1. Where Plaintiff requires an an swer to an amended bill, he must serv, the Defendant with a copy of such bill indorsed in the form or to the effect set out in the schedule to the Act 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, requiring him to enter an appearance within eight days.

Service of a plain instead of an indorsed copy of such an amended bill is, in effect, an intimation to the Defendant, that no answer is required of him; and subsequent service of an indorsed copy and interrogatories is irregular, and may be set aside on motion by Defendant.

Course which Plaintiff should adopt to correct such an irregularity. Barry v. Croskey (No. 2), 130

3. The non-production of a witness for cross-examination is no ground for a postponement of the hearing, if the affidavit of the witness be withdrawn. Sykes's Trust, 415

4. In order to obtain an inquiry, with a view to a decree for wilful default at a future stage of the suit, the Plaintiff must rest upon one or more specific charges.

The observations in Coope v. Carter (2 D. M. G. 298) were not meant to let in general allegations of default, but to meet the case of specific allegations imperfectly proved at the hearing.

Therefore, where a widow and executrix was empowered by will to carry on testator's trade, did so for a short time, and her co-executors, in answer to an allegation that the book debts had not been got in, stated that the widow had got in some, that they believed the rest were bad, but that they had taken no steps themselves to recover any :-Held, that a sufficient case was not made to justify any inquiry as to wilful default. Massey v. Massey,

728

5. A witness who has made an affidavit may be cross-examined either before one of the examiners of the Court or a special examiner, and in the case of a witness abroad the proper course is to apply for a special examiner.

Time will not be enlarged to allow of affidavits in reply being filed after cross-examination of a witness on the other side. Edwards v. Spaight, 617

6. It is not necessary in any case to have an appearance entered to a revivor order. Hall v. Radcliffe, 765

See PLEADING, 7.

SECURITY FOR COSTS.

794 PRECATORY WORDS.

PRECATORY WORDS. See WILLS, 17.

PRESCRIPTION ACT. See EASEMENTS.

PRIORITY.

See WILLS, 4.

PRISONER-ORDER TO TURN

OVER.

See TIME, COMPUTATION OF.

PRIVILEGE.

See PRODUCTION, 2, 3.

PRODUCTION.

of the power, but there was no allegation that the solicitor who prepared the deed was a party to the fraud-Held, that the alleged fraud was not such as to exclude the instructions given by the Defendant to her solicitor for the preparation of the deed from privilege. The bill was framed for the purpose of setting aside this deed; and among the communications as to which privilege was claimed were letters dated a considerable time before the transaction which the bill sought to set aside, but which the Defendant, in her answer, described as having been written for the purpose of obtaining professional assistance as to, and with a view to, her defence against any claim that the Plaintiff

See CHARITY.

PROCESS OF CONTEMPT. See TIME, COMPUTATION OF.

PRODUCTION.

1. The Court accepts the oath of a Defendant whether documents are relevant; but the Plaintiff has a right to judge for himself whether they will assist his case, and is entitled to the production of all relevant documents, except such as the Court can clearly see to have no bearing on the issue.

Where a Defendant by affidavit admitted documents to relate to the matters in question in the suit, but denied that they tended to prove the Plaintiff's case (an alleged partnership), or that the Plaintiff's name appeared in them-Production ordered, with liberty to seal up money items in the accounts. Mansell v. Feeney (2),

320

2. A bill averred that the Defendant procured the execution of a jointuredeed under a power by pressure, in fraud

however, on the face of the bill and answer, that a contest had previously existed as to matters intimately mixed up with the transaction which the bill sought to set aside-Held, that, under these circumstances, the dates were not sufficient to rebut the privilege claimed.

The Defendant was interrogated as to the instructions giveu to her solicitor for the above-mentioned deed, and also as to communications with reference thereto between herself or any persons on her behalf, and any persons acting on behalf of the grantor of the jointure. In her answer she ignored 66 save as herein and in the schedule hereto appears." By a subsequent clause as to documents generally, she claimed privilege for letters written by and to her solicitor, but in other parts of the schedule as to which privilege was not claimed, were some documents which might satisfy the description of communications with third parties-Held, that the form of the answer was no bar to the privilege claimed. And semble, that, even if there had been no documents mentioned in the schedule free from the

3. Confidential letters, which, after the matters in the suit arose, and with reference thereto, were sent by a Plaintiff resident abroad to his agents in England, to be communicated to his solioitor:-Held, to be privileged.

In order to establish privilege as to letters sent by the agent to the Plaintiff:-Semble, that they must appear to have been sent in consequence of communications from the solicitor.

The same practice applies as to the production of books, whether abroad or in England.

It is not sufficient, in order to avoid production in London, to state that books are in constant use, without stating that they cannot be removed without inconvenience. per v. Gumm,

PROFITS.

See SHIP.

Hoo

PROMOTER'S CONTRACT. See RAILWAY COMPANY, 3.

PUBLIC COMPANY. See FRAUD.

PUBLIC POLICY.

See DIVORCE, 2.

PURCHASE

602

OF ANOTHER

COMPANY'S BUSINESS.

See JOINT STOCK COMPANY, 4, 5.

