LAMBE . ORTON. CHAN.] [V.C. K. two gentlemen ought to have been parties to the suit. It was admitted that this appointment was unknown to the plaintiff, and that the deed had not been communicated to him until after the institution of the suit; and it was also acknowledged that the sail sppointment contained no assignment of the trust-funis to Messrs. Goatley and Tress, and that there had been no attempt to transfer the same into their names, as the property had continued to be in the name of the Accountant-General. assigned to trustees for the benefit of the parties, the husband having a power of appointing new trustees on a vacancy. The estate became the subject of a suit in Chancery, and the settled fund was brought into court, where it has ever since remained. The survivor of the trustees died, leaving three executors, and the husband assigned his interest for the benefit of his creditors. The wife and the only child of the marriage mortgaged their fund to the plaintiff, who filed his bill to secure the fund; but, being ignorant of the fact that the husband had, since the death His Honour's chief clerk had certified to this sta of the surviving trustee, appointed two new trustees, of things, and the learned V. C. directed the bill to be he omitted to make them parties. The deed appoint-amended by making Messrs. Goatley and Tress èing the new trustees contained no assignment of the fund to them, and, as it remained in court, there was no attempt to transfer it to them. Stuart, V. C. was, however, of opinion, that the bill must be amended by making the two new trustees defendants. The plaintiff appealed, but their Lordships Held (confirming his Honour's decision), that they nothing had been assigned to them. [Lord Justion were necessary parties to the suit. fendants. From this order the plaintiff now appealed. A. E. Millar, for the appellant, contended that the cases showed that where the legal owners of a fund were present, the intermediate trustees were not necessary parties. They had no legal interest whatever, fg TURNER.-If an incumbrancer, aware of the appoint This was an appeal by the plaintiff from the decisionment, had given notice of his lien to the new trustees. of Stuart, V.C., whereby his Honour, being of opinion that certain new trustees of a post-nuptial settlement, made subsequently to the marriage of John Seaman with Georgiana Spencer his wife, were necessary parties to the suit, directed the bill to be amended by adding their names to the list of the defendants. The circumstances were as follows: Mr. and Mrs. Seaman were married previously to the year 1829, and by the post-nuptial settlement, bearing date the 6th March in that year, all the estate and interest of the lady under the will of one Francis Norton, then deceased, were assigned to Messrs. John Smith and Joseph Morse, as trustees, upon trust to pay the dividends and income thereof to Mrs. Seaman during her life, for her separate use, and after her decease to her husband for his life, with remainder in trust for the children of the marriage, in manner therein mentioned. The settlement also contained powers for the appointment of new trustees upon a vacancy occurring, and upon the death of one of the original trustees that power was duly exercised by Mr. Seaman, who appointed a Mr. William Rackham in place of the deceased. Of the two persons then trustees Mr. Rackham was the survivor, and upon his death, no new trustee having been appointed in the meanwhile, the trust devolved upon three gentlemen who were executors of his will. would not that have been good notice? One reas why trustees are made parties to a suit, is for the protection of the trust-funds.] The legal owners here were Mr. Rackham's representatives, for he was the survivor of those to whom the funds had been duly assigned. He referred to Calvert on Parties, 288; Head v. Lord Teynham, 1 Cox Ch. Cas. 57; Malone v. Geraghty, 2 Conn. & Laws. 249, 262. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE.-Was the power of Mr. Seaman to appoint new trustees gone by reason of his bankruptcy? Archibald Smith said that there was no authority to that effect; this was not a power which would vest it the assignees, and the bankruptcy was, in that respect, no more than if the defendant had assigned his life-estate under the settlement. Lord Justice TURNER.-The bill prays for an appointment of new trustees of the fund, and yet the actual trustees were not before the court. A. E. Millar said that the plaintiff waived the part of his prayer. Archibald Smith, for the defendants Mr. Seaman and his family, was not called on. Charles Hall, for Mr. Dyer, the trustee of th creditors' deed, and Haynes, for the representatives of Mr. Rackham, trek no part in the discussion. