differ in the modes in which they apprehend the truths of religion, the fundamentals of the faith remain the same.

It seems, then, that we shall never reach society except through the individual. A new social order will arise when man demands it, or rather when man is prepared to abandon the 'beggarly elements' of a world whose only criterion of truth is expediency and to guide his path by the only light that can lead him back to the security he seeks. For man is himself the true measure of his world.

REGINALD F. RYND.

THE FUTURE OF ISLAMISM

BEFORE the suppression of the (Turkish) Caliphate by Turkey herself and the expulsion of the dynasty of Osman, in which this dignity had been vested for more than four centuries, if anybody had predicted that such a consummation was impending or that, Turkey having shown herself capable of the 'folly' of despoiling herself of the leadership of Islam, an event of this description could take place without giving rise to a terrible and prolonged crisis in the world of the Faithful, that person would have been put down as a presumptuous meddler in a question of which he understood nothing.

How the Grand National Assembly of Turkey decided, after a debate lasting not more than two sittings, to proclaim the abolition of the Caliphate, this leading to the dispossession of the national dynasty, of the caliphal authority; how the Imperial family, already shorn of the Sultanate, was hurriedly turned out of the country, the deposed Caliph himself being given only a few hours within which to depart-how these and the other acts of the sensational drama enacted last year on the Turkish stage were sprung on an unsuspecting public, is still fresh in the minds of all.

But none of the portentous reactions took place which were expected to follow upon such events: no general upheaval in Islamdom; no clash between the Mussulman sovereigns for the supreme office vacated by Turkey; no division of the Islamic community into conflicting factions; no violent denunciations of Turkey for having disturbed a secular situation accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Faithful; and, what was particularly remarkable, no commotion in Turkey herself, the country directly and principally affected.

On the whole, great moderation and discretion prevailed in the councils of Islam. The only Mussulman ruler to move in the matter of the caliphal succession was the King of the Hedjaz, whose election in family conclave to the vacant post only provoked the scorn and amusement of the other reigning princes. Significantly enough, they neither recognised Hussein as Caliph, nor did they put forward rival claims in their own names. The Wahabi campaign against this potentate is indeed connected with

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the caliphal question, but in the mind of Ibn-es-Seoud it was not. intended, as events have shown, to place him at the head of Islam. Its object was simply to depose Hussein as pretender to the leadership of the Arab world no less than as usurper of the Caliphate and, this having been achieved, to convoke a pan-Islamic congress in view of electing a Caliph enjoying the suffrages of the entire Mussulman community. On the other hand, although Egypt indulged in some vituperation of Turkey, this did not last long, while such other important sections of Islamdom as Afghanistan, Tunisia, India, Java, etc., refrained from all intemperate comment. In Turkey, except for mild protests on the part of a few ecclesiastics and a somewhat more energetic demonstration on the part of one solitary civilian, the country bowed in silence to the change.

The situation created by Turkey, which was considered to be fraught with such tragic possibilities, resolved itself into an anticlimax.

The fact is that, as a result of Turkey's action, the Caliphate as an institution found itself suddenly shorn of its prestige, appearing instead in the light of a prodigious sham, one of those world-shams against which Carlyle waged such strenuous battle. For centuries this sham held together, simply because it had become a habit of mind which no one cared or dared to disturb or even to discuss. Turkey's remarkable initiative in dispossessing herself voluntarily of the Caliphate brought into discussion the whole question of the significance of this institution from the doctrinal and historical points of view. The imposture became evident. Indeed, many people, non-Mussulmans as well as Mussulmans, asked themselves how it had been possible for them to remain so long dupes of what was a manifest fraud. This requires to be explained.

The Caliphate is not an institution of Divine origin. But it sprang up as a logical and indispensable organ of Islamism as originally constituted. It was designed to be the central authority and rallying point of a creed which is even more a political and social code than a religious, or rather it is a code in which these three notions are so intimately and inextricably interwoven as to be indistinguishable from one another. This creed can only exist, strictly speaking, in the shape of a theocratic polity in which Church and State are identical categories. It follows that the boundaries of the State must coincide with the boundaries of the Church, and that the Caliph must reign supreme, in the political as well as the spiritual sense (the latter understood to refer to representation, and not to legislation), throughout an undivided Islamdom. Failing this, the holder of the pontifical office is not a real Caliph.

