Imatges de pàgina
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CHAPTER VIII.

State of France and Spain.

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Persia.

N the subject of the apprehended war between France

and Spain, much has been said and written; but, chiefly going distinctly to show that it would be the extreme of folly in the French government, to determine on hostile measures. We have been considerably gratified with an article in the Journal des Debats in December, the principal points of which shall be presented to our readers.

France, it is said, possesses the right of putting down a state of things in Spain, which keeps France herself in continual dan

ger.

We have no need here to examine the limits and conditions of this right. We shall merely show, that the exercise of this right is very difficult-very hazardous to direct in the particular situation of France with respect to Spain. We set out at first with the principle that every idea of conquest, of aggrandisement, or of territorial indemnity, is out of the question. The pure and noble object which alone can enter into the views of the king's government, is to establish in Spain an order of things. which shall not menace legitimate

1822.

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Portugal. Italy. Russia. Hayti.

monarchies—a desirable end, if it were possible to attain it. But what a responsibility for us, if in choosing wrong our means, we fail of our object; for to fail of an object is in all cases to make it recede farther from our reach, in many to render future success impossible. The continual danger resulting from the situation of Spain might not cease with the present state of things. It would still be necessary that those who overthrew the existing government should substitute another government which might afford us a pledge of tranquillity. Now we are convinced that no human power could, except by means of a protracted military occupation, guarantee a stable and tranquil state of things in Spain. But a military occupation appears to us pregnant with dangers still more pressing, and of a nature far more important.

Suppose the present state of affairs changed by an armed interference, however successful-suppose us at Madrid, surrounded by a victorious army-the king and his august family have been respected by the revolutionists-they have not been dragged to the 2 A

isle

isle of Leon! What government could be established in Spain? It is not forms only which are in question here it is men. There have been in Spain, between the years 1814 and 1820, at least ten complete changes of ministry; there exist from 40 to 50 persons who have successively filled the places of ministers, and who, almost all, have been disgracefully dismissed. Such, especially, was the lot of MM. Pizarro and Garay who acknowledged on all hands, that absolute power ought not to be restored in Spain-that it is morally dead; and who alone excited a certain expectation of stability, resting on their well

known talents. We know that these continual changes were attributed to the inherent defects in absolute power-as it is, moreover, no one wishes to raise its ghost. But three years of constitutional rule have not been less fruitful of change, dictated by dissensions successively created among remarkable men, and their coteries, improperly called parties. There have been nearly two ministers for each year, and without reckoning provisional ministers, ministers ad interim, and ministers refusing to act, we may compute at 30 or 40, the number of men who have sat in council, all in turn scandalised and discredited in public opinion. Now, from whence will you take men invested with that superior moral force which is especially necessary to a government, legislative and restorative? The mi

nisterial matter seems to be exhausted. Every combination has been tried-all classes of citizens have been put to the proof-noblemen of rank, prelates, advocates, journalists, monks, naval

captains, and engineers, figure in the diverse lists of administration.

Spain is arrived at the point to which perpetual changes must conduct every nation delivered over to this dangerous sport. Men are for the moment without moral credit, and authority only inspires ephemeral confidence.

Suppose, however, a French army of 80,000 or 100,000 men master of Spain. What means exist of organizing a government capable of duration, and of securing the future tranquillity of the country, after the return of the liberating army? Where are to be found the elements of such a government?

It is necessary, then, always to recur to a prolonged military occupation. But might not as much security be produced by an army of 30,000 men stationed on the Pyrenées, as by 100,000 men scattered over the whole Peninsula?

This difficulty is, therefore, a very weighty reason in addition to all those which render the mere possibility of a political situation which would force France to make war against Spain a subject to be regretted. We admit, and we always must admit, that the revolutionary violence of some Spaniards may, in spite of all the prudence of the French government, occasion this unfortunate necessity.

But we think that one of the means of abating the violence of the Spaniards would be to refrain from expressing with vehemence a desire forcibly to change in Spain an order of things which might be succeeded by one still worse, from the mere attempt or even bare threat of change. By wishing that Spain should be allowed time to reflect and to com

pose

pose itself, we do not aid the revolutionists of Madrid; on the contrary, we believe that such a proceeding would paralyse their power, for it is founded only upon fears and the illusions of passion: reflection would destroy it, and more rapidly than is probably imagined. We desire, and always shall, that in time, and with the consent of the king, there should arise in Spain, we will not say à party, but a union of men sufficiently powerful and sufficiently skilful to acquire and retain in their hands an authority adequate to effect, without foreign interference or civil war, the modifications which assuredly all enlightened men in Spain wish for, but which they have good reason for not approving of, as long as they are proposed to them in a hostile

manner.

The mass of persons who take a part in politics in Spain is at present composed of three classes; or, more properly speaking, there are in that country three democracies naturally distinct. The first consists of the beneficed clergy and the monks; this class is the least friendly to the existing constitution, but it is not favourable to any other power than its own-it inclines in a great degree towards a republican theocracy.Merchants form the second class probably indifferent as to the political institutions, but decidedly opposed to military occupations. The third class is composed of the liberal nobles, military officers, lawyers, and of all persons who are actively connected with the present state of things. The rest of the nation have no political ideas.

Now, frame wise well-balanced

constitutions for a people thus strange to the manners and social state of other European nations. The best constitution will not put an end to guerillas, or conspiracies, nor to the furious contests of parties.

Some persons, doubtless full of erudition, propose to re-establish the ancient Cortes of Castile and Arragon. This proposition has been favourably received by all that party who are desirous of armed interference; but to induce its abandonment, it is sufficient to point out that the old assemblies. of Cortes (that of Arragon especially) possessed a still more extensive power than their actual successors; and that the famous oath of the Arragonese, "If not, not," is a principle of insurrection far more popular and dangerous than the abstract theories set out in the constitution of Cadiz.