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said that the order of Stuart, V. C. appeared to him to be quite right, i the bill must be amended. The estate of Mr. Francis Norton had been administered in a suit of Frisk v. Norton in this court, and the whole of the property comprised in the marriage settlement had been brought into court in that suit, and had Lord Justice TURNER said that he agreed that the ever since remained invested, in the name of the Ac-new trustees were necessary parties. In Head v. Lo countant-General. In the course of the year 1835 Mr. Seaman became embarrassed, and assigned all his interest under the settlement to a Mr. Dyer, as a trustee for the benefit of his creditors. There was but one child of the marriage, a daughter, and she subsequently joined Mrs. Seaman in an assignment, by way of mortgage, to the present plaintiff of the trust-funds. The plaintiff by his bill prayed that the trusts of the settlement might be carried into execution by the court; that the interest of the several parties in the trust-funds might be declared and secured; and that new trustees might be appointed in the room of the late Mr. Rackham's executors, whom the plaintiff made defendants to his suit, believing that they were at that time the trustees of the funds. In the course of the proceedings, Mr. Seaman filed an affidavit, stating that the executors of Mr. Rackham were no longer trustees of the fund, as he had, under the authority reserved to him, appointed two gentlemen named Goatley and Tress, to be trustees in place of the two deceased trustees; and he objected that these Teynham, the original trustees of the will, in whom the legal estate was vested, were before the court. B that was not the case in the present suit, and the authority cited was therefore distinguishable from the circumstances here. This objection of Mr. Sesmat had been taken by an affidavit, which he had filed, as the plaintiff had not required any answer from him. Then, with regard to the costs of this appeal, his Lordship thought that the plaintiff should have bee contented with the decision of Sir John Stuart; but as that was not so, he was of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed, the plaintiff paying the costs. Appeal dismissed with costs accordingly. V. C. KINDERSLEY'S COURT. Thursday, Jan. 26. V.C. K.] FORWARD v. EDGINTON-WHITTON v. JENNINGS. W. O. wrote to the executor and trustee of his uncle's | "Dear Uncle,-I wish you would be so good as to "Litchurch, May 27, 1831. "You will please to pay the remaining two-thirds of the personal effects due to me from my late uncle Henry Orton to my uncle George and yourself. "Mr. James Orton, Uttoxeter." Held, that the letter was a valid declaration of trust and assignment of all W. O.'s interest, immediate and expectant, under his uncle's will, to the parties named in the letter. This case came on upon an adjourned summons. The question was, whether a letter written by one of the cestuis que trust under the will of the testator in the suit, to one of the executors and trustees of the will, operated as a declaration of trust and assignment of all the property, both immediate and expectant, to which the writer was entitled under the will. The letter was as follows: "Dear Uncle,-I wish you would be so good as to pay to my cousin John Cope one-third part of the portion of the personal property to which I am entitled from my late uncle Henry Orton's effects. Will oblige. "I am, my dear uncle, 46 Your affectionate nephew, "(Witness) "WILLIAM ORTON. John Riddall. Litchurch, May 27, 1831. "You will please to pay the remaining two-thirds of the personal effects due to me from my late uncle Henry Orton to my uncle George and yourself. "Mr. James Orton, Uttoxeter." James Orton, to whom that letter was written and sent, was the executor and. trustee of the will of the testator Henry Orton. William Orton died in 1831. James Orton paid 100%. to John Cope on account of William's share, as directed by him; but it appeared afterwards that that third share ought to have been then taken as amounting only to 831. James Orton therefore paid George Orton 831., and retained the remaining 831. for himself. The will, however, contained a gift to William Orton of an annuity, which had subsequently ceased, and the funds provided for its payment fallen into possession. The question therefore was, whether these funds, being now apportionable, were affected by the above-stated letter. Baily, Q.C. for the plaintiff. Glasse, Q. C., Bagshawe, Q. C., Bazalgette, Q. C., Webster, Karslake, H. Bagshawe, Cracknall and Colt for other parties. Baily, Q. C. in reply. