For tho' a Ship, by the help of a favourable Wind and Tide, might take a right Course for a little way without any Body fitting at the Stern, yet it can't be fuppofed that it fhould make a Voyage at that rate; nor, I prefume, would any one therefore pretend that a Needle and Compass were not neceffary for Navigation. SECT. II. I. Of the Power and Sufficiency of Prudence to a Vertuous Life. I Have already endeavour'd to represent the Neceffity of this great Cardinal Vertue, the Vertue of Prudence, and I think it appears in a full Light. But yet however 'tis to be remember'd, that this is but one fide of the connection that it has with Vertue. There is also another to be confider'd by him that will do it Juftice, it being no lefs fufficient for the Practice of Vertuc, than neceffary to it. For as we cannot be good and vertuous without it, fo we fhall not fail to be fo with it. This alone will ferve to make us fo, that is, I mean, as an immediate Principle. For tho' all that is good in us muft be finally refolv'd into the Grace of God, preventing us that we may have a good Will, and working with us when we have that good Will, as our Church expreffes it, yet it being one part of the Grace of God to inlighten our Underftandings, and to fix and ftay our Minds in the D 4 Senfe Senfe and Confideration of thofe Things which would move and effectually work upon our Wills, which is true Spiritual Wildom, this will not hinder, but rather imply and infer that the next and immediate Cause of our Goodness and Vertue may be Prudence. And that it actually is fo, and fuch as will, not fail (I need not fay with the Grace of God, for that's included as acting by Prudence) to effect and procure Goodnefs in us, may eafily and with great brevity be made appear upon the foregoing Principles. Thus. Every Man must act as he thinks, that is, as he then thinks when he acts. Which is all one with that common Maxim of the Schools, that the Will follows the laft practical Dictate of the Understanding, which I take to be a clear Prin ciple. For as for that Complaint of Medea, of feeing and approving better things, and doing worfe, that I take to be no Contradiction to this rightly understood, which is only of our Speculative, Univerfal and Habitual Judgment, which indeed we do not always follow. But if any one will fay, that the meaning of that celebrated Paffage is, that what we fee and approve as beft by a practical Knowledge or Judgment, when we confider the thing as cloath'd with all its Circumftances, and fo pronounce our final Sentence upon it, that even that we do not follow, then I deny the Fropofition. And that for this plain Reafon, because this would run us into the confefs'd Abfurdity of willing Evil as Evil. For the avoiding of which we muft fay, that every Man Man acts as he then thinks. And therefore as if he thinks ill. he must act ill, fo if he thinks well he must as neceffarily act well. That is, if he judges that to be beft when he acts, which indeed is fo, then he will alfo chufe and act that very Good which he then pronounc'd to be fuch, fince he cannot go against that his practical Judgment without willing Evil as Evil, which can not be. So then a juft and right sense of things infers a conformity of Practice. Not indeed if it be only Notional and Habitual, because a Man may go off from that again, may form another Judgment after that, and fuch as is contrary to it, and 'tis a Man's laft Judgment like his laft -Will and Teftament, that ftands and takes effect. But if this juft and right Senfe be alfo a prefent and an actual Sepfe, it must needs draw the Will along with it. For the Object of the Will being apparent Good, if that appears to a Man as Good which really is fo at the time of Action, there can be nothing wanting to regulate his Practice. And for this Reafon it is that Goodnefs and Vertue is fo often rèpréfented in Scrip ture by the name of Wisdom, and made the refult and product of a good Judgment, and rectify'd Understanding. A good Understanding have all they that do his Commandments, Pfal.111. A good Understanding (mean one that is pratically Good, actually right in its Judgment of Things at the very time of Action) never fails to make a good? Will, and to fecure a good Choice. To which I further add, That the Reasons Reasons and Arguments for Piety and Goodness are so substantially strong, and the Motives of Religion (especially those which are taken from another World) fo very perfwafive in themselves, that if they are rightly confider'd, duely weigh'd, and the fenfe of them be present and actual upon a Man's Mind, their own proper weight will make them effectual. An Habitual and Dormant Senfe of these Things may indeed consist with an Immoral Life, and fo a Man may hold any Truth in Unrighteoufnefs, but a Present and an Actual Senfe cannot, because the Things are fo momentous and important that they want only to appear as they are. So that in fum, tho' a Man may fin againft Habitual Knowledge, yet there is no finning against Prudence. We may fin indeed against Prudence objective, but there is no finning against Prudence fubjective. That is in plainer words, we may fin against the Laws and Rules of Prudence, or against what Prudence, if we had it, would direct us to; but we cannot poffibly fin against that Prudence which is actually inherent in us, which as 'tis neceffary to Vertue, fo 'tis alfo fufficient to fecure it even under the greatest Temptations, and the very worst of Circumstances. 12. The Scripture affords us a very lively and finfible Reprefentation of this in the Examples of two very Eminent Perfons, Jofeph and Mofes. The Cafe of Jofeph was extraordinary. He was tempted indeed to a common Sin, but with peculiar Circumstances. He was got from the low Condition 4 Condition of a Slave into the Favour of his V and |