refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another; and to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding, and the light of that eye is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, in things tending towards any end, is termed Choice.' Concerning Knowledge, 'Behold (saith Moses), I have set before you this day good and evil, life and death. Concerning Will, he addeth immediately, 'Choose life; that is to say, the things that tend to life, them choose... The object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being, as it were, the sundry forms and fashions of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power whether we will be stirred with Affections or no: whereas Actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will's solicitor, and Will is Appetite's controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject; neither is there any other desire termed properly Will but that where Reason and understanding, or the show of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired.'

Hooker proceeds with a discussion of the numerous causes which pervert, enfeeble, and misguide the Will, making it in so many things subservient to the Appetites. But we have quoted enough for our present purpose.

The Will being thus that in us which has the power of determination to do or not to do any mental or corporal act, the question next before us is this: How far is it, in our present condition, actually free? How far is the Will in a state of Liberty or Necessity, as the two opposite ideas of its condition are usually styled?

It is probably a mode of expression liable to misapprehension to make our statements turn much on the freedom or bondage of the Will. Our Article does not so word it.

Our Will exercises its power of choice according to the tastes, feelings, knowledge, and, in a word, apprehension of what is desirable to, and relished by, the human nature of which it is the determining principle. If, therefore, the nature be angelic, the Will determines accordingly. If the nature be corrupt, and in whatever degree it is so, the Will determines and leads the life and thoughts corruptly.

This state, indeed, may be called one of bondage, and is so called in Scripture; but it is not so as being one of blind necessity, but as of inevitable consequence from a depraved condition.

The debate therefore seems more properly to belong to Art. IX., and to result from different views of man's inherent corruption since the fall. And indeed this Article will, on perusal, appear to be a necessary supplement to Art. IX., defining more precisely the helpless condition of fallen man.

The Roman doctrine of original sin as a state of privation only would naturally lead to the Tridentine assertions that man coöperates with grace in preparing himself for justification. On this the remarks of Calvin' are remarkably clear: 'We certainly obey God with a will, but it is with a will which He has formed in us. Those, therefore, who ascribe any proper movement to free will, apart from the grace of God, do nothing else than rend the Holy Spirit. Paul declares, not that a faculty of willing is given to us, but that the will itself is formed in us.' (Phil. ii. 13.)

Finally, Delitzsch2 thus lays down the distinction of which we have treated:

'Since the fall, man is free to choose, and for that reason is accountable. . . He is free to choose, in so far as no foreign will can irresistibly constrain him to will against his own will. He is not free, in so far as within his own personality

'Antidote to Council of Trent.' Tracts, vol. iii. p. 47. 2 Bibl. Psychology,' p. 193.

the sin which has been allowed by himself rules and enslaves his will.'

In the practical work of the ministry a scholastic mode of treating this subject would be usually either unintelligible or repulsive. Yet a fairly accurate illustration of the meaning of this Article may be presented in a popular manner in this way. An appeal may be made grounded on the failure of good resolutions, and the utter breakdown of result from numerous wishes to serve God. The reason may be traced to the will, the determining power, remaining with its old bias. And this brings us to the very root of the matter, the absolute necessity for conversion.

It is an obvious but not an unnecessary caution to give, that before treating on this subject it should be carefully considered what is meant by the will, and in what respect either liberty or bondage is predicated of it.

ARTICLE XI.

Of the Justification of Man.

We are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.

De hominis justificatione.

Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera, et merita nostra, justi coram Deo reputamur. Quare sola fide nos justificari doctrina est saluberrima, ac consolationis plenissima, ut in homilia de justificatione hominis fusius explicatur.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF ARTICLE XI.

The Latin text chiefly requires us to notice the prepositions in the following clauses: for the merit, propter meritum; not for our own works, non propter opera; by faith, per fidem; propter implies the meritorious cause, and per the medium of communication. This is changed in the last clause of the Article into the more direct ablative of the instrument solâ fide.

The first clause of this Article, compared with the Title and with the last clause, gives us this definition of justification: the being accounted righteous.' Since many controversies on this subject (as on others also) turn upon the definition of the terms used, this should be especially noticed.

The eleventh Article of 1552 was more brief than our present form; it was thus expressed: Justification by only

faith (ex solâ fide) in Jesus Christ, in that sense as it is declared in the Homily of Justification, is a most certain and wholesome doctrine for Christian men.'

It is well known that none of the homilies bears or has borne this title. Yet it would seem hardly possible, without disingenuity, to profess doubt which homily is meant. It cannot be seriously maintained that they who wrote both Articles and homilies, or who, in Elizabeth's time, revised and recast this Article, forgot or carelessly miscalled the title of the homily. They evidently chose to speak of the one in question, viz., the homily of The Salvation of Mankind,' by a shorter name, describing its main subject, and identifying it more closely with this Article.

THE CHIEF TOPICS OF ARTICLE XI.

1. The justification of the sinner is the same thing with God accounting him righteous.

2. The meritorious cause of justification is: A-positively, the merit of Christ; B-negatively, not our works or deservings.

3. The instrumental cause of justification in the sinner himself is faith.

4. Nothing is coupled with faith in this peculiar office which it has in justification.

5. The salutary and consoling nature of this doctrine.

The student will consider and carefully compare these five points with Holy Scripture. Especially he will repeatedly study the grand exposition of this doctrine in the Epistle to the Romans, until he has mastered its connection, and can quote and apply it readily.

OBSERVATIONS ON ARTICLE XI.

The doctrine of Justification has of necessity been dealt with more or less by every Christian writer from the first; for the salvation of man is the Gospel itself. The sentiments of writers of all ages might be alleged in a series of quotations,