Money in payment, is legally bound to pay it; and the fact of Receipt is not, therefore, the same Evidence of the title of the Payer, as the fact of payment was, in the other case, of the title of the Receiver.

It is further to be observed that the Receipts given by the Defendant to Abel Jenkins, from the execution of the Deeds of 1781 until his death in 1802, though admitted to be in possession of the Plaintiffs, are not produced; and the suppression of them is Evidence that these Receipts afford inferences unfavourable to the title of the Plaintiffs. The Receipts, after the death of A. Jenkins, state the Interest to have been received from his Executors. But, under the Conveyance of 1781, the Trusts descended to his Heir at Law; and the Receipts, if they had been conformable to the Title, would have expressed that the Interest was paid by the Heir at Law. In the particular case, therefore, the language of the Receipts is not to be relied upon.

But the Defendant further objects, as I have stated, that, admitting Sewell Mansell to have had good Title to make the Conveyance of 1781 to Abel Jenkins, yet the Plaintiffs have now no right of Redemption under it. At Law, the Plaintiffs, or one of them, as owners of the Fee, would have all the Rights incident to the quality of their Estate, and, consequently, the right to redeem the Defendant's Mortgages. But, in Equity, the Plaintiffs, being Trustees, have only such rights of Property as are expressly given to them, or are required for the execution of their Trusts. The Plaintiffs, in the Bill, state that all the Charges and Incumbrances intended to be provided for by the sale of the Estate in 1781, are either extinct by the death of the Annuitants, or have been satisfied from the Rents and Profits, except the Mortgages due to

1826.

JAMES

で。

Βίου.

OWEN

ย.

FLACK

1826.

JAMES

v.

BIOU.

OWEN

70.

FLACK.

the Defendants, and such Charges of the Trustee as may have arisen in the execution of the Trust, without stating that any such Charges have arisen. It is now nearly forty-five years since this Trust was created, and never having yet been executed, and the principal purpose of the Sale answered without it, it must be presumed that the intention of the Trust has long been abandoned by those who are now interested in the Estate, and such persons are not made parties to the Suit in order to sustain the right of Redemption. It might be difficult to make out how the redemption of these Mortgages would be a necessary act in the execution of the power of Sale, if the Trusts subsisted. But, if the Trusts are to be presumed to be determined, and the Plaintiffs have no power of Sale, then; consequently, they can have no power of Redemption, which they could only claim as ancillary to the power of Sale.

Bill dismissed, with Costs.

29th July.

Practice.
Opening
Biddings.

A Purchaser

who has con

VANSITTART v. COLLIER.

A PURCHASER obtained the Order nisi for confirming his Report. Before the Report was actually confirmed he was served with notice of a Motion for opening the Biddings, and nevertheless proceeded to confirm his Report. The Court was now moved to discharge the Order for confirmation, and the Vice-Chancellor diswith a notice of charged it accordingly, on the authority of a Case of Motion to open Watson v. Brickwood, 6th February 1808, with which the Biddings, he had been furnished by Mr. Walker, the Register.

firmed his Re

port nisi, and then is served

cannot confirm
his Report absolutely.

INDEX.

him to set forth the particulars of
the consideration pretended to be
given for it; the answer denied the
allegation, and stated that the bill
of exchange was paid to the de-
fendant in the regular course of his
business as a banker, and that the
consideration did not consist of any
specific sum, but of cash from time
to time drawn out by the payer:
held that this was a sufficient an-
swer, and that it would have been
impertinent in the defendant to set
forth the general banking account.
[Webster v. Threlfall.] - 190
3. A defendant may file a further an-
swer before the master has signed
his report as to the insufficiency of
the first answer. [Wynne v. Jack-
son.]
226
4. A defendant cannot, by answer,
protect himself from answering
fully, on the ground of his being a

the exceptions. [Hodgson v. Butter-
field.]

236
6. Fourteen directors of a joint stock
company, against whom a bill was
filed by a shareholder in the com-
pany for an account and dissolution
of the concern, having filed fourteen
separate answers, with long sche-
dules to each, each of the answers
and schedules being nearly verbatim
the same, and the defendants appear-
ing all by the same solicitor, who
had threatened to ruin the plaintiff
by the costs of the suit; the Court
directed a reference to the Master to
ascertain whether it was necessary

or

expedient, with a view to the de-
fence, that separate answers should
have been filed. [Vansandau v.
Moore.]
509

See COMMISSION, 1.

APPEAL.

purchaser for valuable consideration. No appeal lies to the Court of Chan-

Where a plaintiff takes no exception to
the answer to the original bill, he
cannot take an exception to the
answer to the amended bill, upon
a principle which would have ap-
plied equally to the answer to the
original bill. [Ovey v. Leighton.]

234

5. Exceptions to an answer, contain-
ing in substance, but not verbatim,
the interrogatories not answered will
be overruled; but if the defendant
has submitted to answer, and his
further answer is referred back, he'
is too late to object to the form of

cery from the decisions either of the
Privy Council or of the Commission-
ers under the Acts and Conventions
for indemnifying British subjects for
the confiscation of their property by
the French revolutionary govern-
ment. [Hill v. Reardon.] 431

APPEARANCE.

If a person who is named as a de-
fendant, but has never been served
with a subpoena, or appeared to the
bill, appears by counsel at the hear-
ing and consents to be bound by the