fer the funds, books and papers, relating thereto, to the newly nominated agents.

With this requisition of transfer the Bank refused to comply, on the ground, that it was not warranted by law, and that the Bank was alike bound by its duty to Congress and regard for its own safety so to do.

On the 4th of February, the President of the United States communicated this refusal to Congress, denouncing the Bank in unmeasured terms, for attempting to impede and defeat the measures of the administration, usurping the functions of the judicial power, and prescribing to the executive department the manner in which it should execute the trust confided to it by law.

This grave but unfounded accusation, having been duly examined by the Senate, like every other accusation against the Bank from the same source, has been dissipated into thin air. On the 26th of May, the Senate resolved; 1. That the Department of War is not warranted in appointing pension agents in any State or Territory where the Bank of the United States or one of its branches has been established, except when specially authorized by act of Congress. 2. That, no power is conferred by any law upon the department, or Secretary at War, to remove the agency for the payment of pensions, under the act of 7th June, 1832, or the funds, books and papers, connected with that agency, from the Bank of the United States, and to appoint other agents to supersede the Bank in the payment of such pensions. 3. That the act of Congress for the relief of certain officers and soldiers of the Revolution, passed on the 15th May, 1828, and the act supplementary to that act, passed on the 7th June, 1832, are properly acts providing for military pensions. In these positions the minority of the Committee of Ways and Means of the House concurred.

The President had referred this subject to the Attorney General; who, to maintain the authority claimed by the Secretary of War, contends, from the words of the third section of the act of 1832, directing the pay allowed by the act, "to be paid to the officer, &c. at such places and days as the Secretary may direct;" "that as the power to appoint the place of payment is unlimited, the Secretary may appoint a place at which there is no Bank or other pension agent; in which case the power to appoint an agent to pay must, necessarily, exist, or the acknowleged power to appoint a place of payment be defeated. In this class of

cases, the power to appoint a place of payment, is thus seen to include, as incidental to it, the power of appointing an agent to pay. And if that power be possessed, in any one case, it would seem to be possessed in every other; unless, indeed, it can be held, that the same word, in this law, means one thing in reference to one place, and a totally different thing in reference to another-a construction too refined to be readily adopted."

We have, here, a new exposition of the principles which so broadly characterize the present administration, and in all their latitude. Their enormity is equalled only by the absurdity of the conclusions of the Secretary from his assumed premises. On other occasions the Executive contended, that, the right to superintend and direct an agent gives, as an incident, the power to remove him: now, the Executive claims that the power to appoint, is incident to the duty of superintendence. Thus, if the Legislature give to the Executive a supervisory or other connection with any subject, the power to modify it, to do all and every thing in and about it, is immediately obtained as incidental. And thus a right is set up not only to appoint and remove the officers established by the Constitution or created by law, but to create, direct and remove officers, at the will of the Executive.

The monstrosity of this principle becomes obvious, when we carry it into one of the most important departments of the executive functions-the army. As commander-in-chief the President may lawfully designate the times and places at which the army may assemble. But, says the Attorney General, the power to designate the time when, and the place where a thing shall be done, includes the power of determining who and how many shall do it; therefore, the President may not only direct the troops, levied pursuant to law, to rendezvous, but may call forth as many soldiers and officers as he may choose. With such a power and such an Executive, our political liberties would soon be numbered among the relics of lost worlds.

But, the conclusions of the Secretary are not less revolting to reason, than his principles are to the Constitution. The Secretary," he says, "may appoint a place, at which there is no Bank or other pension agent, in which case the power to appoint an agent to pay must, necessarily, exist." Now, we do not see this necessity of executive assumption of power, when the Legislature is half the year in session, and

may supply the omission, real or supposed, in any statutory provision.

But let us, for a single instant, admit the correctness of the Secretary's deduction. That necessity extends, only, to the case supposed; viz. that in which there is no Bank or other pension agent. A case forming an exception to the general rule, and of course, proving the rule; which is, that, where there is a Bank, or other pension agent, the Secretary cannot appoint. But the instant the exception is assumed, it is converted into the rule, and the right claimed to appoint, where, and because, the law has not designated an agent, is tortured into a right, to appoint agents in all places, and especially in fifteen places, where the law had already established them.

The annual appropriation for pensions exceeds four mil lions, and we cannot doubt that the desire to obtain the uncontrolled possession of these millions and to increase the number of dependants was the motive of the Executive, in diverting them into the channels through which they now pass. With the other treasure of the nation, the pension millions were also obtained, save the small sum which remains in the Bank, subject to the disposition of Congress. It is proper, though almost needless, to say, that the views of the Attorney General had the entire concurrence of the President.

