Re CANT'S ESTATE. I [CHAN. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE.-Independently of the point of practice mentioned by the Lord Justice, I have great doubts as to the law, but none as to the good sense, which is in accordance with the judgments just delivered, and which disposes of the matter. CHAN.] his intention that regard should be had to what they intention must govern, and in the present case it apshould receive during his life, and that his three chil- pears to have been the intention of the testator that dren should receive equally. It was argued that the the children were to take their legacies absolutely trusts of the sum of 2000l. advanced on Haim's mar-without reference to any other provision. I am therefore riage were not the same as those of the residue. But of opinion that the gift of 2000l. must be taken in they do not by any means vary so much as to prevent ademption from Haim's share of the residue. There an ademption. In giving a life-interest to his wife he must be a supplemental bill, as this question has arisen did nothing more than he might be expected to do if between co-plaintiffs and minors being interested. This he married after his father's death. Nor can any in-court has no jurisdiction to make an order in the present jury be done to the children, as they are as well pro- state of the record. vided for under the settlement as under the will. now come to the question, whether, there being also a legacy given to Haim by the will, the ademption should take place out of the legacy or out of the residue. Instead of ademption this might more properly be called substitution. The question then is, for what is this sum advanced on the son's marriage to be substituted? I say that which it most nearly resembles. The residue is almost homogeneous with the settled money, the trusts of both are almost the same, whereas the legacy of 3000l. he was to receive three months after his father's death for his own absolute use and benefit. Great difficulty would arise in effecting the substitution if the ademption were to take place from the legacy. For of how much of the legacy was it to be an ademption? Not of the whole amount, for the settlement money is only for his life, and is not an equivalent for that which is his own absolutely. The intention of the testator may therefore be presumed to be that Ham should receive the whole of the legacy, and that the advance on his marriage is part of the provision contemplated by the residuary gift. I am of opinion, therefore, that the 20001. given to Haim on his marriage must be taken as a portion of his share of the residue of the testator's property. Lord Justice TURNER, after stating the will and the settlement, said:-It is admitted that either the legacy of 3000l., or Haim's one-third share of the residue, ought to be adeemed by the portion settled on his marriage, and it is this question that we have now to decide. It was contended in the argument that all doubt on the subject is removed by the decision in the case of Thynne v. Lord Glengall, the argument being that satisfaction and ademption are on the same footing in this court by reason of the doctrine against double portions. I think the principle is the same in both cases, viz., that a parent does not intend to perform the duty twice of providing for a child. Seeing, then, that satisfaction and ademption rest on the same grounds, this court is not bound to apply the rule as to satisfaction which is established by Thynne v. Glengall to ademption, particularly as the previous cases from which a contrary doctrine has been derived are far from conclusive. Of the two cases of Freemantle v. Bankes, and Farnham v. Phillips, it appears that the former was heard as a short case, and the latter could hardly be considered of much authority, as Lord Hardwicke himself expressed doubts as to the correctness of the doctrine there laid down. [Here his Lordship referred to the cases of Watson v. The Earl of Lincoln; Rickman v. Morgan; and Bengough v. Walker.] On the whole I think the point must depend on the intention of the testator, and although the uncertainty of the amount of the residue ought to be taken into consideration, yet it ought not to decide the question. Here the terms of the residuary gift raise a strong presumption in favour of ademption, and the slight difference between the trusts of the residue and the trusts of the settlement are not sufficient to rebut that presumption. Much of the difficulty in this case is removed by the decision in Pym v. Lockyer. Until that case it was thought that ademption, if it took place at all, must be total; but it was then settled that there might be partial ademption. The only remaining question now is, out of which fund ademption shall take place. In general it ought to out of the gift which is absolute, but here also the Friday, Dec. 9. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Re CANT'S ESTATE. 