ROLLS.]

THE CORPORATION OF THE SONS OF THE CLERGY v. SUTTON.

66

[ROLLS.

with respect to such charity, extend and apply to the | lowing passage in the interpretation clause, which is the income from endowment only;" and then it specifies 66th, and the words are these :-"The expression ‘enwhat is the meaning of, and what is to be done in the dowment' shall mean and include all lands and real case of a donation or bequest: "And no donation estate whatsoever of any tenure, and any charge thereon or bequest unto or in trust for any such or interest therein, and all stocks, funds, moneys, secucharity as last aforesaid, of which no special appli-rities, investments, and personal estate whatsoever, cation or appropriation shall be directed or declared by which shall for the time belong to or be held in trust the donor or testator, and which may legally be applied for any charity, or for all or any of the objects or by the governing or managing body of such charity as purposes thereof." Now this, at first sight, would income in aid of the voluntary subscriptions, shall be appear to be a very startling and extensive meaning to subject to the jurisdiction or control of the said board, be given to the word "endowment," and, if construed or the powers or provisions of this Act, and no portion literally, it would seem wholly to supersede the 62nd of any such donation or bequest as last aforesaid, or of clause; for it is impossible for any institution to possess any voluntary subscription which is now, or shall or any property, or any right to any property whatever, may from time to time be set apart or appropriated that would not be included in this enumeration. Such and invested by the governing or managing body of a thing as a voluntary contribution as contradisthe charity for the purpose of being held and applied tinguished from an "endowment" could not, in this or expended for or to some defined and specific object extended meaning, be said to exist. The instant that or purpose connected with such charity, in pursuance the annual subscription is paid to the treasurer, it is, of any rule or resolution made or adopted by the to use the words of the interpretation clause, "money governing or managing body of such charity, or of any which for the time being belongs to or is held in trust donation or bequest in aid of any fund so set apart or for the charity." Even tables and chairs and other appropriated for any such object or purpose as afore-personal chattels would come within the enumeration said, shall be subject to the direction of the commis- of "personal estate whatsoever." It could not, I think, sioners." That is to say, nobody can deny that a donation have been the object of the Legislature to enact a or bequest would be an endowment, and, if invested, clause, introducing a careful, though obscurely worded, there would be an income from it; but it is especially exception from the operation of the Act, and then four exempted unless there be (to use the words of the Act) clauses later to introduce words in a general interpre"special application or appropriation." That means tion clause wholly negativing the authority of that something specific as distinct from the general purpose 62nd section, and in fact expunging it from the Act. and object of the association. My opinion, therefore, It is the duty of the court, if possible, to reconcile and (founded on the consideration of this clause, taken by give effect to both clauses, and, in my opinion, the itself alone) is, that the word "endowment has only way in which this can be done is to adhere to the reference to an endowment made for some specific pur-interpretation I have already given of the word "enpose or trust. I use the word specific or particular dowment" in the 66th clause, namely, the devotion of purpose or trust advisedly, because it is obvious that a property to a specific and particular trust, and to give gift of a sum of money to the corporation simpliciter, it the same meaning in this 62nd or interpretation or a gift in trust to the corporation, without more, clause; that is, to hold that the meaning of this clause or a gift in trust for the furtherance of the objects and is, not to enact that the possession by any charity of purpose for which the corporation was established, any property of the various kinds here enumerated conwould be one of many different ways of accomplishing stitutes an "endowment," but that property of all the the same end, namely, making a donation to the corpo- classes and characters here specified may be made the ration itself. What words would amount to and con- subject of endowment, in which case the word would stitute a particular and specific trust, so as to bring it properly apply to lands, to money, to every species of within the meaning of the word endowinent according to real and personal property whatsoever, including even the sense in which it appears to me to have been used in personal chattels, provided any such were, either by the this clause, taken alone, it is not necessary for the will of the donor or otherwise, impressed with a parpresent purpose to consider, as no such question arises ticular and specific trust in favour of the charity (which, here and the land in question was paid for by and out of no doubt, might apply to books, or plate, or the like), the general funds of the corporation, voluntarily con- but which interpretation would not fetter the right of tributed for its support. The length of time that the the charity, or the power of its managers, to dispose of investments have lasted cannot, as I have already the property not so devoted, or, to use the words of the stated, alter the character of it. The land remains as statute, as construed by me, not so endowed, to any much a voluntary contribution as if the money which purposes which they might consider necessary for the purchased it had been given to the corporation only purposes of the institution in the due discharge of the twelve months ago, and had been by its managers in-duties attached to them. This would make the disvested in the purchase of the land rather than in the tinction between endowed funds and funds voluntarily purchase of stock, in consequence of their considering contributed, taken by the 62nd clause, plain and unamland to be the more eligible investment. The fact that biguous; and this, although not altogether satisfactory, it is land which was purchased cannot convert the is the only way in which I am able to construe this money invested into an endowment, if the purchase of very obscure statute, and give effect to both its provistock or of Exchequer-bills would not have produced sions. I cannot adopt the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd, that effect. The consequence is, that upon reading of derived from the analogy of suits for the specific perthis clause alone, my opinion is that the word "endow-formance of contracts, where the court has held that it ment," as used in it, does not apply to land purchased would not force a title on a purchaser in cases where by the corporation simply for the purpose of invest- the question on which the title depends is not conment of its funds or savings, and that any other considered clear by the court; first, because the principle struction would be repugnant to the scope and object of those cases-which is, that there exist persons not of this clause. But the difficulty does not cease when this conclusion is arrived at; on the contrary, it is rather increased. The question on this clause arises on the meaning of the word "endowment" as employed in it. The court, therefore, naturally turns to the interpretation clause in this statute, to see if that sheds any light on the meaning of the word "endowment' as used in the Act; and accordingly we find the fol