RAILWAY COMPANY.

1. Two groups of railway companies being respectively the owners of independent conterminous routes agreed to divide the profits of the whole traffic in certain fixed proportions, calculated on the experience of the past course of traffic:—Held, that such an agreement being bonâ fide, was not ultra vires.

Whether a Plaintiff, who, as shareholder in one company, has, with full knowledge, received profits under an agreement between that company and others, can afterwards, on purchasing shares in one of the other companies, parties to the agreement, sustain a bill, on behalf of all shareholders in such company, impeaching the agreement as ultra vires; more especially, if it appear that he is really suing in collusion with one of the companies, parties to the agreement Quære. Hare v. London and North-Western Railway Company,

80

2. The Leeds and Selby Railway Company purchased land and the right of tunnelling under other land, and took a conveyance thereof "according to the true intent and meaning of their Act." Their Act provided, that conveyances should not pass minerals, and that the owners might work minerals under the railway, doing no damage to the railway. The York and North Midland Railway Act contained clauses excluding minerals from their conveyances, and providing that the owners desiring to work minerals under the railway might do so, doing no wilful

damage, and not working in an improper manner, with a proviso, as to minerals under or within forty yards of the line, that twenty-one days notice of such intention should have been given, and that the company should not have elected to purchase the minerals. After the before-mentioned conveyance the Leeds and Selby Railway was sold to the York and North Midland Railway Company under the powers of an Act, which, by sect. 4, repealed the Leeds and Selby Company's Aet, subject to a proviso that all purchases, sales, conveyances, &c., should remain as effectual as if the said Act had not been repealed, and also contained clauses transferring all the contract rights and liabilities of the Leeds and Selby Railway Company to the York and North Midland Railway Company, and a clause (sect. 9) enacting that all the powers, clauses, matters, and things in the York and North Midland Company's Act should-so far as as they were not repealed, altered, varied, or otherwise provided for by this Act-extend to the Leeds and Selby Railway and the lands thereof by this Act agreed to be purchased, to all intents and purposes as if the said railway and lands had been by the York and North Midland Act made part of the York and North Midland undertaking, or as if the said powers, clauses, matters, and things had been expressly enacted in reference to the Leeds and Selby Railway and the lands thereof.

Held-That the original conveyance of the land incorporated the provisions as to minerals of the Leeds and Selby Act; that the 4th section of the Purchase Act transferred the land to the York and North Midland Railway, with the same mutual rights as to the minerals which had existed between the owners and the Leeds und Selby Railway Company, either

by force of the provisions of the Act so incorporated or by the operation of the general rules of law; and that the 9th section of the Purchase Act did not bring the minerals under or near the land conveyed within the operation of the clauses of the York and North Midland Act, the exception in that section being satisfied by the effect of the 4th section.

The Defendant was the owner of minerals under and near to the lands and tunnel comprised in the conveyance to the Leeds and Selby Railway Company, his title being derived under the grantor to the company subsequently to the conveyance to the company. He gave notice of his intention to work pursuant to the provisions of the York and North Midland Act, and the company not having elected to purchase, he claimed to be entitled to work- doing no wilful damage and not working im properly.

On a bill by a company now representing the York and North Midland Railway Company, a perpetual injunction was granted, restraining the Defendant from working such minerals, or any minerals to the support of which the company was entitled, in such manner as to occasion damage to the railway. North-Eastern Railway Company v. Crossland, 565

3. Before the formation of a Company, the Defendant and other landowners, being desirous of obtaining cestain railway communication, signed an agreement with a person acting for the promoters, but described as the agent of the Company, that, if an Act were obtained in either of the two next sessions, they would sell such land as might be required for the railwaw at thirty years purchase.

The bill was lost in the first session, and after an alteration in the course of the line was passed in the second

session:-Held, that the agreement was binding on the landowners, and that it might be specifically performed at the suit of the Company, notwithstanding objections for want of privity, want of consideration, want of mutuality, and vagueness,

After the passing of the Act, the Company-before claiming the benefit of the agreement-served the Defendant with a common notice to treat, and did not formally insist on the agreement until the Defendant had appointed an arbitrator.

The Company subsequently entered under the 85th clause of the Lands Clauses Act: Held, that this clause applied exclusively to compulsory purchases: that the proceedings of the Company assumed the non-existence of any agreement: and on these grounds a bill by the Company and two promoters for specific performance of the agreement was dismissed. Bedford and Cambridge Railway Company v. Stanley,

See COPYHOLDS.

746

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION Аст.

REAL ESTATE-ADMINISTRA

TION.

See PLEADING, 7.

RECITAL,

See MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT, 2.

RECITAL-ERRONEOUS. See WILLS, 15.

RELEASE.

See LEASE.

RE-MARRIAGE.

See DIVORCE, 1.

RENT-COVENANT TO REMIT. See LEASE.

SECURITY FOR COSTS.

A decree was made in several mortgagees' and annuitants' suits directing accounts and enquiries, and appointing a receiver, and authorising him, as the judge should direct, to keep down the interest on the incumbrances and pay the annuities; the costs of the several Plaintiffs to be added to their securities.

The Defendant, the mortgagor,