overlooks this most important distinction. It is sometimes said that this distinction is not real, but imaginary. But we most unhesitatingly and confidently affirm its reality. The mind easily and instantly distinguishes between the two ideas of certainty and necessity, whenever they are brought before it. Language abundantly recognizes this distinction. The terms and propositions employed to express certainty are not the same as those employed to express necessity. To say " he will do that," is not equivalent to saying "he must do that." To say "an event certainly will take place" is one thing; to say "an event must necessarily take place " is quite another thing. The difference is plain, and is acknowledged and acted upon, by all men in the common intercourse of life. Certainty has sometimes been called "moral, or philosophical necessity;" but President Edwards distinctly says, that it is "improperly so called." It is better to call it by its proper name. It is certainty, and nothing else; as distinguishable from necessity as from uncertainty. Accordingly in our statement of the doctrine of divine decrees, we are careful to use no terms which suggest the idea of necessity, but only those which imply the certainty of future events. And by the certainty of events we mean their simple futurition. We only affirm that, in consequence of what God has purposed to do, it is rendered certain that they will be; not that they must be. Respecting the manner in which they will be brought into existence, whether by a necessitating cause, or otherwise, we here make no affirmation. That point is not included in our statement, but is designedly and carefully excluded from it, and is left to be determined by its own proper evidence. So far as respects the doctrine of decrees, it is an open question whether events which are certain to take place, will, or will not, take place under the law of necessity or of physical causation. A rejector of the doctrine of decrees may believe in the literal and absolute necessity of all future events; while an advocate of the doctrine of decrees may consistently and firmly believe that many future events will not take place necessarily, that is, as the unavoidable effects of a necessitating cause.

We have dwelt upon this point, because it is by recog nizing and emphasizing this manifest distinction between certainty and necessity that the Calvinistic doctrine of the divine purposes is distinguished from all forms of fatalism.

With these remarks, designed to indicate more clearly the meaning and scope of our formal statement of the doctrine under consideration, we now proceed to adduce some of the

II. PROOFS OF THE DOCTrine.

There are single arguments in favor of this doctrine which to our own mind, are, independently of the others, conclusive; and if the cumulative force of all those to be presented be not convincing to our readers, the fault will doubtless be in the defective mode of their presentation, rather than in their intrinsic weakness.

1. Our first argument is derived from the works of creation and providence, or from what God actually does. It is admitted by all theists that whatever God himself really does, he from eternity purposed, or predetermined to do. The only question then is one of fact, viz. Does God, by his creative and providential agency, secure the certainty of whatsoever comes to pass, or render it certain that all events will take place precisely as they do take place? No one will hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative, in respect to a very large class of events. The existence of whatsoever comes to pass as the immediate result of divine agency, without the intervening voluntary agency of any other being, is confessedly rendered certain by what God does. All events which are effects, of which God is the sole efficient cause, are rendered infallibly certain by the causative action of God, and so by the eternal decree which rendered certain that causative action. Here there is no room for any difference of opinion. But are the acts of moral beings, and the events which are the inevitable consequences of such acts, rendered certain by the divine agency? If so, then the doctrine of divine decrees, as we have stated it, is manifestly true. The question may be restricted to the vol untary acts of moral beings, since all events consequent on

such acts are rendered certain by their certainty. Does then God do what renders it certain that moral beings will always act precisely as they do act? In seeking for the true answer to this question, we observe :

(a) That the acts of moral beings are certain, whatever may be the cause or ground of that certainty. Take any past act, for example, Judas's betrayal of Christ. It certainly has taken place, and the event proves that it was certain to take place. Its post-certainty is no greater than its antecertainty. We can conceive of a person looking forward eighteen hundred years, and beforehand knowing its future existence to be certain, just as a person can now look backward eighteen hundred years, and know that its past existence is certain. So of all moral acts which have been, or will be, put forth. The very supposition is, that they will be, and their certainty is a mere will be, a simple futurition.