VOL. XXXV.-No. 880, 0.8.-No. 14, N.S.

before the court, and therefore not bound by the decision, who may afterwards raise the same question—does not, as it appears to me, affect the present case, as the only persons who could hereafter raise this question would be the corporation itself, which is before me, and therefore is bound by my decision; and secondly, and principally, because this is a special case, where both parties have agreed to take the opinion of the

JOHNSTONE v. THE EARL OF HARROWBY.

court on the facts agreed to in that case, and where | her lifetime to claim payment to her of the whole fund, consequently the court is bound to answer the question as she was the sole judge of what would be a sufficient put to it, by expressing its opinion. Neither is the income for her; or at least she was entitled to what court at liberty to evade the question by adopting any was necessary to make up from time to time a sufficient such formula as that which I have occasionally met income, and that could only now be estimated by the sam with in opinions from counsel at the bar, namely, that which would have been required to purchase a Governthe inclination of the court's opinion lies in one direc- ment annuity for her of 60%. They cited Methold v. tion, or words equivalent thereto. The court is bound Turner, 4 De G. & Sm. 249; Rudland v. Crocier, to form and to express its opinion. I have formed 2 De G. & Jo. 143; Cowman v. Harrison, 10 mine, and I declare it to be that the consent of the Hare, 234. Charity Commissioners to this sale is not necessary, and I answer the case accordingly.

Daniel, Q.C. and Prendergast for the defendant, the respondent.

Giffard, Q.C. in reply.

The following authorities were referred to: Crowder v. Clowes, 2 Ves. jun. 449; Day v. Croft, 4 Beav. 561; Cookson v. Hancock, 1 Keen, 817; Earl of Shaftesbury v. Duke of Marlborough, 7 Sim. 237; Leacroft v. Maynard, 1 Ves. jun. 279; Russell v. Dixon, 4 H. of L. Cas. 293; Hunt v. Beech, 5 Madd. 350; Pooley v. Hatton, 1 Bro. C. C. 389, n.; Man v. Fuller, 1 Kay, 725.

[CHAN.

dence was, however, produced of their execution and contents; this evidence consisting, amongst other things, of the affidavit of a professional man setting out extracts from the account-books of a deceased solicitor making charges for preparing the missing deeds. It was contended for the defendant, an unwilling purchaser, that a marketable title to the property could not be given, as these deeds were not produced, and the solicitor's account-books could not be given up to him:

Held (affirming the decision of the M.R.), that there was sufficient secondary evidence of the execution and contents of the missing deeds. Also, that the defendant was not entitled to require the solicitor's account-books to be given up to him.

This was an appeal from a decree of the M.R. The following are the facts of the case :-— In March 1857 the plaintiff was possessed of certain hereditaments and machinery hereinafter mentioned, subject to a mortgage for 40007.