46 Lands Clauses Consolidation Act-Section 80- it was His Held (differing from the V.C.), that the order ought to have contained the usual words of exception, and that they must be inserted, but without prejudice to the course to be taken by the taxing master. Observation of Turner, L.J. on the inconvenience of a deviation from the forms of order adopted by the court unless upon very plain and distinct grounds. This was an appeal by the Eastern Union and Harwich Railway Company from a decision of Stuart, V.C., in which the appellants objected to the form of an order made by his Honour as to payment by the company of the costs of a petition presented and argued before him, for the purpose of obtaining payment out of court of the purchase-money of a piece of land bought by the company, and having the rights of the parties to that purchase-money determined. The facts of the case will be found fully reported in Re Cant's Estate, 1 Giff. 10, and on appeal before the Lords Justices, 33 L. T. Rep. 280, and a very slight allusion to them here will suffice. James Cant, the testator in the matter, by his will gave to his son Charles Cant the right of purchasing, after the death of his, the testator's, widow, who was tenant for life of the whole of his residuary real and personal estate, certain portions of his real estate, at the pre of 4501; and if his said son elected not to become the purchaser at that price, the testator directed that the property should be sold. Before the death of the widow the Eastern Union and Harwich Railway Company, under the compulsory powers conferred by their Act of Parliament, bought the piece of land so vised for 7004, [CHAN. The company and paid the purchase-money into court. The money | tion had been merely one of consent. was invested in 8827. 18s. 2d. Consols, and the dividends | had, moreover, delayed to appeal until the parties were were paid to Mrs. Cant during her life, and upon her before the taxing master; and in the mean time the decease the petition mentioned was presented by the fund had been paid out and distributed amongst the executors, praying payment of the 700l. to them. The persons entitled to it; nor had the company given any V.C. made an order to that effect, but Charles Cant notice of their intention of appealing, which would have having appealed, the Lords Justices reversed his postponed the payment of the fund. Honour's decision. This question having arisen for decision upon the petition for payment of the money out of court, the children of the testator, instead of joining together for that purpose, appeared by separate counsel to argue their respective rights, and in the V.C.'s order on that hearing, the usual words, which leave the consideration of what are and what are not "costs of litigation between adverse claimants" to the consideration of the taxing master, were omitted, his Honour being of opinion that in the present case there had been no such litigation; and the taxing master not having the usual discretion, the railway company was placed in the position of having to sustain the whole of the costs. The costs of the appeal to the Lords Justices upon the merits were of course not in question. The 80th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18) provides that "In all cases of moneys deposited in the bank under the provisions of that Act it shall be lawful for the Court of Chancery in England to order the costs" of certain matters, "including therein all reasonable charges and expenses incident thereto, to be paid by the promoters of the undertaking, that is to say," the costs of the purchase of lands, and of the investment of the purchase-moneys, "and also of obtaining the proper orders for any of the purposes aforesaid and for the payment out of court of the principal of such moneys, or of the securities whenever the same shall have been invested, and of all proceedings relating thereto -except such as are occasioned by litigation between adverse claimants." The usual form of order in these cases (see Seton on Decrees, 662,) is founded upon this section, and in part adopts its words, directing the company to pay "the costs of obtaining this order, and of all the proceedings relating thereto, except such costs (if any) as are occasioned by litigation between adverse claimants." These last words, beginning with the word "except," were, however, omitted from his Honour's order in the present matter, although his attention was called to the point, and the railway company now appealed, seeking to have them inserted. G. M. Giffard, Q.C. and F. C. J. Millar appeared for Charles Cant, and relying upon the same arguments, urged that appeals merely for costs ought not to be encouraged. H. F. Shebbeare, for eight other persons in the same interest, supported the order of the V. C. Locock Webb, in reply, submitted that the question, though involving only a small sum in this instance, was of great importance to railway companies, from the number of similar cases in which they were concerned. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said that the usual form of the order in similar cases, which he also considered as the correct one, directed the company which had taken the land to pay the costs, charges and expenses of such order, with an express exception of "such costs (if any) as are occasioned by litigation between adverse claimants." That usual form ought not to be departed from without sufficient reason. If it had clearly appeared that no costs could possibly have been incurred by the litigation between adverse claimants, it might have been right to leave out the contingent exception which was in ordinary cases inserted. But it did not at the time of making the order, nor did it at the present time, appear with clearness or distinctness that no such costs had been or could be so occasioned. For these reasons it appeared to him that it would be better to retain the usual form of the order. With regard to the time that had elapsed since the order was pronounced, his Lordship thought that the railway company was neither too soon nor too late, and that they were therefore entitled to have the order varied by the insertion of the customary words, which had been omitted in this instance. Lord Justice TURNER said that it was a subject of some regret to him that such an appeal should have been brought before their Lordships, arising, as it did, from a deviation from the usual form of order which had been adopted for cases of this description. It was, however, impossible to say that the question was not one of great importance. Two points had been maintained by the respondents: first, that the