(b) There must be some cause or ground of the certainty of moral acts, whether we can determine what it is, or not. If any event is certain, there is some reason why it is certain. This is as true of moral acts as of anything else. There certainly is a fact to be accounted for.

(c) It cannot be satisfactorily accounted for unless it be referred to the divine agency. It does not result from chance. No theist will say that moral acts happen to be certain; neither can the certainty of their occurrence be referred to any law of necessity. Mathematical truths are necessarily true. In the very nature of things, the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides of the triangle. But we cannot thus explain the certainty of moral actions. There is in the nature of things no necessity for their existence, and of course none for the certainty of their existence. What imaginable ground of their certainty, then, is there, if the divine agency be excluded? If what God does, does not render their existence certain, it is past our power to conjecture what does render it certain.

(d) We come, then, to the inquiry: What positive evidence is there that the creative and providential agency

of God does render certain the moral acts of his moral creatures? For convenience, we will pursue the inquiry with reference to the moral actions of mankind only. It will, we suppose, be readily conceded by all, that the agency of God extends to the existence of all men, to every part of their natural constitution, and to all the circumstances of their life. He creates them. He gives to them their complex nature, so "fearfully and wonderfully made," with its material and immaterial properties. He appoints the time and place of their birth, and all the conditions under which their life begins, and all the circumstances in which they act from the beginning to the end of their career. Now, is there not in what is thus unhesitatingly referred to the agency of God, a ground of the certainty of the moral actions of men, or the reason why they act as they do? Had God given them a different nature, or caused them to be born at a different time, or in a different country, would not all their actions have been different from what they now are? Take any given moral act: A man takes up arms to aid in suppressing the great rebellion now existing in our country. Manifestly, if God had caused him to be born blind, or had given him a weak and puny or crippled body, he would never have performed that patriotic act. Who cannot look back and specify some particular providential event, but for which the whole after-course of his life would have been very different from what it has been? If, then, it be true that the present moral acts of men would not have been, if the divine agency towards them had not been just what it has been, are we not warranted in saying that it was the divine agency which rendered their present acts certain? Had God constituted and circumstanced them otherwise than he has, they had certainly acted otherwise than as they do; therefore, in constituting and circumstancing them as he has, did he not render it certain that they would act as they do? This view, we think, accords with the practical judgment of men in daily life, and with the conclusions of the ablest mental philosophers. When seeking for an explanation, or reason of human conduct, do

not men ordinarily trace it to their circumstances and their constitutional propensities? Is it not a dictate of that common sense of mankind, which is the soundest philosophy, that men act as they do, because of the nature they possess, and the circumstances in which they act, including in circumstances all outward influences that affect them? Whatever extreme theory of the contingency of moral actions some persons may adopt, even they will betray, in their ordinary dealings with men, a practical conviction that the ground, or occasion of human conduct, ― that which renders it certain, is as stated above. This conclusion of the practical common sense of men, is the same which President Edwards so incontrovertibly established, and which he expressed by the formula that "the Will always is as the greatest apparent good," or "is always determined by the strongest motive." He did not mean that the will, in the literal and proper sense of the word, is necessitated to follow the strongest motive, but that it certainly does. He speaks, indeed, of the necessity of volitions being as they are, but he is careful to say that by their "necessity," he means "nothing different from their certainty." His doctrine is, that there is in motives that which renders volitions certain. But by motives he does not mean exclusively objective motives. At least, he refers the strength of objective motives, in part, to the nature and state of the mind itself. Thus he says: "Things that exist in the view of the mind, have their strength, tendency, or advantage to move or excite the will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view."2 He thus distinctly recognizes the combined influence of objective and subjective motives, as the ground of the "philosophical necessity," that is, the certainty, of all volitions, or of all moral acts. But this motive-influence is what it is, because men are constituted and circumstanced as they are, and

1 Inquiry, Part I. sec. 3. VOL. XIX. No. 74.

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2

Ibid, Part I. sec. 2.