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-The question has been submitted to the court in this special case, whether the legacy of 1000l. given by the second codicil is cumulative or substitutional for the legacy of 500l. bequeathed by the first codicil. Both sides, however, agree that it is cumulative, this being clearly the intention of the testator, and in accordance with the authorities on the subject. Then comes the question whether the legacy of 10007. be payable out of the same fund out of which the legacy of 500l. is payable; or, in other words, In the same month the following agreement was whether the prudent caution which the testator used entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant :as to the Statute of Mortmain in making the first "Memorandum of agreement made and entered into bequest is sufficient to protect the second from the this 25th day of March 1857, between Stephen Mouloperation of the Act? It was held by Wood, V.C. ton, of Bradford, in the county of Wilts, Esq., of the that it was not, but after great consideration I have one part, and Ezekiel Edmonds, of the same place, come to a different conclusion. The intention of the Esq., of the other part. The said Stephen Moulton testator seems to me to have been to make both lega- hereby agrees to sell unto the said Ezekiel Edmonds cies subject to the same restrictions and conditions. the fee-simple and inheritance of all that clothing-mill When he made the first codicil he was well aware of or factory commonly called or known as Staunton Facthe provisions of the Mortmain Act, and was evidently tory, in the parish of Trowbridge, with the watermost anxious that the charity should have the full wheels, steam-engines and such other machinery and benefit of his legacy, and he must have had the same shafting now therein, or in the mills hereinafter menintention when he gave the second legacy, otherwise tioned, together with the mills, workshops, dwellingthe gift must be said to be almost illusory. Although houses, gardens, lands and appurtenances thereto behe does not repeat the words which he used with re-longing or appertaining, at or for the price or sum of ference to the first legacy as to the Mortmain Act, he might reasonably have supposed that they were unneI think that the authorities that have been referred to support the appellant's contention. [Here his Lordship referred to Leacroft v. Maynard and Crowder v. Clowes.] There was no occasion for the testator to have expressed what the law implies, where the legacy was additional as in this case. It was no doubt argued that there was a distinction between this case and the cases relied upon by the appellant, namely, that in those cases the codicil making the second gift contained expressly the words "additional" or "in addition," while in this case there are no such words. During the argument the counsel for the respondent conceded that if there were such words expressed in this case, the general rule would apply, and in such ease both would have been subject to the same incidents, but there surely is no necessity for such express words; and this is a case in which the maxim expressio corum quæ tacite insunt, &c., operates here. For these reasons I am of opinion that the decree of the V.C. ought to be reversed, and that the legacy of 10007. ought to be paid out of the same fund as that out of which the legacy of 500l. is payable. With respect to the question whether legacy duty is payable on the second legacy or not, I am of opinion that it is not, and that the legacy ought to be paid free from duty.

cessary.

Dec. 17 and 19. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Campbell). MOULTON v. EDMONDS. Specific performance-Title-Lost deeds-Secondary evidence-Solicitors' books.

B. possessed in 1797 a fee-simple estate. In 1815 this estate was conveyed to C., who in 1851 agreed to sell it to the defendant. In the conveyance to C. certain deeds were recited alleged to have been executed prior to 1815. The defendant required these deeds, but they could not be found. Secondary evi

62507. sterling. And the said E. Edmonds hereby agrees to purchase the same hereditaments and appurtenances for the said sum of 62501. sterling. The said Stephen Moulton to deduce a good title to the said factory and other hereditaments at his own expense; but the expense of the conveyance and the assignments of terms (if any) to be paid by the said E. Edmonds. The purchase-money to be paid on or before the 15th day of April next, when possession is to be given of the said premises to the said E. Edmonds, all outgoings being cleared by the said J. Moulton up to that time."

This agreement was signed by John Bush, as the agent of the plaintiff'; and by Richard Tarr, as the agent of the defendant.

The plaintiff alleged that immediately after the execution of this agreement a copy was sent to the defendant, who did not in any manner object to the contents, and that he very shortly afterwards inspected the whole of the property agreed to be sold, and made no objection in relation thereto; that also about the same time he attended with a builder to consult about various alterations which he required to be made to adapt the premises to his own purposes; and that subsequently to this attendance the defendant and Mr. Bush had an interview, at which the defendant instructed Mr. Bush to examine into the title of the premises, and if he were satisfied therewith to prepare a deed of conveyance to the defendant; that Mr. Bush accordingly examined the title-deeds which were in the possession of the mortgagee, and having satisfied himself that the plaintiff's title was a good one, informed the defendant to that effect; that by the hereinbefore mentioned mortgage it was provided that the principal sum of 4000l. thereby secured should remain on mortgage until the 25th March1858, and Mr. Bush inquired of the defendant whether he intended to pay off the mortgage, who said that he did not; that Mr. Bush prepared a draft of conveyance accordingly and delivered it to the defendant to look over; that he had made

MOULTON v. EDMONDS.

