ourselves. For, since justice obliges us to do, as we would be done to, as the irascible faculty restrains us from doing evil for fear of receiving evil, so the concupiscible obliges us to charity, that ourselves may receive good. 39. I shall say nothing concerning the reasonableness of this precept, but that it concurs rarely with the first reasonable appetite of man, of being like God. "Deus est mortali juvare mortalem, atque hæc est ad æternitatem via," said Pliny; and, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," said our blessed Saviour: and therefore the commandment of charity, in all its parts, is a design not only to reconcile the most miserable person to some participations and sense of felicity, but to make the charitable man happy; and whether this be not very agreeable to the desires of an intelligent nature, needs no farther inquiry. And Aristotle, asking the question, Whether a man had more need of friends in prosper * Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐνεργητικὸς πέφυκε.Μ. Anton. 1. ix. y Psal. cxii. 9. ity or adversity? makes the case equal: "OTE yàp åtuxoûvtes δέονται ἐπικουρίας· οἱ δὲ ἐντυχοῦντες συμβίων, οὓς ἐνποιήσωσιν. "When they are in want, they need assistance; when they are prosperous, they need partners of their felicity, that, by communicating their joy to them, it may reflect and double upon their spirits." And certain it is, there is no greater felicity in the world, than in the content that results from the emanations of charity. And this is that, which St. Johnz calls "the old commandment," and "the new commandment." It was of old, for it was from the beginning, even in nature, and to the offices of which our very bodies had an organ and a seat; for therefore nature gave to a man bowels and the passion of yearning; but it grew up into religion by parts, and was made perfect, and, in that degree, appropriate to the law of Jesus Christ. For so the holy Jesus became our lawgiver, and added many new precepts over and above what were in the law of Moses, but not more than was in the law of nature. The reason of both is, what I have all this while discoursed of: Christ made a more perfect restitution of the law of nature, than Moses did, and so it became the second Adam to consummate that, which began to be less perfect, from the prevarication of the first Adam. 40. A particular of the precept of charity is forgiving injuries; and besides that it hath many superinduced benefits, by way of blessing and reward, it relies also upon this natural reason, that a pure and a simple revenge does no way restore man towards the felicity, which the injury did interrupt. For revenge is a doing a simple evil, and does not, in its formality, imply reparation; for the mere repeating of our own right is permitted to them, that will do it by charitable instruments; and to secure myself or the public against the future, by positive inflictions upon the injurious, (if I be not Ἔχοι τε καὶ δύναιτο, κάλλιστος πόνων. — Sophocl. Cdip. Τyr. 514. Quæ lacrymas dedit; hæc nostri pars optima sensûs. Juven. Sat. 15. 131. judge myself,) is also within the moderation of an unblamable defence, (unless some accidents or circumstances vary the case;) but forgiving injuries is a separating the malice from the wrong, the transient act from the permanent effect; and it is certain, the act which is passed, cannot be rescinded; the effect may; and if it cannot, it does no way alleviate the evil of the accident, that I draw him, that caused it, into as great a misery since every evil, happening in the world, is the proper object of pity, which is in some sense afflictive; and therefore, unless we become unnatural and without bowels, it is most unreasonable, that we should increase our own afflictions by introducing a new misery, and making a new object of pity. All the ends of human felicity are secured without revenge, for, without it, we are permitted to restore ourselves; and therefore it is against natural reason to do an evil, that no way co-operates towards the proper and perfective end of human nature. And he is a miserable person, whose good is the evil of his neighbour; and he, that revenges, in many cases, does worse than he, that did the injury; in all cases, as bad. For if the first injury was an injustice to serve an end of an advantage and real benefit; then my revenge, which is abstracted, and of a consideration separate and distinct from the reparation, is worse; for I do him evil, without doing myself any real good; which he did not, for he received advantage by it. But if the first injury was matter of mere malice without advantage, yet it is no worse than revenge, for that is just so; and there is as much fantastic pleasure in doing a spite, as in doing revenge: they are both but like the pleasures of eating coals, and toads, and vipers. And certain it is, if a man, upon his private stock, could be permitted to revenge, the evil would be ὁ ὁ τιμωρῶν τοῦ προϋπάρξαντος ἀδικώτερος. referenda sit Injuria, p. 26. ed. Dav. el Maxim. Tyrius in Dissert. an Απαντα τὰ ζῶ ἐστι μακαριώτερα, Καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπου πολύ. Menand. p. 244. ed. Clerc. |