Mind: A Brief IntroductionOxford University Press, 1 de nov. 2004 - 336 pàgines "The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." One of the world's most eminent thinkers, Searle dismantles these theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. He begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes and Other Disasters"--problems which he returns to throughout the volume, as he illuminates such topics as materialism, consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, mental causation, free will, and the self. The book offers a refreshingly direct and engaging introduction to one of the most intriguing areas of philosophy. |
Continguts
| 1 | |
| 9 | |
2 The Turn to Materialism | 41 |
3 Arguments against Materialism | 83 |
Consciousness and the MindBody Problem | 107 |
The Structure of Consciousness and Neurobiology | 133 |
6 Intentionality | 159 |
7 Mental Causation | 193 |
9 The Unconscious and the Explanation of Behavior | 237 |
10 Perception | 259 |
11 The Self | 279 |
Philosophy and the Scientific WorldView | 301 |
Notes | 305 |
Suggestions for Further Reading | 313 |
Index | 321 |
Name Index | 325 |
Altres edicions - Mostra-ho tot
Frases i termes més freqüents
action answer argument aspectual shape behavior biological body brain processes C-fiber called Cambridge causal causal relations cause chapter Chinese Chinese Room cognitive conception conditions of satisfaction conscious experiences conscious field crossed the Rubicon Descartes determined direction of fit dualism entities exactly example exist explain fact feel first-person folk psychology function causally going human Hume hypothesis idea identity theorists illusion intentional content intentionality irreducible logical material objects materialist mental causation mental phenomena mind-body problem molecules Nagel naïve realism necessary connection neurobiological neurons notion ontological Oxford University Press pain perceive perception personal identity philosophy of mind physical world postulate properties property dualism qualitative question reason reduction rigid designator rule following scious Searle seems sense data sort structure substance substance dualism supervenience suppose theory thing thought tion token Turing machine Turing test unconscious mental
Passatges populars
Pàgina 175 - Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.
Pàgina 93 - Descartes's argument also has the following turned-around version, which to my knowledge he never employed. The existence of the body without the mind is just as conceivable as the existence of the mind without the body. That is, I can conceive of my body doing precisely what it is doing now, inside and out, with complete physical causation of its behavior (including typically self-conscious behavior), but without any of the mental states which I am now experiencing, or any others, for that matter....
Pàgina 21 - I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others.
Pàgina 11 - ... agents in a world that science tells us consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, physical particles.
Pàgina 90 - I carry out the steps in the program) and give back small bunches of symbols (answers to the questions) to those outside the room. I am the computer implementing a program for answering questions in Chinese, but all the same I do not understand a word of Chinese. And this is the point: if I do not understand Chinese solely on the basis of implementing a computer program for understanding Chinese, then neither does any other digital computer solely on that basis, because no digital computer has anything...
Pàgina 9 - The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to the concepts behind the general area of computer science known as distributed and parallel processing.
Pàgina 28 - I have a fear, it must be a fear of something or that something will occur; if I have a desire, it must be a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; if I have an intention, it must be an intention to do something.
Pàgina 136 - ... neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who was able to stimulate a patient's motor neurons directly, to raise the patient's arm, prompting a response from the patient who said. "I didn't do that, you did." This corresponds to the surgeon being able to set u(t) directly, without the patient selecting a control law. Unity At present, I do not just experience the feelings in my fingertips, the pressure of the...
Pàgina 28 - The second intractable feature of the mind is what philosophers and psychologists call 'intentionality', the feature by which our mental states are directed at, or about, or refer to, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than themselves (Searle, 1984, p.
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Communication in Plants: Neuronal Aspects of Plant Life Stefano Mancuso Previsualització limitada - 2006 |
The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity Todd E. Feinberg M.D.,Julian Paul Keenan Previsualització limitada - 2005 |