CHAN.]

[CHAN.

2. An account of the rents and profits of the said premises received by the plaintiff, or by any person or persons by or for his order or use, since the 15th April 1857.

executing and delivering a proper conveyance of the premises to the defendant, or to whom he should appoint, that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff what should be certified to be due to him after such deductions as aforesaid, with liberty to apply.

several applications for the return of the draft, but the defendant had not complied with such applications; that on the 27th May 1855 Mr. Bush and the defendant had an interview at which the defendant raised some objections to completing the purchase, And it was ordered that what should be found comalleging that part of the machinery had been removed ing on account of the said rents and profits should be from the premises, and that there were dilapidations | deducted from the amount of the said purchase-money, to a greater extent than he had expected; the defendant interest and such last-mentioned costs, when so comsubsequently at the same interview withdrew such objec-pleted and taxed as aforesaid. And upon the plaintif tions, and promised to complete the purchase forthwith. The defendant, on the 2nd June 1858, wrote to Mr. Bush as follows:-"With regard to the building plant, gear, shafting, &c., removed from Staverton, I consider that it is nothing but fair and just that an allowance adequate to their value should be made. From this order the defendant now appealed, objectMy instructions to Mr. Tarr were most precise and ing to the title, on the ground that a proper commence particular that the purchase was to include "all that ment of the title sixty years ago was not shown, and Nokes had sold to Mr. Moulton, except the stocks and also on the ground that certain deeds were not progigs; I could not of course tell what was then in the duced which he conceived to be necessary to the title. premises. One of the steam-engines might have been The plaintiff alleged that he was able to show that removed, and I was therefore most particular in insert-John Jones was possessed of the property in fee-simple ing the clause referred to in the agreement which I drew out, which was the only authority I ever gave him on the subject, except as to the increase of the price from 6000l. to 6250%. On receiving the agreement prepared by you, I observed the substitution of another clause in the place of the one I had prepared, and came immediately from London, where I was then staying, to see Staverton, and on finding that a portion of the shafting, gearing and buildings had been removed, I immediately called on you, as you remember, to say that I should expect the value of these things to be allowed for by Mr. Moulton. I can safely say that I would not have named so much by 5001. for the property had I known of the removal, and it will require a much larger sum to replace them. If Mr. Moulton will make an adequate allowance for the things removed I shall be happy to proceed with the purchase; if not, I must decline to ratify the agreement made by Mr. Tarr, being wholly unauthorised by me.'

On the 3rd June 1857 Mr. Bush wrote to the defendant, stating that he had seen Mr. Moulton, the plaintiff, on the subject of his letter, and that he had requested him to inform the defendant that he should hold him to his contract for the purchase of Staverton, and make no allowance whatever; that when Mr. Tarr first applied to him he expressly told him what his price was for the property as it then stood, and that Mr. Tarr had told him that in making the contract he did not in the least degree step beyond his authority, and after the agreement was signed the defendant had confirmed the act as his own, and had offered to sell the property to other parties.

There was much more correspondence, but it is not necessary to state it here. The M. R. was of opinion that although Mr. Tarr had exceeded his authority, the defendant by his subsequent acts had confirmed the agreement. A decree for specific performance was made in case the plaintiff could make out a good title to the estate, and for that purpose the M. R. directed that an inquiry should be made, the defendant being ordered to pay the plaintiff his costs. The chief clerk having certified that a good title could be made, an application was made in chambers for the defendant, that so much of the certificate of the chief clerk as stated that a good title could be made to the premises comprised in the agreement dated the 25th March 1857 might be varied; which application was adjourned to be heard in court.

