Still,

very opposite of what the author probably intended. as to the conclusiveness of the reasoning, and the correctness and value of the work as a whole, there has been but one opinion. By all Hopkinsian teachers of theology, it has been used as a text-book, from the time of its publication to the present hour; and distant be the day when it shall lose its place and its authority in our theological schools.

man.

We need not dwell longer on this topic, or go into more particular explanations. Whatever may have been thought and said as to the bearing of some parts of the Hopkinsian system on the question of free-agency, the fact is undeniable that there have been no more strenuous advocates for a full, unembarrassed human freedom, than are to be found among theologians of this class. With united voice they would adopt the language of a venerable Hopkinsian teacher, who once addressed his pupils in the following terms: "We wish you to feel the importance of maintaining steadfastly, and under all circumstances, the unembarrassed free-agency of Whatever else you may deny, be sure that you hold fast to this. Whatever theories you may be led to form, or views of doctrine you may embrace, be sure that you make room for this. Abandon the free, responsible agency of man, and the very foundations of religion and morality are all broken up. The purposes of God become fixed fate; man is converted into a sort of intellectual automaton; the seuse whether of good or ill desert, is but a vulgar prejudice; moral distinctions are obliterated; virtue and vice are but mere names; and there is nought left on which so much as a theory of religion and morality can be based. Again then I say, whatever else you hold or deny, hold fast the free, responsible agency of man."

'Pres. Edwards followed Locke in referring all our mental phenomena to the understanding and the will; ignoring entirely the great central department of the sensibilities. In consequence of this we find him referring, sometimes to the understanding, and sometimes to the will, what clearly belongs to the sensibilities. In this mistake he was followed by most of the earlier Hopkinsian writers.

THE NATURE OF SIN.

There is a difference of opinion on this point, between Hopkinsians and the generality of old-school Calvinists. The latter make two kinds of sin, original and actual, the sin of nature and of practice; whereas the former hold that all sin is of an active nature-an actual transgression of God's holy law. All sin, they say, is, purely or partially, directly or indirectly, voluntary.

By this, however, they do not mean that sin attaches only to our executive volitions and outward actions, but use the term "voluntary" in a much wider sense. Our resolutions, our purposes, our intentions, our preferences, our wishes, our moral affections, our desires-such of them, at least, as are not instinctive are as really voluntary as our executive volitions, and are either holy or sinful, as they conform or not to the standard of God's law.

Nor do these writers understand that sin is altogether of a voluntary character. Many of our sinful affections and actions are in their nature complex, partly intellectual, partly sentient, and but partially voluntary. Take the sin of intemperance, or any form of sensual indulgence. Here are improper thoughts involved, which are intellectual; inflamed appetites, which are sentient; and the choice to gratify them, which is voluntary. And so of fraud, theft, murder, and many other sins. They are of a complex character. When strictly analyzed, although the voluntary element enters into them, and makes them sinful, they are found to be but partially voluntary.1

Many of our mental affections are holy or sinful, because they are, to some extent, under the direction of the will. This is true of our trains of thought. These are so far under the control of the will, that improper thoughts, when indulged, become sinful thoughts. And the same is true of our sentient feelings. We are commanded to be of good cheer, to rejoice

1

Many of our holy affections are in like manner complex. Take repentance for an example. This involves conviction of sin, which is chiefly intellectual ; sorrow for sin, which is sentient; and a turning away from sin, which is voluntary.

in the Lord, and to sympathise with those around us, in their sorrows and joys. The states of mind here indicated are chiefly sentient; but being more or less under the control of the will, they are with propriety enjoined upon us. When duly exhibited, they are right; when otherwise, they are sinful.

These explanations will show how much is intended, when it is said that all sin is, in its nature, active; that it is, purely or partially, directly or indirectly, voluntary. It is not meant that all our sinful affections are purely voluntary; but that into them all the voluntary element enters, so as to make them active, and give them a moral and a sinful character.