appeal Selwyn, Q.C. and Locock Webb appeared for the came too late; and, secondly, that the decision of his appellants, contending that, although all parties in- Honour was correct. Upon the question of time, his terested in the fund must have been served, yet, unless Lordship did not think that a sufficient objection to there had been adverse litigation, they might all have the appeal had been supported. But then came the appeared by one counsel, whereas now they were question upon the merits. The order had been settled represented by no less than five. They referred to and repeatedly acted on by all branches of the court; Melling v. Bird, 22 L. J., N. S., 599, Ch.; S. C. 17 Jur. and although his Lordship would not dispute that the 155; Ex parte Gardiner, Re The Eastern Counties court might, if it saw reason, depart from that form of Railway Company, 3 Rail Cas. 117, and Re Hore's order, and decide, on hearing the merits of any partiEstate, 5 Rail. Cas. 592; S. C. Hore v. Smith, 14 Jur. 55. cular case, that there had been no costs occasioned by Bacon, Q.C. and Shebbeare, for George Long Cant," litigation between adverse claimants," yet he was of one of the sons of the testator, and his mortgagee, opinion that the court ought to do so only in very plain argued that the 80th section of the statute embraced cases, because it was always most important to adhere the costs of independent litigation rendered necessary to the usual forms which the court had sanctioned and by the act of the company, and his Honour's decision adopted. If the word "such" following the word was expressly that there had been no adverse litigation." except" in the 80th section referred to "proceedings" If the company had not bought the land at a price beyond that fixed upon by the testator, this question between the different persons interested in his estate would never have arisen. The antecedent of the word "such" in the section was not "costs," but "proceedings," and the petition to get the money out of court was one not occasioned by the adverse claims; for that petition was of course indispensable, and upon it the question between the adverse claimants was decided, on which occasion no one had appeared but those who would have had a right to appear if the peti and not to "costs," it might then be that the order in this case would be beyond all question; but his Lordship could not agree in that construction, thinking that "such" must refer to "costs, charges and expenses"for how could "proceedings" be said to be "occasioned by litigation ?" There was here a contest between adverse claimants, which came to litigation when the case was not before the court, and it was impossible to say that some costs might not have been occasioned ly that litigation within the meaning of the Act of Parliament. The usual words ought, therefore, to have CHAN.] BILL . THE SIERRA NEVADA LAKE WAter, &c. ComMPANY. been inserted in the order, and they must be now inserted. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said that the court must be understood as having expressed no opinion as to the view which the taxing master ought to take when the matter should again come before him. No order was made as to the costs of the appeal, Wednesday, Dec. 14. Foreign company - Preferential shares-Increase of [CHAN. the amount to which it was proposed to increase or diminish the capital; and a vote of two-thirds of all the shares of stock should be necessary to authorise such increase. The certificate of incorporation, dated the 24th Aug. 1854, expressed the objects of the company, and provided that its capital stock should be 2,000,000 dollars, in 20,000 shares of 100 dollars each; that the company should continue in existence for fifty years, unless sooner dissolved under the provisions of the law; that the number of trustees should be in the first instance three, and that the principal place of business should be at Downieville, Sierra county, in California. The company being thus legally constituted, took an office in Tokenhouse-yard, London, and the affairs of the company have been, and still are, principally managed and carried on in London. The capital was afterwards legally diminished to one million of dollars. By an agreement dated the 17th April 1856, made between the parties then interested in the company, it was agreed that the 10,000 shares of which the capital consisted should be divided into two classes, called A and C, each numbering 5000 shares, and that the owners of class A shares should at all times be entitled to a preferential dividend of 201. per cent. in priority over class C shares, until and after a dividend of 201. should have been declared on the C shares, after which any surplus profits were to be equally divided between the two classes. This arrangement was then carried into effect, and soon afterwards, but before the plaintiff became a shareholder, bye-laws were passed, providing that the shareholders should elect a committee of three or more persons to control and manage the business in London, and the provisions of the agreement above mentioned were formally recognised and adopted. In conformity with these bye-laws prospectuses were Held (reversing his Honour's decision), that consider-issued, and on the 11th June 1857 the plaintiff bought ing the domicil and purposes of the company, an injunction ought not to issue; for there appeared upon the bill to be no equity to restrain the managers abroad from making application to the Legislature there. No question as to the fund out of which the expenses thirty-five shares of the class C, of which he is still the duly registered proprietor. The bill then alleged certain irregular transactions on the part of the management, and, in particular, that they had endeavoured to increase the number