On the 25th July 1859 the M.R. ordered that the defendant should pay the plaintiff his costs, and that the following accounts should be taken :

1. An account of interest at the rate of 41. per cent. per annum on the sum of 6250%, the purchase-moneys of the premises comprised in the said agreement, from the 15th April 1857.

iu 1798, being more than sixty years ago, and that be could deduce a good title from Jones to himself, which he was able to transfer to the defendant. The defendant did not dispute the seisin of John Jones, but he stated that in a deed executed in 1815, and set out in the abstract, there was a recital of some other deeds which were executed before the sixty years. It was contended for the vendor that it was not necessary for him to go further back than sixty years, there being sufficient secondary evidence of the proper execution of these prior deeds. Secondary evidence was produced of the execution and contents of these deeds, and amongst other evidence an abstract from the books of Mr. Clatterbuck, a deceased solicitor, was produced, in which charges were made for preparing some of these deeds. It was contended for the defendant that he had a right to the possession of these books, or a covenant for their production by the holder, to enable him to show a good title to any future purchaser.

The other objection raised by the defendant w that supposing John Jones to have had a good title the vendor did not show a good title from John Jones to himself. There being a recital of a mortgage of the premises by Jones and a reconveyance to him by the mortgagees, neither of which deeds were forthcoming, it was shown that every search had been made for these deeds without success, and an abstract of the title examined by the conveyancers in 1815 was produced, in which the lost deeds were abstracted. R. Palmer, Q.C., Selwyn, Q.C. and Lonsdale sp peared for the appellant, the defendant. Follett, Q.C., Southgate and Cooper for the respo dent, the plaintiff.

Palmer, Q.C. in reply.

The following authorities were referred to:-Pross v. Watts, 6 Madd. 59; Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 252; Collier v. Finch, 5 H. of L. Cas. 228; Bryant v Bush, 4 Russ. 1; Roberts v. Croft, 24 Bear. 223; Doe v. Fooks, 3 Ad. & Ell. 227; Alexander v. Cras lie, 1 Jo. & La. 666; Cooper v. Emery, 1 Phill. 383.

from

the

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-This is an appeal: an order of the M. R., by which he refused to vary: certificate of his chief clerk, that a good title can be made to the premises comprised in the agreement dated the 25th March 1857. In my opinion the evidence adduced does not support the appeal. The defendant admits that he is an unwilling purchaser, but neverthe less he has a right to insist upon a title for sixty years, and not only a safe holding title (which he hardly denies has been offered to him), but a marketable title capable of strict proof, enabling him to resell whenvendor, alleges that he shows one John Jones to have ever he may be minded so to do. The plaintiff, the been seised in fee of the property in 1798, which is more than sixty years ago, and that a

good

title

both

CHAN.]

NELSON v. SEAMAN.

[CHAN.

period during which a title must be proved, although
attempts have been made by a very distinguished per-
son to abridge this term. I am of opinion that we
have sufficient secondary evidence of those deeds.
During the argument in opening the appellant's case,
there was no argument that the inquiry should go
back to the chief clerk. Subsequently, however, on
the part of the respondent, the most ample evidence
was adduced of the search among the papers of all
persons who could reasonably be supposed to have the

none of them can be found, although there is extant,
and there has been shown to the purchaser, the ab-
stract of the title made out and examined by the con-
veyancers in 1815, from which abstract the deed of
1815 is drawn, and in which abstract these missing
deeds are abstracted. The loss of the deeds being
proved, the question therefore arises, whether there is
not sufficient secondary evidence of their having been
executed, and of their contents. The recital in a deed
is, generally speaking, evidence only between the parties
to the deed. There are various authorities cited before
me to show that in a case of this sort the recital in a
deed has been received as a secondary evidence of the
recited deed. There has been an enjoyment for forty-
four years under these deeds, so that I shall presume they
were executed. The chief peril pointed out by the
appellants' counsel for the purchaser is, that they
might have been placed as security for money bor-
rowed by way of equitable mortgage, and that the
equitable mortgagee may hereafter start up and claim
a charge upon the premises against the purchaser, who
by the recitals must be supposed to have had notice,
which deprived him of his advantage of being clothed
with the legal estate; but I must say that this peril
seems to me to be imaginary. Forty-four years have
elapsed since there could have been any such fraudulent
deposit by way of equitable mortgage; and, if such
equitable mortgagee should now start up, he would
have formidable difficulties to encounter in explaining
his laches, and in overcoming the Statute of Limita-
tions. Particular stress was laid on the non-produc-
tion of the will, which is mentioned in the deed of
1815; but although there was this sweeping requisi-
tion after the delivery of the abstract for the produc-
tion of all the deeds, wills and other documents
recited or referred to in the deed of 1815, why was the
will never asked for or looked at when before the chief
clerk? I make no doubt that, if it had been asked for,
it would have been obtained and produced from
Doctors'-commons. Since 1815, when the legal and
equitable estate vested in the plaintiff, there is a regular
deduction of title down to the present day. This
would not be enough without going further than that;
but I think there is sufficient evidence to show that
the estate was vested in John Jones in 1798, so as to
make a title such as the purchaser was bound to
accept, and that will prevent the possibility of a pur-
chaser attempting to evade by such objections. This
case shows the necessity of such a Bill as that lately
brought into the House of Commons with so much
ability by Sir Hugh Cairns, and I trust that another
Bill upon the same principles will speedily be brought
forward. In the mean time this appeal must be dis-
missed with costs.