Now, with so many parts of Islamdom severed from that part of the complexus which was the seat of the Caliphate and constituting separate political entities, most of which had even passed under Christian rule, the institution itself ceased to be a reality. Neither the Damascus, nor the Baghdad, nor the Constantinople, so-called Caliphs had any right to the title, since their authority as sovereigns was nil in the Mussulman lands outside their personal dominions. Thus it becomes apparent that in renouncing the Caliphate Kemalist Turkey gave up what had become since the break-up of the Arab Empire a purely honorific dignity, such advantages as it possessed proceeding from the importance falsely given to it in Western political circles.

The Angora Government has been violently criticised, paradoxically enough by Turkey's enemies, delighted though they were at heart at the turn taken by events, for what they called its stupidity and sectarianism in 'wantonly' despoiling Turkey of the leadership of Islam. 'To deprive the country of the tremendous advantages attaching to the possession of the Caliphate,' say these unexpected advocates of Turkish interests, ' and deeply offend Islamic sentiment by the brutal manner in which the abolition of this dignity was carried out, was nothing less than committing political suicide.'

To these strictures the Angora leaders retort that the secularisation of the Turkish State, which is indispensable if the latter is to enter the ranks of the truly civilised Powers, could not be thoroughly achieved if the Caliphate survived in its midst. For the rest, they contend that it is an egregious mistake to believe that the possession of the pontifical dignity benefited their country or, if it did, that it was in such a form and measure as to compensate her for the incalculable harm, moral and material, of which 1 it was also, and much more evidently, the source to her. Their thesis may be reduced to the following main points.

'The much-vaunted solidarity of Islam,' say they, 'is no less a fiction than the authority of the Caliphate. It never displayed itself in any appreciable measure during the long course of Turkey's struggle with Christendom, though it was prompt enough to assert itself when there was a share to claim of the glory resulting from the triumphs of the unaided Ottoman arms. The allegiance of the Mussulman world to Turkey, as the holder of the caliphal dignity, never exceeded the bounds of a distant and, on the whole, platonic attachment, which found its highest expression in latter times in contributions to the Red Crescent Fund. In her innumerable wars with the European Powers Turkey never received any assistance worth mentioning from any section of the great Mussulman community. On the contrary, in the Great War, in which Turkey joined to save her threatened existence, the ranks

of the enemy were crowded with Mussulmans from India, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, etc., who were well aware of having been recruited for the special purpose of fighting her, and who acquitted themselves of this task showing little or no repugnance for it. The action of Mussulman India in defence of Turkish rights after the Armistice was scarcely sufficient to wipe out the effects of her active contribution to Turkey's defeat. This belated manifestation of Indian goodwill-it was much more an indirect expression of resentment against England, accused of not fulfilling her promises of autonomy, than a display of sympathy with Turkey— was all that the latter ever received in return for the enormous sacrifices made by her in the cause of Islam. Again, the cost in blood and treasure to Turkey of maintaining her authority over Mecca and Medina, the holy cities par excellence of Islam, the possession of which is inseparable from the notion of the Caliphate, but which were in constant revolt against her rule, opened a chronic sore in her side which kept her in a state of perpetual debility, financial and physical, which acted as one of the principal obstacles to her internal development. Finally, what was supposed to be the principal advantage of the possession of the Caliphate, namely, the influence it was considered to procure her in the Mussulman world, proved, on the contrary, to be its greatest disadvantage, because, being taken seriously abroad, the imaginary hegemony with which she was credited caused her to be feared and suspected in many quarters as the holder of a particularly dangerous weapon. It was as the holder of the Caliphate that she incurred, for instance, the terrible hostility with which England pursued her in latter times. Apart from these considerations, and technically speaking, how could Turkey continue to occupy the Caliphate when even the holy cities are no longer in her possession?'

To these statements, which are corroborated by history, should be added the fact that the system of separate Churches, which has been in reality in operation for centuries throughout Islamdom, has given entire satisfaction. The Caliphate having ceased to be in the hands of Turkey, the only Mussulman country recognised by all the others, this institution is doomed. Torn away from its Turkish anchorage, it has become a wreck abandoned to its fate and will sink rapidly into practical oblivion.

In proclaiming their views and causing them to be adopted by the Grand National Assembly as the basis of a new orientation of Turkish policy, the principal feature of which is the separation of Church and State, Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his coadjutors have rendered an inestimable service not only to Turkey, but to Islamdom in its entirety, nay, to the world at large. The liberation of Turkey from the caliphal bonds has hastened the