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I am of opinion, upon the construction of this letter, that it embraces all the property to which William Orton was entitled under the testator's will, whether immediate or expectant. The letter was never revoked. It has been adopted and acted upon by all parties; and it operates, therefore, as a valid declaration of trust and assignment of the property to the parties named in it—including, course, the annuity fund. of [V.C. K. assignment and when it was executed, and knew of it, is not sufficient proof of notice. B. was a married woman at the time of the assignment, and therefore the notice to her, even if proved, would not have been sufficient. This was a petition for the payment out of court of a portion of the personalty of the deceased intestate, whose estate was being administered. It appeared that a Mrs. Baker was one of the next of kin of the intestate, and as such entitled to a share of his property. Mrs. Baker and a Mrs. Edginton were two of the administrators of the estate. Mrs. Baker's share had been assigned by her husband to a person of the name of Wilson; and the question now was, whether proper notice of the assignment at the time when it was made had been given to the representatives of the estate. It appeared from the affidavit of Mr. Wilson, the assignee, that he "believed Mrs. Edginton knew of the assignment, and that Mrs. Baker was in the house at the date of the assignment and when it was executed, and knew of it." J. T. Humphrey for the petitioner. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.--I think that the affidavit in this case does not establish the fact of the required notice. I cannot hold the notice to Mrs. Edginton proved with sufficient distinctness. With regard to Mrs. Baker, even if she had had notice of the assignment in this case, that would not have been good notice, for she was a married woman at the time, under the dominion of her husband, and presumably interested in professing ignorance of the assignment. Wednesday, Feb. 8. Where the defendant has, by his answer upon oath, The plaintiff then moved for an injunction, or for liberty to bring an action to establish his patent. W. W. Cooper for the plaintiff. Glasse, Q.C. (Southgate with him), for the defendant, objected that the plaintiff had not filed any affidavit to show that his invention was original and patent good: (Hill v. Thompson, 3 Mer. 622.) W. W. Cooper in reply.-This was an application for leave to bring an action, and did not require such an affidavit: (Rodgers v. Nowill, 6 Hare, 325.) The patent was admitted to be good, and therefore the affidavit was not necessary. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-In cases of this nature the court will not, in the ordinary course, try the validity of a patent on an application for an injunction. It is, however, competent to the court to try the validity, but that is not usual. The usual course is, to leave what is purely a legal question to be tried by an action at law. When, therefore, a bill has been filed to restrain the use of an invention, and an application is made for an injunction, the court will not ordinarily grant the injunction without an action. Of course it may dismiss the application; but then it can give the plaintiff leave to bring an action, and let the matter stand over. If the application is made at an early stage of the proceedings, of course the whole cause stands over. But the ease is different if it appears, on the answer put in by the defendants on oath, that the patent is invalid, by reason that the invention is not novel, and that the plaintiff derived the notion from information obtained from a servant of the defendant. If that be the case raised by the defendant, it appears to me that the plaintiff, coming here for an injunction or leave to bring an action, is bound to make oath that he is the inventor, and that there is no ground for the defendant's allegation. It is true that there is not, in this case, any positive allegation of fraud; but there is what amounts to an allegation of dealings which may not be strictly fair and right. The defendant, by his answer put in on Nov. 3, states these dealings, and pledges his oath to them. Three months afterwards the plaintiff, without pledging his oath, applies for an injunction or leave to bring an action. I think that is not sufficient; and therefore I shall give the plaintiff leave to file an affidavit, which must, however, be clear and distinct. V. C. STUART'S COURT. Reported by JAMES B. DAVIDSON, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn, Barrister-at-Law. Tuesday, Jan. 24. SLIM v. CROUCHER. Mortgagor and mortgagee-Advance of money upon interest. It was contended on behalf of C. that he had acted in good faith, and in forgetfulness of the former lease; that that no fiduciary relation cxisted between him and the plaintiff: [V.C. S. of the said houses, at a peppercorn rent, from the defendant Croucher. Messrs. Norton thereupon proposed this security to the plaintiff, who agreed to