Charters, ancient or modern--theories, good or evil-these things have no power to cure the fever of civil commotion.

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Force-wisdom-these are necessary; but where shall we look for them in a nation agitated-distracted; in a nation which foreign invasion may drive to acts of irremediable fury?

Take the case as we may, any central power established at Madrid by the assistance of foreigners would infallibly be met with opposition in the provinces; and that opposition, in the present moral state of Spain, will never have to look far for men disposed to rush to the field with muskets. on their shoulders.

We will add, too, that we have hopes from the character and from the spirit of the Spanish nation, which did not commence a revolu 2A2

tion

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institutions

tion to establish anti-monarchial to crush the throne and the existing dynasty; but which, having taken up arms to defend its lawful sovereign against a usurper, found itself compelled by events, to create a constitution for itself by way of rallying point a provisional constitution, of which it foresaw the defects, and which it reserved to itself the right of revising. Will the royalists forget that Cadiz was the La Vendée of Spain? Shall we despair of seeing those who defended their legitimate rulers against Bonaparte, correct, of themselves, those excesses which have not originated in their plan of revolution, but to which the coincidence of circumstances only has given birth?

An offensive and defensive alliance has been concluded between Spain and Portugal. This measure was, to Englishmen, obviously unavoidable on the part of the two governments by which it has been adopted; and we may add, that the sense entertained by them of its necessity, is the circumstance which of all others will contribute most to impress Europe with an idea of the valuable consequences that it must produce. Had the Portuguese nation not been alive to the danger resulting to its liberties from an invasion of any part of the peninsula, however remote; or had the Spaniards not by the most earnest instances urged upon their brethren the expediency of a united provision against it, we should have said that neither people was morally capable of encountering the crisis to which it was exposed; and that freedom, not fully appreciated by its partisans, was in both quarters of the

peninsula likely to be soon subverted. This treaty, therefore, is a pledge, not merely of the stipulated scale of exertion on the part of Portugal for the defence of Spain, but of such a thorough understanding on both sides of their position and its difficulties, as well as of the identity of interests which unites the nations, as must communicate to their conjoint efforts a vigour progressive with, and proportioned to, their wants; and a spirit of harmony not liable to disturbance from intrigue or petty jealousy. There is another view to be taken of this treaty, which is to us of decisive importance. If the interests of Spain and Portugal be the same in relation to the passage of the Pyrenées by a foreign army, a truth of such value cannot fail to be recognised by Great Britain, nor can it be void of its effect upon her policy.

With regard to Italy, the influence of England at the congress of Verona has been beneficial to her as well as Spain. Sardinia is to be evacuated by the Austrian troops, by three equal portions, in January, May, and September; while half the same force in Naples is to be immediately withdrawn, and a more moderate contribution for the support of the remainder is to be accepted. The final evacuation of that kingdom is however deferred for the present.

There is certainly much in the aspect of Russia to excite the apprehensions of the other European powers. Ever since the reign of Peter the Great, the aggrandisement of Russia has been steadily advancing. The command of the Baltic, the Euxine, and the Caspian; the complete subjugation and organization of the Cossacks;

the

the acquisition of Courland, and finally the possession of Finland and Poland, have given her a fearful ascendancy and capacitated her for mischief, to which she is unhappily prone; so that we see some reason to inquire with one writer" when Constantinople shall be a Russian port, and Persia a Russian province, what will become of the British empire in India, and on the ocean?"

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The debts of Russia, which the operation of the sinking fund embraces, according to the port on the finances of the empire, delivered by M. Gourief, to the council of Superintendence over the Affairs of Public Credit", are divisible into three heads.

1. Those contracted before the institution of the sinking fund.

2. Those which are the result of loans contracted for the purpose of reducing the amount of paper money.

3. Those which were incurred with a view to provide for the necessities of sundry branches of the administration.

The total of debt, under the first of these divisions, not including that on account of Holland, amounted, before the year 1817, to 11,646,418 roub. metalliq, 204,068,739 assig. The Dutch debt was 50,600,000 florins; and on the 1st of January, 1822, the reductions which had taken place in this mass of debt, by means of the sinking-fund, amounted to about 62,000,000 roubles, assig.; and in ten years a certain portion of the above debt, viz. that which is made payable at stated periods, will have been entirely paid offan event which must add to the sinking-fund 12,000,000 of roubles, while that part of the fund

which is made applicable to the redemption of the perpetual rentes will, with the aid of the sums annually brought in, have redeemed the whole of those rentes in 20 years the sinking-fund is 2 per cent. on the capital of the debt. The second general class of debts, viz. those growing out of loans for the reduction of the paper money, were contracted in 1817 and 1818, in assignats, at 6 per cent., and in 1820, in specie roubles, at 5 per cent., per annum. The sum total of these debts, on the 1st of January, 1822, amounted to 334,840 roubles metallic, and 109,720,471 assigs. Of this, the portion which is redeemable will be paid off likewise in 20 years, leaving only between 11 and 12 millions of perpetual debt, which belongs to some of the public establishments.

The specie loan, negotiated by Messrs. Baring and Hope, amounted to 40 millions; but of this, only between 26 and 27 millions were carried to account of the 30 millions assigned to the diminution of the paper money. Of the above loan there has been already redeemed 701,700 roubles; and the government has, or is in the act of destroying assignats, with the proceeds of it, to the amount of nearly 47 millions of roubles, which will make altogether, of paper extinguished, upwards of 256 millions

of roubles.

The 3d class of debts, those contracted to provide for certain branches of the administration, have amounted, during the four years specified, to 1,305,000 metallic roubles, and and nearly 18,000,000 in assignats; but the government was under the necessity of diverting 13 out of 40 mil

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