'These systems may for a time prevail; but their prevalence cannot be permanent or universal.'

Amongst Christians, there are, strictly speaking, only two divisions on this subject, Trinitarians and Unitarians. The former include the vast majority of the Christian world. The Unitarians include persons holding a great variety of opinions, verging downwards from Arianism and Socinianism, with more or less belief in Holy Scripture as a revelation from God, to mere deism.

I. The Unity of God.

It is the object of this work to bring into one focus, as far as possible, the somewhat scattered reading of the theological student. Looking also to the scanty time allowed the aspirant to the ministry of the English Church for acquiring the rudiments of theological science, it is most desirable to give him, as far as possible at this stage of his progress, one treatise only on each main doctrine. And this one treatise ought in each case to be that which has gained the general approval of the Church, and is recognised as a text-book for holy orders. In this point of view, it seems essential to take the guidance of Bishop Pearson under this and the four following articles. The student in divinity will either have read, or is purposing to read, the great work of that prelate on the Creed. But for the sake of completeness, and at the same time not to take the student over superfluous ground, there is subjoined a sketch of such portions of 'Pearson on the Creed' as bear on the present Article.

1. There is but one living and true God,' the passage with which our Article begins, will receive illustration from 'Pearson on the Creed' (Art. I. § 2, 'I believe in God'), the substance of which may be thus given :—

The true notion of God is that of a Being, self-existent, independent of any other, on whom all things else depend, and governing all things.

We are assured of His existence, not by a connate idea (for God has never held us responsible on this score), nor as a

self-evident truth or axiom; but by the necessity of assigning an origin to things having existence, and from the perfect adaptation of means to ends in creation, or the relation of final causes to the efficient cause. Pearson would give weight also to the testimony of conscience, and the universal consent of mankind to the existence of God.

That God is One is deduced first from the primary notion of God, which has been defined as implying independence, and there cannot be two independent beings coexistent and acting together. It further follows from the unity of design and of government in creation. Thus God is One, and not only actually One, but the only possible Supreme. He has an intrinsic and essential singularity.

2. 'Everlasting.'—That God is everlasting will follow from the notion of His self-existence and independence, for He has His existence from none. And it is asserted in numerous passages of Scripture, which need not be here specified.

3. Without body, parts, or passions.'—This doctrine is in several places asserted by Pearson (see the Articles 'Which was conceived' and 'Suffered '), but is not separately handled. It follows from the fundamental notion of the self-existence and independence of God. A body is subject to the laws of space and of limitation, it is divisible and local, it can suffer from other bodies; the whole notion is subversive of the true idea of God. There will be no difficulty in quoting sufficient passages of Scripture under this head.

4. Of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness.'-Pearson deals with the almightiness of God in Art. I. § 4, and Art. VI. § 3, and treats it as involving these main particulars: the absolute power of free-will, the absolute right of possession of all things, the absolute right of using and disposing of all things; further, that God is the source of all power in any creature, that there can be no resistance to His will, and no limit to His power, save that which involves a contradiction, physical, rational, or moral. The infinite wisdom and goodness would follow in like manner from a survey of the divine perfections; and all these attributes will be readily confirmed by Holy Scripture.

5. The Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible.'-These attributes of the Godhead are arranged by Pearson under Art. I. § 5, 'Maker of heaven and earth,' where he shows that heaven and earth must be understood as including all things visible and invisible. (Col. i. 16, &c.) Hence follows the definition 'Everything is either made or not made. Whatsoever is not made is God. Whatsoever is made is not God.'

This creation is further to be conceived of as the bringing all things out of that which had no previous existence, in opposition to ancient fallacies about the eternity of matter. Several passages of Scripture imply this. But it follows from the primary notion of God; for to suppose anything existing independent of God, and coeval with Him, detracts from His independence and self-sufficiency.

In regard of motive, we are to believe that nothing but the goodness of God moved Him to create. No necessity lay upon Him, and His own will was a sufficient cause for the production of all that He willed to exist.