lend Hadson 300%. upon the security of the said houses if an assurance could be obtained from the defendant Croucher that he would grant a lease of the same to Hudson at the nominal rent above mentioned. The defendant Hudson obtained an assurance to the above effect from Croucher, who also wrote a letter in the following terms to Mr. W. H. Norton, one of the aberementioned firm of solicitors, which the defendant Hison delivered to Mr. Norton at Croucher's request. "Post-office, Shadwell, Dec. 7, 1856 "Sir, I am quite agreeable to grant a pepperc lease of ground on which four houses are erected, and situate at Bromley, to Mr. Hudson. "I am, Sir, yours, &c, "J. T. CROUCHER." The ground referred to in this letter was that pin which the four houses above referred to were being built, and then almost completed. On the 19th Jan. 1857 two leases of the said houses, purporting to be for ninety-eight and a-half years respectively from Christmas 1853, were accordingly executed by Croucher to Hudson. The bill alleged that in further pursuance of the said agreement, and on the faith thereof and of the said leases, and in particular on the faith of the aforesaid assurance of the defendant Croucher that he would grant the said leases, the plaintiff, at intervals between the 19th Jan. 1857 and the 2nd May 1857, advanced and lent to the defendant Hudson various sums, amounting in the whole to 3007.; and on the said 2nd May the defendant Hudson executed and delivered to the plaintiff a deed of the same date, purporting to be a mortgage of the said underlease of the houses from Croucher to Hudson, for the purpose of securing the repayment of 300l. and interest. The bill further alleged that the plaintiff agreed to lend the defendant Thomas Hudson the said sum of 300% and did advance him the same on the faith that the defendant John Thomas Croucher could and would grant to him, the defendant Thomas Hudson, the said leases; and that the defendant Thomas Hudson cond and would grant to the said plaintiff a valid security up the said houses for all the residue of the said terms of years. by means of the said underlease expressed to be granted by him as aforesaid; also that, before the said leases were executed, the defendant J. T. Croucher was informed not only by the defendant T. Hudson, but also by the sid Messrs. Norton, Son and Elam, and well knew, that the plaintiff was about to make the said advance of 3004. upas the security of the said leases, and that the plainti would not advance the money without the assursar of the defendant J. T. Croucher that he could and would grant the said leases. Held, that the forgetfulness of C. was no justification, In Aug. 1857 the defendant Hudson got int but that he, having made a misrepresentation to the pecuniary difficulties, and went abroad. The bl plaintiff, must repay to the plaintiff the mortgage-alleged that he was in insolvent circumstances. He money and costs. This was a bill praying for a declaration that the plaintiff Slim was induced to lend to the defendant Thomas Hudson certain sums of money, amounting together to 3004, by fraud, misrepresentation and concealment on the part of the defendants John Thomas Croucher and Thomas Hudson; and that each of the said defendants might be decreed to repay to the plaintiff the said sum of 3007., with interest from the respective times at which it was advanced. was supposed to be in Canada. The plaintiff had since ascertained that the defendant Croucher had in Aug. 1856 granted to the defendant Hudson a lease for ninety-nine years, or some other long term of years, of property which included the se of the said houses in Croucher-place aforesaid, other the premises included in the above-menti leases of the 19th Jan. 1857, which lease was in fail force; and that the defendant Hudson had assigned all the said property to a Mrs. Ince by way of mortIt appeared that in Dec. 1846 the defendant Hud-gage; and that at the date of the said letter of the son, being in want of money, applied to Messrs. Norton, 27th Dec. 1856, as well as when he executed the said Son and Elam, the plaintiff's solicitors, and requested lease of the 19th Jan. 1857, the defendant Croucher to know if any client of theirs would lend him money had no right whatever to grant to the defendant Hadon the mortgage of certain houses in Croucher-place, son the said terms of the 19th Jan. 1857; and that, in the parish of St. Leonards, Middlesex, representing in fact, the said terms of the 19th Jan. 1857 were, at the same time to them that he was entitled to a lease and then were, wholly worthless. V.C. S.] DELEVANTE v. CHILD. [V.C. S. tion summons, though an inquiry might be had, if desired. This was a suit for administration, commenced by summons. The summons had been obtained by the residuary legatee of a testatrix against the