means of which he was persuaded he could place that country in a situation to oppose a powerful barrier to the innovations of Russia, Turkey, and Austria, in case of need: he accordingly regarded Poland as a useful ally of Prussia, of Sweden, and of Denmark. Such are the secret motives of his implacable animosity towards his brother for having prevented his nomination to the crown of Poland, and towards his nephew for having made the last partition of that country.'

But certainly too much of the work is below the dignity of a professor, and scarce worth a second perusal.

There was a chamberlain in the court of the queen-mother, named M. de Morein, who was a man of so cir cumscribed an understanding, as to be constantly held up to ridicule in the sphere to which he belonged. Even after his death some facts were related of him that appeared almost incredible; such as his being unable to recollect whether at the seige of such a place he was the besieged or the besieger, and whether it was himself or his brother who was killed in such a campaign. It was to this M. Morien that the marquis d'Argens lent the same volume seven times over; and being asked afterwards how he liked the work, replied, "I think it, sir, an admirable production; but if I might speak my opinion freely, the author sometimes repeats the same things." The English ambassadour requested him to present to the queen-mother the earl of Essex, then on his travels, and added that it was not the earl of Essex who had been beheaded under queen Elizabeth. Accordingly M. de Morien, at the usual hour of presentations, said to the queen, "Madame, I have the honour to present to your majesty the earl of Essex, a native of England and a traveller; for the rest, the English ambassadour has assured me that he is not the same earl of Essex who was beheaded under queen Elizabeth."

The anecdotes of literary men, by all of whom Frederick was ambitious to be praised or abused, seem the best parts of the work. Rousseau and Raynal gained little kindness from the Prus

sian monarch,and the latter sçavant is still more severely treated by the Professor of the Berlin academy.

"It is notorious that, during the revolution, the abbe Raynal recanted his opinions in the most inconsistent and least honourable manner. He died while preparing a new edition of his Philosophical History, in which be pur posed to suppress all that related to philosophy. Was he in reality convinced of the falsehood of his opinions? No; he from deference them up gave to those whose favour he courted. Self-love, vanity more than pride, the most rapacious avarice, the most un. qualified boasting, and the yearning he felt to be the subject of men's thoughts and conversation, were the passions which during his whole life, perpetuated in his heart a violent and interminable warfare. These were the passions that made him successively a priest who would accept a bribe, a writer rich in the labours of others, a visionary philosopher, an incorrigible tyrant in colloquial society, and, lastly, a hypocritical religionist. The king of Prussia took the most cruel revenge of him in persisting to talk only of those of his works, of which he was really the author; of the two which, as the abbe well knew, had excited no esteem. Every one knows that his Philosophical History contains nothing but the name that is his own.'

The Philadelphia publisher, whose press is famous for its elegant editions, particularly for that of Lorenzo de Medici, has always been liberal and diligent in forwarding us new and valuable publications; but he has either not sent us the 2d Vol. of this work, or it has miscarried.

ART. 17.

Vol. I. part I. Feb. term, 1806Reports of cases argued, and determined, in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New-York. By William Johnson, esquire, counsellor at law. New-York, I. Riley & Co. 1806..

THE small series of reports, with which Mr. Johnson has recently

favoured the profession, is valuable, both on the score of its own merits, and as it gives promise of future productions. If it does not prove that the legal science of our country is perfect, it yet shows that it is meliorating. If the fruits of our judicial systems be not ripe, it proves that,in their natural tendencies, they are ripening. Adjudged cases, well reported, are so many land-marks,, to guide erratick opinion. In America the popular sentiment has, at times, been hostile to the practice of deciding cases on precedent, because the people, and lawyers too, have misunderstood their use. Precedents are not statutes. They settle cases, which statutes do not reach. By reference to books, an inquirer collects the opinions and arguments of many great and learned men, on any particular topick. By the aid of these, he discovers principles and relations, inferences and consequences, which no man could instantaneously perceive. He has, at once, a full view of his subject, and arrives without difficulty, to the same conclusion, to which, probably, his own mind would in time have conducted him by a slow and painful process of ratiocination.