In respect of time, all created things were called into existence at definite times known unto God.

That God is the Preserver of all things follows also from the necessary idea of the dependence of all things upon Him.

II. The Trinity in Unity.

We have already noticed the definition of the term person given in the Augsburg Confession. It may be desirable, before entering on the details of the present section, to pursue that subject somewhat further. Waterland, in his 'Second Defence of Some Queries' (qu. xv.), thus defines the term : 'A single person is an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, he; and not divided nor distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters.' The rationality or intelligence is meant to distinguish a person from an individual of the brute creation, to which he allows personality only in a modified analogous sense. The absence of division is intended to exclude a collective intelligent agent, as an army or a senate.

In this sense the Trinity is not a person. A man, an angel, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, the separated soul, the God-man, are each of them single persons. 'All other persons, save the three divine Persons, are divided and separate from each other in nature, substance, and existence. They do not mutually include and imply each other. . . . But the divine Persons being undivided, and not having any separate existence independent of each other, they cannot be looked upon as substances, but as one substance distinguished into several supposita, or intelligent agents.'

There are compound persons also. Man's soul and body together make a compound person, and yet only one person.

A man does not say we, but I. The God-man is a compound Person, consisting of soul, body, and the Logos. But the result is one Person. 'The same Christ made the world, increased in wisdom, was pierced by a spear.' He is spoken of in Scripture as one I, one He, one Thou, whether with respect to what He is as the Logos, or as having a soul or a body.'

In our discussion of the great doctrines now before us, it will be necessary to anticipate in some measure Articles II. and V.; for we shall have to take these three separate propositions. The Father is God. The Son is God. And the Holy Ghost is God.

The first of these needs no proof. There is no question about it. We pass, therefore, to the second. It must be noted that this is a matter of pure revelation. It is believed as a direct deduction from certain passages; and, if possible, it follows still more certainly from the whole spirit of the New Testament, that the Son is God, and a distinct Person in Himself.

This subject is handled by Pearson (Art. II. §§ 3 & 4, 'His only Son our Lord'). Having spoken of Jesus Christ as the Son of God, Pearson proceeds with the following argument:

1. Jesus Christ had a real existence before His incarnation,

as will appear from the following passages: 'What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where He was before?'

(John vi. 62); 'He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for He was before me' (John i. 15); 'Before Abraham was, I am' (John viii. 58); 'By the Spirit He went, and preached to the spirits in prison. . . . in the days of Noah' (1 Pet. iii. 18-20); 'By whom also He made the worlds' (Heb. i. 11); &c.

2. The pre-existent nature of the Son was not created, but essentially divine, as appears from the following argu

ments.

a. It follows of necessity from the fact of creation being ascribed to Him; for this is absolutely a divine attribute.

b. It follows also from the familiar passage Phil. ii. 6, 7, which, being argued out, shows that the Son was in the form of a servant as soon as He was made man, but that before this He was in the form of God. The word form (uoppǹ), being used in both clauses, applies as really to the divine as to the human nature.

c. Jehovah describes Himself thus, 'I am the First, I also am the Last' (Isa. xlviii. 12). The same is said of the Son (Rev. i. 11).

d. That which in Isaiah vi. is spoken of Jehovah is in John xii. 41 referred to Christ.

e. In several passages Christ is called God, especially Col. ii. 9.

f. In several other places (e.g. Jer. xxiii. 6; Mal. iii. 1; Isa. xl. 3) the name Jehovah is used, and the same is referred in the New Testament to Christ.

Hence we conclude that the Son of God has an essentially divine nature.

3. Next, He has this divine nature not of Himself, but as communicated from the Father.

a. Because of the absolute unity of the divine essence, which will not permit the existence of two divine Persons independently existing.

b. The divine nature being indivisible, the whole and not a part of the Deity must be thus communicated. 'I and the Father are one.' This is the oμoovotov of the Nicene fathers.

4. This communication of the divine essence is of such a