executors. The usual decree for accounts had been made, and the cause now came on upon further consideration. The bill alleged, that under the circumstances afore- | Held, that this could not be done upon an administrasaid, the plaintiff was induced to lend the said sum of 3001. by fraud, misrepresentation and concealment on the part of both defendants; that the defendant Croucher knew that the defendant Hudson was desirous of obtaining the leases of the 19th Jan. 1857, for the purpose of getting money upon them; and that he, as owner of the said leases, was about to obtain a loan from the plaintiff upon the security thereof, and that he in manner aforesaid assisted the defendant Hudson in misleading and deceiving the plaintiff, and by means thereof obtaining the plaintiff's money. The bill charged that, under the circumstances aforesaid, the defendant Croucher was bound to repay to the plaintiff the sum of 300l., with interest in manner above mentioned. The case of the defendant Croucher was, that he had granted the second lease to the plaintiff by mistake, and in forgetfulness of the former instrument; and it was argued in his behalf that no fiduciary relation existed between the plaintiff and himself, consequently that there was no case for a court of equity; that the plaintiff's remedy, if any, was a mere claim for a money demand at law; that the representation made to him by the plaintiff was made without any intention to deceive; that he (the defendant Croucher) was no party to the borrowing of the money, but only to the granting of the lease; and that, if the plaintiff had searched the register for Middlesex, he would have found that the property had been previously leased to the defendant Hudson. The chief clerk, by his certificate, found, amongst other things, as follows:-"The testatrix was, in her lifetime, possessed of a leasehold house, 21, Finsburysquare, and of another leasehold house situate in the rear thereof, being 21A, Providence-row, Finsbury, held under one lease; and shortly before her death, by an agreement in writing, dated the 26th March 1857, she contracted to sell to one Mr. Marcus Samuel the house, 21, Finsbury-square, and the furniture therein, for 8501.; and she received 100%. on account of such purchase-money. The defendants, after the death of the testatrix, completed the sale, and received the remainder of the purchase-money, and are charged therewith in the same amount; and they assigned to the said Marcus Samuel the said house, 21, Finsbury-square, and in such assignment they included the house, 21a, Providence-row, but did not receive any consideration or purchase-money for the same in addition to the said sum of 850l.” Bacon, Q.C. and Jessel, for the plaintiff, were proceeding to argue that the defendants, the executors, had been guilty of a breach of trust in selling the second Malins, Q.C. and G. L. Russell were for the plaintiff.-house under the contract to sell one only, and for the They cited Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 476; Partridge same price as was agreed to be given for the one house, v. Usborne, 5 Russ. 216; and were stopped by the when they were stopped by the court. Court. Lewis, Q.C. and Surrage, for the defendant Croucher, cited Evans v. Bicknell, 5 Ves. 174; Clifford v. Brooke, 13 Ves. 131; Sainsbury v. Jones, 2 Beav. 462; S. C. on appeal, 5 Myl. & Cr. 1; Ellis v. Colman, 25 Beav. 662. No motion had been made to vary the chief clerk's certificate. The VICE-CHANCELLOR said that the chief clerk had stated that he found nothing against the defendants. If the plaintiff wished to charge the defendants with a breach of trust, she must file a bill. The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-This is not a case of Nothing was more inconvenient than to try adverse breach of contract at all. This bill is filed against the questions upon an administration summons. Such a defendant Croucher, in order to recover back money question as this could not be decided upon mere oral which the plaintiff has paid in consequence of a sug-pleading at the bar, nor would the court make a decree gestion of what was false and silence as to what was affecting the rights of Mr. Samuel, the purchaser, withtrue on the part of the defendant Croucher. The con-out having him before the court. He (the V. C.) duct of the defendant Croucher in affecting to grant a lease, which was to be made a security to the plaintiff, of four houses, of which he was bound to know he had previously granted a lease, was conduct, to say the least of it, highly improper. The defendant says he did not know that he had not the property, because he forgot that he had demised it before. But the circumstance that he had forgotten the fact is no justification in this case. There was a misrepresentation to the effect that he