435. The Bank has been charged with violating its charter by the issue, for general circulation, of drafts of the branches on the parent Bank. This measure had become indispensable to supply the demand for the Bank paper, which could not be done by any exertion of the President and Cashier, who by law were required to sign the notes of the institution. The measure was not employed until approved by able legal advisers, among whom was the Attorney General of the U. States. When adopted, it was approved at the Treasury Department, and such drafts were received upon the same footing as the notes of the Bank; and their legality has been repeatedly confirmed by the approbation of the Committees of Congress, and by decisions of the Courts of the United States. Mr. Woodbury, the present Secretary, has however, in the fierce spirit of vindictiveness, given order to refuse these drafts in future payments to the United States. How far this measure will be injurious to the Bank we know not; but we are certain it must, cause much unnecessary inconvenience to the public. The great advantage of dealing with the Bank must keep these drafts in demand; but the receivers may be put to

some delay in the use of the funds in their payments, especially to the Government.

436. The Bank has been also charged with the multiplication of its branches with the design of obtaining and extending political influence. This charge is characterized with the most wanton disregard of facts. The principle which has governed the institution upon this, as upon every other subject, is a due regard to its proper interests and the public accommodation.* If the Bank had sought, by multiplying its offices to exert a controlling influence over public sentiment, it would have been furnished a fair apology, in the numerous applications addressed to it from every quarter, to have multiplied them almost ad infinitum. Those applications have been sustained, in many instances by men of the most exalted reputation. Among these may be named, men of all parties, and no small proportion of such as have become the greatest enemies of its preservation and prosperity-Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, General Jackson, Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Cambreleng, Mr. Grundy, Mr. Bell, Mr. Barry, Mr. Benton, &c. &c.

In the last sixteen years there have been seventy-one aplications for the establishment of branches, embracing almost every part of the country. Of these, sixty-three have been rejected. Of the eight which have been granted, at Nashville, Natchez, St. Louis, Mobile, Portland, Burlington, Utica, and Buffalo, two only, at Utica and Burlington, were established by the Bank without an express call from the Legisla tures of the respective States, wherein they were located, or the urgency of the Treasury Department.

In relation to all charges against the Bank of attempting to obtain political influence, we may offer one conclusive observation. All efforts for this purpose have been denied and disproved by all the Committees that have been appointed by Congress to inquire into its proceedings. But let us admit ex gratia that the attempt has been made. The result shows, that, for this purpose it is wholly powerless; and that so far from being able to subject politicians to its wishes, it has been the victim of politicians, and is in imminent danger of destruction because it has refused to become their instrument.

*It is difficult to conceive how it could in any way enlarge the sphere of its influence, by locating a branch where neither the wants of commercial men, or of any other class, required increased banking facilities. The want of borrowers would seem to be as fatal to the spread of its influence, as the want of money to lend.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE JUDGMENT OF CONGRESS UPON THE SEIZURE OF THE PUBLIC TREASURE.

437. When the reasons of the Secretary were communicated to Congress, an effort was made by the executive partisans to divert attention from them to the conduct of the Bank, to put it, and not the Secretary upon trial. An effort was also made, to get the subject from the representatives of the nation into the recess of a committee room; thus to avoid the discussion which unpledged, unbiassed members would give it. These efforts were defeated; and the debate on the report of the Secretary occupied Congress almost exclusively, for nearly two months.

438. Had this subject come before Congress, simply, upon the relation which the law established between them and their fiduciary, no other question than the sufficiency of his reasons, could have possibly arisen; and probably a sharp reprimand, perhaps impeachment, would have attended an or der for the restoration of the deposits. But the far-reaching, all-grasping responsibility of the President, rendered the propriety of his conduct, the chief subject of consideration.

439. The removal of the deposits was ostensibly, peculiarly, a measure of the President, but in truth was that of Mr. Van Buren and the party. Its effect, as its design, was, to extend and confirm that influence which the abuse of the appointing power had created. Upon it the reputation of the President, the hopes of his designated successor, and the preservation of the party were perilled. Nothing, perhaps, could more fully display the extent and the evil of the unconstitu tional influence of the Executive, than the disregard it produced, in Congress, of the remonstrances of the people upon this occasion. The removal of the deposits deranging the currency and impairing commercial confidence, had produced universal distress. The voice of complaint swelled from every part of the country, and the sufferings of the people overcame even party bias. Every mail bore to Washington petitions and remonstrances, condemnatory of the executive measures, and praying Congress, specifically, for relief, by the restora