But precedents not only assist the judge; they, in a good measure, control him. They tend to bring the judicial system to that excellent condition, in which the law, and not the judge, decides cases. They prevent the substitution of personal opinions for the doctrines of the law. Judges will sometimes affect to play the chancellor, and following an illjudged notion of equity, they pursue the phantom, through courses, devious as the serpent's, and dark as midnight. Equity doctrines, combined in questions at common law, tend to annihilate all

legal certainty and to confound all. principle. The law becomes without form and void, and dark. ness is on the face of it.' There is a medium. No man, in this age, contends for the illiteral constructions, and black-lettered niceties of the ancient gownmen; nor will a wise man push to the other extreme, and overwhelm all certainty and all rule in the chaos of arbitration principles. A discreet judge will take a middle course. He will neither fly to the extremity of the west, nor run away beyond Aurora and the Ganges?' Settled cases narrow the ground of private opinion. They are useful in enabling the profession correctly to advise their clients. They leave less to the judge, and render the rule more certain. This is the legitimate use of precedents.

We beg Mr. Johnson's pardon, and the reader's, for wandering so far from his book.

The case of Ludlow & al. vs. Browne, & al. page 1, seems to be nothing more or less than a question of fact, viz. whether the plaintiff's were bonafide owners of the goods in question, or whether they had merely accommodated the French merchants with their names, with the fraudulent design of covering the property with the mask of neutrality. If this point had been decided by a jury, there would have been an end to the cause. The case of Tucker vs. Jubel & al. p. 20, is still more destitute of any question of law. It ought to be expunged from the book.

In the case, Foot vs. Tracy, p.46, the court, notwithstanding it consists of five learned judges, is said to be equally divided. The question is whether, in an action for a libel, the defendant can give in evidence, under the general issue,

the general character of the plain tiff in mitigation of damages? Ch. J. Kent and Mr. J. Thompson hold the affirmative; Mr. J. Livingston and Mr. J. Tomkins the negative. Mr. J. Spenser gave no opinion, but the reporter has not favoured us with the reason. The impartial balance of the law is thus kept true to its level!

We know of nothing more unhappy for the publick,or more discouraging to those engaged in professional pursuits, than the disagreement of judges. When the ardent inquirer has laboured through the tangles of a complicated and ensnarled statement; when he has toiled after counsel up the steep ascent of inference, induction, conclusion; eager to be solved of his doubts, and overborne perhaps by the pressure of contradictory cases and opinions, he looks to the court for final decision, and beholds, depressed and disheartened, uncertainty and doubt emanating even from the oracle! If six months severe study and reflection could have made the court agreed in the case of Foot vs. Tracy, the time would have been well expended. Mr. J. has reported above forty cases. Of these,several are questions of practise, which are indeed useful to the junior part of the profession, in introducing them to an acquaintance with the administration of publick justice. Perhaps not more than twenty of the cases in this volume involve much difficulty or legal obscurity. In five, the most important of these twenty, the court disagree. This seems to be a great portion of causes of that description. We happen to have Cranch's Reports before us, while we write this, a book of about 500 pages, and upon examination we find no case in it, in

which the court was divided. In the Court of King's Bench in England eleven successive years have elapsed without presenting a diversity of opinion among the judges in a single case; and perhaps for thirty years, in that court, there was hardly as much difference of opinion on the Bench, as happened in the New-York court, in the Term, in which the cases, which Mr. J. reports were heard. The cause of this difference is a subject deserving consideration. Would it not be better, if, in ordinary occasions, but one opinion, and that the opinion of the court, were expressed?

The case of the People vs. Barret and Ward, p. 66,is a highly important one in the principle it involves, but totally unimportant as a precedent from the disagreement of the judges. Judge Livingston's argument in that case is a happy specimen of juridical reasoning.

In the case, Foot vs. Tracy, we observe the marginal abstract is incorrect. The same remark applies to the case of Livingston vs. Cheetham, and to that of New Windsor Turnpike Company vs. Ellison.

There are some errours of the press, which we do not note. The type is handsome and the paper good. There is a great deal too much margin on the pages, for any good purpose. Modern books of poetry and plays have already crowded our shelves with white paper. Ohe, jam satis! The references to authorities are generally correct and pertinent.

On the whole, we believe the Profession will be thankful to Mr. Johnson, not for making a book, but for making a good one.