had the property. He must be held to have known that the plaintiff was parting with his money upon an illusory grant. The case is one within the recognised It has been clearly proved by the plaintiff, and he must therefore have a decree against the defendant Croucher, with the costs of the suit; the money to be paid within one month after service of the decree. doctrine of the court. Tuesday, Jan. 24. DELEVANTE v. CHILD. Practice-Administration summons-Costs. In an administration suit, commenced by summons, the chief clerk certified that the testatrix had contracted to sell a house and furniture for a certain sum; that the executors had completed the contract by assignment, but had included in such assignment another house without any additional consideration. An attempt was made, on the cause coming on for further consideration, to charge the executors with a breach of trust in respect of the latter house: would give the plaintiff leave to take such proceedings as she might be advised with reference to the sale to Samuel; but he must be before the court If the plaintiff were right, she was entitled to the house in specie; if, however, she only sought to charge the defendants with the value of the house in question, he would grant an inquiry. This, however, the plaintiff declined to take. The defendants had filed several affidavits relating to the dealings with the house. Jessel objected to their being read, and to the costs of them being allowed. By the 28th section of Sir G. Turner's Act, the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, the production of affidavits under the general words of that section is limited to matters not directly in issue in the cause. The VICE-CHANCELLOR held that nothing was at issue in a cause commenced by summons, and that the clause in question had virtually become inoperative. It was adapted to the practice before the Chancery Amendment Act. With respect to the affidavits, if the plaintiff could show that wanton expense had been incurred, he would give a direction to the taxing master. Ultimately all parties were allowed their costs out of the fund in court. The costs of the executors were to be taxed as costs between solicitor and client, and those of the plaintiffs, party and party; the defendants having leave to retain a balance found to be due fro them on account of their costs. Greene, Q.C. and Langley were for the defendant V. C. WOOD'S COURT. Reported by W. H. BENNET, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Dec. 7 and 20. THOMPSON T. SHAKESPEARE. Will-Bequest to charity-Mortmain-Uncertainty. A testator by his will bequeathed to his executors 25001. out of his personal estate, to be laid out by them as they should think fit," with the concurrence of the trustee's of Shakespeare's house, already sanctioned by me, in forming a museum at Shakspeare's house in Stratford, and for such other purpose as my said trustees in their discretion shall think fit and desirable for the purpose of giving effect to my wishes: [V.C. W. tion and preservation of the said birthplace as they in their discretion and judgment should think necessary and proper." No such deed as was referred to was, in fact, ever executed by the testator. From the date of this deed to the time of his death considerable sums had been expended by the committee, with the approbation and consent of the testator, in and about the preservation and restoration of Shakespeare's house, and in this way the sum lodged at the Stourbridge and Kidderminster Bank had been expended. A bill was now filed by the trustees to take the opini of the court upon the construction to be put upos bequest of the 25007. contained in the testator's will, and the rentcharge of 60%. per annum on the Langley Prior estate Daniel, Q.C. and Martindale for the pisinti who were the members of the committee ani trustees of Shakespeare's house mentioned in the sove deed. Rolt, Q.C., Sir H. Cairns, Q.C. and H. P. Rocke for the defendants, the trustees and executors of the testator's will. They contended that the bequest was void both upon the ground of uncertainty and under the Statutes of Mortmain. They relied on Morrice v. The Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. 