legal and equitable is deduced from John Jones to him which he is ready to make over to the defendant the purchaser. The seisin in John Jones is evidenced by his occupation of the premises-by his entering in 1798 into a contract to erect a mill, which mill was erected and occupied by him-by his having in March 1799 redeemed the land-tax charged on the premises, and by the uninterrupted enjoyment ever since of those who claim under him. This seisin is not in question by the purchaser, who allows that it would be unassailable were it not that, in a deed exe-possession of those deeds if they were executed, and cuted in 1815, and set out in the abstract, there is a recital of some other deeds respecting the premises, alleged to have been executed before the sixty years. Other deeds show that, by mesne conveyance, this property came to John Jones; but the deeds so recited are not produced, and a controversy arose as to whether it was necessary to produce or to prove the execution of the deeds, which were never in the possession of the vendor. The vendor's counsel contend that it was not necessary for him to go further back than sixty years; for if it were, by reason of the silence of a holder, it might be necessary to go back to deeds more ancient. Perhaps, as to the earlier deeds, the test is, whether the recited deeds cast reasonable suspicion on the title; but, in the present case, there is sufficient secondary evidence of the execution of these deeds, and of their contents, subject to this objection, which was strongly pressed, that after this secondary evidence-which consisted of the affidavit of a professional man, and that the affidavit set out extracts from the account-books of a deceased solicitor, making charges for preparing the deeds, and for attending the execution of such deeds—an objection was founded upon the following supposed canon of law, that to make out a marketable title all the evidence must be such as may be carried into the market and show a title such as may be immediately transferred from buyer to buyer. Here it is said the solicitor's books referred to in the affidavit cannot be handed over with the documents mentioned in the abstract, and that therefore a marketable title is not made out. While the writings referred to in the affidavit are in any way publici juris, it was conceded that the objection would not, hold; but it was urged that a purchaser would have no right to claim possession or inspection of the solicitor's books relied upon, and he would be in no situation to make out a marketable title to another purchaser. No authority whatever was cited for this supposed requirement, and, if sound, it would be clearly applicable to secondary evidence of deeds executed within any time, and would render lands unsaleable wherever by an accidental fire recent deeds conveying property had been destroyed. It is the established practice of conveyancers to consider pedigrees proved by extracts entered into family bibles, and entries in surgeons books, which are not handed over with the documents, and identity of premises is proved by maps, which are not handed over to the purchaser. If such objections are to be held to be valid, the transfer of real property in England would not only be difficult, but impossible in some cases. The next objection most strenuously relied upon was, that the abstract did not properly show the deduction of title from John Jones, and that the deed recites certain deeds by which the premises in question were mortgaged by John Jones, and were reconveyed to him by the mortgagees; such deeds have not been produced, and are not forthcoming. The vendor's counsel first relied upon the new Statute of Limitations, upon which no claim could be made more than twenty years after the right has accrued; and here there has been undisturbed enjoyment since 1815; and though I do not think the new Statute of Limitations any way abridges the sixty years, where there are exceptions by reason of infancy and other disabilities, there the estimate of the life of man is still to be regarded as measuring the Certain interests under a will were upon a marri

Lonsdale.-Perhaps, my Lord, my friends on the other side will have no objection to make affidavit, showing whence the abstract came.

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-You may enter into any negotiations you think fit, but I have simply to dismiss the appeal.

Tuesday, Jan. 24.
(Before the LORDS JUSTICES.)
NELSON v. SEAMAN.

Practice-Parties-Fund in court-Trustees.