through the obedience of another, be justified, (that is, treated as though just,) although we are, by confession, guilty.

And hence, although it were shown that a man was, at any particular period of his being, incapable of that degree of virtue which the law of God required, it would neither follow that he was not under obligation to exercise it, nor that he was not responsible for the whole amount of that exercise of it; since, if he have dwarfed his own powers, he is responsible for the result. And, conversely, if God requires this whole amount of virtue, it will not prove that man is now capable of exercising it; but only, that he is either thus capable, or, that he would have been so, if he had used correctly the powers which God gave him.

A few suggestions, respecting the moral relations of habit, will close this discussion.

Some of the most important facts, respecting habit, are the following:

It is found to be the fact, that the repetition of any physical act, at stated periods, and especially after brief intervals, renders the performance of the act easier; it is accomplished in less time, with less effort, with less expense of nervous power, and of mental energy. This is exemplified, every day, in the acquisition of the mechanical arts, and in learning the rudiments of music. And whoever will remark, may easily be convinced, that a great part of our education, physical and intellectual, in so far as it is valuable, consists in the formation of habits.

The same remarks apply, to a very considerable extent, to moral habits.

The repetition of a virtuous act, produces a tendency to continued repetition; the force of opposing motives is les

sened; the power of the will over passion, is more decided; and the act is accomplished with less moral effort. Perhaps we should express the fact truly, by saying, that, by the repetition of virtuous acts, moral power is gained; while, for the performance of the same acts, less moral power is required.

On the contrary, by the repetition of vicious acts, a tendency is created towards such repetition; the power of the passions is increased; the power of opposing forces is diminished; and the resistance to passion requires a greater moral effort; or, as in the contrary of the preceding case, a greater moral effort is required to resist our passions, while the moral power to resist them, is diminished.

Now, the obvious nature of such a tendency, is, to arrive at a fixed and unalterable moral state. Be the fact accounted for as it may, I think that habit has an effect upon the will, such as to establish a tendency towards the impossibility to resist it. Thus, the practice of virtue seems to tend towards rendering a man incapable of vice, and the practice of vice towards rendering a man incapable of virtue. It is common to speak of a man as incapable of meanness; and I think we see men as often, in the same sense, incapable of virtue. And, if I mistake not, we always speak of the one incapacity as an object of praise, and of the other as an object of blame.

If we inquire what are the moral effects of such a condition of our being, I think we shall find them to be as follows:

1. Habit cannot alter the nature of an action, as right or wrong. It can alter neither our relations to our fellowcreatures, nor to God, nor the obligations consequent upon those relations. Hence, the character of the action must remain unaffected,

2. Nor can it alter the guilt or innocence of the action. As he who acts virtuously is entitled to the benefit of virtuous action, among which the tendency to virtuous action is included; so, he who acts viciously, is responsible for all the consequences of vicious action, the corresponding tendency to vicious action also included. The conditions being equal, and he being left to his own free choice, the consequences of either course rest justly upon himself.

The final causes of such a constitution are apparent.

1. It is manifestly and precisely adapted to our present state, when considered as probationary, and capable of moral changes, and terminating in one where moral change is impossible. The constitution under which we are placed, presents us with the apparent paradox of a state of incessant moral change, in which every individual change has a tendency to produce a state that is unchangeable.

2. The fact of such a constitution is, manifestly, intended to present the strongest possible incentives to virtue, and monitions against vice. It teaches us that consequences are attached to every act of both, not only present but future, and, so far as we can see, interminable. As every one can easily estimate the pleasures of vice and the pains of virtue, both in extent and duration; but, as no one, taking into consideration the results of the tendency which each will produce, can estimate the interminable consequences which must arise from either, there is, therefore, hence derived the strongest possible reason why we should always do right, and never do wrong.

And again. It is evident that our capacity for increase in virtue, depends greatly upon the present constitution, in respect to habit. I have remarked, that the effect of the repetition of virtuous action, was to give us greater moral power, while the given action itself required less moral effort.

There, hence, arises, if I may so say, a surplus of moral power, which may be applied to accomplishing greater moral achievements. He who has overcome one evil temper, has acquired moral power to overcome another; and that which was first subdued is kept in subjection without a struggle. He who has formed one habit of virtue practises it, without effort, as a matter of course, or of original impulse ; and the power thus acquired may be applied to the attainment of other and more difficult habits, and the accomplishment of higher and more arduous moral enterprises. He who desires to see the influence of habit illustrated, with great beauty and accuracy, will be gratified by the perusal of "The Hermit of Teneriffe," one of the most delightful allegories to be found in the English language.

The relation between the moral and the intellectual powers, in the moral conditions of our being, may be thus briefly stated:

1. We are created under certain relations to our Creator, and to our fellow-creatures.

2. We are created under certain obligations to our Creator, and our fellow-creatures, in consequence of these relations,— obligations to exercise certain affections, and to maintain courses of action corresponding to those affections.

3. By means of our intellectual powers, we perceive these relations.

4. By means of our moral powers, we become conscious of these obligations.

5. The consciousness of these obligations alone would not always teach us how they were to be discharged: as, for example, the consciousness of our obligations to God would not teach us how God should be worshipped, and so in

various other cases. It is, by the use of the powers of our intellect, that we learn how these moral affections are to be carried into action. The use of the intellect is therefore twofold. First, to discover to us our relations. Secondly, to discover in what manner our obligations are to be discharged.