In proof that all sin is, in the sense explained, active and voluntary, the following considerations have been urged: 1. All sin is positively prohibited in the scriptures. We are commanded to be holy; we are forbidden to be sinful : "Cease to do evil; learn to do well." This is the substance of all the commands and prohibitions of the Bible. Now though there are various things involved in these commands. and prohibitions, they are all addressed, obviously, to our active natures, and the things required or forbidden imply an exercise of will. The imperative phraseology: Do this, Do that, or Thou shalt not do this, Thou shalt not do that, implies that there is something to be done, or not done; something in which the subject is supposed to be voluntary. Unless, therefore, some form of sin can be pointed out which God has not prohibited, and which cannot with propriety be prohibited, we are bound to believe that all sin is alike in one respect it is, in its nature, active.

2. Not only does God prohibit every form of sin, he uses all proper motives with his sinful creatures, to induce them to forsake their sins and become holy. He invites them, entreats them, pleads and reasons with them, and urges every motive which ought to have influence upon their minds and hearts. Now all this necessarily implies that in sinning and repenting, men are voluntary; that sin is, in its very nature, active. On any other supposition, motives would be quite

out of place, and all attempts at persuasion would be impertinent.

3. In proof of the active nature of sin, an appeal has been made to the testimony of conscience. It is assumed that conscience approves of whatever is holy within us, and condemns what is sinful. But does conscience approve or condemn us, do we feel worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment, for that in which we have had no active concern? Let any person make the experiment. Let him try it on himself, or on another. The African may feel sometimes, perhaps, that his complexion is his misfortune; but endeavor to impress upon him a sense of guilt, and make him feel that he is to blame, and deserving of punishment, for the color of his skin; and see if you can succeed in the undertaking. But why not? The most ignorant African has sense enough to reply: "I did not make the color of my skin. I had no active concern in it. How, then, am I to blame for it?" This is a subject on which the common sense of all men speaks out; and to force a theological dogma, or a philosophical speculation, in opposition to common sense, is to encounter an invincible assailant.

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret. No man ever felt himself blameworthy, no man's conscience ever approved or condemned him, for that in which he was not himself active. It follows, since conscience does condemn us for whatever is morally wrong or sinful within us, that sin, in all its forms and degrees, is active.

4. It is further urged, in proof of the same point, that it is for their deeds only that men are to give an account in the day of judgment. "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad" (2 Cor. v. 10). "Who shall render to every man according to his deeds" (Rom. ii. 6). "Then shall he reward every man according to his works" (Matt. xvi. 27). All persons who believe in a coming judgment suppose that men will be called to an account there for their sins, and for all their sins. But if this be true, then it follows, from the

passages quoted, that all their sins fall under the category of works, deeds; which is but saying that in all their sins they are voluntary and active.

5. The apostle John has given us a definition of sin, in which the same view is presented. "Sin is a transgression of the law." And lest this might not be sufficiently explicit, he tells us, in the same verse, what he means by transgression. It is actively to commit sin. "He that committeth sin transgresseth also the law" (1 John iii. 4). If John understood aright the nature of sin, this surely ought to settle the question.

6. It is still further said, in illustration of the views which have been presented, that as all holy affections are, in essence, love supreme love to God, and impartial, disinterested love to the creatures of God, so all sin may be resolved into selfishness. By selfishness is meant, not that instinctive desire of happiness which is a mere feeling, which no one can or should repress; nor that love of ourselves which we are bound to exercise, as constituting a part of the great whole; nor that care and interest which every one is bound to take in respect to his own proper concerns, without needlessly interfering with those of others; but by selfishness is meant a supreme love of self; a setting up of self above everything else, making it a central point, and estimating other objects as they bear upon this. Selfishness, in this sense, is the opposite of that holy, disinterested love, which is "the bond of perfectness," "the fulfilling of the law," and on which "hang all the law and the prophets," and consequently may be regarded as comprising all sin. As every holy affection may be resolved into love, so envy, avarice, pride, revenge, and every other sinful affection may be resolved into selfishness. But selfishness, certainly, is an active principle. A dormant, passive, inert selfishness is a contradiction in

terms.

The importance of the views here expressed, in regard to the active nature of sin, will more fully appear, as we proceed with this discussion. At present, we turn to a kindred topic of great interest: