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SECT. VII. Emotions caufed by Fiction.

HE attentive reader will obferve, that hi

THE

therto no fiction hath been affigned as the caufe of any paffion or emotion: whether it be a being, action, or quality, that moveth us, it is fuppofed to be really exifting. This obfervation shows that we have not yet completed our task; because paffions, as all the world know, are moved by fiction as well as by truth. In judging beforehand of man, fo remarkably addicted to truth and reality, one should little dream that fiction can have any effect upon him; but man's intellectual faculties are not sufficiently perfect to dive far even into his own nature. I fhall take occafion afterward to fhow, that the power of fiction to generate paffion is an admirable contrivance, fubfervient to excellent purposes in the mean time, we must try to unfold the means that give fiction fuch influence over the mind.

That the objects of our external fenfes really exift in the way and manner we perceive, is a branch of intuitive knowledge: when I fee a man walking, a tree growing, or cattle grazing, I cannot doubt but that thefe objects are really what they appear to be: if I be a fpectator of any tranf

action

action or event, I have a conviction of the real existence of the perfons engaged, of their words, and of their actions. Nature determines us to rely on the veracity of our fenfes; for otherwife they could not in any degree answer their end, that of laying open things exifting and paffing around us.

By the power of memory, a thing formerly feen may be recalled to the mind with different degrees of accuracy. We commonly are fatisfied with a flight recollection of the capital circumstances; and, in fuch recollection, the thing is not figured as in our view, nor any image formed: we retain the confcioufnefs of our prefent fituation, and barely remember that formerly we faw that thing. But with refpect to an interefting object or event that made a strong impreffion, I am not fatisfied with a curfory review, but must dwell upon every circumstance. I am imperceptibly converted into a spectator, and perceive every particular paffing in my prefence, as when I was in reality a spectator. For example, I faw yesterday a beautiful woman in tears for the lofs of an only child, and was greatly moved with her diftrefs: not fatisfied with a flight recollection or bare remembrance, I ponder upon the melancholy scene: conceiving myself to be in the place where I was an eyewitnefs, every circumftance appears to me as at firft: I think I fee the woman in tears, and hear her moans. Hence it may be juftly faid, that in

in a complete idea of memory there is no paft nor future a thing recalled to the mind with the accuracy I have been defcribing, is perceived as in our view, and confequently as exifting at prefent. Paft time makes part of an incomplete idea only I remember or reflect, that fome years ago I was at Oxford, and faw the firft ftone laid of the Ratcliff library; and I remember that, at a ftill greater distance of time, I heard a debate in the House of Commons about a ftanding army.

Lamentable is the imperfection of language, almoft in every particular that falls not under external fenfe. I am talking of a matter exceedingly clear in the perception and yet I find no fmall difficulty to exprefs it clearly in words; for it is not accurate to talk of incidents long past as paffing in our fight, nor of hearing at prefent what we really heard yesterday or at a more diftant time. And yet the want of proper words to defcribe ideal presence, and to distinguish it from real prefence, makes this inaccuracy unavoidable. When I recall any thing to my mind in a manner fo diftinct as to form an idea or image of it as prefent, I have not words to defcribe that act, but that I perceive the thing as a spectator, and as exifting in my prefence; which means not that I am really a spectator, but only that I conceive. myself to be a spectator, and have a perception of the object fimilar to what a real fpectator hath.

As many rules of criticifm depend on ideal prefence, the reader, it is hoped, will take fome

pains

pains to form an exact notion of it, as diftinguished on the one hand from real prefence, and on the other from a fuperficial or reflective remembrance. In contradiftinction to real prefence, ideal prefence may properly be termed a waking dream; because, like a dream, it vanisheth the moment we reflect upon our present fituation real prefence, on the contrary, vouched by eye-fight, commands our belief, not only during the direct perception, but in reflecting afterward on the object. To diftinguish ideal prefence from reflective remembrance, I give the following illuftration: when I think of an event as paft, without forming any image, it is barely reflecting or remembering that I was an eyewitnefs: but when I recall the event fo diftinctly as to form a complete image of it, I perceive it as paffing in my prefence; and this perception is an act of intuition, into which reflection enters not, more than into an act of fight.

Though ideal prefence is thus distinguished from real prefence on the one fide, and from reflective remembrance on the other, it is however variable without any precife limits; rifing fometimes toward the former, and often finking toward the latter. In a vigorous exertion of memory, ideal prefence is extremely diftinct: thus, when a man, entirely occupied with fome event that made a deep impreffion, forgets himfelf, he perceives every thing as paffing before him, and hath a confcioufnefs of prefence fimi

lar

lar to that of a fpectator; with no difference but that in the former the perception of presence is lefs firm and clear than in the latter. But fuch vigorous exertion of memory is rare: ideal prefence is oftener faint, and the image fo obfcure as not to differ widely from reflective remembrance.

Hitherto of an idea of memory. I proceed to confider the idea of a thing I never faw, raised in me by speech, by writing, or by painting. That idea, with respect to the present subject, is of the fame nature with an idea of memory, being either complete or incomplete. A lively and accurate defcription of an important event, raifes in me ideas no lefs diftinct than if I had been originally an eye-witness: I am infenfibly transformed into a spectator; and have an impreffion that every incident is paffing in my prefence. On the other hand, a flight or fuperficial narrative produceth but a faint and incomplete idea, of which ideal prefence makes no part. Past time is a circumftance that enters into this idea, as it doth into an incomplete idea of memory: I believe that Scipio existed about 2000 years ago, and that he overcame Hannibal in the famous battle of Zama. When I reflect fo flightly upon that memorable event, I confider it as long paft. But let it be spread out in a lively and beautiful defcription, I am infenfibly transformed into a fpectator: I perceive these two heroes in act to engage: I perceive them brandishing

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