522-539; Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Coll. 396; and Evans v. Kershaw, 5 Cl. & Fin. 111. Daniel in reply. The testator John Shakespeare by his will dated the 17th Nov. 1856, made the following bequest :-"I give to my said trustees and executors out of my personal estate, and before any other legacies, the sum of 2500, to be laid out by them as they shall think fit, with the concurrence of the trustees of Shakespeare's house, already sanctioned by me, in forming a museum at Shakespeare's house in Stratford, and for such other purpose as my said trustees in their discretion shall The VICE-CHANCELLOR took time to consider his think it and desirable for the purpose of giving effect judgment, and on the 20th Dec. said:-It appeared to my wishes. I direct moreover that out of the that a body of gentlemen forming a committee or a rents of the Langley Priory estate, the sum of 30% set of trustees had made themselves owners of the half-yearly be applied to the wages of a keeper or house in which Shakespeare was born, and had done guardian, whose duty it shall be to reside at Stratford-so by means of a public subscription, for the purpose of on-Avon, near Shakespeare's reputed birthplace, attend the visitants, and offer them a bound-up volume, with pen and ink, to inscribe, on certain conditions, such lines in verse or prose as the fancy of each visitant may induce to write, and I will that this half-yearly payment be a rentcharge for ever upon the Langley Priory domain, consisting of the mansion-house and 558 acres, or thereabouts, of land adjoining." more effectually securing relics and property connected with Shakespeare's name. Amongst other things they had a like scheme for obtaining possession of the se in which Shaksepeare was born, isolating it, and taking down the surrounding houses. Part of the idea was cover it with a glass roof, and amongst other things a museum of Shakespearian relics was to be formed and a house provided for a custodian. The scheme was The testator died in June 1859. It appeared that, certainly put forth in the testator's lifetime, and a corprior to the date of his will-viz. on 18th July 1856- respondence took place with him in reference to the the testator executed a deed, whereby, after reciting different objects contemplated. He (the Vice-Cha that he had that day paid into the Stourbridge and cellor), in referring to this correspondence, did not do Kidderminster Bank the sum of 2500, it was (amongst so as leading to an interpretation of the will, b other things) declared that a committee which had as it indicated a little more clearly what the been appointed for the preservation and restoration of object of the will was. There was an indicati the poet Shakespeare's birthplace at Stratford-upon- of opinion by the testator that these objects were sac Avon should apply that sum, or so much thereof as as he approved of and was disposed to aid. He o might be necessary, towards the purchasing and the tributed 2500%, which was expended in the mode warpayment of the expenses incidental to the purchasing, ranted in the deed of the 18th July 1856, and by on any reasonable terms, and of obtaining the con-reference to the trustees the deed was referred to in the veyance of the next adjoining hereditaments on the will. The counsel for the plaintiffs found some di east and north-west sides of the poet's birthplace, to culty as to the ground upon which this bequest shot the end that the same premises might for ever go along, be rested. They had rather taken the plaintiffs and be enjoyed with, and as appurtenant to, Shake- constituting a club of gentlemen holding Shakespeare's speare's birthplace; and after the payment of the pur-house, and that the testator's intention must be taken chase-money and expenses, and the cost and expense to be the forming of a museum in this house, with a of pulling down the same premises to be purcliased, custodian to attend upon the visitors; the museum and inclosing the ground round the birthplace, and of be provided for the 2500l., and the custodian to be restoring the said birthplace to its original state, the remunerated by the annuity or rentcharge of 6 committee were to stand possessed of the residue of the a-year on the Langley Priory estate. Taking it, bow2500l., “upon such trusts, and to and for such pur-ever, in this point of view, it was extremely difficult to poses, as he the said John Shakespeare should by a deed, consider the gift for the museum to be anything whic intended to be prepared and executed by him and the this court had yet recognised as a charity-that is. said parties thereto of the second part, declare and taking the museum by itself. It is quite true that the provide concerning the same." court has gone very far in these matters, and perhaps It was also thereby provided that, in case default the case which had perhaps gone as far as anyt should be made by him in executing the deed or de-them, but not beyond the previous authorities, at the claring the trusts of the residue of the said sum of same time being the most complete and full develop2500l. within six months from the date thereof, that ment of those authorities, was Thompson v. Thompso then the said committee should appropriate and apply. The testator had there provided a sum not exceeding 50 "the residue of the said sum in or towards the restora-a-year for what he called the literary annuitant. It |