of preferential shares, and that, being straitened for money, they resolved to convert some of the C shares into a new class, to be designated B shares, to bear a preferential dividend of 101. per cent., and they procured a resolution to that effect at a meeting in this country on the 17th March 1859; but this being impracticable, they caused to be srostituted for it, at a meeting held on the 1st June 1859, a resolution approving of the conversion of 800 C shares into A shares, with the like preferential dividend of 201. per cent. Upon this the plaintiff filed a former bill for an injunction, which was granted by his Honour (Stuart, V.C.) on the 24th June 1859, and this attempt was carried no further. The scheme having failed, the defendants, at the usual half-yearly meeting of the company on the 28th Oct. 1859, procured a resolution to be passed, which was in the following words :— The plaintiff's bill stated that in the month of July 1854 the company was duly incorporated according to "It appearing that the balance of outlay to Forest the law of the State of California, under the above title, City, including the Rudyard Reservoir, has exceeded its principal object being to convey water by means of the original estimate of Mr. Roniayne by 7000!., to an aqueduct or canal to be formed by the said com- which the five extra miles of canal and branches have pany from a certain lake called Truckey Lake, in the to be added, besides the cost of the Camptonville Exsaid state, to divers places within the said state, tension, amounting to 12,0007., and that the converand in particular to a certain place there sion of the company's C shares has been a failure, and called Forest City. By the Act under which the that no addition has been made to the capital to cover company was incorporated it was provided that the the deficiency: It was then resolved, that the directors company might, whenever it was desired to increase or be authorised to take the necessary steps abroad for diminish the capital, call a meeting of the stockholders increasing the A capital by a sum not exceeding by a notice signed by at least a majority of the trustees, 30,000., so as to perfect the works, satisfy the and published for at least four weeks in some news-shareholders who are wanting shares for their advawes, paper of the county where the principal place of and to discharge the remaining obligations of the sid business was located, which notice was to specify the company." object of the meeting, the time and place, and The plaintiff protested against this resolution, in He The bill was filed by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other shareholders of class C, except such as appeared as defendants thereto, and it prayed a declaration that the resolution of the 28th Oct. 1859 was null and void, and an injunction in the terms or to the effect already set forth. It appeared that the management in this country had already issued instructions to their agents abroad to proceed to obtain an Act of the Legislature of the state of California, authorising an increase of capital. His Honour, on the plaintiff's motion, granted an injunction, and the defendants-the company-now appealed. | [ROLLS. sisting that no preferential stock could be created over the directors are authorised to take the necessary steps and above the original 5000 class A shares. for increasing the A capital to an extent not exceeding charged that the meeting of the 28th Oct. 1859 had 30,000%. Now, the necessary steps to be taken must be not been duly convened so as to authorise an increase steps either taken through the medium of the Legisof capital, but that, notwithstanding, the directors lature of California, or taken through the medium of the intended to act on the resolution aforesaid. trustees in California. It is not suggested that any proceeding by the trustees in California could enable the act to be done which is sought to be prohibited; on the contrary, the plaintiff's argument is this-that, although the act of the State Legislature gives power to increase the capital, it does not give power to increase the capital at the expense of any class of shareholders, as between them and another class of shareholders. The plaintiff, therefore, is insisting here that the trustees have no power to do this act; and the evidence is that the trustees do not intend to do the act. The parties here are not asking the trustees to do that act. The case, therefore, which we have really to consider here is, whether there is any equity upon this Bacon, Q.C. and Rodwell, for the appellants, con- bill to restrain the parties, the trustees or the managers tended that this was altogether a foreign company, and in California, from applying to the Californian Legisthat there was no intention on the part of the manage- lature to enable what has been resolved upon to be ment to do anything at variance with its constitution. carried out; and I certainly can see no case whatever They only intended to apply to the State Legislature, which can warrant an injunction for restraining that and as the original contract was subject to variation by act. It is not the habit of the court at all to restrain that body, that body would most properly decide whether parties from applying to the Legislature in this counthe proceeding intended was legal and beneficial, or other- try; neither, I think, is it the habit of the court, wise. The resolution was plain upon this point, for it upon any similar ground, to interfere to restrain paronly authorised the necessary steps abroad;" but ties from applying to a foreign Legislature upon the the learned V.C. had treated the proposition as if it had subject. It is said that this ought not to be at the itself been one for the immediate increase of the prefer- expense