substance of the intended proceedings. In transactions then of considerable importance, in which security of title is more an object than economy in expence, the common form which details the order of the proceedings should be observed. This form, with a general notice of the variations which take place under different circumstances, will be added in the appendix. It may be proper also to observe that the deed is evidence of the regularity of the proceedings in those instances only in which there are not any proceedings to rebut the presumption, except that irregularities in the entries are disregarded.

Of Cases in which the Law does, and does not, admit of the Presumption that there was a good Tenant to the Writ of Entry.

In some cases, the courts will presume the concurrence of the freeholder in the reco very; as when the possession has accompanied the title under the recovery for a long time (1).

Or where there has been collateral evidence, to raise the presumption of a surrender, by the person in whom the freehold was vested; as entries in the attorney's books of a surrender prepared and paid for ($).

But unless there are circumstances to raise the presumption, as possession under the recovery, or the like, the court will not presume a surrender (t).

And though a recovery, would, under circumstances, be presumed to be good, yet if the presumption is rebutted, by the production of deeds, which shew a defect of title under the recovery, by proving that

(r) Green v. Proud, 1 Mod. 117.

(s) Warren on the demise of Webb. v. Grenville, 2 Stra. 1129. 2. Burr. 1071.

(1) Goodtitle on dem. Bridges v. Duke of Chandos, 2 Burr.

there was not a good tenant to the writ of entry, the presumption will fail (v.)

The general outline of the doctrine of the presumption of the law, as it applies to this subject, is fully explained by Lord Mansfield, in giving judgment in the case of Goodtitle ex dem. Bridges v. Duke of Chandos (w). He said "Where a person has power to suf❝fer a recovery, and thereby bar the estate

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tail, omnia præsumuntur ritè et solemnitèr "acta, until the contrary appears; and it is "reasonable that it should be so. But if "the contrary shall appear, there is an end "of the presumption. This was the case of "the Earl of Suffolk's recovery, upona trial "at bar in this court in Easter Term, 1747. There, the contrary did appear: and the presumption was thereby destroyed. There "were blundering deeds actually produced, "which appeared clearly to be wrong; and "it was manifest, upon the evidence dis"closed, that there was no good tenant to "the præcipe. It was therefore impossible "for the court, in that case, to presume that "there was one."

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"But if a man has power to suffer a recovery, that is a solid and reasonable

(v) Keene ex dem. Earl of Portsmouth v. Earl of Effingham, Stra. 1267.

() 2 Burr. 1971.

"ground for presuming that all was done rightly and regularly; unless something "to the contrary shall appear."

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So, where the freehold is in a trustee "for the tenant in tail himself, and under "his power and direction, it is a reasonable "and just cause for presuming that every "thing was regularly transacted."

"So, where the person, or persons in"terested to object against the validity of a

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recovery have had an opportunity to make objections to it; but, instead of doing so, have acquiesced under it, and not at all disputed its validity; this is a presumption "that all was right and regular, foras"much as they never did object to it."

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"But there can be no presumption of the "nature of evidence, in any case, without something from whence to make it; some

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ground to found the presumption upon. "Whereas here is absolutely nothing from "whence to presume; no sort of ground to build any presumption upon. The single pretence, to any the least ground of presumption in the present case; can be only "this, that no tenant in tail, in remainder, "would suffer a recovery, without first get

ting a surrender of the life-estate, in order "to make it valid and effectual.'

"But even that ground (slight as it is) will "not hold in the case now before us; for it

does not all appear, upon the report of "the judge, that Mr. George Bridges (who "suffered the recovery in question) had the "least intention whatsoever to include those "particular lands in the recovery which he “ suffered, and had a full power in himself "alone, to suffer, of all the rest of the "estate, whereof he was at that time tenant "in tail in possession. He was then in "possession of the manor of Keynsham, "and of other lands in Keynsham sufficient "to answer the general description used in "the recovery, relating to such part of the "recovered estates as lay in Keynsham. "He must probably know, or have been "informed by his counsel or agents, that he "could have no such power over the settled "part, without obtaining a surrender of the

life-estate. He might perhaps be satis"fied, that he could not obtain a surrender of the life-estate in these settled lands: or, he might have attempted to obtain it, and failed in such attempt."

If the mere single fact of the remainder"man in tail suffering a recovery, was alone sufficient to ground a presumption of a surrender of the life-estate, it would be in the power of every remainder-man in "tail to bar the estate-tail, notwithstanding the tenant for life should absolutely refuse to join with him in suffering a reco