of the company. I agree there may be an ence capital. This court would never prevent, by injunc-equity to restrain the parties from applying at the tion, parties from applying to the Imperial Parliament; still less would their Lordships restrain a foreign company from applying to the legislative authority of a foreign state. In answer to a question by Lord Justice Turner, it was stated that the directors would give an undertaking to do nothing without the sanction of the Californian Legislature, or in disregard of the law of that state. The English interests would be represented abroad by proxy. They referred to Stevens v. The South Devon Railway Company, 13 Beav. 48. Surrage (with whom was Malins, Q.C.) supported the injunction, contending that this was in effect an English company, inasmuch as most of the capital stock was held in this country, and the general control was exercised from London. The present objeet was the same in another shape as that which had been restrained in the former suit, to which the defendants had submitted. The power conferred by the constitu expense of the company, that is to say, out of the funds Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE.-In both courts. ROLLS COURT. Barrister-at-Law. tion of the company was only to increase the capital; Reported by GEORGE WHITELEY, Esq., of the Middle Temple, and there was nothing which could authorise the creation of fresh preferential stock to the detriment of the existing shares. Bacon, Q.C. replied. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE said :-The domicil, the purposes and the objects of the Sierra Nevada Company are such, in my opinion, that the court ought not to act against the defendants for the purpose of injunction, or by way of injunction in such a case as the present one, at least upon an interlocutory motion. I think, therefore, that the injunction and order had better be discharged, and that the costs before the V.C. and here should be costs in the cause. Lord Justice TURNER said:-I thought upon the opening of this motion that it might have involved some question of very considerable importance; but upon consideration I do not think that it does so. It does not appear to me to be necessary, for the purpose of disposing of this case, to enter at all into the question of jurisdiction, or into the question as to the power which the shareholders of this company, in this country, have to direct the trustees to do an act which is not authorised by the powers vested in those trustees. All that is here authorised to be done by the resolution in respect of which this bill is filed is, that Nov. 7 and Dec. 6. CARVER v. RICHARDS. Power-Valid execution-Intention to execute power. S., the donee of an exclusive power of appointment to her children, appointed the whole estate, subject to the power, to her eldest son, upon an understanding that the estate should be resettled. A resettlement of the estate was accordingly made, by which an annuity was made payable to the husband of S., if he should survive her, and a joint power of appointment was reserved to S. and her husband, and a power to S. alone, if she should survive. The husband and wife made two appointments under this power, reserving a power of revocation to them jointly, and to S. if she survived. S. having survived her husband, afterwards made another appointment in pursuance of the power reserved to her by the said several appointments, " or by the several deeds therein recited, and of all and every other power in her vested, or her thereunto enabling," whereby she in part revoked the previous appointments, and so fur made a reappointment, and in other respects confirmed the said appointments: Held, that S. had, by her said last appointment, shown an intention to pass the property subject to the power, by all the means in her power or at her disposal, and that the court would carry that intention into effect, although imperfectly expressed, and although the appointment was not expressly stated to be in execution of the power. The question in this case, which was a suit to enforce specific performance of an agreement for the sale of an estate, was with respect to the validity of the exercise of a power of appointment by the donee. [ROLLS. in default of any such appointment, &c., to the uses therein mentioned. By indenture of appointment, dated the 26th Feb. 1820, reciting the several indentures before stated, the said Daniel Carver and Sarah Carver his wife, pursuant to and in exercise and execution of the power or authority, powers or authorities given, limited or reserved to them or either of them in and by the said indenture of settlement of the 19th July 1813, and by force and virtue and in exercise thereof, and of all and every other power and powers, authority and authorities whatsoever to them or either of them belonging, or in them or either of them vested, or them or either of them in anywise thereto enabling, appointed that the said estate should, from and after the death of the said Sarah Carver, go to and be equally divided among all and every the children of the said Daniel Carver and Sarah Carver, as tenants in common. And the said Daniel Carver and Sarah Carver did thereby further direct and appoint that the annuity of 2007. secured to the said Daniel Carver for life should rents and profits of the hereditaments thereinbefore limited to them, in the proportions therein mentioned. The deed contained a power to the said Daniel Carver and Sarah his wife, during their joint lives, by deed, with or without power of revocation, and to the said Sarah Carver, in case she should survive the said Daniel Carver, at any time, by deed, with or without power of revocation, executed, &c., or by her will; to revoke and make void the appointment thereinbefore By indenture of lease and release dated the 19th and 20th March 1807, the Lynypeod estate was limited to trustees to the use of all and every, or such one or more of the children of the body of Sarah Carver, lawfully begotten or to be begotten, whether by her present or any future husband or husbands, for such estate or estates, interest or interests, and in such parts, shares and proportions, and with such limitations over, and charged and chargeable with such annual or gross sums (such limitations over and charges to be for the benefit or advantage of some or one of the same children), and in such manner and form as the said S. Carver, notwithstand-be borne and paid by the said children out of the ing her then present or any future coverture, and whether covert or sole, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, either with or without power of revocation, to be by her sealed and delivered in the presence of two or more credible witnesses, or by her last will and testament in writing, or any codicil or codicils thereto, or any writing or writings purporting to be or in the nature of her last will and testament or codicil or codicils, to be by her signed, sealed and published in the presence of and attested by three or more credible wit-made in favour of the said children, and to declare nesses, should direct or appoint, give or devise the same, with remainder to the uses therein mentioned. new uses of the said hereditaments in favour of their said children. By deed-poll dated the 16th July 1813, under By a deed-poll dated the 18th July 1826, and the hand and seal of the said Sarah Carver, and duly indorsed on the said indenture of appointment of the attested, after reciting the said indentures of lease and 26th Feb. 1820, Daniel Carver and Sarah Carver made release, and reciting that the said S. Carver had then some unimportant variations in the disposition of the living Richard, her eldest son, and several other chil-estate contained therein, and subject thereto they condren, the said S. Carver, pursuant to and by force firmed the several directions, limitations and appointand virtue and in exercise and execution of the powerments therein contained, and the deed reserved to the and authority to her for that purpose limited by the thereinbefore recited indenture of release, appointed the said lands and hereditaments, from and after the decease of her the said S. Carver, to the use of the said Richard Carver, his heirs and assigns for ever. said Daniel Carver and the said Sarah Carver, and to the said Sarah Carver in case she survived her husband, a power of revocation and new appointment similar to that contained in the appointment of the 26th Feb. 1820. Daniel Carver died in 1827. By indenture of lease and release, dated the 18th and 19th July 1813, and made between the said By a deed-poll dated the 16th May 1829, executed Richard Carver of the one part, and trustees of the by the said Sarah Carver, reciting the deed-poll other part, after reciting that the above-mentioned of the 26th Feb. 1820, and the deed-poll of the appointment was made by the said S. Carver in 18th July 1826 indorsed thereon, and the authority pursuance of an agreement between the said Daniel by the last-mentioned deed-poll reserved to the Carver and Sarah his wife, and the said Richard said Sarah Carver, if she survived her husband, Carver, that the said Llynypeod estate should be forth-to revoke the said appointment thereby made with settled and assured to, for and upon the several and to reappoint the said estate; and reciting the uses, trusts, ends, intents and purposes thereinafter mentioned, it was witnessed that in pursuance and performance of the said agreement the said Richard Carver conveyed the said Llynypeod estate unto the trustees, to hold the same, subject to the life-estate of the said Sarah Carver, "to the use, intent and purpose that the said Daniel Carver should and might during his natural life receive out of the rents and profits of the said estate a yearly rentcharge of 2001. after the death of the said S. Carver," with the usual powers of distress and entry, and subject thereto," to the use and behoof of all and every of such one or more of the children of the said Daniel Carver on the body of the said Sarah Carver, his wife, lawfully begotten or to be begotten, at such times, for such estate or estates," &c., as they the said Daniel Carver and Sarah his wife at any time or times during their joint lives by any deed or deeds, &c., or as the said S. Carver (in | case she should survive the said D. Carver, but not otherwise) at any time or times during her life by any i or deeds, &c., or by her will should appoint, and death of the said Daniel Carver; and reciting that, in pursuance of the powers reserved to her for that purpose, in and by the said several recited deeds of appointment, she was desirous of making such alterations therein respectively as were therematter contained, the said Sarah Carver, "in pursuance, exercise and execution of the power or authority, powers or authorities, given, limited, or reserved to her in and by the said two several deeds of appointment thereinbefore mentioned, or either of them, or in or by the several indentures therein respectively recited, and by force and virtue thereof, and of all and every other power and powers, authority and authorities whatsoever to her belonging, in her vested, or her thereunto in any wise enabling," by this present deed or writing by her signed, sealed, &c., revoked certain parts of the appointments made by the said deeds-poll of Feb. 1820 and July 1826, and made a reappointment thereof. And then the deed contained a declaration by her that she did thereby ratify and confirm the several directions, limitations and appointments in the |